“Where are the TLAMs?”
During the Cold War, when presidents were informed of budding crises, it is said that the first question often asked was, “Where are the carriers?” If true, then we can surmise that the first question presidents have asked since the Cold War’s end is, “Where are the Tomahawks?”

These sea-launched cruise missiles, or TLAMs,¹ have become the “weapons of choice” for maritime strike operations—especially initial strike operations—over the last ten years. The trend is toward lesser reliance on strikes conducted by manned aircraft, while relatively greater use is being made of extended-range precision-guided missiles, which have greater range than carrier-based aircraft and can be employed without risking pilots and their expensive aircraft. This trend occurs as the Navy considers what to do with four Trident ballistic missile submarines slated for decommissioning, but which have at least 20 years’ service life left in them. The Navy should seize this opportunity and convert the Tridents into “stealth battleships” carrying large numbers of extended-range precision weapons in lieu of nuclear missiles. Such boats, or SSGNs, would have greater long-range striking power than the battleships that conducted TLAM strike operations during the Persian Gulf War. A battle group comprising carrier-based aircraft, conventional precision-strike missiles aboard surface combatants and submarines, and Trident SSGN “stealth battleships” could all be linked by information technologies that enable what the Navy calls “network centric warfare.”

SSGNs—conventional missile carriers capable of holding 150 TLAMs, or more.² They would prowl the world’s oceans as the Navy’s first stealth battleships, capable of inflicting more prompt damage at extended ranges, and at lower risk to the combatant and its crew, than any warship in the fleet.

The Trident Stealth Battleship and Navy Innovation
The United States Navy has demonstrated a remarkable capacity for innovation over the last century, as well as an ability to exploit unexpected opportunities. One case in point occurred during the 1920s. Budgets were tight and the Navy found itself under the strictures of the Washington Naval Treaty, an arms control agreement that prohibited the construction of new battleships and other major surface combatants. However, the Navy took advantage of a provision in the treaty to convert two partially completed battle cruisers into the U.S.S. Saratoga and U.S.S. Lexington, the first big-deck carriers. They formed the backbone of the fleet that, fifteen years later, turned the tide against Japan in the battles of Coral Sea and Midway.

Today the Navy is faced with a similar opportunity. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson, has declared that, even if Russia does not ratify the START II arms control agreement, four Trident ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) can be withdrawn from the U.S. nuclear deterrent forces in order to bring U.S. forces down to START II force levels.³

At a cost of roughly $500 million per boat, the Navy also has the option of converting the Tridents into SSGNs—conventional missile carriers capable of holding 150 TLAMs, or more.⁴ They would prowl the world’s oceans as the Navy’s first stealth battleships, capable of inflicting more prompt damage at extended ranges, and at lower risk to the combatant and its crew, than any warship in the fleet.

Why Tridents?
But why Trident SSGNs? After all, the Navy already has TLAMs aboard other surface combatants and is planning to build the DD-21 land attack destroyer that, as its name indicates, will focus its efforts on striking targets ashore. Why not retire the four boats, despite their 20 years of remaining useful life? The answers are both clear and compelling.

Meeting the Area Denial Challenge
The CNO, Admiral Johnson, described this challenge succinctly when he observed:

“Over the past ten years, it has become evident that proliferating weapon and information technologies will enable our foes to attack the ports and airfields needed for the forward deployment of our land-based forces.

I anticipate that the next century will see those foes striving to target concentrations of troops and materiel ashore and attack our forces at sea and in the air. This is more than a sea-denial threat or a Navy problem. It is an area-denial threat whose defeat or negation will become the single most crucial element in projecting and sustaining U.S. military power where it is needed.”⁵ [Emphasis added]

• Firepower and Range. Fleet surface combatants must distribute their missile loads to address a variety of missions that include antisubmarine, antiair, and missile defense operations. This reduces considerably their inventory of offensive strike missiles. Because of its inherent stealth, a Trident SSGN would have little need for such defensive weapons. Each SSGN would be capable of ripple firing over 150 missiles in less than six minutes. Moreover, the substantial advantage in range that TLAMs have over carrier-based aircraft would enable SSGNs to strike the same target set while further out at sea, further complicating enemy efforts at detection and counterstrike.

• Stealth. Tridents are far more difficult to locate than surface combatants, making SSGNs ideal for penetrating into the littoral and conducting initial strikes against enemy defenses ashore, and for covert insertion of Special Operations Forces (SOF). The SSGNs thus confer the advantage of surprise, and the ability to strike deep inland targets at low levels of risk.⁶ This would enable the other extended-range strike elements—such as carrier aircraft, missile carrying surface combatants, and long-range bombers—to operate at far less risk and with far greater effectiveness. In addition to their magazine of 150-plus missiles, Trident SSGNs can also carry over 60 SOF. Covert insertions may be a critical part of meeting the area denial challenge identified by Admiral Johnson. Small teams operating inland could prove essential in locating targets and directing extended-range precision attacks.

• Readiness. The SSGNs can remain on-station far longer than CVBGs. Carriers typically shuttle back and forth over long distances from their U.S. base to their forward location. This requires the Navy to build three or four carriers for each one that is forward deployed in order to maintain a rotation base. The SSGNs, on the other hand, could easily rotate crews. As is the case with the SSBNs today, this would enable the Navy to keep each SSGN on station for a far higher percentage of the time than a carrier.

• Cost. As noted above, the Navy finds itself with an overly ambitious modernization program relative to its projected budgets. Tridents can be converted to SSGNs at a cost of $500-600 million each, while carriers cost of nearly $5 billion each, excluding the cost of their air wing. Moreover, SSGN operations, maintenance, and personnel costs would be but a tiny fraction of those incurred by a CVBG.

• Retention and Quality of Life. Much has been made recently of the Navy sending CVBGs on deployments with major crew shortages. Concerns also have been voiced over the hemorrhaging of the Navy’s pilot force, and broader retention problems that are associated with long deployments. A carrier crew ranges from 5-6,000 sailors, while an entire CVBG requires roughly 7-8,000 personnel. The crews comprising the SSGNs would number roughly 150, or about 2 percent the manning required for a CVBG. Moreover, SSGNs do not require pilots. Simply put, SSGNs could greatly reduce the stress placed on the Navy’s sailors (to include its pilots), improving their quality of life and, most likely, the fleet’s ability to retain its best people.

In short, Trident stealth battleships offer the Navy a means for thinking more creatively about strike operations and forward presence. In so doing, they can help the Navy alleviate its recruitment and retention problems. Finally, SSGNs cost an order of magnitude less than carriers to procure, and would produce a stream of long-term operations, maintenance, and personnel savings relative to CVBGs.

In the final analysis, it is not a case of carrier battle groups or stealth battleships—the Navy needs both.

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking about defense planning and investment strategies for the 21st century. CSBA research makes clear the inextricable link between defense strategies and budgets in fostering a more effective and efficient defense, and the need to transform the U.S. military in light of the emerging military revolution. CSBA is directed by Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich.

© 1999 CSBA. All rights reserved.

1. The technical term is Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM), or “Tee-Lamms” in Navy parlance.

2. The Tridents would not be restricted to carrying TLAMs, and could carry other missiles, such as NTACMS, or Navy Tactical Missile System, as part of their weapons load out. Converted Tridents also would have an enormous capacity for accepting a wide range of emerging combat payloads, to include unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), advanced mines, and command and control systems.

3. Walter Pincus, “Naval Chief Backs Cut in Force of Trident Subs,” Washington Post (7 January 1999), p. 23.

4. The Tridents would not be restricted to carrying TLAMs, and could carry other missiles, such as NTACMS, or Navy Tactical Missile System, as part of their weapons load out. Converted Tridents also would have an enormous capacity for accepting a wide range of emerging combat payloads, to include unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), advanced mines, and command and control systems.

5. Admiral Jay Johnson, “Anytime, Anywhere: A Navy for the 21st Century,” Proceedings (November 1997). This challenge has also been referred to as the “anti-access” challenge and, by the Air Force, as the “theater denial” challenge.

6. Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre recently commented that the Desert Fox air strikes on Iraq could have been launched without losing the element of surprise had an SSGN been available.

7. Steven M. Kosiak, Analysis of the Fiscal Year 2000 Defense Budget Request (Washington, D.C.: CSBA, 1999), p. 17.

8. Interestingly, in their early days carriers were seen as the providers of “pulse” strikes relative to the “stream” of fires provided by the battleship’s big guns.