Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and speak on this important subject. This committee hearing raises a vital, and I believe not yet satisfactorily addressed issue, the sufficiency of the Department of Defense’s organization and force structure for protecting the US homeland. While the armed forces have served the nation extremely well in responding to security concerns in the wake of the September 11 attacks and prosecuting the global war against terrorism, the debate over the department’s future roles and capabilities has been shallow and inadequate.

Now is not just the right time to assess the future place of the Defense Department in protecting the homeland, it is the essential moment. Many have compared this administration’s current initiatives to the period coinciding to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947. This comparison is indeed apt. The National Security Act of 1947 marked the beginning of the effort that created a new organization and national security structure that protected the nation throughout the course of the Cold War and into the present. The administration’s current efforts to draft a different strategic direction could yield a new security architecture that may also stand for generations. It is worth remembering, however, that the national security instruments used to fight the Cold War were not cut from whole cloth. It took over a decade of experimentation, trial and error, and innovation to create the national security system that we know today. Thus, it is worthwhile at the onset of this process to take stock of where we are and ensure the “first order” questions, the determination of the ends, ways, and means, are being properly addressed.

Current Guidance, Organization, and Practices
The Department of Defense’s efforts to define its future role in protecting the homeland appears tentative at best. For example, the 2002 Defense Authorization Act required the Secretary of Defense to submit a report within six months on the department’s efforts in counterterrorism and homeland security.¹ As far as I am aware, this report is still in draft. Two institutional factors may, in part, account for the hesitant steps in addressing present and future tasks. First, the means of evaluating and providing guidance on new roles and missions are only somewhat changed from the system that was used at the end of the Cold War. Second, the new organizations the department has created in the wake of the 9/11 attacks to address issues regarding protection of the homeland are still in their infancy. It is far too soon to judge how effective they will be in articulating new requirements, obtaining resources, and managing forces and programs.

Any discussion of how the department evaluates proposed domestic security missions must begin with a consideration of strategy. The purpose of strategy is to make sure the appropriate linkage of ends, ways, and means, ensuring effort is focused on securing key objectives while efficiently and effectively utilizing the instruments at hand. Equally important, strategy can be a powerful catalyst for change. For example, “Shape, Respond, Prepare,” the US military strategy presented in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review was intended not just to describe how the armed forces would be employed but also to make the case for building a wedge to invest in new operational concepts and advanced technologies.² This approach worked. Some of these new capabilities recently saw extensive service during Operation Iraqi Freedom. In short, strategy can and has been an effective tool for turning institutional and operational practices in a new direction.

Within the Pentagon there is an important nexus between strategy and the operations of the Department of Defense. Strategy serves to inform the formulation of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) which imparts the Defense Secretary’s programming and fiscal priorities to the military departments. The DPG provides the major link between the Joint Strategic Planning System and the Defense budgeting system. Thus, any assessment of the department evaluates and determines its mission needs for protecting the homeland over the long term must begin with these keystone documents, the DPG and the administration’s national strategies.

Strategic planning documents prior to the September 11 attacks were virtually devoid of any reference to homeland missions. It is, therefore, not surprising that these issues received scant attention within the defense community. For example, in 1999 the Defense Department conducted Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study (RCE-05), to that point its most detailed, wide-ranging analysis of the Reserves’ potential future organization, structure, and missions. RCE-05 made four major recommendations with respect to homeland security. In large part, however, these conclusions were not translated over to the Defense Planning Guidance and the report’s conclusions in the area of domestic security were virtually ignored. Out of over a million Reserve Component troops, less than an additional thousand personnel were dedicated to the task of protecting the homeland.³

In September 2001, shortly after the 9/11 attacks the Department of Defense published its most recent Quadrennial Defense Review. This review also included elements of a new military strategy. The challenge of protecting the homeland was addressed, but only to repeat the military’s traditional responsibilities in defending the nation and supporting civil authorities.⁴ Likewise, the new National Strategy for Homeland Security and National Security Strategy simply stated that the Defense Department contributes to homeland security through its military mission overseas, traditional defense missions, and support for civil authority.⁵ The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, published in December 2002, offers no specific guidance on the use of defense assets for domestic missions. Only the National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets addressed the Department of Defense’s domestic role in any substantive way, though even here the strategy largely reemphasizes traditional responsibilities.⁶ In general, the current national strategies do little more than describe the military’s present role. They are more doctrine than strategy. They are not a catalyst for change or innovation.

Additionally, the status quo approach to the role of defense in domestic security appeared to be largely reflected in the DPG. In some areas, the guidance seems to have been very specific. For example, the secretary has directed particular attention to enhancing the preparedness of military installations, with increased funding for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and conventional explosive detection equipment and emergency response capabilities.⁷ This year the Defense Department plans to spend about a $1 billion to enhance security at military installations.⁸ For the most part, however, the department has given little focused direction to the Services.

The absence of a decisive course appears to be reflected in the organization of the joint staff and the Services. Each has adopted a different method for organizing and addressing domestic security issues. The Joint Staff established a Homeland Security Directorate within its Strategy and Policy Directorate (J5). The Air Force formed a Homeland Security Directorate under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and Space Operations, but also maintains a separate Air Staff section for civil support. The Army created a homeland security integrated concept team, led not by the Army Staff but by a Director of Homeland Security at the Army Training and Doctrine Command at Fort Monroe, Virginia. In addition, the Army has a Consequence Management Integration Office serving under its Director of Military Support on the Army staff. The Marine Corps also created an integrated concept team and established a homeland security section at its Warfighting Lab at Quantico, Virginia.⁹ It is not clear that the Navy has created any unique command structure to deal with domestic security issues. A survey of this plethora of organizations raises the question of whether the military can forge an effective joint approach to homeland missions, as they do with other military operations, if the joint staff does not have suitable counterparts in the Services with which to interact.

In addition, until recently the organization of the Defense Department has lacked any center of gravity that could serve as a focal point for assessing the adequacy of force structure, missions, and requirements. The wake of the September 11 attacks, however, has introduced two potential candidates: the recently established Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense and a new combatant command, US Northern Command (NORTHCOM). It is, quite frankly, too soon to tell if these organizations will have a significant impact on how the department determines missions and requirements. There are a number of issues that need to be addressed.

It does not appear that the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense has a clear mandate. The department’s homeland agenda could well cut across issues of policy, acquisition and technology, and force management. There is some question of whether the placement of the office or its relationship to other elements of the secretariat will allow the new assistant secretary to play an appropriate role. Assistant Secretary Paul McHale recently described his responsibilities as “recommending to the Secretary [of Defense] the roadmap for the Defense Department’s role in securing our nation.” It is not completely clear, however, what portfolio his office will have to manage and implement this roadmap.¹⁰

One seemingly still unresolved issue is the how the functions of military support to civilian authorities will be managed. In the past, support to state and local governments for natural and technological (manmade) disasters was coordinated by the Secretary of the Army acting as the executive agent for the Defense Department. With the establishment of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense, this organization is being rethought. The support function could well be added to the portfolio of the assistant secretary, coordinated by a new Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Support.¹¹ If the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense, however, is intended to serve primarily a policy function managing operational missions might be a significant distraction. In addition, any organizational structure that assigns elements of the secretariat with operational responsibilities will likely also require the Joint Staff to take on additional responsibilities in this area, like promulgating deployment orders. Such an approach could create as many problems it is intended to solve. An organizational design that plunges high level staffs into operational missions diverts important resources from the staff’s primary tasks. This issue bears watching. How the department elects to handle the executive functions of performing military support to civilian authorities could be an important bellwether for gauging the effectiveness of the Pentagon organization for support of homeland missions.

Also key to the success of the department will be its relationship between the new assistant secretary and NORTHCOM. If history is any guide, the department would do well to clearly sort out functions and responsibilities now. By many accounts, since its establishment in 1987 the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict have always had an uneasy relationship. Over time, the command’s statutory authority over special operations budgets and the gravitas of being a combatant command gave SOCOM a dominant position in driving the agenda for determining the future of special operations forces, largely marginalizing the role of the assistant secretariat.

A final concern driving the agenda for the future will be the place homeland missions are assigned in the military’s transformation effort. Transformation reflects innovation on a grand scale, undertaken to exploit major changes in the character of conflict.¹² The Secretary of Defense has created an Office of Force Transformation to serve as an incubator for innovation in warfighting, acquisition, and business practices, but the Pentagon has no equivalent for domestic security missions.¹³ The department’s latest transformation planning guidance does not even address homeland security issues.¹⁴ As a result, it is hardly surprising that the Services have given the problem scant attention. For example, the Army’s current 108 page transformation roadmap devotes less than a page to the topic.¹⁵ Excluding domestic security from the main axis of the transformation effort may well hamstring the military effort. If the challenge is not an integral component of the Pentagon’s transformation plan, it is doubtful that it will ever get the resources, let alone the intellectual capital required to foster new initiatives and appropriate programs.

Looking Forward
The current strategic guidance, organization of the Defense Department, and military force structure would be adequate if the status quo were acceptable. This may not be the case. Current strategies rely heavily on the notion that the best defense is a good offense, placing a premium on preempting or interdicting threats before they reach US shores. But the almost infinite links with the rest of the globe, which carry the people, goods, services, and ideas that define America’s place in the world, belay the idea that every attack can be stopped at the source. In addition, adequate defense is part of a good offense. Knowing the homeland is secure, allows the United States greater freedom of action abroad.

There is some question whether the US military currently provides the best mix of offense and defense to ensure the security of the homeland over the long term. There are major strategic issues that do not appear to have been adequately addressed. These include the adequacy of the nation to respond to multiple, catastrophic terrorist attacks, assuring the safety of critical infrastructure, and preparing for new threats that may emerge in the future. Some degree of new strategic thinking, organizational change, and force structure innovation could well be required to meet these needs.

Addressing outstanding security concerns might begin with a fresh appreciation of the strategic guidance given to the department. This could start with scrapping the distinctions between “homeland defense” and “homeland security” that the department has put forward to prescribe and limit its own role in the domestic realm. The department sees its responsibilities as largely homeland defense, protecting US borders and waters against traditional military threats. Homeland security, as defined in the national homeland security strategy is “detecting, preparing for, preventing, protecting against, responding to, and recovering from terrorist threats or attacks within the United States.”¹⁶ The distinctions between homeland “defense” and “security” seem to have little practical or legal utility. Also, it is not clear that America’s enemies will clearly recognize these boundaries and limit their methods and operations so that they can be countered either by the military or other federal agencies as appropriate. In fact, they may seek to use these artificial distinctions to find gaps and seams in US security that can be easily exploited. Second, in practice, many federal agencies will play a role in countering both conventional and terrorist military threats.

The nation would be better served if specific strategic goals for the Defense Department, as with the other federal agencies, were outlined using the six critical mission areas established in the homeland security strategy¹⁷ and modifying the strategy to make it more holistic, accounting for the full range of conventional and unconventional threats to the homeland. The US Coast Guard’s Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security might provide an appropriate model for what a more holistic DoD homeland security strategy might look like.¹⁸

Options for the Future
Within the six critical mission areas there are several concerns where more specific strategic guidance, particularly in the area of force structure initiatives might well be called for. These might not only help better meet domestic security needs, but could assist in addressing future military operations and personnel tempo challenges.¹⁹ Such initiatives might, for example, include the following.

• The Department of Defense should take another hard look at whether it has forces adequately prepared to deal with catastrophic disaster. One challenge that should be more carefully scrutinized is the potential proliferation of nuclear or virulent biological weapons that might be smuggled to a target by ground, sea, or air transport or carried by short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or unmanned aerial or undersea vehicles launched from a covert maritime platform disguised as a commercial or private vessel. These weapons could inflict catastrophic casualties, killing tens of thousands of people and causing hundreds of billions of dollars in damage, destruction on a scale that might well overwhelm civilian response capabilities and require robust military support.²⁰

• If there is a need for national weapons of mass destruction (WMD) response forces, these units could be formed by reorganizing existing National Guard units. Such organizations might resemble the US Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, but be organized on a much larger scale with organic detection, treatment, decontamination, evacuation, mortuary, veterinary, environmental monitoring, mental health, and security assets capable of addressing multiple large-scale disasters simultaneously in different parts of the country. These forces might then be assigned to NORTHCOM, where they could participate in a robust training program with state and local responders. Fielding these units might also help relieve the pressure on state and local governments now struggling to equip and pay first responders to meet what are essentially national security needs.

• An assessment of force requirements also needs to consider the future demand for “homeland security” overseas as well as at home. Many areas where US forces might deploy may face the danger of nuclear, chemical, or biological strikes. Host countries could well lack the robust infrastructure required to respond to these attacks. In addition, international non-governmental organizations are not well prepared to deal with the consequences of a WMD attack. American homeland security forces could be needed to provide consequence management for civil populations areas where US forces are deployed. In fact, all the regional combatant commands might have a use for WMD-response forces provided by NORTHCOM. This arrangement would be in keeping with the guidance established in the last Unified Command Plan revision directing NORTHCOM to provide technical advice and assistance to support other combatant commands in consequence management operations outside the United States.

• In addition, given their medical, security, logistic, engineer, and transport capabilities these forces could also substitute for other conventional units when such assets are in short supply and there is little threat of WMD attacks. It would be better to have WMD-response forces that are well prepared to deal with catastrophic attacks and save thousands of lives, but could also do other military missions, rather than continue with the current force structure which maintains National Guard forces marginally prepared and resourced to do warfighting tasks that would have to be reorganized in an ad hoc manner to respond to a major terrorist strike.

In addition, the Defense Department should assess the requirement for a military force structure primarily designed for critical infrastructure protection. Critical infrastructure forces might also have utility for overseas missions as well. As was seen during Operation Iraqi Freedom, for example, US forces were required to protect and in some cases assist in the reconstitution of critical infrastructure. In the future, these operations might be accomplished by specially skilled units that, as with WMD-response forces, might also be able of performing a wide-range of other more conventional tasks as a secondary mission.

If creating such units is desirable there are a few factors to consider. Setting up these organizations could be done without violating legal prohibitions against employing federal military forces for domestic law enforcement.²¹ By tradition and knowledge of state and local requirements, Reserve Component forces could be well suited to supporting both critical infrastructure and consequence management missions. To facilitate their use, however, it probably makes sense to give the Department of Defense more latitude in organizing, managing, and training Reserve Component Forces. On the other hand, ensuring adequate resources to sustain them could be an issue. NORTHCOM might be given authority similar to that granted to SOCOM to develop and manage its own budget in order to facilitate rapidly developing new capabilities. In addition, the means of funding drug-interdiction support to state and local governments could well serve as model for managing many military homeland security activities.²² Finally, the issue of how best to employ members of the Reserve Components who are civilian emergency responders and who might also be mobilized to respond to military missions both at home and abroad needs to be addressed. This should, however, be seen as a personnel management issue not a strategic impediment to creating new organizations.

It should also be remembered that unlike operations in other theaters military activities will likely not be the centerpiece of homeland security efforts. The Defense Department needs to ensure that whatever forces and command network that does evolve is well designed to support state and local governments and the work of other federal agencies. Efforts should be coordinated closely with the Department of Homeland Security’s objectives for managing the federal response plan which governs how national assets support state and local governments. The Homeland Security Department’s Office of State and Local Coordination could well serve as the focal point for integrating initiatives at all levels into a cohesive national response.

If these units are thoughtfully organized, resourced and balanced with other national response assets they may prove to be the most effective and efficient contribution the federal government could field in providing back-up capabilities for state and regional needs. In addition, they could provide resources to efficiently ramp-up security during periods of heightened alert without state and local governments incurring expensive overtime costs.

In terms of its operational practices, the Defense Department might well be directed to make homeland security more central to its transformation efforts. A case in point is network-centric operations, linking diverse systems together so that warfighters can take full advantage of available information and bring assets to bear in a rapid and flexible manner. Network-centric capabilities may well be one of the centerpieces of defense transformation.²³ In many respects, homeland defense missions could benefit from employing network-centric operations. For example, dealing with covert maritime threats may require tracking thousands of ships and hundreds of ports, integrating the information available to naval forces, the Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security’s Border and Transportation Security Directorate, national law enforcement and intelligence services, local port authority administrators, private-sector shippers, and others.

Rather than viewing domestic security missions as competitors for resources with other military missions worldwide, efforts to protect the homeland should be viewed as a full partner in the transformation effort. Operational practices, concepts, and implementing technologies and force structures designed to serve one combatant command could well be applied to others. There are several areas, in fact, where NORTHCOM could serve as the lead in the transformation effort. Intelligence sharing, interagency coordination, maritime surveillance, air and missile defense, force protection, WMD-defense, critical infrastructure reconstitution, and consequence management are just a few missions where NORTHCOM could develop the blueprint for other commands on implementing network-centric concepts.

The Defense Department might also be directed to undertake some organizational initiatives, particularly ones that would enhance the effectiveness of both NORTHCOM and the newly established Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense and provide a stronger focus for domestic security missions within the Pentagon. For example, one means for strengthening NORTHCOM’s ability to work more closely with the Department of Homeland Security and other federal agencies would be to provide the command a more prominent presence in Washington. Currently, NORTHCOM maintains only a small liaison office in the Pentagon. The command would benefit from the creation of a senior deputy commander and a requisite staff in place at the nation’s capital. To ensure close coordination between NORTHCOM operations and the policymaking in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the department might establish a unique command arrangement, such as appointing a deputy NORTHCOM commander simultaneously as a deputy assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense within the Pentagon.

As the Defense Department reorganizes the civil support mission, it should consider carving out a significant role for NORTHCOM in the planning, training, and day-to-day management of operations. This would allow the assistant secretary to focus more of his primary effort on policy issues, a more appropriate role for the secretariat than managing field operations. In addition, placing NORTHCOM in the routine business of coordinating these missions, even when a large federal military presence is not required, will allow the command to establish solid working relationships with the other federal agencies and state and local governments with which it will have to work intimately in responding to a large-scale disaster or terrorist attack. Having NORTHCOM in the civil support chain of command will help its staff develop the trust and confidence it will need to operate under the stressful demands and pressing time-constraints of a major national response. In particular, expanding NORTHCOM’s responsibilities for planning support for a range of operations, such as preparation for the annual forest fire season where military forces support state fire fighting missions, might provide important dividends in preparing for more dramatic future tasks.

Finally, it would be worthwhile to pursue means to harmonize the Homeland Security and Defense Department’s research and development and acquisition efforts. A case in point is the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship program and the Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater Project, where there are significant efficiencies to be gained from synchronizing these efforts. The Army’s tactical high energy laser is another example of a defense program that could have a number of homeland security applications for protecting critical infrastructure and transportation assets. There are many other initiatives where synergies could be gained as well.²⁴ Lessons should be learned, however, from the successful and unsuccessful attempts to encourage joint defense acquisition programs. The two departments need to be encouraged and enabled to form partnerships that logically provide mutual benefits. One possible model might be establishing an organization similar to the National Security Space Architect which is responsible for developing and integrating the efforts of DoD and the intelligence community by creating a shared-architecture that will serve both their needs over the medium- and far-term.

Conclusion
While great strides have been made in shifting the nation’s national security structure to meet the realities of the post-Cold War world, this is not the time for complacency. The issues raised here are not meant to be comprehensive. They are intended to highlight the institutional obstacles that may be limiting a more thorough and appropriate appreciation of the Defense Department’s future strategic requirements, as well as illustrate what might be achieved if we elect to move beyond the status quo.

A combination of new strategic guidance, organizational change, force structure innovation, and legislative support could well be required to set a better course. Such an approach should include important caveats. Efforts to rethink the military’s role in homeland security should not be taken isolation. They should be balanced with a transformation that accounts for all the Department of Defense’s missions at home and abroad, seeks to make the most effective use of active and reserve forces, and promotes the synergistic and efficient use of military capabilities in coordination with other federal, state, and local assets.

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee I thank you again for holding this hearing and inviting my comments on this important subject.

1. Public Law 107-107 §1511.
2. The National Defense Panel, Assessment of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, np,
   http://www.defenselink.mil/topstory/ndp_assess.html].
3. James Jay Carafano, “The Reserves and Homeland Security: Proposals, Progress, Problems Ahead,” CSBA Backgrounder (June 19 2002), p. 8.
4. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: September 30, 2000), pp. 18-19. The elements of military strategy highlighted in the document also briefly discussed the importance of defending critical infrastructure and mentioned the potential requirement for new force structures or organization to support homeland security.
5. See, for example, Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: 2002), p. 13.
6. Office of the President, The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets (Washington, DC: February 2003), pp. 45-46.
7. Department of Defense, memorandum, subject: Preparedness of U.S. Military Installations and Facilities Worldwide Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Attack, September 5, 2002.
8. “Pentagon Launching New Program to Protect 200 Installations,” Homeland Defense Watch, April 21, 2003, p. 5.
9. Steven Metz, “Military Support to Homeland Security,” paper presented to the Lexington Institute, February 27, 2003, pp. 13-14.
10. Statement by Mr. Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 8, 2003, p. 6.
11. Jim Garamone, “Homeland Defense Chief Speaks of New Responsibilities,” American Forces Press Service, March 19, 2003, np, [http://www.defenselink.mil].
12. Testimony of Andrew F. Krepinevich before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 9, 2002,
    [http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/T.20020409.Defense_Transforma/ T.20020409.Defense_Transforma.htm].
13. Metz, “Military Support to Homeland Security,” p. 14.
14. The only reference related to the homeland is a restatement of the objective in the Quadrennial Defense Review to protect critical base structures against attack. Department of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance (April 2003), p. 10.
15. Department of the Army, Army Transformation Roadmap (2002), p. A-4.
16. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House Executive Order Establishing Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council, October 8, 2001,
    [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011008-2.html].
17. National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. viii. The mission areas include intelligence and early warning, border and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure and key assets, defending against catastrophic threats, and emergency preparedness and response.
18. US Coast Guard Headquarters, Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security (Washington, DC: December, 2002).
19. See, for example, James Jay Carafano, “Shaping the Future of Northern Command,” CSBA Backgrounder (April 25, 2003), p. 5-13.
20. For a notional list of requirements for responding to a catastrophic attack see, Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters, Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), p. 60.
21. Posse Comitatus prohibits federal forces from performing law enforcement activities without the permission of Congress.. The act has never been a serious obstacle to the use of federal forces for domestic operations, nor does it preclude the military from providing logistical support, loaning equipment, and offering technical advice, facilities, and training to civil authorities. Though there is much confusion in this area that might be addressed by more clearly stated and publicized policies, there is strong precedence to support using military forces for homeland security activities. The Posse Comitatus law and other strictures are not significant legal impediments to creating home defense forces. For more on this issue see, Mathew Carlton Hammond, “The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in Need of Renewal,” Washington University Law Quarterly, Summer 1997, p. 3, [http://www.wulaw.wuslt.edu/75-2/752-10.html]; Jeffrey D. Brake, “Terrorism and the Military’s Role in Domestic Crisis Management: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, RL30938, April 19, 2001, p. 11-18; Craig T. Trebilcock, “Posse Comitatus—Has the Posse Outlived Its Purpose?” Center for Strategic and International Studies Working Group, 2000, pp. 1-5.
    
22. James Jay Carafano, “The Reserves and Homeland Security: Proposals, Progress, Problems Ahead,” CSBA Backgrounder (June 19, 2002), p. 9. The proposed National Guard Act of 2003 (S. 215) adopts this strategy, modeling funding programs for homeland security on the current National Guard counterdrug program.
23. Department of Defense, Network Centric Warfare: Report to Congress (July 27, 2001), p. 1.
24. See, for example, Science and Technology for Army Homeland Security: Report 1 (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2003).