The US military is currently investing billions of dollars annually in developing and deploying a broad range of new precision-guided and electronic-strike weapons. These weapons are revolutionizing the way military organizations are thinking about future conflict. Perhaps nowhere are the potential implications of these weapons more significant than in the case of nuclear forces and strategic-strike operations. For the last forty years, the US strategic deterrent has centered on a triad of intercontinental bombers and land- and sea-based ballistic missile forces. A strong case can be made that the United States should take steps to create a new strategic-strike triad, relying on its precision- and electronic-strike capabilities to form two of the three legs, with a smaller residual nuclear force comprising the third leg.

Given the current geopolitical landscape and the US lead in developing and deploying nonnuclear precision- and electronic-strategic-strike weapons, it would appear that the residual nuclear force of the new strategic triad might comprise somewhere between 2,000–3,000 warheads. Indeed, given the considerable opportunity costs of maintaining nuclear forces above this level, the United States should strongly consider reducing its current nuclear forces to these levels for strategic reasons, irrespective of current arms control negotiations.

Periods characterized by dramatic surges in technologies, such as those underwriting the development of precision- and electronic-strike weapons, have often led in the past to equally dramatic changes in the conduct of war. These weapons seem likely to blur what was once a relatively clear distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons. The US military may soon be capable of conducting, against certain types of strategic targets, nonnuclear strategic-strike operations at levels of military effectiveness approaching those of nuclear strikes. As the congressionally appointed National Defense Panel noted in 1997, “Advancing military technologies that merge the capabilities of information systems with precision-guided weaponry and real-time targeting and other new weapons systems may provide a supplement or alternative to the nuclear arsenals of the Cold War.” Thus, although nuclear weapons have dominated discussions of strategic-strike operations since their appearance at the end of World War II, the United States may increasingly be able to rely on both precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and electronic means of attack to effect a significant displacement of nuclear weapons in these operations.

This condition will emerge, in part because, as the world continues its transition away from industrial-based economies and toward information-based ones, there will likely be a corresponding shift in the principal sources of military, economic and political power of states. The character of the strategic target base will necessarily change to reflect these developments. The strategic bombardment depicted in old World War II newsreels showed massive bomber raids on steel plants and fire storms ignited by incendiary bombs. Cold War era films projected horrific images of the aftermath of atomic explosions. Future strategic strikes may instead find militaries, in a growing number of instances, being able to employ well-placed conventional precision and electronic strikes discretely directed against critical elements, or nodes, of an adversary’s center of gravity.

Given the changes in the strategic target base and the emerging precision- and electronic-strike capabilities, it would seem increasingly appropriate for the United States to consider fielding a new type of strategic triad. Residual nuclear forces would be relied upon to address those strategic targets that cannot otherwise be disabled or destroyed by nonnuclear means and to serve as the ultimate guarantor of deterrence by holding an adversary’s society at risk. Assuming that the United States does not want to rely on a pure countervalue targeting strategy, it would appear that residual nuclear forces in the new strategic triad could comprise somewhere between 1,500–3,000 warheads.

Transitioning toward an increased reliance on nonnuclear strategic-strike capabilities could offer several major advantages over today’s high reliance on nuclear weapons. For one, strategic deterrence—including extended deterrence—might be enhanced, since the threat of employing the nonnuclear elements of the new triad would probably be seen as more credible than the threat of employing nuclear weapons. Moreover, while there is unquestionably some deterrence value in not foreswearing the possibility of nuclear retaliation, potential adversaries would be far more likely to believe, and thus be deterred by, a US threat to respond to a nonnuclear provocation with conventional and/or electronic strikes.

There may also be benefits to having a nonnuclear strategic-strike capability in the event that deterrence of nuclear use fails. At that point, the relevant question would then become how best to restore deterrence. The basic requirement for restoring deterrence is straightforward—the United States, together with like-minded countries, would have to demonstrate to the world community that the penalty for nuclear use is exceedingly high. Nuclear retaliation, of course, would serve this purpose rather well, but it would also further undermine the tradition of non-use. That is to say, a nuclear response to nuclear use may in fact work at cross-purposes with the objective of re-establishing nuclear deterrence. In contrast, nonnuclear strategic strikes may, in some instances, be capable of making nuclear renegades pay dearly for their errant behavior without undercutting the presumption of non-use.

Furthermore, by adding a rung on the escalation ladder between conventional theater war and general nuclear war, a nonnuclear strategic-strike capability could provide US political leaders with a very valuable commodity during a period of crisis: flexibility. This rung could also act as a firebreak that might prove helpful in preventing an escalation to nuclear war.

Since a nonnuclear strategic strike would be far more discriminating than a comparable nuclear strike, it would also offer benefits in war termination. The effects of the former are likely to be far more easily reversed than those of the latter, and the prospect of a relatively rapid return to normalcy may substantially strengthen an adversary’s incentives to cease hostilities.

Given the funding shortfalls of the current defense program, maintaining a larger than necessary nuclear force posture incurs substantial opportunity costs that impede efforts to improve US military capabilities in areas where real shortfalls exist (i.e., in creating a different kind of strategic-strike capability). Reducing the current US strategic nuclear forces to Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II levels (i.e., 3,500 warheads) would save some $6 billion over the next seven years. Moving below START II levels to 2,000 warheads could save as much as an additional $2 billion per year through 2010. Last, but not least, by transforming its strategic-strike forces in a way that devalues nuclear weapons, the United States may encourage other advanced military organizations to do the same.

To be sure, there are several potential disadvantages associated with this new type of strategic triad, which warrant careful study. First of all, conventional precision-strike and electronic-strike weapons will, for the foreseeable future, be incapable of reliably disabling all, or even a majority of, strategic targets. While technologies are currently being developed to enhance conventional bomb damage assessment (BDA), obtaining accurate information about the results of precision strikes will probably continue to be difficult. Generating dependable BDA for electronic strikes is, and will likely remain, even more problematic. In many cases, successful electronic strikes will not generate any directly observable signatures. By contrast, assuming they detonate properly, nuclear weapons leave comparatively little doubt about whether the target has been disabled. Moreover, would-be adversaries can also be expected to explore ways for offsetting nonnuclear, strategic-strike systems (e.g., by constructing deep underground facilities, hardening other targets, etc.).

There is also the danger that the development of an effective nonnuclear strategic-strike capability by the United States—because it would appear to be much more useable than a nuclear-strike capability—could increase the incentives for potential adversaries to acquire at least a small nuclear arsenal for deterrence purposes. Their objective would be to have their homeland, or at least some portion of strategic targets within it, accorded sanctuary status. This may be especially true with less-developed countries, which may view the acquisition of a substantial conventional strategic-strike capability as well beyond their means and view nuclear weapons as a relatively cheap (albeit primitive) counter. Moreover, nuclear weapons will also likely prove irreplaceable to major powers as instruments of assured destruction of the enemy homeland. In fact, nuclear weapons seem likely to exert a strong and enduring influence on warfare, casting a long shadow over humankind even after the emerging military revolution matures in the early decades of this century.

Amassing an inventory of conventional PGMs and, to a lesser degree, electronic-strike systems sufficient for two major regional contingencies, as well as for strategic deterrence and warfighting, could also be a rather expensive undertaking. To a certain extent, these weapons would be developed and produced for other operations, but the additional cost associated with creating a strategic reserve that could supplant part of the existing nuclear arsenal would be substantial. Nuclear weapons are simply more efficient than conventional PGMs, particularly with respect to destroying large area targets such as ports, airfields, storage depots, industrial complexes, and other high-value military installations. As a result, depending on the proportion of such targets in the future strategic target set, it would probably be necessary to procure hundreds of PGMs for every nuclear warhead replaced.

Another possible downside to reduced reliance on nuclear weapons is that it could lower the entry barrier to nuclear superpower status. For instance, it would not be in the US interest to lower its nuclear arsenal unilaterally to the point that relatively minor nuclear powers could easily become de facto nuclear peers. Nor would it be prudent to so outpace Russia in reducing the US nuclear inventory that a disarming nuclear first strike against US strategic forces (both conventional and nuclear) becomes even a remote possibility.

Finally, there is the chance that this type of strategic triad could make both conventional and nuclear conflict more likely by making the consequences of engaging in strategic warfare appear more palatable. It can be argued that the willingness of nuclear-armed states to engage in conventional conflicts with each other has been throttled in the past by the prospect, however slight, that escalatory pressures or misperceptions might trigger a nuclear war. By reducing the perceived risk of nuclear conflict by interposing the option of nonnuclear strategic warfare, it is possible that conventional wars may actually become more frequent. As a result, the risks of inadvertent escalation to nuclear weapon employment might increase.

In the final analysis, this paper raises more questions than it provides answers. But asking the right questions is the key to laying the foundation for a comprehensive strategic assessment of future strategic-strike operations and their implications for US security. Among other things, any strategic-strike net assessment must account for the highly dynamic nature that characterizes military competitions during periods of military revolution, such as we find ourselves at present. For example, we do not know with high confidence those states that will comprise the major competitors in strategic-strike capabilities. Nor do we know what paths these competitors will take in terms of developing the various capabilities comprising the new strategic triad or the policies and doctrines that will govern the use of these capabilities. Yet strategic planners must make decisions today that will determine the character and effectiveness of US strategic-strike forces in a post-transformation regime. In its own way, this represents a challenge as demanding for strategists as that posed by the last major transformation in strategic-strike capabilities a half century ago.