The Department of Defense (DoD) is beginning a very ambitious and costly tactical aircraft modernization effort. Under current plans, over the next several decades the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps will buy three different types of new tactical combat aircraft. In fiscal year (FY) 1997 the Navy will begin procurement of the F/A-18E/F. In FY 1999 the Air Force will begin procurement of the F-22 fighter and around FY 2005, the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps will begin procurement of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). These are DoD’s three most costly acquisition programs planned for the FY 1997-FY 2013 period. Altogether, current plans call for the Services to buy as many as 4,400 of these aircraft at a cost that could exceed $350 billion¹ (FY 1997 dollars).² According to DoD, these modernization efforts are necessary if the United States is to sustain over the long term the land- and carrier-based fighter forces called for in the administration’s Bottom-Up Review (BUR) defense plan.

However, based on an evaluation of these plans, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) finds that:³

The Services’ tactical aircraft modernization plans are almost certainly unaffordable, given the amount of funding likely to be available for these efforts.

• The rate of modernization currently envisioned for U.S. tactical air forces may well be excessive, given the relatively slow rate at which potential adversaries appear to be modernizing their air forces.

• Because DoD is buying new aircraft, upgrading existing aircraft and greatly expanding the number of aircraft capable of delivering precision-guided munitions (PGMs), it could probably meet future U.S. security requirements with smaller tactical air forces than currently planned.

• Since future budgets are likely to remain tight, the near-term risks to U.S. security are relatively modest, and we are entering a period of potentially revolutionary change in warfare, DoD should consider: slowing its tactical aircraft modernization plans, adopting a smaller force structure, and investing relatively more in the development and operational testing — though not necessarily serial production — of new systems such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Originally, the Navy’s plan to buy 1,000 F/A-18E/Fs included the acquisition of 660 aircraft for the Navy and 340 aircraft for the Marine Corps. In 1994, however, Marine Corps officials stated that the Service did not intend to buy any F/A-18E/Fs. Instead, under current plans, the Marine Corps will eventually replace of its entire fleet of F/A-18C/Ds and AV-8Bs with a short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) version of the JSF. Nevertheless, the Navy continues to assume a total purchase of 1,000 F/A-18E/Fs. Navy officials argue that, because of possibility that the JSF program could encounter delays and other uncertainties, this remains a prudent assumption.⁵ If only 660 F/A-18E/Fs are in fact produced, the unit procurement cost of the aircraft might increase to as much as $71 million. In this case, buying 660 F/A-18E/Fs would result in total procurement costs of $46.9 billion.⁶

The Air Force’s near-term modernization efforts center on the F-22 fighter, which is intended to replace the Service’s existing fleet of F-15 fighters in the air superiority role. Production of the first four F-22s is scheduled to begin in FY 1999, with aircraft deliveries scheduled to begin in FY 2000. Altogether, the Air Force plans to buy 438 F-22s with production peaking at 48 aircraft a year. The Air Force estimates that this program will cost roughly $70 billion, including $22.7 billion for R&D and $40.0 billion for procurement — about $91 million per aircraft. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has estimated that — assuming historical rates of cost growth — the unit procurement cost of the F-22 is actually likely to reach $108 million. In that case, total procurement costs for the F-22 program would amount to $47.3 billion.

The third major tactical aircraft program being pursued by the Services is the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The JSF is currently being pursued as a technology development program. Eventually, this effort is expected to yield a family of relatively low-cost aircraft for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. Specifically, versions of the JSF are intended to replace the multi-role F-16 in the Air Force, the F-14 air defense fighter in the Navy, and the AV-8B and F/A-18A/B/C/D in the Marine Corps. Production of the JSF is projected to begin around FY 2005, with the first JSF becoming operational in FY 2010. Altogether, the Services plan to buy 2,978 JSFs, with production peaking at 158 aircraft a year. DoD estimates that R&D costs for the JSF program will total about $19.7 billion. Assuming the Services’ cost goals set for the JSF can be met, unit procurement costs for the JSF would average between $45 million and $61 million, depending on the version of the aircraft. This implies total procurement costs for JSF program of some $144.8 billion. By contrast, assuming historical rates of cost growth, CBO has estimated that the JSF program could cost a total of some $218.8 billion, including $21.5 billion for R&D and $197.3 billion for procurement — with unit procurement costs ranging from $63 million to $81 million per aircraft (depending on the version).

Table 1: Tactical Aircraft Acquisition Cost Estimates (in FY 1997 dollars)

Source: CSBA. Based on CBO and DoD data. Taken together, these estimates indicate that the Services plan to buy between 4,076 and 4,416 aircraft of these three new types for a total cost that is likely to range from about $280 billion (assuming DoD’s cost goals are met, and only 660 F/A-18E/Fs are procured) to $356 billion (assuming historical rates of cost growth, and 1,000 F/A-18E/Fs are procured). (See Table 1.) By comparison, during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, DoD bought a total of nearly 4,600 F-15, F-16, F/A-18A/B/C/D, and AV-8B fighters for about $177 billion.⁷ On a per unit basis, the F/A-18E/F will cost about 40-60 percent more to procure than the F/A-18A/B/C/D, while the F-22 will cost 90-130 percent more than the F-15, and the JSF will cost 100-170 percent more than the F-16.

Table II: Joint Strike Fighter

Source: CSBA. Based on CBO and DoD data.

Affordability
It is doubtful that the Services’ current tactical aircraft modernization plans are affordable given likely future budget levels. Historically, procurement funding for tactical combat aircraft has accounted for an average of about 4.6 percent of the Air Force’s budget and 4.0 percent of the Navy’s budget.⁸ Assuming that these same shares are maintained in the future and that the overall budgets of the Air Force and the Navy stay flat in real (inflation-adjusted) terms at the levels currently projected for FY 2001 (the last year for which information on Service budgets is available), CBO has estimated that over the FY 2002-FY 2020 period the Services would have an average of about $6.6 billion a year available for fighter procurement.⁹ By contrast, even assuming the Services’ unit cost goals can be achieved, an average of $9.6 billion a year would be required to pay for the current modernization plan. Worse yet, assuming that — consistent with past experience — CBO’s higher unit cost estimates turn out to be correct, an average of $11.8 billion would be needed to pay for the current plan.¹⁰

In theory, it is of course possible that in the future the Services could achieve and sustain tactical aircraft modernization budgets on the order of $9.6-$11.8 billion a year. This might be possible if, for example, rather than staying flat, the overall Air Force and Navy budgets were to grow in the years beyond the FY 1996-FY 2001 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Alternatively, sufficient funding could be made available for these programs if a greater share of the overall Air Force and Navy budgets were allocated to tactical aircraft modernization. However, neither of these possibilities seem likely to become realities. Rather than increasing, it is probably at least as likely that funding for defense will be cut more deeply after the FYDP.

Although the 1996 congressional budget resolution (CBR) contains more money for defense over the next few years than does the administration’s plan, funding for defense would still continue to decline from current levels. By FY 2002 (the last year for which funding levels are specified in either the CBR or the administration’s plan) the CBR actually projects somewhat lower levels of funding for defense than does the administration. Moreover, given the continued interest in deficit reduction and tax cuts, and the difficulty of identifying, let alone actually implementing, reductions in Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security and other domestic programs, defense budgets may remain an attractive target for cuts for many years to come.

Likewise, it may be difficult to shift funding from within the Air Force and Navy budgets to pay for tactical aircraft modernization programs. Both Services have other major modernization programs competing for their resources. Among other things, current Navy plans call for continued procurement of a large number of surface combatants, and the purchase of new classes of attack submarines and amphibious ships. In the case of the Air Force, competing programs may include airlift and tanker modernization, and command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) programs.¹¹ An even greater obstacle to using funding from elsewhere within the Air Force and Navy budgets to pay for tactical aircraft modernization programs may be the prospect of increasing operations and support (O&S) costs. Current DoD plans assume that O&S costs, which (as defined here) include military pay, operations and maintenance, family housing, and military construction costs, will decline over the next few years as a result of reductions in overhead and infrastructure (e.g., base closures). If these savings do not materialize or, worse yet, O&S costs increase in the future at anything like the annual rates at which they grew during the Cold War, the Services could be hard pressed to provide tactical aircraft modernization efforts with even their historical share of funding.

Finally, it is worth noting that the actual cost of DoD’s long-term fighter modernization plans could be substantially higher than the $356 billion estimated here if DoD were to decide to build a replacement for the Air Force’s deep-interdiction aircraft, the F-15E and the F-117. DoD has stated that it may be necessary to begin procuring such an aircraft, known as the Replacement Interdiction Aircraft (RIA) sometime after FY 2010.¹² Given the requirements for this aircraft, it seems likely that its unit cost would be at least as high as the F-22’s.

Are Current Modernization Plans Necessary?
A strong case can be made that the U.S. could maintain a dominant lead in air-to-air and air-to-ground combat capabilities over the foreseeable future with significantly smaller and less modern forces than are projected in current plans. Current U.S. plans call for keeping a force of some 3,500 combat aircraft over the long-term. By comparison, the three countries typically identified as potential adversaries — Iran, Iraq and North Korea — have a combined total of only about 1,200 aircraft.¹³ And these forces are projected to decline to about 1,000 aircraft by 2005. Moreover, these aircraft are also greatly inferior to U.S. combat aircraft in terms of quality. According to CBO, today only about 100 of these aircraft are comparable in design to current-generation U.S. fighters, and this number is projected to grow to only about 120 by 2005.¹⁴

In attempting to justify their modernization plans, Air Force and Navy officials have pointed to the fact that, even if those plans are followed, the average age of the Air Force’s and Navy’s fighter forces will increase substantially over the next decade. Specifically, the Air Force estimates that the average age of its fighter fleet will increase from about 9.5 years in FY 1996 to some 17.5 years in FY 2006,¹⁵ before beginning to decline again around 2010. Similarly, the Navy and Marine Corps estimate that the average age of their fighter forces will increase from about 10 years in FY 1996 to 14 years in FY 2007, before falling to about 12 years in FY 2013.¹⁶ To be sure, older aircraft can develop structural problems and may require repairs, modifications and upgrades to increase their service lives. However, it is far from clear that the increasing age of the fighter fleet should be an especially great concern.

The average age of the U.S. fighter force consistently increased throughout the Cold War, reflecting — among other things — the maturation of fighter technology and decreases in peacetime attrition rates. Given the fact that many of the most important strides in fighter technology now concern improvements in avionics (e.g., navigation and targeting capabilities) — which can often be retrofitted into existing aircraft — rather than aerodynamic and other structural improvements, a continuation of this trend toward increasing service lives may well be appropriate.¹⁷ In short, it appears that aircraft age is becoming a progressively less useful gauge of aircraft capabilities.

In any case, the trend toward older aircraft is hardly restricted to the United States. The delivery of combat aircraft to countries of the developing world has dropped dramatically over the past decade. According to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the number of combat aircraft delivered to developing countries dropped from an average of 578 a year over the 1983-85 period to only 146 a year over the 1992-1994 period.¹⁸ This suggests that the average age of fighter fleets in the developing world is also substantially increasing. There is also some evidence that countries are modernizing their ground-based air defense forces less rapidly than they did during the Cold War. According to ACDA data, deliveries of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to the developing world have fallen from an average of about 6,726 per year over the 1983-84 period to some 1,082 per year over the 1992-94 period.¹⁹

These trends certainly do not provide a complete picture of the air-to-air and SAM threats likely to face U.S. air forces in the future. Among other things, it is possible that potential adversaries are making (or will make) significant improvements to existing aircraft and SAMs through modifications and upgrades. These trends also tell us nothing about what steps these countries might be taking to improve their command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) capabilities, upon which the effective functioning of air defense systems critically depend. Nevertheless, recent trends in aircraft and SAM deliveries do suggest that Pentagon concerns about the aging of the U.S. tactical aircraft fleet may be substantially overstated. Finally, at a more general level, the fact that, according to ACDA, the value of all major arms deliveries to the developing world declined by some 80 percent over the 1984-1994 period may also suggest that DoD could afford to take a slower approach to fighter modernization and adopt a smaller tactical aircraft force structure than called for under current plans.

Precision-Guided Munitions (PGMs)
Another factor that may indicate that the United States could afford to reduce the size and slow the rate of modernization of its fighter fleet is the enormous expansion of that fleet’s capability to deliver precision-guided munitions (PGMs). The 17,000 PGMs used by U.S. air forces contributed significantly to the success of the allied air campaign during the Gulf War (although just how critical PGMs were to the U.S. victory is the subject of some debate).²⁰ In a future war, the contribution made by PGMs would likely be even greater.

Laser-guided bombs (LGBs) were the most widely used and perhaps the most effective type of PGM employed by U.S. air forces during the war. However, the ability to employ LGBs during the Gulf War was severely constrained because of the relatively small number of aircraft in the U.S. inventory equipped with laser designators. The United States had only 229 aircraft capable of delivering LGBs during the Gulf War. By comparison, because of the installation of “low-altitude navigation and targeting for night” (LANTIRN) pods on F-15Es and some F-16s, today the U.S. Air Force has nearly 500 LGB-capable aircraft.²¹ Moreover the number of aircraft configured to carry PGMs, as well as the number and effectiveness of PGMs is projected to grow substantially over the next decade.

The United States currently possesses a vast inventory of relatively modern PGMs. Over the past several decades, DoD has procured some 122,000 air-to-surface PGMs, as well as some 4,000 sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles.²² Moreover, in order to improve U.S. PGM capabilities and ensure that U.S. forces are capable of effectively defeating the kinds of threats that might emerge in future years, current plans also call for the Services to buy large quantities of new PGMs. In particular, the Services are projected to buy a total of some 74,000 Joint Attack Munitions (JDAMs), a relatively inexpensive kit that can be attached to existing “dumb” bombs,²³ and 23,800 Joint Standoff Weapons (JSOWs), a more expensive unpowered glide bomb.²⁴ Both weapons will rely (at least in their initial versions) on information from DoD’s Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite network for guidance and, as such, will be capable of being delivered from almost any combat aircraft. In addition to these relatively short-range systems, current plans also call for acquiring about 2,400 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs), which are projected to have a range of some 180 km.²⁵

Broader Airpower Picture
In considering the appropriateness of current U.S. fighter modernization plans it is critical to remember that fighters are only one element of U.S. airpower, and fighter modernization is only one of the elements affecting the capabilities of fighter forces. The substantial edge in numbers and quality of fighter aircraft enjoyed by U.S. air forces during the Gulf War was not the only factor that contributed to the stunning success of those forces. Also of great importance were a variety of other factors, including: the vastly superior training provided to U.S. pilots and ground support personnel; the refueling capability provided by DoD’s large fleet of tanker aircraft; the targeting, intelligence and other battle management information provided by DoD’s unmatched network C3I systems (e.g., satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft); the vast fleet of airlift aircraft that helped deploy and supply U.S. forces, including tactical air forces, sent to the Gulf; and long-range bombers (B-52s). It was the ability of DoD to effectively integrate all of these different capabilities that allowed the United States to achieve such a decisive victory in the Gulf War.

Likewise, the effectiveness of the U.S. military in a future air campaign will depend on the quality of U.S. military personnel and their training, the existence of a wide variety of supporting capabilities, and the ability of DoD to effectively integrate these capabilities. Unfortunately, there is a real danger that, if DoD moves ahead with its current fighter modernization plans, insufficient funding will be available to provide for high levels of training or adequately fund various supporting capabilities — some of which, like C3I and PGMs, are likely to become even more critical in a future conflict.

An Alternative Approach
The current strategic environment is marked by a number of salient realities. First, the near-term military threats facing the United States are relatively modest. Second, if history is any guide, over the longer term there is a significant danger that a great power competitor to the United States will emerge. Third, we are on the cusp of a military revolution that could dramatically transform the ways in which wars are fought, although precisely how is unclear.²⁶ Fourth, over the long term, funding for defense — which is likely to continue to decline or at best stay relatively flat in real terms — will almost certainly prove insufficient to pay for the administration's current defense plan, including its fighter modernization plans.

Given these realities, DoD’s present approach to planning future fighter capabilities appears to be off track. Current Pentagon planning assumes that future challenges will closely resemble those faced by the U.S. military in the Cold War and the Gulf War. As a result, not surprisingly, the forces called for in its long-term plans closely resemble the kinds of forces used during those conflicts. Thus, under current plans the U.S. air forces existing 10 or 20 years from now are projected to be far more modern and capable (and costly) than those existing today. But the forces are also projected to be essentially the same kinds of forces, organized in roughly the same way and intended to accomplish essentially the same missions, as the U.S. tactical air forces existing during the Cold War and the Gulf War.

But in fact, the Pentagon’s toughest future competitors are unlikely to be updated versions of the Soviet Union or Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The next several decades will be marked by dramatic advances in technology, especially information and information-related technologies. In turn, these advances, when combined with the creation and adoption of new operational concepts are likely to change profoundly the ways wars are fought. It is impossible to predict exactly how the nature of warfare will be changed. But some of the changes on the horizon could call into serious question the appropriateness DoD’s current tactical aircraft plans.

Among other things, there is good reason to believe that, because of the proliferation of increasingly accurate ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, and the growing access of many countries to satellite imagery, the in-theater air bases from which U.S. Air Force and Marine Corps fighters would have to operate in wartime will become increasingly vulnerable. Likewise, these improvements in long-range strike capabilities, combined with advances in anti-ship mines and submarines, could significantly increase the dangers posed to U.S. aircraft carriers — and thus decrease the effectiveness of U.S. carrier-based aviation.²⁷ On the other hand, there is also strong evidence to suggest that advances in technology could greatly increase the value to U.S. forces of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including weaponized UAVs, long-range precision-strike munitions (PGMs) and other new weapon systems.

The fact that we are at the beginning of a military revolution that could lead to dramatic changes in the ways wars are fought does not mean that the United States should abandon entirely its current aircraft modernization plans. However, when combined with the relative paucity of near-term threats, the prospect of increasing threats in the future, and flat or declining defense budgets, the coming revolution in military affairs does suggest that a substantially different approach to tactical aircraft modernization might be more appropriate.

This alternative approach would involve the adoption of lower tactical aircraft force structure goals and, in the near term, buying smaller numbers of new fighters than currently planned. Taken together, these two steps would help bring planned programs in line with projected resources, and help ensure that sufficient funding is available to cover the cost of developing and experimenting with some new types of forces, and to create options for procuring and fielding those new systems relatively rapidly if and when the emergence of new threats warrants it.

Describing in detail what such an approach might look like is well beyond the scope of this analysis; however, it might include:

• Reducing the number of Air Force tactical fighter wings and Navy carrier air wings (as well as carrier battle groups) below the level called for in the BUR.

• Slow, low-rate production of the F-22 and possibly procuring only a relatively small “silver bullet” force of these aircraft.

• Slow, low-rate production of the F/A-18E/F, with production being increased only if the aircraft proves, during operational testing, to be significantly more capable than the F/A-18C/D. If the F/A-18E/F does not prove to be significantly more capable, the Navy should instead consider procuring additional F/A-18C/Ds. Even if it does prove to be a significant improvement over the F/A-18C/D, the planned procurement of F/A-18E/Fs should be reduced to reflect the Marine Corps’ decision not to buy the aircraft and the fact that the number of carrier battle groups included in DoD’s long-term plan probably should and will eventually be cut.

• Continuing development of the JSF, while deferring a decision on how many of these aircraft should ultimately be procured. A decade from now the future will have become nearer and clearer. If, at that time, it appears that manned aircraft will continue to play a dominant role in warfare for the foreseeable future, it may be necessary to buy substantial numbers of JSF. Alternatively, if UAVs or other new technologies have demonstrated significant potential, a significantly smaller buy of JSF might be appropriate.²⁸

• Creating strategic options for the future by engaging in vigorous experimentation, testing and evaluation of new kinds of systems such as stealthy long-range UAVs and weaponized UAVs, and long-range PGMs, as well as new kinds of Air Force and Navy organizations.

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (formerly the Defense Budget Project) is an independent, nonprofit, public policy institute established to make clear the inextricable link between near-term and long-range military planning and defense investment strategies. The Center is directed by Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich.

1. Cindy Williams, Assistant Director, National Security Division, Congressional Budget Office (CBO), “Modernizing Tactical Aircraft,” statement before the Subcommittee on Military Research and Development and the Subcommittee on Military Procurement, House National Security Committee, June 27, 1996, p. 1.

2. Unless otherwise stated, all figures in this analysis are expressed in FY 1997 dollars.

3. See also, Steven Kosiak, The Air Force of the 21st Century: A Budgetary Perspective (Washington, DC: CSBA, October 1996).

4. This is the unit procurement cost of the aircraft. In contrast to recurring unit flyaway costs, unit procurement costs include not only the cost of procuring the aircraft itself, but also the cost of other items such as initial spares and ground-support equipment that is also paid for through the procurement account. Unit procurement costs are typically 30-40 percent higher than recurring unit flyaway costs. Unit procurement costs do not include any R&D costs. Unless otherwise noted, the cost estimates for the F/A-18E/F, F-22 and JSF programs contained in this analysis are taken from Cindy Williams, CBO, p. 5.

5. General Accounting Office (GAO), Navy Aviation: F/A-18E/F will Provide Marginal Operational Improvement at High Cost, GAO/NSIAD-96-98, p. 96.

6. The Navy projects recurring flyaway costs for the F/A-18E/F of $46 million per aircraft, assuming a 1,000-aircraft buy. In addition, the Navy estimates that other associated procurement costs will amount to an average of about $15 million per aircraft, yielding a unit procurement cost of $61 million. According to the GAO, the lower (and less efficient) production rate consistent with a 660-aircraft buy would increase recurring flyaway costs by about 22 percent. Ibid., p. 50. This suggests that recurring flyaway cost would grow to $56 million and unit procurement costs to $71 million ($56 million + $15 million).

7. Ibid., p. 7.

8. These figures reflect funding over the FY 1974-FY 1997 period.

9. Ibid., pp. 24.

10. Ibid., pp. 30.

11. The Air Force eventually plans to replace its current fleet of C-130E intra-theater airlift aircraft with the C-130J. In addition, the Air Force is considering procuring replacements for the C-5A inter-theater transport and the KC-135 tanker. Finally, it might be reasonable to assume that funding for C3I programs will increase (at least as a share of DoD funding) over the coming decades, given the likely greater importance of “information dominance” in future warfare.

12. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 1996), p. 181.

13. Cindy Williams, “Modernizing Tactical Aircraft,” CBO, p. 14.

14. For its discussion of adversary air forces, the CBO analysis drew heavily from an analysis recently released by the Office of Naval Intelligence.

15. Perry, Annual Report, p. 179.

16. Ibid.

17. One area where dramatic improvements can probably only be achieved through the production of new aircraft designs is in stealth.

18. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 1996), p. 171.

19. Ibid.

20. For a relatively critical assessment of the performance of PGMs during the Gulf War, see GAO, “Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air War,” GAO/PEMD-96-10, July 1996, pp. 4-5.

21. GAO, “Operation Desert Storm: Evaluation of the Air War,” p. 11.

22. CSBA estimate based on GAO and DoD data. See, GAO “Weapons Acquisition: Precision-Guided Munitions in Inventory, Production, and Development,” GAO/NSIAD-95-95, pp. 12-13.

23. DoD originally estimated that JDAM kits would cost an average of $40,000-$48,000 apiece. Current estimates project costs of some $18,000 per kit. Tony Capaccio, “Smartly Bought Smart Bomb Contractor Selected,” Defense Week, October 16, 1995, p. 3.

24. GAO, “Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions in Inventory, Production, and Development,” p.13. The JSOW is projected to have a unit procurement cost of some $180,000. CBO, Options for Enhancing the Bomber Force, July 1995, p. 24.

25. Philip Finnegan and Robert Holzer, “JASSM Pick May Delay Missile Industry Consolidation,” Defense News, June 24-30, 1996, p. 48.

26. Andrew Krepinevich, The Air Force of 2016 (Washington, DC: CSBA, October 1996).

27. See, Andrew Krepinevich, The Air Force of 2016 and Andrew Krepinevich, A New Navy For a New Era (Washington, DC: CSBA, May 1996).

28. Gen. Ronald Fogleman, the Air Force Chief of Staff, has also suggested that later versions of the JSF might be unmanned. John A. Tirpak, “First Force,” Air Force, September 1996, p. 39.