CSBA: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Washington, DC)


Strategic Studies Strategy for the Long Haul [Flash slide show] Future Warfare > Alliances Competitive/Grand Strategies Scenarios Transformation Strategy Revolution in Military Affairs Service-Focused Analysis > Army Navy Air Force Marines DOD Strategy and Policy > QDR Rumsfeld Strategy Review US Commission on National Security National Defense Panel Comission on Roles and Missions Bottom-Up Review Radical Islamism China Proliferation Defense Budget Studies Overview [Flash slide show] Strategy for the Long Haul [Flash slide show] Annual Defense Budget Cost of Defense Plans and Forces> Overview Systems and Force Structure Personnel and Readiness Nuclear Forces Tables and Graphs > Budget Topline Budget By Title Weapons Systems Budgets Service Budgets Federal Budget Cost of Military Operations > Iraq Costs Afghanistan Costs Other Operations Costs Defense Budget Process > Defense Budget Process Congressional Budget Resolution Defense Authorization Defense Appropriations National Defense Components Homeland Security Publications Publications List Publications Orders Subscription Service Subscription Service Orders Events and Activities Congressional Programs> Forums Testimonies Briefings and Presentations Strategic Studies Exercises CSBA in the News Press Releases Subscribe to CSBA News About Us Mission Statement President’s Message Staff Directory Board of Directors Employment Opportunities CSBA in the News Contact Us

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1994 established the independent Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) to review the appropriateness of the current allocations of roles, missions and functions among the Armed Forces; evaluate and report on alternative allocations; and make recommendations for changes in the current definition and distribution of those roles, missions and functions.

The Commission's membership included John P. White, Chairman, Les Aspin, Antonia H. Chayes, Robert J. Murray, Franklin D. Raines, and Jeffrey H. Smith. Other members drawn from the ranks of senior retired military officers include Admiral Leon A. Edney, Major General John L. Matthews, General Robert W. RisCassi, Lt. General Bernard E. Trainor, and General Larry D. Welch.

On May 24, 1995, the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) of the Armed Forces released its report, Directions for Defense. The report contains the CORM's recommendations on restructuring the Defense Department to reflect the dramatically different security environment that emerged from the Soviet Union's collapse and the Cold War's end.

Commission on Roles and Missions

CSBA’s assessment, Missed Opportunities: An Assessment of the Roles and Missions Commission Report, concludes overall that the Commission does not meet its objective: to provide a blueprint for restructuring the US military for new challenges in an era marked by great uncertainty and rapid change. CSBA finds that the CORM report:

Lacks Vision: Arguing that "revolutionary adjustments" to military doctrine and operations are necessary, the CORM wisely calls upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to develop a vision of the character of future military operations as a means of guiding efforts to "accelerate the process of thinking differently about defense." But the CORM advances no such vision of its own to guide its work and its recommendations. Rather, the CORM seems to have adopted the existing defense posture, based on the Defense Department's Bottom-Up Review (BUR). Yet the BUR emphasizes traditional threats and missions, and calls for a military that is smaller and similar to that which the United States maintained during the Cold War.
Lacks Imagination: One way to help develop an understanding of how the military Services' roles and missions need to change is through examining a range of scenarios. Given its stated belief that the future will likely be very different from the past, it is difficult to understand why the CORM did not present alternative scenarios to challenge the Defense Department's use of a single scenario modeled on the Gulf War to shape US forces, and their roles and missions, for the very different kinds of challenges they will encounter 10-20 years into the future.
Fails to Consider Funding Constraints: The Commission's recommendations seem to assume that the Pentagon is not constrained by resources. In fact, the Defense Department clearly cannot afford to sustain its current defense program with the resources projected to be available for defense. Yet the CORM enjoins DoD to maintain the BUR's two-regional war defense posture, while developing proficiencies in new areas (e.g., information warfare and operations other than war), establishing new organizations (a functional joint training command), and increasing funding in selected areas (e.g., precision-guided munitions, joint and combined training). Moreover, no priorities are suggested.
Offers Contradictory Advice: The CORM encourages DoD to look more to the long-term future and emphasize innovation, but also to increase the CINCs' powers—principally at the Services' expense. Yet the CINCs naturally tend to be focused on near-term threats and day-to-day operations, while the Services tend to excel at long-term innovation
Misuses Core Competencies: The CORM's use of the concept of "core competencies" as a means to help identify the appropriate mix of Service roles and missions is both vague and contradictory. First, the CORM undermines its own argument concerning the importance of viewing capabilities from a joint perspective by discussing core competencies principally from a Service perspective. Second, the Service core competencies presented have a somewhat arbitrary, even random quality about them.
Fails to Address Forward Presence and Deep Strike (Attack): Despite spirited debate among the Services over these two missions, the Commission refused to offer any clear recommendations. In one instance, the CORM offered potentially contradictory recommendations on the deep strike mission when it: recommended "accelerating funding for the precision-guided munitions [PGMs] most needed by the CINCs;" yet observes that "DoD" may have greater quantities of strike aircraft and other deep attack weapons than it needs." Moreover, the CORM reviewed over 20 studies on the long-range bomber force (whose requirements are influenced by the number and capabilities of other kinds of attack aircraft and PGMs). Yet the CORM feels yet another study is needed to determine the proper mix of deep-attack assets.
Fails to Set Priorities: The CORM may be correct in its conclusion that these are false issues, and that the capabilities inherent in existing arrangements are complementary in nature, rather than examples of redundancy. But this misses the point: the existing force and defense program cannot be sustained with the resources projected for defense. Tough choices will have to be made: selected divestment is inevitable. Again, no priorities are suggested.
Ignores the Role of America's Allies: In each of the five major wars the US armed forces have waged in this century, they have fought alongside major allied contingents. Allies have long been a major source of competitive advantage for the US military, allowing it to scale back in certain mission areas while emphasizing others. The CORM makes no mention of how the United States' global network of military alliances could affect the restructuring of the US armed forces.
Creates a Smaller and More Efficient—But not Smaller and Different: Some of the Commission's proposals for strategic outsourcing, infrastructure reductions, acquisition reform, moving to a tiered readiness system, and consolidating selected functions make sense and, if fully enacted, could result in significant savings. The CORM's estimate is $3 billion per year. But the result will be, at best, a smaller and more efficient military, when what is required is a smaller and very different military.

On August 24, 1995, the Defense Department released its critique of the CORM's recommendations for restructuring the US military for the 21st century. A number of the Commission’s recommendations were accepted by DoD. They include:

Developing a vision of future joint operations (the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had such a review under way prior to the CORM recommendation).
Undertaking efforts to better support the CINCs by creating an integrated command, control, communications, computer and information (C4I) architecture, and increasing regional commanders' control over theater communications resources.
Designating primary responsibility for acquisition of multi-user satellites to the Air Force.
Designating the Air Force as the executive agent for combat search and rescue.
Designating the Air Force as the executive agent for theater air defense battle management C4I.
Assigning the Army and Navy responsibility for Marine Corps medium-altitude air defense.
Supporting a Bottom-Up Review (BUR)-like quadrennial strategy review.

In the aggregate, however, it would appear that the CORM’s impact on the Defense Department will be to make a smaller military a bit more efficient, but not the different military that was envisioned when the Commission was established by Congress.