It is now possible to assess whether the president was successful in his efforts to force new thinking and hard choices on the Defense Department and, more specifically, whether the president's goal of skipping a generation and replacing existing programs was realized.

This brief assessment finds that the Defense Department's actions with respect to the DD-21 program may provide some cause for cautious optimism. However, other clear opportunities to skip a generation in weapon systems in order to prepare for the critical operational challenges presented in the QDR appear to have been ruled out. Thus, despite the president's call to transform the US military, judging by its recent budget submission, it appears the Pentagon has decided to skip skipping a generation.

Why Skip a Generation?
Under what conditions does it make sense to skip a generation with respect to modernization and adopt a leap-ahead approach? Skipping a generation makes sense when the following three conditions apply.

• First, when the near-term risks to our security are relatively low, thus reducing the need to procure large numbers of incrementally improved systems. This is currently the case.² The United States is not in an arms race with any significant hostile power as, for example, was the case during the Cold War with respect to the Soviet Union. The Cold War military competition was both immediate and intense. Incremental improvements in weapon systems such as tanks, combat aircraft and submarines could have made an important difference in maintaining deterrence, or in the event of war, defeating aggression. At present, no rogue state or combination of rogue states, such as the "Evil Axis" of Iran, Iraq and North Korea, comes close to the scale of the military challenge posed by the Soviet Union to the United States. Correspondingly, no likely near-term US adversary is even developing, let alone producing, large quantities of advanced versions of Cold War-era military staples such as main battle tanks, advanced jet fighter, or nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.³

• Second, when incremental modernization yields an improved system that will actually see its effectiveness decline, perhaps precipitously, because of coming changes in the threat environment. For example, modern battleships at the time of Pearl Harbor were unquestionably superior to the world's best battleships at the end of World War I. However, with the rise of naval aviation and the advent of the fast carrier task force, the relative effectiveness of the battleship as the final arbiter of sea control declined dramatically. Thus while investments made during the interwar period to improve the performance of battleships were a success, they were also, to a significant extent, irrelevant.

  Similarly, today rapidly diffusing military-related technology--such as satellite and missile technology--will, over time, enable adversaries to challenge US power-projection forces in new ways. The terrorist attacks against the United States employing anthrax biological agents and jetliners as suicide missiles is only Exhibit A for those who believe a transformation in the challenges to US security is underway.⁴ Information warfare may be a major part of the transformation in military competitions. For example, the United States has, for some time now, been subjected to information warfare attacks.⁵ The Rumsfeld Commission on Space warned that the United States risked a Pearl Harbor in space in the coming years unless steps were taken to address the rising threat to America's space assets.⁶ To deal with these threats, the United States will need more than an improved version of its Cold War military. It will need a substantially different kind of military.

  In fact, the Bush Administration's defense posture, presented as the product of its QDR, directs the military to reorient its efforts on meeting the challenges of a new military regime. The QDR presents these challenges in the form of "six critical operational goals" that "provide the focus for DoD's transformation efforts."⁷ These goals can be summarized as follows:

• protecting critical bases, both at home and abroad, from attack, to include attack by chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) weapons;

• protecting critical information infrastructure from attack while conducting effective information operations;

• projecting and sustaining US forces in distant anti-access or area-denial (A2/AD) environments and defeating anti-access and area-denial threats⁸ ;

• denying an enemy sanctuary through persistent surveillance, tracking and engagement with high-volume precision strike against both fixed and mobile targets at all ranges and in all weather conditions;

• enhancing the capabilities and survivability of space systems and supporting infrastructure; and

• creating a joint command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) architecture.⁹

• The third condition under which skipping a generation becomes attractive occurs when rapidly advancing technology offers the opportunity to field substantially different--and much more effective and relevant--military capabilities than incremental improvements of existing system types, and which are oriented on meeting the challenges and opportunities described in the "critical operational goals" associated with the emerging military regime. Today rapid advances in information-related technologies promise to effect a military revolution, or dramatic change in the character of military competitions.¹⁰ Recent US military operations have shown the substantial influence that relatively new or emerging capabilities (e.g., unmanned reconnaissance and strike aircraft; advanced precision-guided munitions, or PGMs; stealth; space-based positioning and targeting satellites) can have in boosting US military effectiveness. Pursued energetically, these and other prospective capabilities (e.g., network-centric warfare) can enable the United States to develop a different kind of military, one well prepared to address the new challenges to America's security. For example, by exploiting advanced information and information-related (e.g., stealth) technologies, US forces may be able to operate in a highly dispersed, yet highly integrated manner, greatly reducing their vulnerability to detection and attack while retaining the combat effectiveness traditionally associated with the military principle of mass. Forces operating along these lines may be far less vulnerable to enemy anti-access/area-denial capabilities.

Nor should modernization be equated with transformation. Modernization efforts often focus on improving performance in existing warfighting methods within the current military regime. Transformation, however, is directed primarily toward developing the new capabilities and operational concepts that will dominate a new military regime. Thus the principal reason for skipping a generation is to achieve a higher level of military effectiveness in a newly emerging military regime and, in so doing, to enhance the nation's security.

Prime Candidates for Skipping a Generation
The critical operational goals that promise to have the greatest effect on the future defense program are those associated with projecting power against an anti-access/area-denial threat and denying enemies sanctuary (also an element of power-projection operations). This is because the great majority of US forces are oriented on the power-projection mission, and because three of the four remaining critical challenges (space, C4ISR architecture and information operations) are directly linked to the power-projection mission.¹² Thus this backgrounder focuses its attention on the US military's power-projection forces.

Given this framework, what systems stand out as prime candidates for skipping a generation? What leap-ahead systems or capabilities are sufficiently attractive as to warrant such a move? Finally, how might the administration hedge against the possibility that in pursuing a leap-ahead capability, it may discover that the alternative system or capability, however promising it may appear today, cannot be realized in the anticipated time frame, or perhaps not at all? The following discussion presents three candidates for skipping a generation, and responds to the questions raised above. The reader should note that, while each of the candidates is associated with a specific Service, the recommended alternatives are multi-Service, or Joint, in their orientation. This is because over the last half-century the Services have developed capabilities that enable them to conduct strike operations well into one another's traditional battle space.

The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)¹³ (conventional take-off/land version)
The administration has decided to move ahead with the JSF program established under the Clinton Administration. The current plan is to procure a total of 2,852 of these tactical fighters for the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, of which 1,763 would be Air Force conventional take-off/land (CTOL) fighters.¹⁴ To be sure, the JSF represents a significant improvement over each Service's existing tactical aircraft. However, the buy of the JSF CTOL version assumes the U.S. military will continue to enjoy unimpeded access to forward air bases for the indefinite future. Yet such access is already problematic and will likely worsen over time. There are three reasons for this, presented here in ascending importance:

• The new era of "coalitions of the willing" has led to US forces being denied base access by allies and friends. During Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 both Turkey and Saudi Arabia prohibited the United States from launching strikes from their territory. This led to the US land-based tactical fighter force being marginalized during that brief campaign. A year later, in Operation Allied Force, Greece, a longstanding NATO ally, denied the United States access to its bases for strike operations against Serbian forces. Most recently, during Operation Enduring Freedom against al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan, severe limitations were placed on US aircraft operating from bases in the region. The result was that only about ten percent of the total bomb tonnage dropped in support of operations in Afghanistan was provided by US Air Force tactical fighters.¹⁵

• The US military will not always be operating in regions where a large sophisticated basing structure exists. As recent operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan demonstrate, most countries do not have the kind of basing infrastructure that American forces enjoyed in Western Europe and Northeast Asia during the Cold War. The US Army found it difficult to deploy ground forces quickly to Albania in 1999, in large part because of that country's austere basing structure. Similarly, the Air Force's tactical fighter force found itself playing a fringe role in the air campaign in Afghanistan in part because adequate air bases were not made available for their use. One can speculate on other potential contingencies (e.g., a China-Taiwan crisis) where adequate air bases in close proximity to the US interest being threatened will be difficult to secure.

• The continued diffusion of ballistic and cruise missile technologies will increasingly enable enemies to hold large, fixed forward bases--and the aircraft located there--at high risk of destruction. Thus access is much more than a challenge of convincing prospective host states to provide US forces with access or of locating suitable bases within a threatened region. Increasingly, the challenge of access will stem from the diffusion of military capabilities.

The opportunity exists to move much more aggressively in developing a range of UCAVs. Since UCAVs are remotely piloted, they can utilize the weight and space that would normally support the pilot for other purposes, such as to increase range and/or payload. Some might be designed to permit their launch and recovery from relatively austere landing strips, allowing them to operate within an enemy's anti-access umbrella. A combination of stealthy extended-range, Air Force UCAVs, sea- (i.e., mobile) based Navy UCAVs, and distributed, land-based, tactical UCAVs (for the Army and Marine Corps) could provide future commanders with a range of options for addressing the "critical operational" anti-access challenge.¹⁷ Because they do not require pilots--or flight hours for pilot training and extensive ground maintenance--UCAVs also promise to reduce substantially manpower requirements, as well as operations and maintenance costs. Finally, UCAVs are also projected to cost between one-third and one-half the price of manned combat aircraft.

At present, UCAVs are not expected to enter service until the second decade of this century, and it seems likely that they will not appear in substantial numbers until around 2015 at the earliest. Hence, there is a need for capabilities to bridge the gap between the anticipated fielding of the JSF and the maturation of UCAVs.

Major Unknown Planning Factors: How many manned aircraft missions can be accomplished effectively by UCAVs, and how soon? While UCAVs have great promise, it is far from clear how many missions they can assume from the manned combat air arm, or how quickly they can be made to do so. It seems clear that UCAVs can almost certainly function as "reusable Tomahawks;" i.e., they can fly to a fixed target, drop a PGM, and return to base. As the Air Force program indicates, UCAVs also show promise in performing the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) mission. Another promising mission for UCAVs is the one they performed in Afghanistan: exploiting their relatively long loiter time to play an important role in the destruction of critical mobile targets (e.g., terrorists). This mission may be particularly important in providing the "sensor reach" and prompt strike needed to detect and destroy, respectively, the mobile ballistic and cruise missile forces comprising the core of an enemy's anti-access capability.¹⁸

Hedge: The JSF is viewed primarily as an efficient deliverer of precision munitions. But the US military has many options for delivering ordnance on targets over significant distances. The Defense Department can avoid locking in to a large JSF buy while also hedging against a slower-than-anticipated development of UCAVs with a mix of the following capabilities:

• reopening the B-2 production line to provide the Air Force with a more balanced mix of short- and long-range manned strike platforms;

• increasing substantially the number of PGMs (e.g., the small-diameter munitions) carried in the long-range bomber fleet through accelerating programs focused on small, smart munitions;

• procurement of the "maritime" versions of JSF, in particular, the carrier-based version; and

• accelerating Army deep-strike capabilities (e.g., Comanche, ATACMS Block IIA).

  These force elements can better provide strike capability in an anti-access environment in that they do not rely on large, fixed forward bases for their effective operation.¹⁹

  To hedge against any strike gap that would exist between the anticipated introduction of the JSF late this decade, and the arrival of UCAVs sometime in the next decade, the Defense Department should consider:

• continuing "bridge" production of Air Force F-16 Block 60s to address current fleet aging issues (e.g., increased maintenance requirements) and to improve substantially current tactical air capabilities; and

• procuring advanced PGMs for non-stealthy bombers, such as the B-1 and B-52 fleets.

The DD-X (Formerly the DD-21 Land-Attack Destroyer)

• The Navy's DD-X program emerged from the restructuring of the Service's DD-21 Land-Attack Destroyer, and may represent a serious attempt to skip a generation of weapon system in order to better position the US military for emerging threats to the national security. With its large number of vertical launch systems (VLS), the DD-21 represented the Navy's effort to enhance its capabilities to support the battle ashore. With the Soviet Navy gone (and the blue-water threat with it), the Navy has rightly shifted its emphasis from open-ocean blue waters to littoral green waters. As it does, the Navy will encounter a very different threat environment, which the Service has dubbed the area-denial threat (see footnote 8).

Leap-Ahead System: The Streetfighter Concept employing Littoral Combat Ships practicing Network- Centric Warfare. The concept asserts that advanced information technologies are an asymmetric US advantage that can enable highly integrated, yet highly distributed maritime operations. Rather than buy a relatively small number of DD-21s (32 were planned), an effort should be made to explore the potential of squadrons of much smaller, faster, stealthier and less expensive surface combatants. These combatants could be more effective in supporting the campaign to seize control of the littoral and strike targets ashore. Owing to their substantially greater numbers and low cost relative to the DD-21, such combatants could be employed both earlier and more aggressively in the littoral at far lower risk.²² To its credit, the Navy has included a class of Littoral Combat Ships as part of its restructuring of the DD-21 program.

Major Unknown Planning Factors: Is it possible for information technologies to create a "distributed" capital ship, and, if so, how soon? The idea of violating the principle of mass to gain the advantage of reduced vulnerability, while at the same time avoiding the penalty of reduced military effectiveness brought on by dispersion, is undeniably attractive. However, although the concept has been percolating for a number of years, and has shown promise in some wargames, the Defense Department has yet to produce small combatant prototypes that could be used to determine the potential of such a force. Introducing a squadron of such ships into the Navy's Fleet Battle Experiment (FBE) program, or integrated into maritime forward presence operations, could substantially increase DoD's understanding of the Streetfighter Concept and its viability for future maritime operations.

Hedge: As with the JSF, the DD-21 was principally viewed as a strike platform. As noted, the US military has many different ways to conduct strike operations. Three readily available near-term maritime force hedges for the DD-21 program that would support strike operations in an anti-access/area-denial threat environment involve:

• converting the four SSBNs coming out of the nuclear deterrent force to SSGNs, to provide a stealthy extended-range strike capability;

• increasing the quantity and variety of PGMs for existing surface combatants and submarines; and

• reopening the B-2 bomber line to provide stealthy, high-volume, long-range strikes, to include increasing the bomber force PGM capabilities.

Other hedges that could be pursued include those mentioned with respect to the JSF (e.g., Army deep strike assets; maritime UCAVs).

Current Status: In November 2001 the Navy restructured the DD-21 program. In lieu of proceeding with a program to build a single class of destroyers, the Navy has decided to develop a "family of advanced technology surface combatants," comprising a land-attack destroyer (DD-X); a guided-missile cruiser (CG-X); and a Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).²³ It is far from clear, however, that this restructuring represents an effort to skip a generation in weapons development. Indeed, under the Surface Combatant-21 (SC-21) program, undertaken in 1995, the Navy planned to build both a land-attack destroyer and a cruiser variant. One potentially significant difference is the plan to build an LCS-class of ships. At present, however, it remains unclear how vigorously the Navy intends to pursue the LCS program, or the role it envisions such combatants playing in addressing the anti-access/area-denial challenge. One would hope that first priority would be accorded to developing and deploying an LCS squadron to determine its potential effectiveness in an area-denial environment.

The Crusader Artillery System
The Crusader artillery system represents a major advance in capabilities over the Army's current Paladin artillery system. The Crusader is faster than the Paladin, can fire at longer ranges, and has a greater rate of fire. The Crusader system comprises two vehicles: a self-propelled 155mm howitzer and a dedicated supply vehicle. The system is designed to be the "keystone fire support system" for the Army's legacy force. Army support for the Crusader has been strong.²⁴ Crusader is fully funded in the Army budget, with the Service planning to acquire 480 Crusaders, at an anticipated cost of $11 billion.

As with the JSF and Land-Attack Destroyer, however, the issue is not whether Crusader represents a major improvement over similar systems currently in the US military's inventory. Rather, it is whether opportunities exist to field a significantly different kind of capability that is more relevant for the new critical operational challenges the Bush Administration sees confronting the US military.

Today's Army finds itself challenged to become more of a rapidly deployable expeditionary force. Over the last decade the Army has had to deploy forces rapidly to areas where the Service had little in the way of forward-deployed forces, such as occurred in Africa, the Balkans and the Persian Gulf. This has posed problems for the Army, as its heavy units require enormous amounts of airlift to deploy quickly, in addition to well-developed bases at their point of debarkation. Unfortunately, strategic airlift is very costly and thus, hard to come by. It also is in great demand by the Air Force. Moreover, less-developed regions of the world typically have modest transportation infrastructures, to include air base facilities.

This has led the Army to undertake an ambitious effort to transform its force structure to enable it to deploy substantial combat power quickly to a threatened region by air. A major effort is underway to reduce the weight of Army formations (thus reducing the demand on strategic lift) while retaining as much of their combat punch as possible. Hence the Army's Future Combat System (FCS) initiative, which, in part, hopes to displace systems like the 70-ton Abrams tank with a 20-ton FCS.

Beyond losing weight while retaining muscle, the Army must develop the capability to project substantial land power rapidly, and sustain it indefinitely, in the absence of access to large, fixed forward bases and logistics centers, as called for in the QDR. This implies an ability to effect a distributed insertion of Army forces into a threatened area, as well as an ability to conduct highly distributed, or dispersed, operations employing C4ISR systems to scout the physical gaps between Army formations and extended-range fires to cover them. Furthermore, the Army also needs to exploit its advantages in accessing joint C4ISR capabilities to conduct precision strikes at extended ranges. In so doing it can minimize the vulnerability of lighter forces by exploiting opportunities to outrange enemy ground force strike systems (e.g., artillery, attack helicopters).

Despite strong endorsement from the Army, considerable skepticism exists concerning the Crusader's relevance to the Army's future warfighting concept. While few will contest that Crusader is a superior system to the Paladin it is designed to replace, skeptics point out that:

• Plans call for the Crusader to reach the field in 2008--only a few years before the Army plans to begin fielding its new FCS mobile artillery weapons--which are intended to replace the Crusader.

• The Crusader is anticipated to weigh about 40 tons, while the Paladin weighs 32 tons. Given the great lengths to which the Army is going to enhance its forces' ability to deploy rapidly, it seems odd indeed that it would pursue an artillery system that weighed 25 percent more than the system it is replacing, while at the same time designing a replacement for the Abrams tank (i.e., the FCS) whose specifications call for a 70 percent reduction in weight.

• Perhaps the greatest gain in effectiveness that comes with Crusader is its planned use of the Army's Excalibur precision artillery round, which promises to be far more accurate than existing rounds, and which is now in development. However, this munition could be fired from a Paladin system as well.

• While it is true that the Crusader outranges the Paladin, the fact remains that other Army strike systems--to include the Army's multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS), high-mobility artillery rocket system (HIMARS), Apache and Comanche helicopters, and prospectively Army UCAVs--also outrange the Crusader. Thus, if greater emphasis on longer-range fires is needed, the Army has ready-made options for pursuing them other than Crusader.

• Even at its reduced weight (the system was originally designed at 110 tons), the Crusader will not fit on a C-130, violating a key Army design metric for both the Interim and Objective Forces. Given that, it is unclear how the Army would deploy the system into the anti-access/area-denial threat environment posited in its operational concept.²⁵

Major Unknown Planning Factors: As noted above, it is not clear how quickly UAVs and UCAVs will mature. Nor is it clear to what extent they will be able to displace manned systems in performing the broad range of reconnaissance and strike missions. The Army's potential to see deep and to fight effectively at great range on a nonlinear battlefield has yet to be demonstrated in field exercises against an opposing force possessing the kinds of capabilities that might be encountered over the next decade in conflict against prospective adversaries. Finally, while a forward-deployed DSB might prove very capable in an anti-access/area-denial threat environment, it remains unclear how the Army will solve the challenge of rapidly deploying these kinds of brigades as part of an expeditionary force in such a threat environment.

Hedge: The Army can hedge against concerns over its fire support by upgrading its Paladin self-propelled howitzers or by replacing them with systems produced by America's allies (e.g., the German PzH 2000). More importantly, perhaps, the Army can accelerate the procurement of the Excalibur smart artillery round.²⁹ As the experience of the last decade has shown, in terms of generating combat capability and military effectiveness, platforms are generally declining in importance relative to PGM's and to their ability to tap into the information provided by C4ISR networks. Viewed more broadly, the other means of providing enhanced fires cited above with respect to the JSF and DD-X programs could, of course, be employed in support of Army operations.

Current Status: The administration's defense program retains the Crusader buy as outlined by the Clinton Administration.

Conclusion
As a presidential candidate, George Bush declared that the United States must not miss this rare opportunity to skip a generation in military capability. It is easy to see why. Undertaking such an approach in the manner presented above offers the following advantages:

• Options can be created for dealing with an uncertain future--and the risk of putting too many eggs in the short-range tactical aviation, large surface combatant, or heavy field artillery baskets, can be avoided.

• If successful, such capabilities promise to be far more effective in meeting the QDR's critical operational challenge of maintaining the US ability to project decisive military power to areas of vital interest in the face of the growing anti-access/area-denial threat.

• Would-be adversaries' knowledge that the United States is already moving to develop access to advanced military capabilities may serve as a powerful deterrent to their willingness to enter into a military competition with America--in short, skipping a generation can be a key element in the administration's dissuasion strategy.

• Relatively low-cost hedges can be put in place that guard against the uncertainty that the leap-ahead capabilities may not materialize as soon as forecast, or be as effective as anticipated.

1. George W. Bush, Speech on Defense Policy, The Citadel, Charleston, SC, September 23, 1999.

2. Some might contend that, given the current war on terrorism, that the risks to US security are substantial. This may be true. However, this paper focuses its discussion on the anti-access/area-denial threats. At present, the risk to the US military's ability to conduct power-projection operations almost anywhere on the globe is perhaps at its lowest level in the country's history. Moreover, despite the threat posed by global terrorism, few would argue the risk to America's security is greater today than it was during the Cold War.

3. This is not to say a military should only seek to skip a generation when the risk to its security is low. Inferior military powers have great incentives to explore novel ways of creating a new basis for military competition, or a new military regime. For example, the attempts by inferior naval powers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to exploit the potential of torpedoes to put at risk the Royal Navy's dominance in battleships and fast battle cruisers were undertaken at significant risk. However, this paper does contend that skipping a generation is particularly attractive when the near-term risks to one's security are relatively low.

4. See, for example, Andrew F. Krepinevich, The First War of A New Century (Washington, DC: CSBA, September, 2001).

5. "Hamre: Balkans Fighting Called 'First Cyber War,'" Military and C4ISR, April 23, 1999, at http://www.inforwar.com/mil_c41_042399a_j.html; and Paul Festa, "Defense Department Fights Off Hackers," CNET News.com, March 5, 1999, at http://news.com.com/2102-1023-222630.html.

6. "Rumsfeld Commission Warns Against 'Space Pearl Harbor,'" Space Daily, January 11, 2001.

7. DoD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: DoD, September 30, 2001), p. 30. Hereafter cited as "QDR."

8. The anti-access threat stems primarily from the growing proliferation of military and commercial satellite services and missile technology. Increased access to these satellite services will allow even regional rogue states both to pretarget key fixed facilities and to monitor US deployments into forward bases. Unless one makes heroic assumptions regarding advances in missile defense effectiveness, these facilities can be held at risk through the employment of large numbers of ballistic and cruise missiles. The problem is further exacerbated if one posits advanced enemy air defenses.
   The area-denial threat concerns the increasing difficulty US maritime forces--particularly surface combatants and amphibious assault ships--will encounter in operating in the littoral (i.e., along enemy coastlines, or in "green" waters). With forward bases coming under increased risk of destruction from ballistic and cruise missile attack (i.e., the anti-access threat), the fleet will have to move closer to shore to support efforts to defeat anti-access forces and project power against other enemy forces ashore. As this happens, the fleet will encounter area-denial forces in the form of sophisticated anti-ship mines, coastal submarine fleets; onshore, high-speed, anti-ship cruise missiles; and other enemy capabilities that may place the US surface combatants at high risk of destruction. In addition, prospective improvements in enemy surveillance capabilities (e.g., access to satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), over-the-horizon radars) could make avoiding detection in the littoral even more difficult.
   In short, as the fleet moves from Cold War era blue-water sea control to focus increasingly on green-water littoral sea control, it will come within range of more and more of the enemy's military capabilities. Making matters worse, the screening elements that protect the carrier, the Navy's core strike element, will begin to collapse back on the carrier as they encounter the coastline. Thus, not only will maritime forces come within range of more enemy systems, their warning time of attack will be reduced as well. The diffusion of weapon systems, such as high-speed antiship cruise missiles, will reduce warning time even further.

9. QDR, p. 30.

10. For an overview of military revolutions, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment (Unpublished paper, Office of Net Assessment, DoD, July 1992); Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Keeping Pace with the Military Technological Revolution, Issues in Science and Technology, Summer 1994, pp. 23-29; Andrew F. Krepinevich, "Cavalry to Computers: The Pattern of Military Revolutions," The National Interest, Fall 1994, pp. 30-42; and Andrew F. Krepinevich, "The Military Revolution: Restructuring Defense for the 21st Century," Testimony, Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Acquisition and Technology, May 5, 1995.

11. It is also important to note that militaries skip a generation in order to establish a strong competitive position in what they envision to be a new military regime. A new military regime comes about as a consequence of a military revolution, one of the principal characteristics of which is the displacement of prior dominant forms of military operations, force structure and systems. If one believes such a revolution is under way, then it becomes imperative to begin the transformation of one's military. Skipping a generation is one aspect of this transformation effort.

12. To be sure, it can be argued that US power-projection operations are inextricably linked to homeland defense, in that they can reduce the danger to the homeland (e.g., operations against al Qaeda terrorist networks overseas), and can be compromised by attacks on the homeland (e.g., by attacks on US ports of embarkation for troops headed overseas). Threats to the US homeland can also serve as a deterrent to US power-projection operations. However, consideration of this important issue is beyond the scope of this paper. In addition, while one can conceive of space and information operations being independent forms of military competition, clearly they also play important roles in power-projection operations as well.

13. With the awarding of the JSF contract, the aircraft has been designated the F-35.

14. The Navy Department has indicated it plans to reduce its purchase of JSFs from 1,089 to 680, owing primarily to budget constraints. A final decision will probably not occur until the Defense Department completes its program and budget review in late summer or early fall.

15. In Operation Enduring Freedom, carrier-based strike aircraft delivered around 43 percent of the precision-guided weapons against targets in Afghanistan, while bombers delivered roughly 46 percent. Some 10 percent of the PGMs were dropped by land-based tactical strike aircraft. See William Arkin, "Weapons Total from Afghanistan Includes Large Amount of Cannon Fire," Defense Daily, March 5, 2002.

16. Building on the CIA's success, in the just-submitted fiscal year (FY) 2003 budget, the Air Force proposes to procure 22 Predators configured to carry Hellfire missiles.

17. Stealthy UCAVs would likely be required against adversaries possessing robust air defenses. To the degree such defenses are not confronted, or can be defeated quickly, the requirements for stealth are diminished. However, given the difficulties experienced in quickly eliminating even modest air defense networks such as that possessed by the Serbs in Operation Allied Force, it would appear that the emphasis on stealth aircraft is appropriate.

18. While there are missions for which UCAVs seem to have a high promise, other missions--such as air-to-air combat--seem quite ambitious. It may be that UCAVs--like manned aircraft nearly a century ago--will have to work their way up the hierarchy of missions, from the simple to the more complex. The UCAV's ability to expand its role will depend on several factors, to include the pace of technological change, the aggressiveness with which UCAV programs are pursued, the nature of the threat, and the concept of operations chosen to defeat the threat.

19. To be sure, the carrier-based JSF would have to contend with the area-denial threat, but the aircraft would be operating from a mobile base. The advantage of the Army strike elements mentioned here would likely depend, to a great extent, on their being pre-deployed to the threatened theater, as their rapid deployment in an anti-access environment is likely to be highly problematic. While the range of Army systems is not in a class with that of the carrier-based JSF, this might be offset by the ability to deploy ground forces ashore in forward positions.

20. HMS Dreadnought displaced some 17,900 tons. The DD-21 was projected to displace roughly 12-14,000 tons.

21. QDR, pp. 20-21.

22. For an overview of the Network-Centric Warfare and Streetfighter concepts, see Wayne Hughes, Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000), pp. 145-67; and Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (Ret.). "Rebalancing the Fleet," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1999. For a thoughtful opposing view of the littoral area-denial challenge, see Arthur H. Barber III and Delwyn L. Gilmore, "Maritime Access: Do Defenders Hold All The Cards?" Defense Horizons, October 2001.

23. DoD, "Navy Announces DD(X) Program," DoD News Release No. 559-01, November 1, 2001; and Anne Marie Squeo, "Navy to Scrap New Destroyer in Favor of Building 'Family of Ships,'" The Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2001.

24. Secretary of the Army Thomas White feels Crusader will enable the Army to better deal with prospective enemy artillery capabilities: "There was a serious [artillery] match-up problem with the Soviets. It would be a challenge with any of the three countries that the president talked about recently--Iran, Iraq, North Korea." General Shinseki testified before Congress that the Army needs a highly maneuverable artillery platform, and that Crusader was the only system capable of meeting that need. Ann Roosevelt and Ron Laurenzo, "Army Considers Crusader 'Vital' Despite Criticisms" Defense Week, March 4, 2002. The Army Vice Chief of Staff, General John Keane, stated before Congress that "I can't imagine any conflict where [Crusader] would not be put on a C-17 and taken to support the Objective Force . . ." Ann Roosevelt, "General: Army Could Use Crusader in Afghanistan," Defense Week, March 18, 2002, p. 5.

25. The Army is planning to employ C-130 cargo aircraft operating from intermediate staging bases to deploy forces in an anti-access threat environment. The intent appears to be to exploit the C-130's ability to land at a wider range of air bases than the Air Force's C-5 or C-17 aircraft. By proliferating the number of insertion points, the Army apparently hopes to complicate an enemy's targeting problem, thereby reducing the vulnerability of its deploying forces.

26. ATACMS stands for Army Tactical Missile System.

27. Of course, among the many variations of the FCS is a new artillery system. Obviously, this system could provide enhanced fires as well.

28. The reader should not infer that this paper recommends the Army center its force structure around deep-strike brigades. While such brigades may prove very congruent with the Army's warfighting vision of detecting and engaging the enemy at extended ranges, these formations are not likely to be optimal for other critical Army missions, such as urban control and eviction operations, stability operations, and homeland defense missions.

29. The Excalibur, or XM982, is a family of precision-guided 155mm artillery munitions. Like other PGMs, the Excalibur is far more accurate than traditional (or "dumb") artillery munitions. Just as PGMs have greatly enhanced the strike capability of aircraft, so too do artillery PGMs offer the promise of greatly enhancing the effectiveness of existing artillery systems. See the US Army 2001 Weapon Systems Handbook at http://www.defensedaily.com.