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National Defense Panel Report: First Shot in the Debate Over Transforming the US Military
Andrew Krepinevich Published 12/01/1997
Backgrounder
The National Defense Panel (NDP) today released its report on the long–term security challenges likely to confront the United States and how the Department of Defense (DoD) should change its plans to better prepare for those challenges. The report’s findings differ sharply from many of those contained in DoD’s own Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), completed in May. In particular, the report stresses the need for DoD to adopt a transformation strategy which will ensure that U.S. forces are prepared to meet the very different kinds of threats likely to be faced by 2010-2020. By offering a real strategic alternative to the QDR, the panel has provided the basis for a reinvigorated debate about U.S. defense policy. The NDP does not, however, provide details concerning much of its proposed transformation strategy. And, like the QDR, the NDP report does not thoroughly address the unaffordability of DoD’s long-term plans.

Fundamental Improvements Over the QDR
The NDP Report includes a number of important findings and recommendations that differ sharply from the QDR. Among other things, the NDP:

  • Identifies new operational challenges likely to confront U.S. forces, such as the absence of access to forward bases, information attacks, war in space, deep inland operations, urban eviction, and new forms of homeland attack.
  • Identifies the current two-theater war construct as an “inhibitor” to developing the capabilities the U.S. military will need in the 2010-2020 timeframe.
  • Recommends a $5-10 billion budget wedge to fund innovative programs that could be central to successfully transforming the U.S. military.
  • Proposes that this budget wedge be funded, if required, with cuts in “legacy” systems such as the three planned tactical fighter programs and/or force structure.
  • Suggests a “force design template” which emphasizes the following characteristics for future systems: stealth, speed, mobility, small logistics footprint, increased operational and strike ranges, precision strike, information systems protection and information operations, systems architectures, and automation.
  • Advocates the construction of prototype emerging systems, such as arsenal ships and Trident SSBNs converted to conventional precision–guided munitions delivery.
Funding the Transformation Strategy
The NDP calls for DoD to shift funds from the acquisition of “legacy systems to new systems focused on meeting the challenges of 2010-2020.” In particular, the NDP identifies a handful of systems currently in DoD’s plans which might be appropriate to cancel or scale back.

  • M1A1 Upgrades: 1,000 M1A1 tanks are to be upgraded to the more capable A2 configuration at cost of about $7.3 billion.
  • Crusader: 824 Crusader artillery systems and 824 resupply vehicles are to be procured for about $12 billion, with production to begin in fiscal year (FY) 2003.
  • Comanche: 1,300 of these scout/attack helicopters are planned for a total cost of roughly $35 billion. Procurement is scheduled begin in FY 2004.
  • CVN-77: the NDP recommends that DoD consider canceling this last Nimitz-class carrier ($5.4 billion) and instead accelerate procurement of a new class of carriers optimized for short take-off, vertical landing aircraft and UAVs.
  • Tactical Aircraft Programs: 548-785 F/A-18E/Fs, 339 F-22s and 2,852 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF) are to be procured over the next several decades at a cost of some $300 billion.
The NDP also calls for more ambitious infrastructure reforms than the QDR or the recently released Defense Reform Initiative (DRI). In particular, while the DRI called for competing 150,000 jobs, the NDP urges DoD to compete all 600,000 of its commercial-like positions. The NDP estimates that doing so could yield long-term annual savings of $10 billion. The NDP also suggests that it might be possible to accelerate the new base closure rounds the DRI proposed for 2001 and 2005.

Further Steps Needed
Many of the proposals included in the NDP report, especially the call for a transformation strategy, echo recommendations previously made by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), the Defense Science Board and others. (See, for example, CSBA–chaired Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 1997 Summer Study on Transformation Strategy.) However, while a positive first step, the report leaves some important questions unanswered and issues unaddressed.

The NDP’s analysis of the future security environment lacks a clear linkage with the future military capabilities the panel recommends. There is little discussion of the problems of scale that might occur if a future adversary were a peer competitor (e.g., an emerging China), instead of a regional power. There is similarly little discussion of the potential impact the emergence of “anti–navy” capabilities could have for global and regional trade flows. There is likewise little discussion of alternative concepts for forward presence, given the risks to overseas bases that the NDP postulates.

The NDP has provided the broad outlines of a transformation strategy, but what remains to be done is an analysis of the specific kinds and magnitude of tradeoffs that will be required among R&D, incremental modernization programs, force structure and readiness to balance strategic risk over the near- to long-term while transitioning to a new force posture. Illustrative transformation paths, e.g., how the transformation might unfold, will need to be described, as will each phase of the transformation.

Affordability
Prior to the QDR, the cost of DoD’s plans was likely to exceed projected DoD funding levels by some $20 billion annually over the long term. CSBA estimates that the cuts in force structure, modernization programs, National Guard and Reserve personnel, and military bases proposed in the QDR could yield $6-7 billion a year in savings, leaving a remaining gap of some $10-15 billion. Like the DRI, the NDP suggests that much of this gap can be eliminated through infrastructure reforms. If history is any guide, however, significant savings may well fail to materialize.

Thus, from a budgetary perspective, the NDP’s most important recommendation may be that, if infrastructure reductions, cuts in legacy systems, and other savings prove insufficient to pay for the proposed $5-10 billion transformation budget wedge, DoD should consider cuts in force structure and, if necessary, abandon or modify the two-MTW requirement that is central to both the BUR and the QDR. CSBA estimates that further force structure cuts of 10-15 percent might be needed to make DoD’s current plans affordable within projected budgets.

Conclusion
In summary, the NDP has provided us with the grist for a true debate over national security priorities, and a rough roadmap for how to navigate our way to 2010 and emerge more secure than now seems likely. But the transformation of the nation’s military is just beginning.

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For additional information, contact Stacey Shepard, Public Outreach Manager, at (202)331-7990.

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking about defense planning and investment strategies for the twenty-first century. CSBA research makes clear the inextricable link between defense strategies and budgets in fostering a more effective and efficient defense, and the need to transform the U.S. military in light of the emerging military revolution. The Center is directed by Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich.