Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are unmanned aircraft generally used to provide surveillance and reconnaissance information to military commanders. UAVs were first employed extensively to conduct reconnaissance missions during the Vietnam War. Today’s UAVs incorporate cutting-edge intelligence-gathering technologies, including TV cameras, radars and infrared sensors. They range from small, remotely controlled drones resembling model airplanes to glider-sized UAVs that can fly independently for hundreds of miles on preprogrammed missions. In the future, UAVs will likely be used to conduct an expanded range of missions, including long-range precision strikes against ground targets and close air support.

This Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) backgrounder provides a brief introduction to UAVs generally and to the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) UAV programs in particular. CSBA’s major findings are that:

• DoD is currently pursuing a number of different UAV efforts, including the Pioneer, Outrider, Predator, Global Hawk, and DarkStar programs. Some of these programs, like some past efforts, have encountered significant technical problems and unanticipated cost growth. On the other hand, UAVs have proven to be highly effective in certain roles: for instance, over the past three years DoD has made use of UAVs for reconnaissance missions in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia.

• Given expected technological advances in the miniaturization of electronics, stealth and munitions, and changing concepts of operation, the importance of UAVs is likely to grow, perhaps dramatically, over the coming decades.

• UAVs may be particularly useful in helping U.S. forces meet two emerging challenges. First, UAVs may help U.S. forces operate effectively in forward areas that might otherwise be rendered inaccessible by an adversary equipped with ballistic and cruise missiles, submarines, mines, and other “anti-access” capabilities.¹ Second, UAVs may contribute to the effectiveness of U.S. forces used to fight or conduct peacekeeping operations in the growing number of urban areas in the developing world.

• Notwithstanding the potentially revolutionary impact that UAVs could have on the way wars are fought in the future, DoD’s investment in UAVs remains relatively modest. Over the last two decades, DoD has spent about $2 billion on UAV development and procurement. For fiscal year (FY) 1998, the administration is requesting $445 million in UAV acquisition funding. By comparison, the administration’s FY 1998 request includes $5.5 billion in acquisition funding for DoD’s three major tactical aircraft programs, the F/A-18E/F, F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter programs.

• Over the FY 1998-FY 2003 period, the administration plans to spend a total of $1.8 billion to acquire UAVs—equivalent to about 3 percent of the roughly $50 billion² budget planned for these three tactical aircraft programs over the same period. The amount to be provided for UAV programs over the next five years is also far less than projected for attack submarines ($10.7 billion), combat helicopters ($6.9 billion)³ and many other traditional weapons programs. These simple comparison certainly do not prove that DoD should spend more on UAVs and less on these other programs. They do, however, suggest that a relatively small shift in funding from tactical aircraft efforts or other traditional weapons programs would be sufficient to permit a far more robust and ambitious UAV effort than currently envisioned.⁴

In addition, UAVs differ in terms of the payloads they carry and the manner in which they are controlled. Today’s UAVs can carry a wide variety of payloads, including TV cameras, radars, infrared seekers, electronic signals intelligence equipment, lasers, meteorological sensors, as well as sensors to detect chemical agents and radioactivity.⁵ They could also be equipped to carry precision-guided munitions (PGMs) with which to hit ground targets. Furthermore, the Army is experimenting with the use of UAVs to shoot down theater-range ballistic missiles during their boost phase, just after launch.

Some UAVs fly pre-programmed flight paths, while others can be remotely piloted, via radio link, by pilots on the ground. Sensor-equipped UAVs also differ in the manner in which the collected data is retrieved. In some cases the data (e.g., film) is retrieved when the UAV is recovered. In other cases the information is transmitted in real time, via data link, from the UAV to the ground station.

Figure 1: Diagram of Predator UAV Concept of Operation

Source: Department of Defense.

Although the elements that make up a UAV system can vary as well, they typically consist of the following: the UAVs themselves, ground vehicles to transport the UAVs, launching and recovery platforms, a flight control station, and stations to retrieve and process the information collected by the UAVs.⁶ (See Figure 1 for an illustration of how a typical UAV surveillance system operates.) It is also important to note that information collected by UAVs is not, at least ideally, used in isolation. Rather, it is integrated into the overall command, control, communications, and intelligence (C³I) network, supplementing information from satellites, manned surveillance aircraft such as the Air Force’s Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) and other sources.

Advantages and Disadvantages of UAVs
Compared to manned aircraft, UAVs have a number of potentially significant advantages. Among other things, UAVs are smaller,⁷ and thus generally more difficult to detect; much less costly, both to procure and to operate and support;⁸ capable of longer loiter times; and, perhaps most importantly, UAVs avoid putting pilots and other crew at risk. Likewise, UAVs have some significant advantages over satellites, including the ability to fly close to the ground, under cloud cover, and to provide coverage on short notice, rather than only on a predictable schedule. These advantages make UAVs especially well suited to providing even relatively low-level commanders with real-time reconnaissance of the battlefield in their area of operations.

UAVs also suffer from a number of limitations compared to manned aircraft and satellites. Current-generation UAVs lack the mission flexibility possible with a pilot in the cockpit. Moreover, UAVs cannot generally be maneuvered as easily or unpredictably as manned aircraft. In addition, some ground-controlled UAVs depend on access to limited and expensive satellite communication, which is vulnerable to interference. Likewise, compared to satellites, UAVs cannot cover as large an area on as persistent a basis and are more vulnerable to being shot down.⁹

This brief discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of UAVs compared to manned aircraft and satellites suggests that over the short-term the best approach for DoD is to invest in a mix of all three types of systems, as it is now doing. The real question is not whether DoD should replace either manned aircraft or satellites with UAVs, but whether, given the promise UAVs appear to hold and the relatively small amount of funding being invested in these programs, DoD should be placing a higher priority on UAV programs than it is under current plans.

History of UAVs¹⁰
Unmanned aerial vehicles were first used to conduct surveillance missions during the Korean War. Extensive use of UAVs in this role, however, began during the Vietnam War. From 1965 to 1972, UAVs provided surveillance over areas of China, North Vietnam and the Far East that were too dangerous for manned aircraft. Launched from C-130 aircraft, Teledyne Ryan’s Frisbee UAVs flew over 3,000 missions, supplying tactical information to commanders that satellites could not. However, several problems limited the usefulness of the Frisbee. Perhaps most importantly, it proved difficult to identify the areas photographed, and a significant period of time typically elapsed before the film was developed and made available to local commanders.¹¹

After the Vietnam War, DoD began to develop a new UAV intended to remedy many of the shortcomings exhibited by UAVs during the war. In 1979, DoD awarded Lockheed Corporation a contract to build a new UAV dubbed the Aquila. Unfortunately, the Aquila—which was to include evasive maneuver, night-time target designation and an anti-jam data link capabilities—proved to be too ambitious for the available technology. It experienced both technical problems and significant cost growth and, after having spent about $1 billion, DoD cancelled the program in 1987.

At the same time the ill-fated Aquila program was under development in the United States, the Israeli military began to demonstrate the effectiveness of UAVs when used in a number of different roles. Specifically, in the early 1980s, the Israelis began to use UAVs to gather intelligence about Syrian air defense sites located in Lebanon. In 1982, Israeli forces used their Mastiff and Scout UAVs to draw fire from Syrian surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, allowing Israeli manned fighters to locate and destroy the sites.¹²

Noting Israel’s success, in 1984 the U.S. Navy began purchasing the Israeli Mastiff II to provide reconnaissance support for, and help direct gunfire from, the Navy’s battleships. The Service also pushed for the development of a new UAV. In the mid 1980s, the Navy awarded a contract to develop and procure the new Pioneer UAV to a joint venture consisting of a U.S. firm (AAI Corporation) and an Israeli firm (Maslat). Ultimately, DoD purchased nine Pioneer UAV systems, with each system comprising eight UAVs and a ground station.¹³

UAVs also piqued the interest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), who started reviewing requirements for programs in 1984. The Joint Chiefs determined that advances in sensors, electronics miniaturization, airfoil design and lightweight materials were sufficient to overcome the technical problems that had limited the effectiveness of previous UAV efforts. The JCS believed that these advances would make it possible to build lightweight UAVs with longer loiter times that could quickly transmit sensor data, including instantaneous video imagery, to end users and to link UAV data-gathering to DoD’s overall intelligence architecture.

These early investments in unmanned aerial vehicles clearly paid off during the Gulf War, when UAVs filled in gaps in the intelligence coverage provided by satellites and manned reconnaissance aircraft. In its final report on Desert Storm, DoD noted, “During one mission, a Pioneer located three Iraqi artillery battalions, three free-rocket-over-ground launch sites, and an antitank battalion . . . . [Pioneers] proved excellent at providing an immediately responsive intelligence collection capability.”¹⁴ As in Lebanon, UAVs drew fire from enemy air defenses, exposing them to strikes by U.S. manned aircraft, located Iraqi forces, and surveyed attack routes. UAVs also proved highly effective in assessing battle damage.

DoD learned two key lessons from its Gulf War experience with UAVs. First, not enough UAVs were available for fielding to meet the demand. Indeed, due to the scarcity of UAVs, DoD would have pressed into service Teledyne Ryan’s Model 324 UAV, built for the Egyptian military, if the Gulf War had lasted much longer.¹⁵ Second, the fact that UAVs had proven useful for a range of missions during the Gulf War persuaded DoD that it would be better to develop a family of UAVs rather than one, all-purpose vehicle. Thus, DoD decided to pursue tactical UAVs for front-line operations, medium-range UAVs to survey the general area of operations, long-range, high-endurance UAVs to search for distant targets, and low-observable UAVs for searching in well-defended areas.

DoD has used UAVs in contingency operations in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia since September 1994. UAVs were used in Bosnia prior to the Dayton peace accords for variety of reconnaissance missions, including monitoring suspected mass grave sites to detect any tampering. Today, UAVs are being used to help implement the peace agreement by, for example, tracking combatants’ attempts to illegally camouflage equipment and conceal various actions.

UAVs and the Future Conflict Environment
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world has undergone a geopolitical revolution. Moreover, we are currently in the midst of a technological revolution, related especially to the dramatic advances being made in such areas as miniaturization, stealth and information technologies. The combination of the changed geopolitical environment and the ongoing technological revolution may have profound implications for the way wars are fought in the future, and for the kinds of forces and weapon systems that will dominate future battlefields.¹⁶ Some of the new kinds of operations that may evolve from this transformation of warfare are long-range precision strike, space control, information warfare, and missile defense. UAVs could prove particularly effective in carrying out long-range precision strike, close air support and information warfare operations. ¹⁷

• Long-range precision strike: In the case of long-range precision strike, UAVs could be deployed as part of a larger reconnaissance and precision strike architecture. Detailed near real-time data from UAVs could be used to enhance the targeting of PGMs, and to provide both mid-course corrections to PGMs and post-strike battle damage assessments. In addition, as noted earlier, UAVs could be equipped to carry their own PGMs.¹⁸

• Close air support: Because they could be operated from locations near the forward edge of the battle area and directed by local commanders (leading to short response times), PGM-equipped UAVs might also prove highly effective at providing time-urgent close air support to ground units.

• Information warfare: UAVs might provide a hedge against some forms of information warfare because they are relatively inexpensive and survivable. For instance, if part of the U.S. satellite constellation were rendered inoperable, some reconnaissance and surveillance functions could be quickly replicated by launching a fleet of high-altitude, high-endurance UAVs.

• Anti-access challenge: UAVs could help defeat such an anti-access strategy in a number of ways. High-endurance, long-range UAVs could assist in the search for enemy mobile ballistic missile launchers. As mentioned earlier, it might also be possible to provide specialized UAVs with a capability to shoot down theater-range ballistic missiles during their initial boost phase. In addition, since many UAVs do not require the lengthy runways manned aircraft require, and some short-range systems can even be launched and recovered from unprepared fields, UAVs may be able to substitute for manned aircraft in many roles, especially early in a conflict when access to large air bases is limited.

• Urbanization of warfare: UAVs might also be well-suited for future military operations, whether peacekeeping or combat, that take place in urban settings. The world is becoming increasingly urbanized, thanks in part to demographic trends in the developing world. Moreover, U.S. forces have experienced difficulties operating in urban environments in the recent past (e.g., Beirut and Mogadishu). Small, short-range and micro-UAVs could play an important role in improving the success and survivability of U.S. forces operating in urban areas. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is in the midst of developing micro-UAVs. These tiny UAVs, which might be no larger than six inches long or wide, are being designed to detect biological or chemical warfare agents and for use as listening devices in buildings. It might be possible to use small, tactical UAVs and, eventually, micro-UAVs to monitor streets and investigate building interiors to protect U.S. units from ambushes and snipers, help troops locate friendly units or noncombatants, and avoid sites containing biological and chemical agents.

Current U.S. UAV Programs

DoD is currently pursuing a number of different UAV efforts, including the Pioneer, Outrider, Predator, Global Hawk, and DarkStar programs. Each of these programs is designed to meet different mission requirements. Operational since 1986, the Pioneer is a short-range (100 miles) tactical reconnaissance UAV that has been used by the Army, Marine Corps and Navy. The Outrider is a new tactical UAV now under development that will eventually replace the Pioneer. The Predator is a new medium-range (500 miles) UAV designed for use in reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition roles. Global Hawk and DarkStar are complementary programs currently under development. Global Hawk is long-range (3,000 miles), high-endurance UAV intended to provide long-range surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities in relatively benign environments. By contrast, the DarkStar is optimized for operations in heavily defended airspace, trading off range for a less conventional, stealthy design.

As noted earlier, funding for UAV systems is quite modest compared to many other weapons programs, including manned aircraft and satellites. DoD’s FY 1998 request includes a total of $116.5 million in procurement and $338.7 million in research and development (R&D) funding for the various UAV programs. DoD projects total acquisition funding of about $1.8 billion for these programs over the FY 1998-FY 2003 period. (Table II provides a breakdown of UAV funding from FY 1996 to FY 1999.)

Table II: Funding Requests for Specific UAV programs as of February 1997**** (in millions of dollars)

*The $12 million for the Hunter in FY 1997 is in the operations and maintenance (O&M) account to bring Hunters out of storage for training and experimentation only.

**The Common Ground Segment is used for both Global Hawk and DarkStar.

***R&D funding in FY 1999 is provided by UAV category only (tactical and endurance). For FY 1998, the Outrider R&D request was $87.5 million; the remaining funding in the R&D tactical UAV request was unspecified.

****FY 1996 is actual, FY 1997 is estimated, and FY 1998 and FY 1999 are proposed funding levels.

Congressional Action
In past years, Congress has generally supported DoD’s UAV programs. It has, however, exercised extensive oversight, reflecting concerns and differences with DoD over the cost, pace and direction of UAV programs. The large measure of attention Congress has paid to UAV programs stems primarily from DoD’s handling of three UAV programs, the Aquila, Medium Range UAV and Hunter UAV. Each of these programs was eventually cancelled, mainly due to technical problems and cost growth. Moreover, Congress would prefer DoD to concentrate on developing only a few types of UAVs with a high degree of commonality. By contrast, DoD’s preferred approach has been to pursue a range of specialized UAVs. The following section provides a brief chronology of congressional oversight of DoD’s UAV programs.

• After DoD cancelled the Aquila, Congress directed it to establish a centralized UAV program to avoid the duplication of effort and infighting among the Services that was thought to have contributed to the failure of the Aquila program. Specifically, the FY 1988 Continuing Appropriations Act required DoD to submit a UAV master plan that would be executed under centralized direction. The act further stated, “The conferees agreed to eliminate funding within the services’ separate RDT&E accounts for individual RPV [remotely piloted vehicles],¹⁹ and to consolidate these efforts in a Joint RPV Program.” As a result, in 1988 DoD formed the Joint Program Office (JPO) under the aegis of the Navy’s Air Systems Command. One goal of the JPO was to integrate as much commercial technology as possible to facilitate the development of UAVs and to hasten the fielding of operationally effective UAVs.

• Congressional frustration with the pace of UAV development and fielding continued into the early 1990s. In 1993 DoD cancelled the Medium Range UAV, a jet-powered UAV then in development which was designed to precede strike aircraft into hostile airspace and relay near-real-time video back to the incoming aircraft. The program was cancelled due to a combination of technical problems, cost growth and lack of interest among the Services.²⁰ In the FY 1994 defense authorization act Congress declared that “the conferees have repeatedly expressed concern about the lack of progress the UAV JPO is making. The conferees have also expressed disappointment with the proliferation of unique vehicle programs which have been designed to fill disparate categories of requirements.” Further, Congress stated that DoD needed a new UAV management structure and that programs for unmanned and manned reconnaissance, sensor development and ground station support should be directed by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. In response, DoD created the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office (DARO) in November 1993. DARO is charged with the overall policy and budgeting for all joint service and defense-wide manned and unmanned airborne reconnaissance efforts, including development, demonstration and acquisition program activities.

• Congress again expressed its displeasure with DoD’s handling of UAV programs in the FY 1997 defense authorization act. Particular points of contention included DoD’s refusal to release its analysis supporting cancellation of the Hunter UAV program; DoD’s decision to merge the Army and Marine Corps requirements for a tactical UAV into one program, Outrider; and the potential for cost growth in the DarkStar program. Pending receipt of specific DoD reports, Congress also has restricted the use of Outrider funds.

• The Senate appropriators, in the FY 1997 defense appropriations bill, had harsh words regarding DoD’s management of UAV and other airborne reconnaissance programs: “These instances of multimillion dollar reprogramming of appropriated funds after formal appropriations deliberations were concluded have clearly improperly circumvented the oversight authority of the Committee.” In reaction to this shifting of funds, the Senate appropriators directed DoD to request separate funding for each UAV program in the future. This provision was included in the final FY 1997 defense appropriations act passed by Congress. The act also directed DoD to transfer any procurement funding to the Services’ accounts.

• In April 1997 the General Accounting Office (GAO) testified before Congress on the results of a recent study of DoD’s UAV acquisition efforts.²¹ GAO noted that DoD’s UAV programs have had a mixed degree of success over the last 20 years. Of the eight programs GAO studied, only two are operational, Pioneer and Predator. Three others (Outrider, Global Hawk and DarkStar) are in development, and the remainder have been cancelled. GAO concluded that DoD has had difficulties in moving from the development to the procurement of UAV programs for three reasons. First, DoD tends to inflate the original design requirements, sometimes interfering with the UAV’s ability to perform its stated mission. Second, while DoD relies on mature technologies for its UAV programs, because these technologies are often commercial technologies, they are sometimes incapable of withstanding the rigors of military operations. Lastly, GAO found that, while DoD has tested the UAV air vehicles, it has often not adequately tested the entire UAV system (i.e., the air vehicles in conjunction with the associated computer processors and software, data links and dissemination equipment, ground control stations, launch and recovery equipment, sensor suites, and logistics support) before beginning initial production. As a result, DoD’s UAV programs typically have not met initial cost projections and schedules.

• Both the House National Security Committee (HNSC) and the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) continued to express concern about DoD’s UAV programs in their respective versions of the FY 1998 defense authorization act.²² The HNSC bill would eliminate R&D funding for the Outrider joint tactical UAV program, redirecting the funds to acquire a commercial, tactical UAV as a replacement (see Outrider, p. 15). Moreover, the HNSC bill proposes eliminating DARO, shifting DARO’s broad oversight function to the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and assigning responsibility for both UAV development and acquisition to the Services. The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) bill shares the HNSC concern over DoD’s progress in acquiring working UAV capabilities: “The results have been discouraging so far, especially when compared with the promises and plans for UAV employment.” While the SASC bill would fund the various UAV programs at the requested level for FY 1998, it would restrict future spending on Global Hawk and DarkStar UAV programs (see pp. 18-19).

Indeed, most current UAV programs have been developed through the ACTD process (with the exception of the Pioneer and the cancelled Hunter program). The Predator UAV is the first ACTD to be approved for transition to full-scale production. DARO is responsible for overseeing the development, demonstration, acquisition and support of all joint-service and defense-wide airborne (manned and unmanned) reconnaissance systems. In the case of UAVs, DARO is charged with ensuring that UAV programs meet the operational requirements, set by the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council, for both the “tactical” (short-range, low-endurance) UAV programs (Pioneer, Hunter and Outrider) and the “endurance” (long-range, high-endurance) UAVs (Global Hawk and DarkStar). DARO, however, is not responsible for overseeing the Predator now that this endurance UAV has moved into low-rate production under the auspices of the Air Force.

Although the Predator ACTD appears to be relatively successful, the Global Hawk and DarkStar UAVs, among a number of other ACTDs, have been heavily criticized by the Pentagon’s Inspector General. The Inspector General contends that neither UAV program is based on a mature technology or is meeting an urgent need—two of the criteria used for selecting systems to be acquired through the ACTD process.²³

Information on Specific UAV Programs
Tactical UAVs: short-range, low-endurance UAVs generally designed for tactical reconnaissance, surveillance, targeting and battle damage assessment for Army, Marine Corps and Navy units.

• Acquisition Plan & Cost Estimates: Nine systems (air vehicles and supporting equipment) were initially procured for some $88 million. The Navy later spent about $50 million in R&D funds to develop the modifications necessary to make the systems operational.

• The Pioneer program was started in 1985 to develop an interim Navy capability to support Marine Corps operations on land and provide gunfire support for Navy ships. Originally launched from Iowa-class battleships, the Pioneer is now operated from amphibious ships.

• The Pioneer has been used in the Persian Gulf, Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. (It replaced the Hunter in Bosnia.) In the Gulf War, the Air Force’s JSTARS aircraft would identify potential targets, after which Pioneer UAVs would be used to confirm the target and, on occasion, to correct misidentifications, with the updated information relayed back to the JSTARS aircraft.

• Nine systems (each includes five air vehicles) are in active use today: the Navy has five, the Marine Corps three, and one is at the Joint UAV Training Center (Ft. Huachuca, Arizona). Another thirty air vehicles, including spares, had been delivered by November 1996.

• Four Pioneers have crashed in Bosnia. The first three crashes have been linked to engine and autopilot problems.

• In FY 1997 Congress provided funds to maintain Pioneer’s readiness and effectiveness until the new Outrider passes its operational tests and can be deployed. This is the third extension DoD has made to the Pioneer’s operational life.

• The administration’s FY 1998 request includes no R&D or procurement funds for the Pioneer.

• Acquisition Plan & Cost Estimates: The total Hunter program was originally projected to cost about $1.2 billion for 50 systems (400 aircraft). Eventually, the cost estimate reached $2.1 billion for 52 systems (416 aircraft). About $1 billion was spent on the program before it was cancelled.

• A joint tactical UAV for Army and Marine forces, the Hunter was developed with Israel. It was intended to replace the Pioneers being used by Army and Marine Corps units. (A marinized version of the Predator was originally the planned replacement for the Navy’s Pioneer UAVs.)

• In FY 1993, the Joint Program Office awarded an initial contract for seven systems, including one for the Marines, three for the Army and one for the Navy (to experiment with shipboard integration).

• In January 1996, DoD chose to let the contract expire after the first seven systems were acquired, following the October 1995 recommendation of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Not only had the program been plagued by crashes, but DoD also agreed, in part, with GAO’s finding that the Hunter’s 1994 operational test results were unacceptable.

• The Hunter has never been used in military operations.

• In FY 1997 Congress provided $12 million in operations and maintenance (O&M) funding to bring three Hunter systems out of storage to “provide a capability to further develop UAV concepts of operation” by using assets that “are currently consuming resources without providing any return.” Congress prohibited the use of funds to acquire more Hunters.

• Similarly, the FY 1998 HNSC bill would provide $12.2 million in O&M funding to operate the Hunter systems already acquired.

• Acquisition Plan & Cost Estimates: DoD awarded a two-year, $52.6 million contract to Alliant Techsystems to develop six systems for delivery in FY 1998. Eventually, DoD intends to acquire 60 systems (including 240 aircraft) for about $850 million. An Outrider system is composed of four air vehicles, four payloads, two ground stations/data terminals and one remote video terminal.

• The winning candidate of the Joint Maneuver UAV program (a project to develop a short-range UAV to replace the Pioneer), the Outrider UAV was begun by DoD after the Hunter’s cancellation. The Outrider, rather than the Hunter, will now replace the Pioneer in the Army, Navy and Marine Corps.

• The Outrider is reportedly experiencing some problems in development. Its weight has increased by 50 percent, and wind tunnel test results suggest that redesigning the air vehicle may be necessary.

• For FY 1997 Congress appropriated $65 million for the program.

• The FY 1998 SASC bill would fully fund the administration’s $87.5 million request for R&D funding for the Outrider.

• Noting the Outrider’s technical problems and schedule slippage, as well as DoD’s weighing of whether to cancel the program, the HNSC bill would eliminate all FY 1998 Outrider funding. Instead, the HNSC bill would add $10 million to support a vertical takeoff and landing UAV competition recently initiated by DARO, would direct DoD to use $20 million toward acquiring an “off-the-shelf” short-range tactical UAV from among the joint tactical UAV candidates initially bested by Outrider,²⁴ and would provide $5 million to begin developing a new short-range UAV that would meet all the services’ requirements.

• Acquisition Plan & Cost Estimates: DoD estimates that it will spend some $580 million to develop the Predator and procure 13 systems (80 air vehicles).

• The Predator is a medium-range UAV that, in July 1996, completed its ACTD phase and is now moving into low-rate initial production. It is a derivative of the CIA’s Gnat 750 (Tier 1) UAV.

• While an ACTD, Predator was used operationally in Albania (November 1995) to provide United Nations support and in Hungary (March 1996) to support Joint Endeavor in Bosnia.

• During March 1996 operations in Bosnia, Predator monitored suspected mass grave sites for tampering and aided cease-fire efforts by tracking combatants’ attempts to illegally camouflage equipment and conceal actions. The Predator UAV was operated in conjunction with the Air Force’s JSTARS aircraft.

• Three UAVs were lost in Bosnia; one due to gunfire and two to engine trouble, perhaps caused by gunfire. A fourth UAV crashed during testing this past February.

• The Navy experimented with operating a Predator from a submarine. Funded by the Submarine Warfare Directorate, the USS Chicago successfully operated Predator in a June 1996 test. In addition, the Navy has experimented with using a Predator aboard a surface ship.

• But in its FY 1997 defense authorization act Congress barred the use of any funding to continue this effort: “Other than ensuring that Predator UAV data is made available to ships in an area of operation, the committee opposes any modification of Predator for the purpose of operating the vehicle from ships.” The projected costs of modifying the Predator UAV for shipboard use are significant: the Navy estimates some $11 million in development costs plus about $500,000 per air vehicle to modification costs.

• In FY 1997, Congress supported the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation to acquire 16 systems and the FY 1997 defense appropriations act added $50 million to the Predator’s $58 million procurement request. Congress suggested leasing a limited number of Predators for the Air Force’s first UAV squadron, which the service established at Nellis Air Force Base. However, all Predator UAV systems were deployed for operations in 1996, leaving none for the Nellis squadron.

• Also in its FY 1997 defense authorization act, Congress transferred program management of the Predator to the Air Force as of October 1, 1996.

• The administration requested $117 million for the procurement of 15 more Predator UAVs in FY 1998. The HNSC bill would fully fund this request and add $30 million for spare and attrition aircraft. It would also add $4 million to the administration’s $15 million Predator R&D request to develop upgrades. In addition, $10 million would be shifted from tactical UAV R&D to the Predator UAV program to develop a dedicated Predator UAV system for testing a common control system for Predator and other tactical UAVs. By comparison, the SASC bill would fund the Predator program at the requested level.

• Acquisition Plan & Cost Estimates: DoD planned at the outset to spend some $643 million to develop three ground segments (shared with the DarkStar UAV) and eight Global Hawks.

• Global Hawk and its companion, DarkStar, are two high-altitude, high-endurance UAVs comprising an ACTD to develop UAVs capable of providing long-range, persistent surveillance coverage comparable to a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. Global Hawk is a non-stealthy UAV, designed for long-range and persistent coverage (up to 24 hours) in a relatively low threat environment. A Global Hawk UAV, for example, could take off from California, fly to the East Coast and transmit near real-time data for about 24 hours and then return to its home base.

• To keep costs under control, DoD decided to field two complementary UAVs, Global Hawk and the stealthy DarkStar, rather than combine the required features into one, potentially much more costly system. However, both UAVs will share a common ground element for launching, recovery and mission control.

• Global Hawk will provide high resolution, near real-time imagery, including video, of large areas. While the UAV is aloft, commanders will be able to choose among radar, electro-optical and infrared sensor sweeps.

• The Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office is managing this ACTD with user input coming from the U.S. Atlantic Command.

• The first flight of Global Hawk is scheduled for the fall of 1997. Under current plans, DoD will not acquire more than five air vehicles and two ground stations until the UAVs have demonstrated their airworthiness. The original plan called for acquiring eight UAVs and three ground stations for some $640 million.

• In FY 1997, Congress restricted funding for the ACTD until the operational demonstration phase is completed and a system procurement decision has been made. Congress recommended using off-the-shelf electro-optical and infrared imagery equipment, rather than developing a new camera.

• In FY 1997, Congress appropriated $71 million for Global Hawk development.

• The FY 1998 request contains $96 million for Global Hawk and $51.1 million for the common ground segment (CGS). The HNSC bill would fully fund the request for Global Hawk, but reduce R&D funding for the common ground segment by $9 million. It also directs that, once the ACTD phase is completed, DoD is to transfer both the Global Hawk and DarkStar programs to the Air Force for operational testing.

• The SASC bill would fully fund the administration’s FY 1998 request. But, it would restrict future spending between FY 1999 and FY 2002 to $239 million for both Global Hawk and DarkStar and prohibit the acquisition of more UAVs until the two UAVs meet certain testing requirements. Further, the ACTD would not proceed to initial production until GAO certifies that the average unit cost of a Global Hawk or DarkStar aircraft will not exceed $10 million in FY 1994 dollars (about $11 million in today’s dollars).

• Acquisition Plan & Cost Estimates: Initial plans called for spending about $330 million to develop six DarkStar UAVs. (R&D for the common ground segment was included in the Global Hawk’s development costs.)

• The DarkStar is a low-observable UAV designed in tandem with the Global Hawk. It replaces Tier 3, a more expensive stealthy UAV that was discontinued.²⁶

• The DarkStar design sacrifices performance (e.g., limiting data-transmission to fixed images while the air vehicle is in flight) to maintain the UAV’s stealth and survivability in high-threat environments. DarkStar’s radar was originally developed by Westinghouse for the Navy’s A-12 program.

• The program suffered a setback in April 1996, when one air vehicle crashed.

• In FY 1997, Congress added funding to rectify the problems that apparently caused the crash last April. It also added funds to procure long-lead items for a replacement aircraft. Because of lingering concerns, however, in the FY 1997 defense authorization act Congress mandated that a new competition for development of DarkStar should be opened if its unit flyaway cost increases beyond $10 million (FY 1994 dollars).

• DoD’s original plan called for acquiring six DarkStar air vehicles for some $330 million (it would share the common ground segment with Global Hawk). Under current plans, DoD will not acquire more than five DarkStar air vehicles until the UAV has demonstrated its airworthiness.

• Congress appropriated $46 million for DarkStar’s development in FY 1997.

• The FY 1998 request contains $54.6 million in R&D funding for the DarkStar UAV. The FY 1998 HNSC and SASC bills would both fully fund this request.

Notwithstanding the promise UAVs appear to hold, in the near-term, UAV efforts should probably focus on the development of new systems to keep pace with rapidly advancing technologies. DoD also should emphasize limited production and extensive operational testing. Such an approach should be easily affordable even within the relatively tight budgets DoD is likely to face for the foreseeable future²⁷ and would provide DoD with a valuable hedge should it become necessary or desirable to begin fielding large UAV forces rapidly in the more distant future.

On the other hand, adequately funding such a hedging strategy might require shifting at least a modest amount of funding out of other portions of DoD’s budget, including tactical fighter programs—which are currently projected to receive some 25 times more funding than UAV programs over the next six years.

The troubled history of a number of past and current UAV programs suggests that DoD and Congress should continue to keep a close eye on the progress of these programs. In particular, steps should be taken to guard against the tendency of DoD and the Services to add too many new requirements and capabilities to planned UAV systems, a tendency which in the past has greatly contributed to the emergence of both significant technical problems and cost growth. At the same time, however, it should be understood that both UAV technology and concepts of operations for employing UAVs are much less mature than those for manned aircraft or other traditional systems, which have been in widespread use for many decades. As such, a much greater tolerance for occasional false starts and even failures should be granted. Indeed, if DoD’s UAV efforts were to generate no technological or operational failures it might well be an indication that DoD was not exploring the full range of UAV technologies and operational concepts that merit consideration.

* * * * *

For additional information, contact Elizabeth E. Heeter or Steven M. Kosiak at (202) 331-7990.

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking about defense planning and investment strategies for the twenty-first century. CSBA research makes clear the inextricable link between defense strategies and budgets in fostering a more effective and efficient defense, and the need to transform the U.S. military in light of the emerging military revolution. The Center is directed by Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich.

1. See discussion of the potential anti-access problem on page 8.

2. This figure is based on DoD’s plans prior to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Released May 15, 1997, the QDR proposed reducing the procurement quantity for all three new tactical fighters. However, these changes would primarily affect the cost of the three programs in the years beyond FY 2003.

3. This includes funding for both the AH-64D Longbow Apache and RAH-66 Comanche programs.

4. Alternatively, savings from a small reduction in the size of the U.S. military’s force structure (e.g., Army divisions, Navy carrier battle groups and Air Force tactical fighter wings) could be used to fund an expanded UAV effort.

5. Richard A. Best, Jr., “Intelligence Technology in the Post-Cold War Era: The Role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),” Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report to Congress, July 26, 1993, p. 5.

6. Dagnija Sterste-Perkins, “Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs),” CRS, January 17, 1996, p. 1.

7. UAVs, like manned aircraft, come in many different sizes. The short-range Pioneer is about 14 feet long and has an empty weight of about 300 pounds, while the long-range Global Hawk is about 44 feet long and has an empty weight of about 8,900 pounds. By comparison, the F-16 fighter has a length of some 49 feet and an empty weight of about 18,200 pounds, while the F-15 fighter has a length of some 64 feet and an empty weight of about 28,600 pounds.

8. The unit cost of UAVs varies considerably depending on the type of system and the number procured. The Outrider short-range tactical UAV is projected to have a unit “flyaway” cost of some $350,000 for the air vehicle itself. (Flyaway costs exclude the cost of procuring associated launch and recovery platforms, transports, and other ground support equipment.) Congress has capped the unit flyaway cost of the DarkStar, a long-range UAV, at $10 million. By comparison, the F-16 fighter has a unit flyaway cost of about $16 million and the F-15 fighter has a unit flyaway cost of some $36 million. UAV unit costs are somewhat higher than they would be if the systems were procured in the same quantities as tactical aircraft. However, DoD plans to procure only about 240 Outrider and 6 DarkStar air vehicles. By comparison, to date the Air Force has procured some 2,200 F-16s and nearly 1,100 F-15s. The unit cost of UAVs appears even more modest when compared to specialized manned reconnaissance aircraft, such as the Air Force’s Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) aircraft, which costs about $300 million a copy (though it must also be noted that the JSTARS aircraft carries a much more complex and sophisticated set of sensors and related equipment than the most advanced UAVs such as DarkStar).

9. Best, p. 6.

10. Sources for historical information include: Richard Best, “Intelligence Technology in the Post-Cold War Era: The Role of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” CRS, July 26, 1993; Peter Grier, “DarkStar and Its Friends,” Air Force, July 1996, p. 40; David Fulghum, “Gulf War Successes Push UAVs Into Military Doctrine Forefront,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 9, 1991, pp. 38-39; Dagnija Sterste-Perkins, “Military Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” CRS, January 17, 1996; and Testimony of Louis J. Rodrigues, director, Defense Acquisitions Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, General Accounting Office, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DoD’s Acquisition Efforts,” before the House National Security Subcommittees on Military Research & Development and Military Procurement, April 9, 1997.

11. Best, p. 9.

12. Israel lost only one airplane compared to Syria’s loss of 54 aircraft and 19 missile batteries. Adam Piore, “Expensive Tastes,” Washington Monthly, June 1997, pp. 16-17. Further, surveillance UAVs provided a steady stream of data to Israeli commanders, allowing them to judge the effectiveness of their strikes and adjust their fire patterns accordingly. UAVs were also able to track the take-off and landing patterns of the Syrian air force, further strengthening the Israeli information edge. Brian Tice, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: The Force Multiplier of the 1990s,” Airpower Journal, Spring 1991, pp. 43-44 as quoted in Best, p. 9.

13. Best, p. 10.

14. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, April 1992, Appendix C, p. 12 as quoted in Best, p. 12.

15. Fulghum, p. 39.

16. For a discussion of the potential impact of these revolutionary changes on warfare, see, for example, Andrew F. Krepinevich, “From Cavalry to Computers: the Pattern of Military Revolutions,” The National Interest, Fall 1994, pp. 30-42; Michael Vickers, Warfare in 2020: A Primer (Washington, DC: CSBA, October 1996). For a discussion on the ways in which UAVs may impact future operations, see also Defense Science Board 1996 Summer Study Task Force, Tactics and Technology for 21st Century Military Superiority, Volume 1 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, October 1996).

17. The wide range of possibilities offered by future UAV capabilities has made this technology appealing to many countries. At the end of 1996, DoD counted some 50 countries that were pursuing UAV technologies.

18. Among other things, the Air Force’s Scientific Advisory Board recently suggested that the Air Force should equip high-endurance, long-range UAVs like Global Hawk and DarkStar with precision guided munitions. “Air Force Scientific Board Defines Future Combat Missions for UAVs,” Inside the Air Force, January 17, 1997, p. 1.

19. Remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) cover those UAVs that must be controlled from a ground station (e.g., Pioneer). Some newer UAVs such as Global Hawk can fly autonomously.

20. See, Louis J. Rodrigues, Director, Defense Acquisition Issues, National Security & International Affairs Div. General Accounting Office, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DoD’s Acquisition Efforts,” statement before the House National Security Military Research and Development and Military Procurement Subcommittees, April 9, 1997, p. 3; Joseph Lovece, “Deutch Kills Pentagon’s Medium Range Drone Program,” Defense Week, November 1, 1993, pp. 1 and 11.

21. Louis J. Rodrigues, Director, Defense Acquisition Issues, National Security & International Affairs Div., General Accounting Office, “Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: DoD’s Acquisition Efforts,” statement before the House National Security Military Research and Development and Military Procurement Subcommittees, April 9, 1997.

22. At press time, the SASC bill has not yet been approved by the Senate. The HNSC bill passed the House of Representatives, 304-120, on June 25, 1997.

23. Jason Sherman and Daniel Dupont, “Pentagon IG Finds Key ACTDs Lack Mature Technology, Critical Military Need,” Inside the Army, February 3, 1997, p. 1.

24. Nine systems competed for the joint tactical UAV program: Vixen (the winning design that was developed into the Outrider) Puma, Shadow 200, Eagle Eye, Prowler, Starbird, Specter-2, Raven, and an unnamed design. DoD awarded an initial contract to develop and deliver six UAV systems (four air vehicles) within a two-year schedule. The first Outrider flight occurred this past March, five months behind schedule. Pat Cooper and Robert Holzer, “9 UAVs Vie for Tactical Mission,” Defense News, April 15-21, 1996, pp. 4, 26.

25. Electro-optical (EO) cameras produce images from light sources. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) sends radio waves to earth, creating high resolution images from the reflections. SAR can penetrate cloud cover, but its images lack the sharpness of electro-optical ones.

26. Sterste-Perkins, CRS, p. 6.

27. Steven M. Kosiak, “Defense Spending Under the Balanced Budget Agreement” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, June 6, 1997).