We will modernize some existing weapons and equipment . . . but we will do this judiciously and selectively. Our goal is to move beyond marginal improvements to harness new technologies that will support a new strategy . . . .Our defense vision will drive our defense budget, not the other way around.¹

Comparatively little effort, however, has been given to developing a construct by which the value of the Rumsfeld Review might be evaluated. What follows is an attempt to provide a series of first-order metrics by which to evaluate whether the forthcoming defense strategy represents an improvement over the current defense posture, as laid down by the Clinton Administration’s 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).³

Metric Number 1: Why transform the world’s best military?
The United States has by far the world’s best military, by practically any conceivable measure. The Bush Administration must present a convincing case that, in effect, “what is seemingly not broken, must be fixed.” To make its case, the Rumsfeld Review must do two things. It must show how changes in the threat environment require transformation, and how opportunities exist, thanks to the military revolution (“revolution in military affairs”) to effect a transformation:

• The threat environment is changing (or likely to change) in location, scale or form in such a way that an improved version of today’s military (i.e., an in-kind modernized version of our current military) will be far less effective in dealing with tomorrow’s challenges than today’s. For example, one might expect Rumsfeld to argue that Asia will require a greater focus relative to that accorded it during the Cold War. In terms of a change in the scale of defense challenges, it might be argued that, over the long term, maintaining a stable military balance in East Asia will be a far different, and a far more demanding, prospect than preparing for one major theater war (MTW) on the Korean peninsula. A case can be made that the shifting form of military competitions—such as defeating anti-access/area-denial threats, controlling space and homeland defense—requires major changes in US military doctrine, force structures, capabilities, and investment patterns.

• It is possible, if we begin now, to transform the US military over time into a far more effective fighting force than that which is called for in existing modernization plans. The administration must make the case that it is possible for the US military to exploit rapidly advancing technologies to deal with both existing and nascent threats, before they are capable of posing a serious risk to our security. Can the US military deploy, support and operate forces that are highly distributed, yet also highly networked through advanced information technologies? Is it possible to conduct effective sustained operations from extended ranges? How much can we leverage space and cyberspace to enhance the effectiveness of our forces? Perhaps most important: How might such capabilities be integrated into a warfighting concept that enables the US military to play its role in dissuading, deterring or (if need be) defeating would-be aggressors?

Metric Number 2: Does the prescription fit the diagnosis?
If the case for the need to transform the military is made, does the Rumsfeld Review place the US military along the right transformation path? Can we be confident that the defense strategy and program called for by the Rumsfeld Review is appropriate to deal with existing and emerging challenges to our security? For example, assuming the diagnosis in Metric 1, one would expect to see a relatively greater emphasis on Asia translated into a significant increase in emphasis on maritime forces, systems with extended ranges, and greater efforts to export capabilities to space (owing both to range demands and the relative paucity of forward bases). Dealing with the anti-access/area-denial threat will argue for a vigorous effort to exploit the potential for highly distributed, highly networked force deployment, sustainment, and operations. This would seem to favor, among other things, greatly increased emphasis on a range of potential capabilities, such as the so-called Streetfighter concept linked to Network Centric Warfare, advanced C4ISR, unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVS), highly dispersed ground forces with the ability to scout and engage at extended-ranges (e.g., employing attack helicopters, rocket artillery and UCAVs), and long-range bomber aircraft. Significantly, one would expect less emphasis would be placed on heavy ground forces, fixed forward assets (e.g., land-based tactical aviation), and large, relatively slow-moving surface combatants than was called for in the 1997 QDR. (Note that this discussion is both hypothetical and suggestive, as opposed to definitive and comprehensive.)

Metric Number 3: If transformation is warranted, does the new defense program have a process for effecting it?
Transformation can be defined as innovation on a grand scale, sufficient to bring about a discontinuous leap in military effectiveness, and thus cannot be effected through processes established by the Defense Department to support and sustain the existing ways of operating. Therefore, a transformation strategy must be an integral part of any overall defense plan and program that emerges from the Rumsfeld Review.

An effective transformation strategy would almost certainly comprise the following:

• A future warfare vision to provide direction to transformation efforts. The administration must provide a clear vision to focus the military on the kinds of threats and opportunities that are the foundation of its call for transformation.

• Selection of senior leaders based on their ability to effect transformational change. One key indicator of what transformation means to this administration, and its prospects for success, will be what military leaders are chosen to replace the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Air Force Chief of Staff, whose terms expire this year.

• Robust funding for leap-ahead technologies. At present, there are few opportunities to field a significantly different kind of military in the near term. Realistically, transformations usually take a decade or more to take effect. However, one would expect to see a vigorous effort to increase funding for the science and technology (S&T) accounts over the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) to develop capability options to deal with an uncertain future.

• Joint and Service field exercises and experimentation. To identify the proper mix of new and legacy systems required to meet emerging challenges, one would expect the administration to give new life, and far greater emphasis, to Service and joint transformation field exercises oriented principally at the operational level of warfare. Doing so will require establishing a Joint National Training Center oriented on the anti-access/area-denial challenge, along with a Joint Urban Warfare Training Center. It also means establishing joint standing opposing forces at these centers, under Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).

• A new procurement strategy. Will the defense review set a new course with respect to modernization, one that corresponds to its vision of the new security environment? The president has called for new thinking with respect to defense modernization, to include “skipping a generation” of weapon systems where possible. Thus one would expect the Rumsfeld Review to yield a procurement strategy in the near- to mid-term that places somewhat less emphasis on costly next-generation weapons programs that represent essentially linear improvements over existing systems (e.g., the three new tactical fighter programs). At the same time, one would expect to see greater emphasis placed on procuring advance versions of current-generation systems (e.g., the latest, Block 60 versions of the F-16); service-life extensions of existing weapon systems, and, most importantly, limited production runs of promising new kinds of weapon systems (e.g., converted Trident SSGNs).

• Divestment strategies to eliminate capabilities that are a poor fit with the emerging strategic environment and to free up resources to support transformation. This requires making tough choices and balancing near- and long-term risk. It also would send an important signal that the administration understands that successful transformation is not only comprised of new initiatives, but also involves reducing reliance on capabilities that are likely to decline in effectiveness, perhaps precipitously. Is such a divestment strategy part of the Rumsfeld Review?

Metric Number 4: Is the defense program that emerges from the Rumsfeld Review supported by realistic budget estimates?
America’s wealth, great as it is, is not unlimited. Given the Bush Administration’s priorities, and those of Congress, it seems unlikely that major increases in defense spending will be realized. Even more sobering, the current defense program suffers from a plans-funding mismatch of some $120 billion over the next six years, with even greater shortfalls thereafter.

Consequently, the current defense program cannot avoid substantial trimming, even if transformation is not undertaken. Fortunately, the current defense program supporting the two-MTW posture can incur significant force structure and modernization program reductions without incurring a significant increase in near-term risk to the national security. There is an opportunity to make significant reductions in both areas to enable defense transformation, and bring the Defense Department’s program in line with anticipated budget estimates. Given the likely trade-offs the Rumsfeld Review confronts, sustaining the force structure at it current levels runs a high risk of producing a stillborn transformation effort. Will the Rumsfeld Review make the tough choices that are inherent in an era of finite defense resources and increasing challenges to our national security?

Conclusion
To date, the Bush Administration arguably has made a good case for the need to transform the US military. To the extent that it does so, it satisfies one of the four first-order metrics presented above. Interestingly, success in meeting the first metric increases greatly the need to provide compelling answers to the other three. Making a strong case that we must begin now to transform the American military is only a start. The Rumsfeld Review must provide a defense strategy and program placing the Defense Department on a transformation path. In so doing, it must resist the temptation to take the path leading to a more efficient—but far less effective—version of today’s military in favor of a transformed military optimized, not for yesterday’s conflicts, but rather for dealing with the challenges of tomorrow. The Rumsfeld Review also must put into place a process for ensuring that momentum along the new path can be sustained. It must do all this within realistic defense budget estimates. If it can satisfy these four metrics, the Rumsfeld Review will have earned the support of Congress and the gratitude of the American people.

1. Speech, President George W. Bush, Norfolk Naval Air Station, February 13, 2001. Http://frwebgate6.access.gpo.gov.

2. Ibid.

3. Obviously, a far more detailed set of metrics would be required to evaluate how well the first-order metrics outlined in this brief paper are being addressed.