CSBA: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Washington, DC)


Strategic Studies Strategy for the Long Haul [Flash slide show] Future Warfare > Alliances Competitive/Grand Strategies Scenarios Transformation Strategy Revolution in Military Affairs Service-Focused Analysis > Army Navy Air Force Marines DOD Strategy and Policy > QDR Rumsfeld Strategy Review US Commission on National Security National Defense Panel Comission on Roles and Missions Bottom-Up Review Radical Islamism China Proliferation Defense Budget Studies Overview [Flash slide show] Strategy for the Long Haul [Flash slide show] Annual Defense Budget Cost of Defense Plans and Forces> Overview Systems and Force Structure Personnel and Readiness Nuclear Forces Tables and Graphs > Budget Topline Budget By Title Weapons Systems Budgets Service Budgets Federal Budget Cost of Military Operations > Iraq Costs Afghanistan Costs Other Operations Costs Defense Budget Process > Defense Budget Process Congressional Budget Resolution Defense Authorization Defense Appropriations National Defense Components Homeland Security Publications Publications List Publications Orders Subscription Service Subscription Service Orders Events and Activities Congressional Programs> Forums Testimonies Briefings and Presentations Strategic Studies Exercises CSBA in the News Press Releases Subscribe to CSBA News About Us Mission Statement President’s Message Staff Directory Board of Directors Employment Opportunities CSBA in the News Contact Us

The Bottom-Up Review (BUR) was initiated in March 1993 by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin. The BUR was intended to be a "comprehensive review of the nation’s defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations." The review was purportedly conducted from "the bottom up" because of the dramatic changes that have occurred in the security environment as a consequence of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the Cold War’s end. These changes required a fundamental review of US defense concepts, plans and programs from the ground up according to Secretary Aspin.

In September 1993, the Clinton Administration released details of its $1.3 trillion defense program in the Defense Department’s Report on the Bottom-Up Review.

Bottom-Up Review

CSBA’s assessment, The Bottom-Up Review: An Assessment, concludes that the BUR neither makes a persuasive case for its recommended defense posture, nor is it likely to be affordable.

Specifically, according to CSBA’s study, the BUR offers a defense program that:

Allocates primary emphasis to maintaining US military capability over the near-term future, at the expense of preserving US military potential over the long-term. Essentially, the BUR maintains the US planning perspective that existed during the Cold War: it focuses on the near-term future, and on the most familiar threats, as opposed to the greatest or most likely threats to the national security, which will probably appear in the next decade, at the earliest.
Advocates dedicating the bulk of the US defense resources to meeting the requirement to wage two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs) - without allied support if need be - to quick and decisive victories. The BUR does not provide a convincing argument for this planning requirement, especially when the opportunity costs are considered.
Emphasizes planning to refight the Gulf War more effectively rather than preparing for the challenges of the next decade. For example, Third World regional powers with aggressive designs are likely to adopt substantially different operational concepts and force structures than those anticipated by the BUR in designing its force requirements for future MRCs.
Fails to set priorities between preparing for major regional conflicts and preparing for unconventional operations, such as peacemaking. Furthermore, the BUR appears to assume that forces trained and reoriented for conventional conflict environments can be readily shifted to unconventional operations with little or no loss of military effectiveness. The US military's recent experience would seem to indicate this assumption is unfounded.
Fails to make a convincing case for its recommended twelve-carrier Navy. The US experience in the Cold War, in the Gulf War, the dramatic changes that have occurred in military capabilities, and even Defense Department-sponsored studies do not sustain the BUR recommendation.
Fails to take into sufficient account the potentially profound influence that an emerging military revolution could have on the determinants of military effectiveness and the parameters for an effective defense investment strategy.
Is unaffordable and becomes progressively less affordable over time, given projected resource constraints. The BUR five-year plan may be short of some $33-50 billion. Over the longer term, the BUR defense posture could well suffer funding shortages of some $20 billion per year.
Is, finally, critically handicapped by the administration's failure thus far to enunciate a clear national security strategy that defines the American military's role in the post-Cold War era.