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Bibliography1 wallclock secs ( 0.18 usr + 0.02 sys = 0.20 CPU) 6 hits Dissuasion Strategy Press Release (PDF file - opens in new window) By Andrew Krepinevich and Robert Martinage
05/06/2008 Dissuasion Strategy Report (PDF file - opens in new window) By Andrew Krepinevich and Robert Martinage The report dissects the concept of dissuasion; highlights its differences with deterrence; offers insight on how it can be operationalized; and solutions for overcoming possible impediments. 05/06/2008 Defense Roles, Missions, and Requirements Testimony (PDF file - opens in new window) By Andrew Krepinevich Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee 06/20/2007 The Global War on Terror: Costs, Cost Growth and Estimating Funding Requirements Testimony (PDF file - opens in new window) By Steven Kosiak Testimony Before the Senate Budget Committee 02/06/2007 U.S.-China Relationship:Economics and Security in Perspective Testimony (PDF file - opens in new window) By Thomas Ehrhard Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 02/02/2007 The Quadrennial Defense Review: Rethinking the US Military Posture Report (PDF file - opens in new window) By Andrew Krepinevich An anlysis of the $441.8 billion request for national defense authority for fiscal year 2006, not including funds for Iraq and Afghanistan. 10/24/2005 |
ChinaChina's immediate rise to great regional power status and, over time, to global power status is the third principal and enduring challenge to U.S. security. To date, many discussions of China’s disposition paint it in stark terms: as either a threat that must be addressed along the lines of the Soviet Union, or as a state that simply wants to be acknowledged as a great power and fully incorporated into the global economy and international community. The truth probably lies somewhere in between these gloomy and rosy poles. China does not represent the type of threat posed by the Soviet Union. Unlike Soviet Russia, China is not wedded to an aggressive, expansionist ideology. Whereas the United States had no significant commercial relationship with the Soviet Union, it has enormous economic ties with China. Moreover, both the United States and China may have important common security interests in the area of limiting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and combating radical Islamists. However, China could emerge as a major threat to U.S. security in the manner of Germany against Britain a century ago. Like Germany in the late 19th and early 20th century, China is a rapidly rising power. The regime in Beijing is confronted by challenges to its political legitimacy; growing ecological problems; an economy that has enjoyed remarkable growth, but which may be entering a more mature period characterized by slower growth; serious demographic problems that could induce societal instability; a rapidly growing dependence on foreign energy supplies; and outstanding security issues over Taiwan, the Spratley Islands, Tibet, and perhaps portions of the Russian Far East. These strains could lead to friction between Washington and Beijing. There is some evidence that China seeks to displace the United States as the principal military power in East Asia, and to establish itself as the region’s hegemonic power. If this were to occur naturally, stemming from the evolution of Chinese economic power and a corresponding increase in influence, the United States would probably accept such an outcome. However, if Chinese preeminence were achieved through coercion or aggression, this would serve neither U.S. interests in the region, nor the stability of the international system and the rule of law. The ways in which China may challenge the U.S. forces will likely be quite different from those posed by other U.S. adversaries within the post-Cold War context. The scale of military effort that China can generate far exceeds that of any rogue state. China’s anti-access and area-denial capabilities are far more mature than any existing or likely potential U.S. rival. China’s enormous territory provides it with great strategic depth, a problem U.S. defense planners have not had to address since the Cold War. Since, for a variety of reasons, China is unlikely to challenge the U.S. military symmetrically, the U.S. defense planner’s challenge is to adapt the forces to confront more novel forms of Chinese military power. The United States should encourage China to cooperate in areas where the two states have common security interests, and convince Beijing that the resolution of outstanding geopolitical issues should be address within accepted international legal norms. This means creating and maintaining a military balance in East Asia that is favorable to the United States and its allies against those kinds of contingencies that might tempt Chinese toward acts of at coercion or aggression. |