The Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996 established the National Defense Panel (NDP) as an independent body to review the findings of the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and to provide an independent appraisal of US force structure. Panel members were appointed by the Secretary of Defense: Philip Odeen, Richard Armitage, Richard Hearney, Admiral David Jeremiah, Robert Kimmitt, Andrew Krepinevich, James McCarthy, and Janne Nolan. The panel issued its final report, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, on December 1, 1997. The report assesses the long-term security challenges likely to confront the United States and how the Department of Defense (DoD) should change its plans to better prepare for those challenges.

Bibliography

0 wallclock secs ( 0.10 usr + 0.01 sys = 0.11 CPU) 2 hits

National Defense Panel Report: First Shot in the Debate Over Transforming the US Military
Backgrounder By Andrew Krepinevich

By offering a real strategic alternative to the QDR, the panel has provided the basis for a reinvigorated debate about U.S. defense policy.

12/01/1997
National Defense Panel, Transformation, US military

CSBA Analysis Of National Defense Panel Report: A Major Step In The Right Direction
Press Release By Stacey Shepard

Citing support for a transformation strategy and a program of funding for innovation and experimentation, CSBA analysis concludes that, " the NDP offers a real strategic alternative to the QDR."

12/01/1997
Strategy, National Defense Panel, NDP

National Defense Panel

CSBA’s assessment, National Defense Panel Report: First Shot in Debate Over Transforming the US Military, concludes that the NDP’s findings differ sharply from many of those contained in DoD’s previously-released Quadrennial Defense Review. In particular, CSBA finds that the NDP stresses the need for DoD to adopt a transformation strategy which will ensure that US forces are prepared to meet the very different kinds of threats likely to be faced by 2010-2020. The NDP does not, however, provide details concerning much of its proposed transformation strategy. And, like the QDR, the NDP report does not thoroughly address the unaffordability of DoD’s long-term plans.

Among the findings cited in CSBA’s report, the NDP:

• Identifies new operational challenges likely to confront US forces, such as the absence of access to forward bases, information attacks, war in space, deep inland operations, urban eviction, and new forms of homeland attack.
• Identifies the current two-theater war construct as an "inhibitor" to developing the capabilities the US military will need in the 2010-2020 timeframe.
• Recommends a $5-10 billion budget wedge to fund innovative programs that could be central to successfully transforming the US military.
• Proposes that this budget wedge be funded, if required, with cuts in legacy systems such as the three planned tactical fighter programs and/or force structure.
• Suggests a "force design template" which emphasizes the following characteristics for future systems: stealth, speed, mobility, small logistics footprint, increased operational and strike ranges, precision strike, information systems protection and information operations, systems architectures, and automation.
• Advocates the construction of prototype emerging systems, such as arsenal ships and Trident SSBNs converted to conventional precision-guided munitions delivery.
  

The NDP calls for DoD to shift funds from the acquisition of "legacy systems to new systems focused on meeting the challenges of 2010-2020." In particular, the NDP identifies a handful of systems currently in DoD’s plans which might be appropriate to cancel or scale back:

• M1A1 Upgrades: 1,000 M1A1 tanks are to be upgraded to the more capable A2 configuration at cost of about $7.3 billion.
• Crusader: 824 Crusader artillery systems and 824 resupply vehicles are to be procured for about $12 billion, with production to begin in fiscal year (FY) 2003.
• Comanche: 1,300 of these scout/attack helicopters are planned for a total cost of roughly $35 billion. Procurement is scheduled begin in FY 2004.
• CVN-77: the NDP recommends that DoD consider canceling this last Nimitz-class carrier ($5.4 billion) and instead accelerate procurement of a new class of carriers optimized for short take-off, vertical landing aircraft and UAVs.
• Tactical Aircraft Programs: 548-785 F/A-18E/Fs, 339 F-22s and 2,852 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) are to be procured over the next several decades at a cost of some $300 billion.
  

The NDP also calls for more ambitious infrastructure reforms than the QDR or DoD’s 1997 Defense Reform Initiative (DRI). In particular, while the DRI called for competing 150,000 jobs, the NDP urges DoD to compete all 600,000 of its commercial-like positions. The NDP estimates that doing so could yield long-term annual savings of $10 billion. The NDP also suggests that it might be possible to accelerate the new base closure rounds the DRI proposed for 2001 and 2005.

While a positive first step, the report leaves some important questions unanswered and issues unaddressed.

The NDP’s analysis of the future security environment lacks a clear linkage with the future military capabilities the panel recommends. There is little discussion of the problems of scale that might occur if a future adversary were a peer competitor (e.g., an emerging China), instead of a regional power. There is similarly little discussion of the potential impact the emergence of anti-navy capabilities could have for global and regional trade flows. There is likewise little discussion of alternative concepts for forward presence, given the risks to overseas bases that the NDP postulates.

The NDP has provided the broad outlines of a transformation strategy, but what remains to be done is an analysis of the specific kinds and magnitude of tradeoffs that will be required among R&D, incremental modernization programs, force structure and readiness to balance strategic risk over the near- to long-term while transitioning to a new force posture. Illustrative transformation paths, e.g., how the transformation might unfold, will need to be described, as will each phase of the transformation.
In terms of affordability, the NDP suggests that much of plans/funding gap can be eliminated through infrastructure reforms. If history is any guide, however, significant savings may well fail to materialize.

From a budgetary perspective, the NDP’s most important recommendation may be that, if infrastructure reductions, cuts in legacy systems, and other savings prove insufficient to pay for the proposed $5-10 billion transformation budget wedge, DoD should consider cuts in force structure and, if necessary, abandon or modify the two-MTW requirement that is central to both the Bottom-Up Review and the QDR.

CSBA estimates that further force structure cuts of 10-15 percent might be needed to make DoD’s current plans affordable within projected budgets.