Bibliography
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U.S. Strategy in Iraq: A Third Way Alternative
Testimony
(PDF file - opens in new window)
By Andrew Krepinevich
Prepared remarks for the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation hearing
01/23/2008
army, dod strategy and policy, iraq, military operations
Of IEDs and MRAPs
Slides
(PDF file - opens in new window)
By Andrew Krepinevich and Dakota Wood
Presentation Slides from Congressional Briefing
10/17/2007
afghanistan, army, defense industry, iraq, military operations, personnel and readiness, select weapons systems, systems/force structure, usmc
Of IEDs and MRAPs: Force Protection in Complex Irregular Operations
Report
(PDF file - opens in new window)
By Andrew Krepinevich and Dakota Wood
Political and military leaders are currently grappling with the question of how much to invest in a new system of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected armored vehicles without undermining the ability of the force to conduct the current mission, or its effectiveness across the range of missions and operating environments in the years ahead. This paper’s purpose is to ensure that the issues relevant to arriving at a good decision are given proper consideration.
10/17/2007
afghanistan, army, defense industry, iraq, military operations, personnel and readiness, select weapons systems, systems/force structure, usmc
CSBA Questions DoD's Substantial Investment in MRAP
Press Release
(PDF file - opens in new window)
By Natalya Anfilofyeva
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments today released Of IEDs and MRAPs: Force Protection in Complex Irregular Operations, by Andrew F. Krepinevich, President, and Dakota L. Wood, Senior Fellow. This analysis reviews the current effort by the Defense Department to acquire and field thousands of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) class vehicles, and to do so on a crash program basis, in support of US forces in Iraq.
10/17/2007
army, critical technologies, defense industry, iraq, military operations, personnel and readiness, select weapons systems, systems/force structure, usmc
The Future of U.S. Ground Forces: Challenges and Requirements
Testimony
(PDF file - opens in new window)
By Andrew Krepinevich
Testimony before the Unites States Senate Committee on Armed Services
04/17/2007
afghanistan, alliances, army, congressional action, cost of defense-overview, cost of military operations, critical technologies, iraq, military operations, personnel and readiness, qdr 2005, select weapons systems, service budgets, systems/force structure
New Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Baghdad Surge
Slides
(PDF file - opens in new window)
By Andrew Krepinevich
Presentation slides from Future Defense Planning Needs Seminar for Senior Congressional Staff
02/28/2007
army, competitive/grand strategies, dod strategy and policy, iraq,military operations, personnel and readiness, service-focused analysis
Forging the Sword: Unit Manning in the US Army
Report
(PDF file - opens in new window)
By Pat Towell
Pat Towell analyzes Army plans for unit manning. Will it improve combat effectives and training?
09/01/2004
army, dod strategy and policy, personnel and readiness, service-focused analysis, systems/force structure
Pentagon Takes Major Step Toward Military Transformation
Press Release
By Alise Frye
Cutting the Crusader is the best example yet of DoD's commitment to creating tomorrow's military.
05/08/2002
Crusader, Defense, Pentagon, Army
W(h)ither the Army?
Highlight
By Andrew Krepinevich
Analysis of the Army's modernization plans
01/18/2000
Transformation, US Army, army modernization, Shinseki, Army After Next, Force XXI
The Future of Land Forces
Highlight
By Michael Vickers
An analysis of the future composition of land forces
04/21/1999
Army, future land forces, transformation, RMA
RMA and the Future of Land Forces: Era of Tank Primacy is Over
Press Release
By Stacey Shepard
Press release on CSBA's predictions for the future of land forces
04/20/1999
RMA, Revolution in Military Affairs, land forces, Army, military transformation
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Army
Military operations associated with the Global War on Terrorism, especially the invasion and occupation of Iraq, have greatly increased the number and intensity of the Army’s missions. With the exception of the 2nd Infantry Division (stationed in South Korea), all of the Army’s ten active component combat divisions have been deployed at least once to Afghanistan or Iraq, and many are scheduled to return in the next rotation of forces. The Army has mobilized and deployed an increasing number of Army National Guard combat brigades, and now depends on the National Guard’s combat forces to a degree not seen since the Korean War. That dependence, in conjunction with the Army’s need to mobilize and deploy Army Reserve and Army National Guard support units has required it to sustain a level of reserve component mobilization that the modern reserve component system has never previously experienced.
At the same time, the Army is engaged in several high-profile initiatives to alter the nature and type of its units. The Army has begun an extensive plan, called “modularity”, that is intended to increase the number of combat units available to the Army, while making those combat units more flexible, more self-contained, and faster to deploy. As a part of the Department of Defense’s broader strategy, the Army is also pursuing a number of modernization programs to replace it’s current mix of tanks and armored vehicles with families of light armored vehicles that are intended, in part, to greatly speed up the Army’s ability to rapidly deploy forces to combat theaters.
The Army’s very high level of commitment in prosecuting ongoing military operations and its extensive plans for changes to its units have led numerous external observers, members of Congress, and officials within the Department of Defense to question whether the current size and composition of the Army is appropriate. These concerns have focused on the following questions:
- Does the Army have sufficient forces, of the right kind, to respond to any other contingencies that may arise—that is, does the Army have sufficient ability to fight wars?
- Does the Army have enough forces, of the right kind, to sustain the occupation of Iraq, or to conduct a similar operation requiring stabilization and reconstruction of a sizable country—that is, does the Army have sufficient “peacekeeping” ability?
- Should the Army be structured to rely heavily on mobilization of reserve component personnel for the lengthy time periods associated with stabilization and reconstruction operations?
- Is the Army capable of rapidly responding to and deploying to distant theaters of operations?
These concerns have led to a number of actions in recent years:
- Chief of Staff of the Army General Peter Schoomaker has begun a process of re-organizing the Army’s units into “modular” formations, while increasing the number of active component combat brigades.
- Several Army modernization initiatives, most notably the Stryker armored vehicle, and Future Combat Systems, have been justified for their ability to increase the responsiveness and deployment speed of Army units.
- The Secretary of Defense has ordered all of the military services to find ways to reduce dependence on their reserve components.
- The Department of Defense has committed to a new set of “Joint Swiftness Goals” that set demanding targets for how fast forces must be able to deploy to contingencies.
- The Secretary of Defense has granted the Army temporary authority to add up to 30,000 soldiers to the active component Army.
- The 2005 Defense Authorization Act increased the Army’s active-component end-strength by 20,000 personnel.
This study by the Congressional Budget Office examines various alternatives that illustrate the potential to restructure the Army to respond to the concerns listed above. CBO’s analysis includes quantitative measures of the capability each alternative would provide for warfighting, peacekeeping, reliance on the reserve component, and deployment speed. CBO also estimated the costs associated with each alternative.
CBO’s analysis points to several general conclusions about the possibilities for restructuring the Army:
- In general, alternatives that would significantly improve the capabilities CBO examined would require more personnel and cost more. Within current budgetary and personnel constraints, there is only limited potential for “trading” one kind of capability for another kind, and similarly limited potential to significantly increase the Army’s warfighting and peacekeeping capabilities, or to decrease its reliance on the reserve component.
- The Army’s modularity plan will increase the amount of combat forces available to the Army by up to seven percent, and may require an additional 60,000 personnel to achieve that goal. Modularity is not likely to lead to substantial improvements in deployment timelines.
- The number of support forces that the Army normally uses with major combat units means that even relatively limited increases in combat units would require significant additional personnel. However, there is potential to increase the number of major combat units in the Army without adding many personnel by reducing the levels of support provided to combat units. Doing so, however, would increase risk in warfighting according to current Army doctrine.
- The Army’s current structure is so dependent on reserve component forces for even relatively small operations that eliminating that dependence (to allow the active Army to operate without extensive reserve component mobilization) would require either increasing the size of the active Army by very large amounts, or sacrificing a substantial fraction of the active Army’s combat power. However, by reallocating the types of support units currently resident in the active and reserve components, it would be possible to reduce somewhat the level of reserve component mobilization needed to sustain peacekeeping operations.
- It is unlikely that proposals to create dedicated “peacekeeping” formations in the Army would be able to generate a significant improvement in the number of soldiers the Army could deploy to such operations. Although such formations might have qualitative advantages, CBO found that converting combat forces to peacekeeping forces would not generate a significant increase in the number of soldiers the Army could sustain in extended deployments.
- Proposals to field “medium weight” formations equipped with Stryker or Future Combat Systems-like vehicles could improve deployment timelines, but not substantially.
- Proposals to restructure the Army to employ fewer, smaller, lighter combat units equipped with advanced weaponry would reduce the number of soldiers the Army could deploy to peacekeeping operations. They could also improve deployment timelines, but not substantially.
- Proposals to eliminate some layers (or echelons) of command structure (such as the corps level) are unlikely to reduce the size of the Army or permit faster deployment as long as the general types and numbers of support units included in those command levels are retained.
Investing in additional sealift assets and pre-positioned materiel sets, along with some organizational changes, has the potential to substantially improve deployments timelines, but would require upfront costs to purchase the lift assets and materiel sets
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