CSBA: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Washington, DC)


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Bibliography

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Estimating Funding for Afghanistan
Update
(PDF file - opens in new window)
By Todd Harrison

12/01/2009
adb (year), afghanistan, annual defense budget, army, cost of military operations, military operations, service budgets, tables and graphs, usmc

The deployment of additional troops to Afghanistan over the coming months will require additional funding in Fiscal Year 2010 (FY10). It is difficult to precisely estimate the cost that will be incurred by the deployment due to a variety of factors including the composition of the forces deployed and the specific mission they are given. The adversary also has a say in determining the operational tempo of our forces, and thus the costs incurred in terms of such items as fuel, ammunition, and equipment. Still, historical trends in the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan can provide a useful guide for making such an estimate.

The Future of the MV-22 Osprey
Testimony
(PDF file - opens in new window)
By Dakota Wood

06/23/2009
select weapons systems, service-focused analysis, systems/force structure, usmc

Prepared remarks for the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform hearing

Charting A Course
Slides
(PDF file - opens in new window)
By Robert Work

02/17/2009
competitive/grand strategies, navy, qdr 2009, service budgets, service-focused analysis, SLH, systems/force structure, usmc

presentation slides from congressional briefing

The US Navy: Charting a Course for Tomorrow's Fleet
Report
(PDF file - opens in new window)
By Robert Work

02/17/2009
competitive/grand strategies, navy, qdr 2009, service budgets, service-focused analysis, SLH, systems/force structure, usmc

In this report, Work assesses the adequacy and affordability of current US Navy plans in light of trends in naval warfare, expected future budget environments and the likely operational demands associated with the enduring long-term strategic challenges. The report recommends changes to the current Navy plans in order to envision a future fleet that is more capable and affordable.

The US Marine Corps: Fleet Marine Forces for the 21st Century
Report
(PDF file - opens in new window)
By Dakota Wood

11/17/2008
usmc, dod strategy and policy, military operations, personnel and readiness, service-focused analysis, SLH

The report makes recommendations for Marine Corps strategic,operational and organizational concept development that will help position the Marines to maximize their utility and value as soldiers of the sea, able to successfully support US national security objectives in an increasingly complex and dangerous world.

Fleet Marine Forces for the 21st Century
Slides
(PDF file - opens in new window)
By Dakota Wood

11/18/2008
SLH, usmc, dod strategy and policy, military operations, personnel and readiness, service-focused analysis

Presentation slides from Reorienting US Military Services Conference

Of IEDs and MRAPs
Slides
(PDF file - opens in new window)
By Andrew Krepinevich and Dakota Wood

10/17/2007
afghanistan, army, defense industry, iraq, military operations, personnel and readiness, select weapons systems, systems/force structure, usmc

Presentation Slides from Congressional Briefing

Of IEDs and MRAPs: Force Protection in Complex Irregular Operations
Report
(PDF file - opens in new window)
By Andrew Krepinevich and Dakota Wood

10/17/2007
afghanistan, army, defense industry, iraq, military operations, personnel and readiness, select weapons systems, systems/force structure, usmc

Political and military leaders are currently grappling with the question of how much to invest in a new system of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected armored vehicles without undermining the ability of the force to conduct the current mission, or its effectiveness across the range of missions and operating environments in the years ahead. This paper’s purpose is to ensure that the issues relevant to arriving at a good decision are given proper consideration.

CSBA Questions DoD's Substantial Investment in MRAP
Press Release
(PDF file - opens in new window)
By Natalya Anfilofyeva

10/17/2007
army, critical technologies, defense industry, iraq, military operations, personnel and readiness, select weapons systems, systems/force structure, usmc

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments today released Of IEDs and MRAPs: Force Protection in Complex Irregular Operations, by Andrew F. Krepinevich, President, and Dakota L. Wood, Senior Fellow. This analysis reviews the current effort by the Defense Department to acquire and field thousands of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) class vehicles, and to do so on a crash program basis, in support of US forces in Iraq.

Marine Corps

During the 1920s and 1930s, even as it was engaged in a series of “small wars,” the
Marine Corps dedicated itself to solving the “Gallipoli problem”: how to conduct amphibious assaults against a heavily defended shore. To do so, the Corps had to develop new concepts of operation, tactics and techniques, equipment, and organizations that enabled it to apply combat power against the enemy more effectively. The most daunting tactical challenge for the Corps was gaining a foothold on an enemy shore and steadily building combat power while under constant attack. The Navy and Marines thus developed an operational concept that included extensive shore bombardment from Navy ships and naval aircraft, amphibious landing craft by which the Marines could get to the beach, and various techniques for methodically breaking through and reducing enemy defensive positions. The fruits of the Corps’ labor were seen in the many amphibious successes of the United States military in World War II, in both the Pacific and European theaters.

Since the end of the Second World War, the Corps has always had to balance its
“organize, train, and equip” efforts to account for its new hybrid nature. It became
a ground Service that deploys to sea then projects combat power back onto land.

Usually operating far from fixed physical infrastructure, but needing to employ the
full range of military capabilities available, it has developed its own air force able to
operate from ships and from austere sites ashore, ground equipment able to transit
from sea to shore and emerge ready to engage in conventional combat operations, and combat formations specifically organized for maximum effectiveness in combined arms warfare. At the same time, the Corps also retained its ability to fight “small wars” against insurgencies and non-state actors, and to mount stability and security operations of various types, requiring a focus on small unit tactics and equipment for the individual Marine. While the Corps has enjoyed success with this approach to equipping and employing its forces in a broad range of missions, it is not a foregone conclusion that it will prove effective in light of emerging challenges confronting the United States.