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Bibliography0 wallclock secs ( 0.11 usr + 0.00 sys = 0.11 CPU) 29 hits A Cooperative Strategy for the 21st Century Seapower Backgrounder (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work and Jan van Tol The backgrounder offers a general assessment of A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, highlighting its nature,origins, strengths and weaknesses. 03/26/2008 The Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration Program: A New Dawn for Naval Aviation? Slides (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work and Thomas Ehrhard Presentation Slides from Congressional Briefing co-sponsored by Senator Dorgan 07/11/2007 A New Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era Report (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work, Andrew Krepinevich Whenever the nation contemplates making a major shift in its global defense posture, planned changes should be seriously and broadly debated, because these changes will shape and constrain US strategic options for some time. While the broad outlines for the ongoing shift in the US defense posture appear to be headed in the right direction, the changes have generally been made without much public or even internal governmental debate. Several important questions remain to be fully answered, and further changes will likely be required to address several existing or looming 21st century strategic challenges. 04/20/2007 A New Transformation Plan for the Navy's Surface Battle Line Report (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work This report is an expansion of a Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Backgrounder entitled Know When to Hold ’Em: Modernizing the Navy’s Surface Battle Line, dated September 20, 2006. It provides a broader, historical-based analysis of the Navy’s current plans to modernize and recapitalize its fleet of guided-missile cruisers, guided-missile destroyers, and general-purpose destroyers, and proposes a different transformation approach than the one now being pursued. 04/19/2007 Know When to Hold'Em, Know When to Fold'Em Backgrounder (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work This Backgrounder is the Executive Summary from the upcoming CSBA report: Robert. O. Work, Know When to Hold ‘Em, Know When to Fold ‘Em: Thinking about Navy Plans for the Future Surface Battle Line (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, forthcoming). 03/07/2007 Seabasing: All Ahead Slow Slides (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work Slides from the Marcus Evans Third Annual Seabasing Conference 02/06/2007 Seabasing: All Ahead, Slow Testimony (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work Presentation Slides from Congressional Briefing on Seabasing 11/14/2006 Modernizing the Navys Surface Battle Line Backgrounder (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work The 84 guided missile cruiser and destroyers soon to be in commissioned service in the Navy's surface battle line, all equipped with the superb AEGIS anti-air warfare combat system and the flexible vertical launch (missile) system (VSL), will represent pe 09/20/2006 The 313-Ship Fleet and the Navy's 30-year Shipbuilding Plan Testimony (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work Will it float? Robert Work testifies before the HASC on the advisability and feasibility of the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan. 03/30/2006 Recapitalizing and Modernizing the Navy's Surface Battle-Line Testimony (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work, Ron O'Rourke, Eric Labs, & Capt. James McCarthy Robert Work, Ron O'Rourke, Eric Labs, & Capt. James McCarthy discuss the Surface Warfare Fleet in the 2006 QDR. 03/30/2006 Thinking About Seabasing: All Ahead, Slow Report (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work The report grew out of a broader CSBA study to define an alternative US fleet naval platform architecture, completed in 2005, and was prompted by a request from the Office of Force Transformation of the Secretary of Defense for a more detailed look at the the development of US seabasing concepts and programs since the end of the Cold War. 03/01/2006 To Take and Keep The Lead:"A Naval Fleet Platform Architecture for Enduring Maritime Supremacy Report (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work This monograph attempts to define the future maritime competitive environment and to design a naval fleet platform architecture attuned to its emerging requirements. 12/01/2005 Winning the Race: A Naval Fleet Platform Architecture for Enduring Maritime Supremacy Backgrounder (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work Slides from Robert Work's presentation on alternative fleet architecture study. 03/01/2005 Small Combat Ships and the Future of the Navy Article-non CSBA pub (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work The Navy is wisely preparing to introduce a new, small ship design, but it should evaluate prototypes comprehensively before moving into production. 10/18/2004 Transforming the Battle Fleet: Steering a Course Through Uncharted Waters Slides (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work Slides from Robert Work's presentation on capabilities-based fleet transformation strategic planning. 10/18/2004 Analysis of the FY 2005 Defense Budget Request Report (PDF file - opens in new window) By Steven Kosiak The $423.1 billion funding request for FY 2005 is about 5 percent higher in real terms than the FY 2004 enacted budget, without including supplemental spending for the War on Terror. Whether the requested increase in defense spending is necessary to meet US security requirements adequately is unclear. Fully implementing the administration’s defense plan would likely require spending substantially more on defense than proposed by the administration. 04/11/2004 Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship Slides (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work Three slide presentations featuring the report Naval Transformation and Littoral Combat Ship. 02/25/2004 CSBA Releases Report on Controversial Littoral Combat Ship Press Release By Alise Frye Press release announcing the availability of Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship. 02/18/20004 Naval Transformation and the Littoral Combat Ship Report (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work A report examining the Littoral Combat Ship, its requirements, necessity, design and recommendations for testing and acquistion. 02/18/2004 The Challenge of Maritime Transformation Report (PDF file - opens in new window) By Robert Work The following review of the fleet's expanding capabilities suggests that leades should worry less about chasing higher fleet numbers and more about how they might spark a real transformation in maritime power-projection operations. 03/21/2002 Emerging Capabilities May Permit Fundamental Change in US Strategic Force Posture Press Release By Stacey Shepard In releasing their latest report today on The Transformation of Strategic-Strike Operations, Andrew Krepinevich and Robert Martinage present a thought-provoiking framework for considering how America's strategic forces might be reshaped to meet tomorrow's 03/21/2001 The Transformation of Strategic-Strike Operations Report (PDF file - opens in new window) By Andrew Krepinevich and Robert Martinage A strong case can be made that the United States should take steps to create a new strategic-strike triad, relying on its precision- and electronic-strike capabilities to form two of the three legs, with a smaller residual nuclear force comprising the third leg. 03/00/2001 Transforming to Victory: The U.S. Navy, Carrier Aviation, and Preparing for War in the Pacific Article-non CSBA pub By Andrew Krepinevich A discussion of how the United States was able to transform its navy to help win the war and become what it is today 2000 Options for US Fighter Modernization Report By Steven Kosiak The main purpose of this report is to describe a range of alternative approaches to fighter modernization that might be pursued if the current plan is deemed either unnecessary or simply unaffordable. 09/00/1999 The Future Of Tactical Aviation - A Strategic Perspective Testimony By Andrew Krepinevich Testimony of Andrew Krepinevich before the Senate Armed Services AirLand Subcommittee 03/10/1999 Trident Stealth Battleship: Opportunity for Innovation Backgrounder By Andrew Krepinevich The Navy should seize this opportunity and convert the Tridents into “stealth battleships” carrying large numbers of extended-range precision weapons in lieu of nuclear missiles. 02/24/1999 Navy Strike Operations In The 21st Century Highlight By Andrew Krepinevich A description of potential future strike operations that the Navy should be prepared to pursue 11/00/1997 US Tactical Aircraft Plans: Preparing For The Wrong Future? Backgrounder By Steven Kosiak The Services tactical aircraft modernization plans are almost certainly unaffordable given the amount of funding likely to be available for these efforts. 10/03/1996 A New Navy For A New Era Report By Andrew Krepinevich Analysis of the way the Navy needs to transform to counter future threats 05/00/1996 |
NavyNaval warfare—that is, fleet-on-fleet combat—is essentially about sinking another navy’s ships. In competitions among naval powers, then, those that have bigger navies have an inherent advantage. Therefore, in the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries, a period marked by intense naval competitions, the relative ranking of navies was often derived by comparing their overall fleet numbers, and particularly their numbers of “capital ships.” Accordingly, after 1890, when the United States decided to compete against the world’s top naval powers, the Navy became obsessed with metrics such as its overall number of ships and aggregate fleet tonnage. In 1945, as World War II came to a close, the Navy’s battle fleet numbered no less than 6,768 ships of all types, surpassing the British Royal Navy as the largest and most powerful naval force in the world in terms of tonnage, number of ships, and manpower. It was, without doubt, “incomparably the greatest Navy in the world.” If numbers tell the whole story, the US fleet has been steadily diminishing in capability ever since. In the war’s immediate aftermath, with no enemy fleet to fight, no forward bases to seize, and an emerging nuclear competition with the Soviet Union diverting most defense resources to the newly established US Air Force, the Navy’s battle fleet was gutted. By 1950, the fleet had shrunk to just 634 ships, a staggering 90 percent reduction from its World War II high. The Korean War temporarily reversed the battle fleet’s decline, although its numbers never again approached those of the World War II fleet. In the 25 years between 1954 and 1969—a period in which the Navy adjusted to account for the triple threat of high-speed jet aircraft, fast attack submarines, and long-range missiles—the fleet averaged between 800 and 900 ships. After the Vietnam War, as defense expenditures were once again cut, and as many modernized World War II-era ships reached the end of their service lives, the battle fleet began to shrink once more, reaching a post-World War II low of 521 ships in 1981. At this point, however, US political leaders began to take note of the alarm being raised over the possible loss of US naval supremacy to a new naval challenger—the Soviet Navy. Heartened by strong support from the Administration and Congress, the Navy published a new Maritime Strategy that Alfred Thayer Mahan would have instantly recognized and appreciated. Its associated “600-ship Navy”—with force level goals of 100 nuclear attack submarines, 15 aircraft carrier battle groups, four battleship surface action groups, and an amphibious fleet capable of lifting the assault echelons of a Marine Amphibious Force and a Marine Amphibious Brigade—was specifically designed to regain and maintain US naval superiority over the Soviet Navy. With the abrupt implosion of the Soviet Union and its powerful navy, the US Navy once again faced the specter of a major fleet demobilization. By 1995, its battle fleet had dropped below 400 ships for the first time since before World War II. Two years later—with the fleet at 365 ships and still falling—Navy leaders used the first Congressionally-mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR/1997) to establish a floor for the post-Cold War fleet drawdown. They concluded that 300 ships was a level below which the fleet could not be allowed to fall, and they grudgingly accepted an ultimate battle fleet target of some 302 ships. In truth, however, naval advocates both inside and outside the Navy found it difficult to accept a fleet than numbered “only” 300 ships, and they took every opportunity to publicly call for a larger fleet. Indeed, after the second QDR (QDR/2001) endorsed a 307-ship Navy, then-Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Vern Clark announced a new naval Global Concept of Operations with an associated battle fleet numbering 375 vessels. This larger fleet was roundly cheered by the Navy’s rank and file, naval proponents, and the US shipbuilding industry. However, with rising personnel expenses, escalating ship costs, and the unexpected costs associated with a newly declared Global War on Terror and its first two campaigns, Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the Navy found it difficult to maintain a fleet of even 300 ships. In order to free up money to help recapitalize the fleet, Admiral Clark had to reluctantly order the decommissioning of all remaining Spruance-class destroyers and the first five Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruisers long before the end of their 35-year expected service lives. Consequently, in 2003, the fleet fell right through the 300-ship floor set by the Navy six years earlier. As 2004 came to a close, the official fleet count, known as the Total Ship Battle Force (TSBF), stood at 288 ships, and DoN officials expected the fleet to fall to about 280 ships before beginning to rebound. For those who equated fleet combat capability with fleet numbers, the “incredible shrinking Navy” was becoming progressively weaker. Indeed, more than a few warned that the “300-ship Navy” was on the verge of losing its six decade-old lead as the world’s number one naval power, threatening America’s standing as a global superpower. |