



CSBA

The QDR & Long-Range Surveillance and Strike

**2168 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC
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Director of Strategic Studies**

Agenda

9:00-9:05	Introduction
9:05-9:35	Remarks by the Congressman Norm Dicks
9:40-10:15	Remarks by General Richard Hawley (USAF, Ret.)
10:15-10:30	Break
10:30-11:25	Panel Session <ul style="list-style-type: none">– Michael Vickers, Director of Strategic Studies, CSBA– Bob Work, Senior Analyst, CSBA– Col Tom Ehrhard (USAF), OSD Net Assessment
11:25-11:30	Closing Remarks

Strategic Context

- **The United States faces four current and emerging challenges:**
 - Radical Islamic terrorist networks and the global Islamist insurgency
 - Threats to the US homeland from both state and non-state actors
 - The rise of China
 - The proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)


The Current Defense Portfolio is Out of Balance

- **The programs of record of the Services are not well-aligned with current and emerging challenges**
 - DoD has excess capacity for traditional challenges – and not enough for irregular warfare (i.e., GWOT), disruptive threats (i.e., China), and countering WMD
- **With respect to long-range surveillance and strike, the portfolio is significantly out of balance:**
 - Short-range aircraft are oversubscribed relative to long-range platforms
 - Serious shortfalls (both capability and capacity) exist in:
 - Penetrating, long-range surveillance and strike
 - Long-dwell surveillance
 - Prompt global strike
 - Rim and sovereign basing infrastructure

DoD Investment in Short- & Long-Range Strike FY1999-2006

USAF 1999-2006:

- \$48.6 billion in short-range
- \$5.1 billion in long-range
- Ratio: 9.6-to-1



Excludes ~\$2.5 billion in lethal unmanned systems

Re-Balancing the Portfolio

- **Begin development immediately of new, penetrating, long-range surveillance and strike aircraft to:**
 - Gain increased freedom of action and independence from politically deniable, forward air bases
 - Shape adversary investments in ways favorable to US interests and impose costs
 - Deny sanctuary to prospective adversaries and hold at risk emergent/time-sensitive/fleeting/moving targets in anti-access environments and at great strategic depth
 - Complement space-based ISR
- **Put stealthy, long-range aircraft on carrier decks to enable naval air power to operate from stand-off ranges and penetrate into airspace defended by emerging IADS**
 - Extended-range J-UCAS may be the best option available
- **Field prompt global-strike capabilities**
 - Conventional ICBMs / submarine-launched IRBMs
 - Common Aero Vehicle (CAV)
- **Expand significantly basing infrastructure in the Western Pacific**
 - Build new bases in the Northern Marianas and on Palau

Re-Balancing the Portfolio (2)

- **Expand existing capacity for GWOT-focused persistent air surveillance**
 - At least 24 Predator-like UAV systems (4 aircraft per) are required to maintain 8 orbits continuously in high-priority GWOT operating areas
 - Explore longer dwell systems and standoff WMD detection options
- **Current fighter-attack force structure should be reduced by at least one-third**
 - The fighter force should be focused on air superiority, SEAD/DEAD, and close air-support
 - Long-range, high-payload aircraft (both manned and unmanned platforms) should be the principal ground-attack arm
- **Buy two or more wings of F/A-22**
- **Reduce variants / buy of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter**
- **Reconsider necessity of E-10A procurement**