Although there is increasing sense that we may be witnessing another period of transformational change in the conduct of war,¹ several sharply divergent views on this emerging revolution in military affairs, or RMA, are readily identifiable.² Current perspectives on the RMA can be characterized by the assumptions that are made about the rate and scope of change in the conduct of war. These perspectives range from denial that a revolution is currently underway—or in the more extreme variant, that revolutions do not even exist—to the view that we are entering a period of continuous revolutionary change in which discrete military regimes will no longer be discernible. Each of these divergent "schools" of thought on the emerging RMA is summarized briefly below.

The Revolution Does Not Exist. Those holding this view—among whom are several former and current senior U.S. flag officers—argue that current change is evolutionary, not revolutionary, and that existing military capabilities will be changed only at the margin over the course of the next two to three decades. Proponents of the "revolution does not exist" school argue further that there is little prospect for more radical change, given both an austere defense fiscal environment and the absence of any significant strategic rivalry within the international system.

The Revolution Has Arrived. The core belief of this group, primarily but not exclusively associated with the most radical air–power theorists, is the dominance of air power, which is seen as a result of dramatic advances in the striking power (via precision) and penetrability (via stealth) of modern aircraft. The revolutionary impact of air power became evident, according to the "revolution has arrived" school, during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

The Revolution Is At Hand. There are two variants of this approach. The narrower view argues that the Persian Gulf War only foreshadowed the dominance of air power, and that a revolution will only be realized after the B–2, F–22, and new precision and wide–area, air–delivered weapons are deployed. Closely related to this air power–based "revolution is at hand" perspective is the view advocated by some civilian strategists within the Office of the Secretary of Defense that a military revolution will be brought about within the next five to ten years by matériel already in the current U.S. force structure or programmed for in the Future Years Defense Plan. In this latter, broader view, the RMA is seen as an inevitable output of near–term U.S. military strategy, or the Bottom–Up Review.

The Revolution Without Pain. Here, a rising RMA tide lifts all boats. While proponents of this view ostensibly buy into the notion of an emerging revolution in military affairs, like those who argue that the "revolution does not exist," or that it is "at hand" as an inevitable result of current U.S. force planning, they envision a revolution which does not render existing military operations obsolete or subordinate, but, instead, makes each of them more effective. According to the middle–grade officers from each of the services, who have advanced the notion of a "revolution without pain," land warfare would still be centered on mechanized—although digitized—combined arms field armies, naval warfare would still be centered around carrier battle groups and amphibious task forces, and air warfare would still be centered on manned air superiority and attack aircraft.

The Hidden Revolution. This idea, which has been most forcefully advocated by Admiral William Owens, the former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, emphasizes joint warfighting and the centrality of long–range precision strike and information supremacy. This vision of an emerging RMA is largely limited to its impact on land combat. While naval and air combat may rely more on information dominance and increased range, the conduct of war in these dimensions is not seen as changing as radically as the conduct of operations on land. No new platforms or new observable combat formations are brought into existence by this RMA—which is munition and C⁴I driven—hence the notion of a "hidden" revolution.

The Multidimensional Revolution. Extending the "hidden revolution" further is the notion that the RMA will transform not only land operations, but also sea and air combat, in addition to bringing warfare into two new dimensions: space and the information spectrum. This vision of the RMA sees future land combat dominated by deep strike operations and non–linear close combat by small, highly mobile, stealthy formations. It sees naval warfare driven below the surface as land and space–based systems are increasingly able to dominate extended sea areas. It envisions large–scale substitution of unmanned for manned systems. It sees reduced need for air superiority operations, but increased need for air mobility operations. It sees the emergence of space warfare as a distinct warfare area via counterspace operations and space–to–ground attack, and the emergence of independent as well as integrated information warfare.

The Micro Revolution. An even more radical extension of the "hidden revolution" is the notion of a platformless "micro revolution." Here, the idea is that a proliferation of inexpensive, micro sensors and weapons systems will make all movement impossible and all existing platforms and forms of combat obsolete. Thus, the micro revolution would potentially render not only the current conventional warfare regime obsolete, but also the strategic nuclear regime.

The Revolution After Next. An alternative, but potentially equally radical vision is the notion of a military revolution derived from the ongoing revolution in biotechnology. This revolution's potential effects are likewise not restricted to the conventional realm, and they are also viewed not merely as a twin of an information revolution–derived RMA, but as a dominant means of waging war. Hence, the notion of the "next revolution."

The Continuous Revolution. This view is derived from the belief that an enduring or sustained information revolution will spawn a series of military revolutions, with increasingly short intervals between them. In this view, the idea of a military regime as a relatively stable equilibrium will itself become obsolete.

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For additional information, contact Michael Vickers or Andrew Krepinevich at (202) 331-7990.

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (formerly the Defense Budget Project) is an independent, nonprofit, public policy research institute established to make clear the inextricable link between near-term and long-range military planning and defense investment strategies. The Center is directed by Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich and funded by foundation grants.

1. See, for example, Thomas E. Ricks, "How Future Wars Are Fought Will Change Radically, Pentagon Planner Says," The Wall Street Journal, July 15, 1994, p. A1, and Bradley Graham, "Battle Plans for a New Century," The Washington Post, February 21, 1995, p. A1.

2. “Revolution in Military Affairs, “ “Military-Technical Revolution” and “Military Revolution” are essentially identical concepts, and should be considered interchangeable here.