The U.S. military is currently investing billions of dollars annually in developing and deploying a broad range of new conventional and electronic weapon systems. These systems, which combine great lethality with great precision — and are made possible by dramatic advances in information and information-related technologies — are revolutionizing the way military organizations are thinking about future conflict. And perhaps nowhere are the implications more significant than in the case of nuclear forces and strategy.

Although nuclear weapons have dominated discussions of strategic strike since their appearance at the end of World War II, the United States may increasingly be able to rely on both precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and electronic means of attack to effect a significant displacement of nuclear weapons, transforming the strategic triad and helping to pave the way for deep cuts in the current U.S. nuclear arsenal. These reductions could strengthen the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, recently shaken by the nuclear testing of India and Pakistan, and encourage Russia and the other major nuclear powers to make deep cuts in their own nuclear arsenals. They could also yield significant savings in the U.S. defense budget of perhaps $2 billion a year over the long term. Most importantly, however, they could enhance stability and provide the U.S. military with a strategic flexibility that nuclear weapons cannot provide.

Given the U.S. military’s recent progress in expanding its precision strike capabilities and the fact that it is the only military at present able to begin the transformation to a new strategic force posture, the United States should be willing to consider effecting unilateral military force reductions. This paper argues that, given current geopolitical and military-technical trends, the United States need not await Russian ratification of the START II Treaty before reducing its own nuclear forces to the 3,500 warhead level allowed under the treaty. The United States should also seriously consider making additional unilateral reductions to the 2,000-2,500-warhead level tentatively announced as the goal for a future START III Treaty. Furthermore, with the cooperation of Russia and the other major nuclear powers, reductions to 1,000-1,500 warheads, as advocated in the December 1996 statement by 60 retired senior military officers, might well be prudent. ¹

Russia: A “Cheshire Cat” Arsenal?
Treating Russia’s nuclear forces as a “baseline” for U.S. force requirements may have had some merit during the Cold War, but it is of far less relevance considering the more complex nuclear threat we confront today. The principal, indeed overarching, danger the United States faced from nuclear weapons during the Cold War — a large-scale homeland attack executed by the Soviet strategic rocket forces — has receded dramatically with the collapse of the hostile communist regime, the ongoing elimination of nuclear forces in the former non-Russian Soviet Republics, and the continuing gradual reduction (and erosion) of Russian nuclear forces.

Recognizing this, the Clinton Administration’s policy, dubbed “Lead but Hedge,” calls for the United States to take the leadership role in moving toward lower nuclear force levels, while also hedging against the instabilities and uncertainties of today’s security environment. However, in practice, reductions in U.S. strategic nuclear forces have been tightly linked to progress on arms reduction negotiations with Russia. At present, both countries are obligated by the START II Treaty (which has been signed but not ratified by Russia) to reduce their nuclear force levels to 3,500 warheads each by the end of 2007.²

Both countries have indicated a desire to eventually move toward lower levels of nuclear forces. At the March 1997 Helsinki conference, President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a joint statement in which they pledged to begin negotiations for a follow-on START III Treaty as soon as the START II Treaty enters into force. As part of the framework for START III, they agreed to aim for a reduction to some 2,000-2,500 strategic warheads for each side before 2008.

Yeltsin’s commitment to the START II Treaty and a future START III Treaty notwithstanding, the prospects for rapidly concluding an agreement to make deeper cuts in nuclear forces are unclear. To date, the Russian parliament, or Duma, has been reluctant to ratify the START II agreement. This hesitation has several sources. First, in an ironic twist, under the terms of START II, maintaining a rough parity with the United States would probably require a financially strapped Russia to spend billions of rubles to deploy 500 new single-warhead ICBMs to replace the multiple warhead missiles eliminated by the treaty. (Hence Russia’s interest in proceeding promptly to the lower warhead levels projected for START III.) Second, post-Cold War Russian military doctrine has placed increasing reliance on nuclear forces to offset the rapid decline in its conventional force capabilities. In a sense, the nuclear forces are the last remaining jewel in the tarnished Soviet crown of military might. Third, Russia has tried to use the issue of nuclear arms reductions as a way to dissuade the NATO alliance from extending membership to former Soviet satellite states.

Nevertheless, the Russian Duma has a strong incentive to eventually ratify the START II Treaty and agree to further reductions as part of a START III Treaty. This is true if for no other reason than that Russia will probably find the financial cost of maintaining START I or START II levels of nuclear forces prohibitive. As a recent report by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) concluded:

[E]ven if mandated dismantlement and destruction lags behind the pace of the United States (and that is not clear), Russian nuclear forces will continue to decline due to a lack of financing and the natural effects of aging, exacerbated by the interruption of the cycle of Cold War modernization³

If such agreements can indeed be rapidly reached, by all means, they should be pursued. But the strategic and fiscal logic of making deeper cuts in nuclear forces is strong enough, and the potential cost of not doing so is severe enough, that the United States should consider making some substantial further reductions in nuclear forces unilaterally if necessary. This is particularly true when one considers the U.S. military’s development of a substantial conventional precision strike capability that can serve as a significant “hedge” as the administration seizes the opportunity to “lead” the way to lower nuclear force levels.

Cold War Thinking and New Challenges
With the Soviet Union having passed into “Chapter Eleven” and the Cold War having been over for nearly a decade, senior U.S. decision makers now find themselves concerned more with the danger of Russian “loose nukes” falling into the hands of Third World rogue states or non-state terrorist groups than with arcane calculations over how a U.S.-Russian nuclear exchange would play out. Moreover, it seems unlikely that a rogue state possessing a handful of nuclear weapons would view the U.S. nuclear deterrent differently if it comprised 3,500 warheads instead of 7,500, or 1,500 warheads instead of 3,500. In any case, deterring and defending against unstable regimes with small nuclear forces that may not subscribe to U.S. notions of deterrence may require a very different mix of military forces than those that were crafted to deter a Soviet nuclear strike. Yet despite the radical changes in the security environment, the United States maintains its focus on maintaining quantitative parity with Russian nuclear forces.

The eclipse of this metric as a useful measure was noted by the National Defense Panel (NDP), a group of independent experts charged by Congress with critiquing the administration’s May 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). As the NDP put it:

Deterrence of attack as the central focus of nuclear policy is already being supplanted by the need to manage — identify, account for, and safeguard against — the proliferation and possible use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Such efforts are already part of the cooperative threat reduction initiatives undertaken by the United States and other concerned countries, and they will have to be continued as long as nuclear weapons remain a threat. Arms control and nonproliferation agreements . . . will also play an important role in reinforcing the foundations for a more stable security system at lower levels of armaments.⁶

The Military Revolution: A New Strategic Triad?
The traditional way of thinking about nuclear forces becomes even more problematic when the emerging military revolution is taken into account.⁸ Military revolutions have occurred periodically for centuries. They are often stimulated by major surges in technology that facilitate a discontinuous leap in military effectiveness over a relatively short period of time, as occurred, for example, between the world wars, when mechanized armored forces came of age on land, aircraft carriers supplanted the battleship at sea, and strategic aerial bombardment was established as a new way of war. In mid-century the world witnessed the introduction of nuclear weapons, once again leading strategists to rethink, in the most fundamental ways, the calculus of war.

These transformations of war typically displaced, or rendered obsolete, some of the formerly dominant weapons and forces that were central to the previous military regime. Thus the tank consigned the horse cavalry to the pages of history, while the world's major navies ceased producing battleships following the carriers’ rise to primacy. In terms of strategic aerial bombardment of an enemy state, nuclear weapons rapidly displaced conventional weaponry.

Just as dramatic technological advances in mechanization, aviation, radio and radar stimulated a transformation in the character of conflict between the two world wars, today the military confronts the challenge of interpreting the impact of a revolution in information technologies. These technologies offer advanced military organizations the potential to locate, identify, and track a far greater number of targets, over a far greater area and for far longer periods of time, and to engage those targets with far greater lethality, precision and discrimination than has ever before been possible.

The implications for strategic strike operations — and for how militaries view nuclear weapons — are potentially profound. The emerging military revolution strongly suggests that the conventional “tortoise” has, after some fifty years, finally begun to catch up to the nuclear “hare,” due in large measure to radical advances in the effectiveness of precision-guided munitions, and of stealth and electronic means of cloaking aircraft and missiles from enemy detection. For example, during 1943 the U.S. Eighth Air Force was able to strike roughly fifty strategic targets in the war against Germany. In 1991, during the Persian Gulf War, coalition air forces (the overwhelming majority of which belonged to the United States) struck at over three times as many targets on the first day of the war. This represents a two-order-of-magnitude increase in conventional strategic strike capability. But that is only part of the story.

Precision munitions comprised barely seven percent of the conventional munitions employed in bombing attacks during the Gulf War. According to the Gulf War Air Power Survey conducted following the war, those aircraft employing precision munitions were demonstrably thirteen times more effective than aircraft employing “dumb” conventional bombs.⁹ And the shift toward such capabilities is just beginning. Former Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman has stated that once the transition is complete, U.S. forces “may be able to engage 1,500 targets in the first hour, if not the first minutes, of a conflict . . . .”¹⁰

A New Form of Strategic Strike?
If, as General Fogleman seems to imply, it is possible to deploy a conventional precision strategic strike capability that can be employed with the speed and effectiveness approaching that of a nuclear strike, it may constitute an irresistible option for those military organizations that can afford to develop such forces and organizations. At present, the only military that fits these criteria belongs to the United States.

In fact, the U.S. military plans to field an integrated group of networked systems (or architectures) that could rapidly execute conventional precision strategic strikes against an adversary.¹¹ This will involve linking airborne and space information (and perhaps weapon) platforms, and unattended ground sensors to provide near-real-time targeting information to long-range precision-guided munitions (PGMs), or platforms carrying PGMs. These platforms could be land-, space- or sea-based.

This type of strategic strike capability may also include what some have termed “electronic strike” forces. Well-placed electronic strikes, be they in the form of computer viruses, logic bombs, high-power microwave generators, or conventional electromagnetic pulse munitions, may become increasingly feasible as a means of disabling both strategic military targets and critical elements of newly emerging information-based economies.

As this change in military weaponry occurs, it will be increasingly appropriate for the United States military to consider transitioning to a new type of strategic triad. Such a triad would not be based on the traditional three types of delivery systems for nuclear weapons — bombers, land-based ballistic missiles and ballistic missile submarines. Rather, the new triad would comprise long-range conventional precision strike, electronic strike and residual nuclear strike forces.

Advantages of Greater Reliance on Non-Nuclear Strategic Strikes
An increased reliance on non-nuclear strategic strike capabilities could offer several major advantages over the current exclusive reliance on nuclear weapons. First, by helping to facilitate deep reductions in the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, it could strengthen the NPT, which obligates the nuclear powers to reduce their nuclear forces, with the ultimate goal of eliminating them. Second, it could encourage Russia to effect similar reductions in its nuclear forces.

Third, such a transformation would likely enhance deterrence. Potential adversaries would see a United States strategic deterrent posture as more credible if it included forces capable of conducting effective nonnuclear strategic strike operations. Thus the new triad would offer U.S. political leaders a more credible option than nuclear strikes alone for responding to the threat of nuclear employment by a small nuclear power, or even employment itself. As such, U.S. possession of a substantial nonnuclear strategic strike capability could help reduce the perceived need by some U.S. friends and allies to acquire a nuclear deterrent of their own.

Fourth, since a nonnuclear strategic strike would be far more discriminating, it would not cause anything like the horrific level of casualties that would almost certainly result from even a “limited” nuclear war. As such, it might also reduce significantly the prospects for triggering a nuclear response from a nuclear-armed adversary.

Finally, cuts in nuclear forces could yield substantial budgetary savings. According to the Defense Department, reducing the current U.S. strategic nuclear forces from START I to START II levels would save some $6 billion over the next seven years.¹² Likewise, the authors estimate that reducing the size of the strategic arsenal to 2,000 warheads could save an average of some $2 billion a year through 2010 if the United States were to implement the reduction by, for example, cutting an additional four Trident ballistic missile submarines and 300 Minuteman ICBMs. ¹³ This would leave the United States with a strategic nuclear force structure consisting of 10 Trident submarines and 200 Minuteman ICBMs, plus the 71 B-52 and 21 B-2 (dual-capable) bombers projected under current plans.

The “Nuclear Shadow” and Possible Dangers
Although reducing reliance on nuclear forces and increasing emphasis on conventional and electronic strike systems could substantially reduce the danger of nuclear war over the long term, such a shift will certainly not render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete. Moreover, making such a shift is not without its dangers.

The future conflict environment, while radically different from the late Cold War period, will still find military forces operating under a “nuclear shadow.”¹⁴ There are several reasons why this condition will persist. First, although precision-strike weaponry will be able to substitute for nuclear strikes, this substitution effect will not be comprehensive. Moreover, would-be adversaries can also be expected to explore ways for offsetting even this limited capability. For example, targets that are hardened sufficiently, or buried deep underground, may prove impervious to the most accurate of non-nuclear munitions.

Second, as noted above, nuclear weapons will likely prove irreplaceable to major powers as instruments of “assured destruction” of the enemy homeland. Conventional precision strategic strikes, by virtue of their high accuracy and low yield, produce comparatively little direct damage against a society's population and economic infrastructure. Although such strikes, by disabling key nodes such as communications switching centers, might bring a modern information-based economy to its knees, the loss of life and property would likely be nowhere near as immediate, devastating and irreversible as that caused by a nuclear “assured destruction” attack.

As such, nuclear weapons will continue to exert a “dampening” effect on military operations, particularly strategic strikes, whether they be conventional, electronic, nuclear, or a mix of all three. Indeed, those states possessing a nuclear deterrent may see their homeland accorded status as a strategic “sanctuary,” not only from nuclear strikes, but perhaps from all forms of strategic strikes.

In the absence of a “sanctuary” regime, there is a danger that transitioning to a highly effective nonnuclear strategic strike capability could actually make nuclear war more likely, by blurring the distinction, or “firebreak,” between nonnuclear and nuclear capabilities. In other words, there is a danger that the United States will feel freer than it has in the past to conduct strategic strikes — because it will be able to do so without resorting to nuclear weapons. However, the country on the receiving end may not view such a distinction as particularly meaningful and may well feel compelled to retaliate with nuclear weapons.

Similarly, there is a danger that the development of an effective nonnuclear strategic strike capability by the United States — because it would appear to be much more usable than a nuclear strike capability — would increase the incentives for potential adversaries to acquire at least a small nuclear arsenal, so that they too will have their homeland, or at least some portion of strategic targets within it, accorded “sanctuary” status. This may be especially true with less developed countries, which may view the acquisition of a substantial conventional strategic strike capability as well beyond their means and view nuclear weapons as a relatively “cheap,” albeit “primitive,” counter to nonnuclear strategic strike operations.

The New Triad: Getting There
In order to guard against these potentially perverse effects of developing a nonnuclear strategic strike capability, and to ensure that instead the positive features of such a transition are maximized, it is important that U.S. officials think through carefully the implications of the ongoing transformation to a new strategic triad.

Unfortunately, this transformation raises a great number of very difficult questions. Some of the questions concern the possible impact of such a transformation on the strategic value attributed to nuclear weapons. Will the transformation of the U.S. military “devalue” nuclear weapons in the eyes of other states, supporting our efforts both to block nuclear proliferation and to reduce the arsenals of nuclear states? Or will it, by enabling substantial reductions in U.S. nuclear forces, lower the “entry barrier” for states other than Russia that might seek nuclear parity with the United States?

Other questions relate to the implications for the military balance that arise when nuclear arsenals are cut deeply and we transition from a essentially bipolar to multipolar nuclear world. If the current nuclear powers reduce their arsenals down to hundreds of warheads, what will “deterrence” mean in a future world that could see the United States confronting a half dozen or so small or medium-sized nuclear powers, rather than a single large adversary? How does one make sense of terms like “parity” and “assured destruction” in such a world? In short, what are the new measures of merit for considering “How much is enough?” when it comes to strategic strike capability in general, and nuclear forces in particular?

Still other questions concern how the United States should react when other countries begin to transform or show a desire to transform their own militaries. What kinds of “entry barriers” will exist for those militaries that seek to move along the transformation path toward lower reliance on nuclear weapons? What states are best positioned to surmount them? To what extent, if any, should the United States assist states in substituting other military means for nuclear weapons? How much and what kind of assistance should we provide? For example, should assistance be limited to selling close allies advanced PGMs and other technology, or should we restrict assistance to providing access to U.S. satellite constellations and other critical supporting elements? Finally, if such a course of action proves desirable, how can it be effectively implemented?

Attempting to answer these questions is far beyond the scope of this article. Notwithstanding the substantial uncertainty that is likely to exist for some time in this area, however, it seems clear that a transition strategy for the United States should probably involve at least four elements.

First, the Defense Department needs to ensure that the strategy, doctrine and forces it develops in fielding a future conventional strategic strike capability take into consideration the dynamic effect on the military balance of this “post-transformation” regime. This must include the ability to meet national security objectives and avoid unintended consequences (e.g., the potential for inadvertent escalation).

Second, the United States must continue to strongly support ongoing non-proliferation efforts, including, for example, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA’s) safeguards program.

Third, the United States must continue to work hard to reduce regional tensions in the Middle East, the Korean peninsula and elsewhere, in order to remove the root causes that provide much of the incentive for would-be proliferators.

Finally, the United States needs to undertake deep cuts in its strategic nuclear forces to capture the initiative and exploit the positive strategic and budgetary aspects of this transition.

Conclusion
The United States today faces a dramatically different strategic environment than it confronted during the Cold War, presenting its armed forces with very different kinds of challenges, including those pertaining to nuclear deterrence and strategic strike. Moreover, the United States also has by far the world's most advanced military, which is now poised to become the first military to cross the threshold into a new military regime which will offer new means for conducting strategic strike operations, effecting a substantial, albeit far from complete, displacement of nuclear weapons.

Assuming no dramatic changes for the worse from today’s geopolitical environment, for both strategic and (to a lesser extent) budgetary reasons, the United States should move expeditiously to effect substantial cuts in its strategic nuclear arsenal. At a minimum, the United States should promptly move to START II nuclear force levels, whether or not Russia ratifies the treaty. This could be followed by further reductions to some 2,000-2,500 warheads — within the range for START III set by presidents Clinton and Yeltsin. Moreover, rather than simply removing these warheads from its forces, the United States should strongly consider the merits of dismantling most of them.¹⁵ A force of this type would provide a very robust deterrent, especially when one considers the near-monopoly the U.S. military currently enjoys in conventional long-range precision strike forces. Ideally, Russia would join with the United States in quickly moving to a START III agreement.

However, the United States should be prepared to act unilaterally. At present, it is the only power whose military is capable of making the transformation to a post-Cold War strategic triad, comprising much lower levels of nuclear forces, along with conventional precision strategic strike forces and, prospectively, an electronic strategic strike leg. Thus the United States military is in a position to lead the world into a different military regime, one that reduces substantially the role of nuclear weapons as an element of military power. At some point, the other nuclear powers may follow the U.S. lead and effect their own transformations. But the United States should acknowledge that states such as Russia may continue to rely more on their nuclear forces as an offset to the advanced nonnuclear strategic strike capabilities they themselves cannot as yet field.

In summary, the U.S. military’s revolution in precision strike capabilities gives the Clinton Administration a significant conventional precision strategic strike “hedge,” with the promise of an emerging additional electronic strike “hedge.” It is now time to for the administration to “lead” the way toward lower nuclear force levels.

[SIDE BAR]

Advances in Precision-Strike Capabilities
The Defense Department is currently investigating, developing, or producing a wide variety of different conventional capabilities that could revolutionize the way wars are fought in the future, and substantially displace nuclear weapons for many missions. These capabilities include, for example:

• Conventional air-launched cruise missiles and other stand-off PGMs. These include a number of systems currently being developed, such as the short-range Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), the Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), and the longer range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Weapon.

• Hypersonic air-to-ground missiles which can more effectively attack mobile, time-critical targets, and deep underground facilities, from extended range. For example, the U.S. Air Force is currently funding R&D for a planned mach 8 hypersonic missile under the Fast Reaction Standoff Weapon (FRSW) program.¹⁶

• Long-endurance weaponized unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) able to loiter over the battle space for extended periods.¹⁷

• Broad-area, conventional, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and high-power microwave (HPM) weapons, which, when “detonated over distant enemy-occupied battle zones, can produce upsetting or lethal effects in electronic equipment, sensor suites, and even personnel.”¹⁸

• Miniature warheads incorporating advanced high explosives (4-5 times more explosive power per pound than today) which will permit future strike platforms to carry several times as many weapons per sortie.

 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists web site

1. Since December 1996, more than 100 present and former heads of state and other senior civilian leaders have also endorsed this proposal. General Lee Butler, USAF (ret.), “The Risks of Nuclear Deterrence: From Superpowers to Rogue Leaders,” speech before the National Press Club, February 2, 1998; and William M. Arkin, Robert S. Norris, Joshua Handler, Taking Stock: Worldwide Nuclear Deployments, 1998 (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, March 1998) pp. 14 and 27. Specifically, these former generals and admirals recommend that the United States and Russia reduce their strategic stockpiles, which now comprise some 7,500 and 6,000 operational warheads, respectively, to 1,000-1,500 warheads each.
2. The START II Treaty originally called for reductions to be completed by January 1, 2003. This deadline was subsequently extended to December 31, 2007 to address Russian concerns about meeting the original deadline.
3. Arkin, et al, pp. 11-12.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid, p. 12.
6. National Defense Panel (NDP), Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: National Defense Panel, December 1997), p. 50.
7. Ibid.
8. See Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Military Revolution (Unpublished paper, Department of Defense, August 1993); Krepinevich, “Keeping Pace With the Military-Technological Revolution,” Issues in Science and Technology (Summer 1994); Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Patterns of Military Revolutions,” The National Interest (Fall 1994); and Michael G. Vickers, Warfare in 2020: A Primer (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996). Borrowing from the Soviet term, the Defense Department uses the phrase “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) to describe the emerging military revolution.
9. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 243. The ratio was derived by examining 12 representative sorties of F-117 and F-111F aircraft carrying PGMs with 12 sorties flown by aircraft delivering unguided bombs. The former covered 26 targets employing a total of 28 PGMs, while the latter covered two targets, expending 168 bombs.
10. General Ronald R. Fogleman, “Getting the Air Force into the 21st Century,” Speech delivered to the Air Force Association’s Air Warfare Symposium (Orlando, FL: 24 February 1995). It is important to note that many of these targets may not fit the criteria established for “strategic” targets.
11. See the U.S. Air Force’s vision document, Global Engagement (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force, n.d.).
12. This includes $5.2 billion associated with maintaining 18 rather than 14 Trident ballistic missile submarines in service and $550 million associated with keeping 50 MX missiles in service rather than retiring them. General Eugene E. Habiger, Commander in Chief, U.S. Strategic Command, Interview with Defense Writer’s Group, Washington D.C., March 31, 1998.
13. This estimate was derived based on a number of different sources, including the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “Estimated Budgetary Impacts of Alternative Levels of Nuclear Forces,” March 1998; CBO, letter to the Honorable Jesse Helms, May 4, 1995; and CBO, Preserving the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Under A Comprehensive Test Ban (Washington, DC: CBO, May 1997). The largest savings would result from buying fewer Trident II missiles, avoiding the cost of backfitting early Trident submarines to accommodate the Trident II missile, reduced operations and support costs due to the smaller number of ICBMs and submarines in the force, and lower Department of Energy costs resulting from a smaller warhead stockpile requirement.
14. Krepinevich, The Military Revolution, pp. 41-45, and Vickers, Warfare in 2020, pp. 13-14.
15. To maintain 2,000 operational warheads, some small number of additional warheads would be necessary for maintenance, non-nuclear testing and other purposes.
16. See Robert Wall and David Fulghum, “Combat Weakness Triggers New Research,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, February 16, 1998, p. 25.
17. The U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board has assessed that “UAV platform, sensor and weapons technology have all matured sufficiently to permit low risk, rapid, and low-cost development and application of weaponized UAVs in the near-term (1996-2005).” See United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, Report on UAV Technologies and Combat Operations (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1996).
18. Board on Army Science and Technology, Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems, National Research Council, Star 21 Technology Forecast Assessments: Strategic Technologies for the Army of the Twenty-First Century (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1993), p. 503.