CSBA: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Washington, DC)


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Report Raises Questions About Costs and Effectiveness of Space-Based Weapons
Press Release (PDF file - opens in new window)
By Steven Kosiak

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has released a new report “Arming the Heavens: A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and Cost-Effectiveness of Space-Based Weapons” authored by Steven Kosiak, CSBA’s Vice President for Budget Studies.

11/01/2007
critical technologies, defense budget by title, nuclear forces, proliferation, select weapons systems, systems/force structure

Arming the Heavens
Report (PDF file - opens in new window)
By Steven Kosiak

A Preliminary Assessment of the Potential Cost and Cost-Effectiveness of Space-Based Weapons

10/31/2007
critical technologies, defense budget by title, nuclear forces, proliferation, select weapons systems, systems/force structure

Defense Roles, Missions, and Requirements
Testimony (PDF file - opens in new window)
By Andrew Krepinevich

Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee

06/20/2007
china, congressional action, critical technologies, dod strategy and policy, nuclear forces, proliferation, radical islamism, scenarios, systems/force structure

CSBA Releases New Report: Thinking About Seabasing: All Ahead, Slow
Press Release (PDF file - opens in new window)
By Natalya Anfilofyeva

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments has released Thinking About Seabasing: All Ahead, Slow by Senior Analyst Robert Work

10/19/2006
critical technologies, nuclear forces, personnel and readiness, proliferation"

CSBA Releases New Report: Spending on US Nuclear Forces
Press Release (PDF file - opens in new window)
By Natalya Anfilofyeva

The report analyzes options the United States might pursue over the next several decades to modernize its nuclear offensive strategic forces.

09/14/2006
critical technologies, nuclear forces, personnel and readiness, proliferation"

Spending on US Strategic Nuclear Forces
Report (PDF file - opens in new window)
By Steven Kosiak

The report analyzes options the United States might pursue over the next several decades to modernize its nuclear offensive strategic forces

09/01/2006
critical technologies, defense budget by title, nuclear forces, proliferation, select weapons systems, systems/force structure

The QDR and Long Range Surveillance and Strike
Backgrounder (PDF file - opens in new window)
By Michael Vickers

Slides from the congressional briefing on the QDR and long range surveillance and strike.

11/10/2005
air force, competitive/grand strategies, congressional action, critical technologies, dod strategy and policy, nuclear forces, qdr, qdr 2005, select weapons systems, systems/force structure

FY 2005 Funding of Military Operations
Backgrounder (PDF file - opens in new window)
By Steven Kosiak

Analysis of the administration's FY 2005 supplemental budget request to fund ongoing military operations and other projects.

04/11/2005
critical technologies, dod strategy and policy, nuclear forces, select weapons systems, systems/force structure

Long-Range Strike: Imperatives, Urgency and Options
Report (PDF file - opens in new window)
By Barry Watts

Long-range precision strike (LRPS) is a core strategic capability of the United States in the post-Cold War era, and the US Air Force. Is the Defense Department doing enough to sustain sufficient US capability and dominance in long-range strike? What should be done in the short, medium and long term to capitalize on long-range strike?

04/06/2005
air force, competitive/grand strategies, critical technologies, dod strategy and policy, nuclear forces, select weapons systems, service-focused analysis, systems/force structure, transformation strategy

Cruise Missile Defense of North America
Backgrounder (PDF file - opens in new window)
By Major General William Hodgkins

Slides from Major General William Hodgkins presentation at CSBA's Cruise Missile Challenge congressional seminar.

03/10/2005
critical technologies, dod strategy and policy, nuclear forces, select weapons systems, systems/force structure

The Cruise Missile Challenge
Report (PDF file - opens in new window)
By Thomas Mahnken

An analysis of trends in personnel costs and the implications for the DOD plans and programs.

03/10/2005
air force, critical technologies, dod strategy and policy, nuclear forces, proliferation, qdr 2001, select weapons systems, systems/force structure

The Cruise Missile Challenge Overview
Backgrounder (PDF file - opens in new window)
By Thomas Mahnken

A review of the cruise missile challenge, an increasing threat to US security.

11/09/2004
critical technologies, dod strategy and policy, nuclear forces, proliferation, select weapons systems, systems/force structure

Moving Forward On Long-Range Strike
Backgrounder (PDF file - opens in new window)
By Barry Watts

This backgrounder analyzes the US Air Forces ability to deliver long-range strike, now and in the long term.

09/27/2004
air force, competitive/grand strategies, critical technologies, nuclear forces, select weapons systems, service-focused analysis, systems/force structure, transformation strategy

Cost of Defense Plans and Forces

Nuclear Forces and Proliferation

In the years ahead, the usefulness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is likely to be largely eclipsed by the capabilities of a host of new conventional and electronic weapons—weapons that are highly precise and lethal but do not produce the horrific destruction of a nuclear bomb. As such, the development of these new capabilities should pave the way for making substantially deeper cuts in nuclear forces than are currently envisioned. These trends suggest, for example, that it might be possible to go down to as few as 1,000-1,500 nuclear warheads—as proposed in 1996 by 60 retired senior military officers—or perhaps even fewer.

Moreover, up to a point, at least, the United States should be willing to make these cuts unilaterally. Certainly, the United States should not wait until Russia ratifies the START II treaty to begin its own reductions to START II levels. The administration’s decision to keep U.S. forces at START I levels until Russian ratification of START II demonstrates the unfortunate extent to which it still clings to Cold War notions about deterrence, strategic strikes and the utility of nuclear forces.

Other countries with less access to new conventional weapons technologies may, of course, continue to see strategic value in maintaining or acquiring nuclear forces. And it is likely that even for the United States and other advanced countries nuclear weapons will continue to cast a long shadow over military operations and strategy. However, neither of these facts provides a reasonable argument for why the United States should not take advantage of ongoing advances in conventional capabilities and the emergence of electronic strike capabilities to reduce substantially its reliance on nuclear forces.

Pursuing such a course will yield both substantial political advantages and budgetary savings for the United States. Politically, implementing further deep cuts in U.S. nuclear forces would strengthen the hand of START II supporters in Russia. It also would strengthen support for the NPT regime by demonstrating a more serious U.S. commitment to reducing—and perhaps eventually eliminating—nuclear weapons.

Deeper cuts in nuclear forces could also yield significant budgetary savings. Maintaining START I levels, rather than moving to START II levels, could cost the United States several billion dollars over the next few years, because of the requirement to keep additional SSBNs and ICBMs in service. Over the longer term, moving toward a force of some 1,000-1,500 nuclear warheads could yield budgetary savings of several billion dollars a year. These savings would be due to both lower operations and support costs and acquisition costs for the Department of Defense, as well as lower costs related to maintaining the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile for the Department of Energy.