The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, the FY 2003 Defense Budget Request and the Way Ahead for Transformation: Meeting the "Rumsfeld Test"
Michael Vickers
Published 06/19/2002 Backgrounder
June 19, 2002
There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order.
In September 1999, then-Governor Bush gave a presidential campaign speech at the Citadel in South Carolina in which he pledged, if elected, to “begin creating the military of the next century.” Bush promised he would, upon assuming office, “launch a comprehensive review of the military, including the structure of its forces, the state of its strategy, and the priorities of its procurement to challenge the status quo and envision a new architecture of American defense for decades to come.” This would involve “shifting budget priorities away from marginal improvements in current weapons and toward new technologies and strategies.” He added, “this will involve spending more—and spending more wisely.”2
The President’s Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, testified similarly in his confirmation hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee that:
The explosive advance of modern technology and the forces of globalization that are making the technology available to ally and adversary alike make transformation of US military power essential. While much of the existing defense establishment can be adapted to 21st century needs, a good deal cannot.…It is not a time to preside and tweak and calibrate what’s going on.…I just hope and pray that we’re wise enough to do it well.3
On September 30, 2001, the Department of Defense (DoD) released its 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report. A major theme of the new defense strategy is the need to transform the US military for the challenges of the 21st century. Secretary Rumsfeld noted in his forward to the report that “transformation is not a goal for tomorrow, but an endeavor that must be embraced in earnest today.”4 The QDR, however, provided only limited guidance about the ways in which the new strategy would affect the defense program. Major program decisions were deferred until the fiscal year (FY) 2003 budget request, which had been described as the “transformation budget” by senior defense officials.5 The administration released its FY 2003 budget request on February 4, 2002; $378.6 billion was requested for DoD, an increase of $48 billion or 11.2 percent in real terms.6
The QDR notes that history has shown that new military technologies can revolutionize military competitions and the character of armed conflicts in ways that render obsolete, rapidly and unexpectedly, the forces and doctrines of previously dominant powers.7 The QDR explicitly acknowledges that an ongoing revolution in military affairs (RMA) could change the conduct of military operations.8 It describes six key operational challenges that mandate transformation and provide focus for DoD’s transformation efforts:9
protecting critical bases of operations including the US homeland;
assuring US information systems and conducting effective information operations;
projecting and sustaining US forces in anti-access or area-denial environments;
denying enemies sanctuary;
enhancing the capability and survivability of space systems; and
leveraging information technology and innovative concepts for more effective joint operations.
The QDR affirms that DoD’s leadership recognizes that continuing “business as usual” within the Department is not a viable option given the new strategic era and the internal and external challenges facing the US military.10 “Without change,” the QDR cautions, “the current defense program will only become more expensive to maintain over time and will forfeit many of the opportunities available to the United States today.”11 It further warns that “without transformation, the US military will not be prepared to meet emerging challenges.”12
This Backgrounder focuses on two critical transformation challenges identified in the QDR—projecting power in anti-access and area-denial environments and denying sanctuary to enemies. These two challenges have the largest potential impact on force structure and investment decisions across the Services and are also the areas where the least change is evident in the defense program.13 In short, while the administration deserves high marks for “talking the transformation talk” in the QDR, it remains to be seen whether it will “walk the transformation walk” with respect to defense investment and divestment.
The Anti-Access/Strategic Sanctuary Challenge
The QDR asserts that future adversaries could have the means to render ineffective much of the US military’s current ability to project power overseas.14
Saturation attacks with ballistic and cruise missiles could deny or delay US military access to overseas bases, airfields, and ports. Advanced air defense systems could deny hostile airspace to all but low-observable aircraft. Military and commercial space capabilities, over-the-horizon radars, and low-observable unmanned aerial vehicles could give potential adversaries the means to conduct wide-area surveillance and track and target American forces and assets. Anti-ship cruise missiles, advanced diesel submarines, and advanced mines could threaten the ability of US naval and amphibious forces to operate in littoral waters.15
New approaches for projecting power, therefore, must be developed to meet these threats.16 Adversaries will also likely seek to exploit strategic depth to their advantage, the QDR concludes.17 Mobile ballistic missile systems can be launched from extended-range, exacerbating the anti-access and area-denial challenge. Space-denial capabilities, such as ground-based lasers, might be located deep within an adversary’s territory. Accordingly, a key objective is to develop the means to deny sanctuary to potential adversaries. This will likely require the development and acquisition of robust capabilities to conduct persistent surveillance, precision strike and maneuver in denied areas.18
The FY 2003 Budget: Failing the “Rumsfeld Test”
On January 31, 2002, four days before the administration released the FY 2003 defense budget request, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld gave a speech on “21st Century Transformation” to students, faculty and staff of the National Defense University. In it, he described what might be called the “Rumsfeld Test” for assessing how well the FY 2003 defense budget request meets the transformation objectives established in the QDR:
Our job is to close off as many avenues of attack as possible.…We need to prepare for new forms of terrorism, to be sure, but also attacks on US space assets, cyber attacks on our information networks, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.…We need improved intelligence, long-range precision strike, and sea-based platforms to help counter the “access-denial” capabilities of our adversaries.…We must work to build up our own areas of advantage—such as our ability to project power over long distances, precision-strike weapons, our space, intelligence, and undersea warfare capabilities.…As we change investment priorities, we must begin shifting the balance in our arsenal between manned and unmanned capabilities, short- and long-range systems, non-stealthy and stealthy systems, shooters and sensors, and vulnerable and hardened systems.19
The FY 2003 defense budget request ostensibly provides $21.1 billion in support of transformation initiatives, but it falls far short of the standard set by Secretary Rumsfeld in his NDU speech.20 It does not begin shifting the balance of the defense portfolio between short- and long-range systems. Modernization spending on tactical fighters, for example, exceeds that spent on long-range bombers by a ratio of more than 20 to 1, despite the seeming lessons of the war in Afghanistan.21 Long-range bombers accounted for approximately 10 percent of the sorties flown in Afghanistan, but delivered approximately 70 percent of the bombs dropped.22 The payload, range, endurance, all-weather, precision-guided munition delivery capability (combining mass with precision) and flexible targeting of long-range bombers, when employed in conjunction with Special Forces and the Afghan opposition, shattered Taliban and al Qaeda defenses in a little more than a month. Yet no additional stealthy bombers are being funded, the QDR’s warnings about threats to future forward base access and non-stealthy aircraft notwithstanding.
Similarly, while the FY 2003 budget request provides modest increases in funding for unmanned systems, it does not begin altering the balance between manned and unmanned systems; spending on manned tactical air programs alone exceeds spending on unmanned systems by a factor of more than 12:1. The ratio of spending on manned tactical air programs relative to unmanned systems actually increased between FY 2002 to FY 2003, from approximately 10:1 to 12:1.23 Moreover, the major unmanned systems that are funded—Global Hawk, Predator, the Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) and its naval variant (UCAV-N)—are either non-stealthy or short-range, which will likely limit their ability to meet the anti-access and strategic sanctuary challenges described in the QDR.
Failing to meet the “Rumsfeld Test” means that important potential avenues of attack (e.g., anti-access threats) may not be sealed while opportunities (e.g., denying strategic sanctuaries) may not be exploited even though US military appears to have the capacity to do so. It also means that important chances may be missed to dissuade potential competitors and thereby strengthen future deterrence.
There are, to be sure, several small, but potentially important initiatives from a transformation perspective in the FY 2003 defense budget request: increased funding for defenses against biological weapons; initiation of a space-based, kinetic-kill interceptor research program for limited global missile defense;24 funding aimed at attaining by 2010 a space-based radar system (SBR) to track mobile targets over wide areas at strategic depths; increased funding for largely classified, information warfare and space control programs; funding to convert four Trident submarines to conventional strike platforms (SSGNs); increased funding for unmanned undersea vehicles to provide countermine capabilities in contested littoral waters; funding for small diameter bombs (SDBs), advanced energetic materials (i.e., more powerful high explosives) and new earth penetrator weapons to increase precision-strike payloads of aircraft and attack hardened and deeply buried targets; and funding for wideband, satellite communications to enable high-bandwidth, network-centric warfare. A number of other ongoing but nonetheless potentially transformational programs, such as the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS), which could contribute to a rapid and lethal ground force power-projection capability, are also receiving continued support. There is also a significant increase in resources devoted to defense R&D, though it is far from clear whether defense R&D is focused in the right areas to support transformation.
The four SSGNs proposed by DoD will enhance substantially the Navy’s ability to project power in anti-access environments, but they are limited by their weapons’ reach and in their inability to deliver high-volume precision fires. There are no additional B-2 stealth bombers in the budget, or, alternatively, a start on a new long-range penetrating bomber. Yet a robust fleet of long-range stealthy bombers — only 16 operational aircraft are available today—appears to be a key capability for providing “day one,” sustained, high-volume, precision fires in anti-access/deep-inland environments for the next 15-20 years. Meanwhile, some $340 billion will be invested in three new short-range fighters, despite their highly questionable relevance to the transformation challenges described in the QDR.25 There likewise does not appear to be a program to develop a stealthy, long-range, reconnaissance and surveillance unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Such a platform is critically needed to provide persistent surveillance of deep, critical mobile targets in anti-access environments as a complement to a Space-Based Radar constellation. It also is a critical hedge should the SBR prove unable to surmount the many technical challenges facing it, and therefore not be deployed in the timeframe currently envisioned. Finally, there is also an urgent need for stealthy air mobility capabilities for denied areas, deep insertion of special operations forces (SOF) and aerial refueling of stealth aircraft.26 Special Forces are a critical early entry capability in anti-access contingencies, and the US military’s ability to insert and sustain such forces will be increasingly held at risk by advanced air defenses and forward base denial. Similarly, the presence of advanced air defenses will likely create a requirement to sustain stealthy air operations over denied areas, a capability that is lacking today.
Indeed, DoD’s planned mix of capabilities seems incoherent from an anti-access and sanctuary denial perspective. DoD is moving to an almost completely stealthy (albeit, almost exclusively short-range) air strike force, for example, while pursuing a non-stealthy, persistent surveillance force. It is pursuing a capability to locate and track mobile targets at strategic depths (SBR), but it is not developing a corresponding capability to strike deep with high-volume fires. The Defense Department is hedging against the potential vulnerability of surface, naval-strike platforms by investing in SSGNs, but is only minimally hedging against the much greater likelihood that in-theater bases could be denied. It is moving to an all-stealth, early entry air strike force (B-2, F-22, Naval Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), UCAV and UCAV-N), but seems to be assuming that early entry ground forces will be able to be inserted and sustained by non-stealthy C-130 transports.
DoD’s transformation investment decisions may be severely handicapped by the absence of plausible Service, joint and interagency operational concepts to address the transformation challenges described in the QDR. Some Service concepts, such as the Air Force’s Global Strike Task Force, acknowledge the anti-access challenge, but assume that a very limited force of B-2s and F-22s will be sufficient to negate the threat. Other Service and joint concepts, such as Rapid Decisive Operations, essentially assume away the anti-access/strategic sanctuary problem. DoD’s force structure and investment decisions likewise may be severely handicapped by the lack of a robust experimentation program focused on transformation challenges. Perhaps as a result, inherent tensions between the need to provide recapitalized legacy forces for forward deterrence and warfighting while developing transformational capabilities responsive to the challenges identified in the QDR were decisively resolved in favor of the former.
Anti-Access/Sanctuary Denial Investment
The investments described in recent testimony as being responsive to the QDR’s challenges of projecting power in anti-access environments and denying enemies sanctuary may be valuable military capabilities in a number of contingencies. Most are not, however, the kinds of capabilities that immediately leap to mind for countering anti-access threats and denying strategic sanctuaries.
Projecting Power in Anti-Access Environments
The FY 2003 defense budget request includes $7.4 billion under the rubric of projecting power in anti-access environments, including:27
$630 million for upgrades to the Global Positioning System (GPS);
$5 million for research related to the Future Maritime Prepositioning System;
$83 million for the development of unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs);
$500 million for the Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing (STOVL) variant of the JSF;
$812 million for 332 Interim Armored Vehicles (IAVs);
$707 million for the Army’s FCS; and
$88 million for ground force hypervelocity missiles.
The above list, drawn from prepared testimony, is obviously incomplete, but it raises a number of questions about the operational concept that underlies it. Several of the programs listed appear ill-matched to the transformation challenges they are intended to address, or, at the very least, appear to be unsupported by plausible joint operational concepts. Several capabilities that would seem to be important in addressing the anti-access/area-denial challenge, moreover, are not evident.
The only program that seems unambiguously related to the challenge of projecting power in anti-access/area-denial environments is the UUV, which could be an important capability in mine-infested littoral waters. GPS upgrades, while essential to power projection, seem to have more to do with information assurance. The Future Maritime Prepositioning System, IAVs, the FCS, and ground force hypervelocity missiles seem geared more to rapid power projection than they are to projecting power in anti-access environments. The Army’s IAVs and FCS, for example, will be dependent on C-130 transports for strategic entry into a theater, which may be problematic in advanced air defense environments.28 It seems unlikely that the STOVL JSF will be the “kick-in-the-door” capability of choice for defeating anti-access threats. It would seem that B-2s and SSGNs, with their stealth, range, payload and independence of forward bases, would comprise a far more potent anti-access, early-entry strike force. Similarly, it would appear that the F-22 would be superior in the air dominance role, though its sortie rate would be significantly constrained if ballistic missile threats to close-in bases forced it to operate from extended range.
Capabilities not on the above list, but potentially very responsive to the challenge of projecting power in anti-access environments include: Space-Based Radar (funded, but listed under “denying sanctuary”) and stealthy, long-range, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) UAVs for covert, persistent, deep surveillance; space-to-ground kinetic-strike platforms for rapid, limited global strike; stealthy, long-range bombers (either manned or unmanned) for high-volume, precision fires; converted Trident submarines (and SSNs as well) for covert cruise missile delivery and SOF insertion (funded, but listed under “denying sanctuary”); “Streetfighter” littoral combat ships; small diameter bombs (funded, but listed under “denying sanctuary”); stealthy, air-launched cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles; and stealthy, extended-range air mobility aircraft (both for SOF insertion and aerial refueling in denied areas). Such capabilities would appear to form the basis for a robust, assured-access, extended-range, space-, long-range air-, undersea-, and special operations-centric joint operational concept that could defeat current and future anti-access threats more effectively and quickly than DoD’s planned force. Such a force would pose a formidable multidimensional challenge to prospective adversaries and complicate their strategic planning. It would be able to project power deep inland in access-constrained environments without relying on potentially vulnerable theater bases, thereby denying potential adversaries the sanctuary of strategic depth while increasing US freedom of action in crises. The effectiveness of these capabilities, of course, would depend significantly on the development of appropriate joint operational and organizational concepts for their use, but they seem far more useful for defeating anti-access threats than those specified in DoD testimony.
Denying Enemies Sanctuary
The FY 2003 budget requests $3.2 billion for programs under the rubric of denying enemies sanctuary, including:29
$141 million to accelerate development of UCAVs;
$629 million for the Global Hawk UAV and a maritime variant;
$91 million for the SBR system;
$54 million for the development of SDBs;
$1 billion for the conversion of four Trident submarines to SSGNs;
$30 million for advanced energetic materials (i.e., thermobaric weapons and other boosted explosives) and new earth penetrator weapons; and
$961 million for the DD(X) destroyer.
Only two programs/program-categories on the above list seem fully responsive to the objective of denying enemies sanctuary (i.e., denying any adversary, including those with anti-access and area-denial capabilities, the ability to exploit strategic depth): the Space-Based Radar and the program to develop advanced energetic materials and new earth penetrator weapons. Assuming the technology matures sufficiently, an SBR constellation would allow persistent surveillance of critical mobile targets over wide areas at strategic depth—a capability the US military currently lacks. Similarly, new means of attacking deeply buried and hardened targets could remove another form of enemy sanctuary.
Trident conversion, while certainly applicable to the sanctuary denial mission, is more applicable to the anti-access challenge given the somewhat limited reach of its Tomahawk missiles. The same is true for DD(X) program, though to the extent that it results in a survivable platform, the ship will likely be less survivable and therefore less immediately useful in area-denial environments than the converted Tridents. Many of the DD(X)’s projected strike capabilities, moreover, will not be able to reach far inland.30 The Small Diameter Bomb is fungible to both anti-access and deep inland environments, but is dependent on platform reach and survivability. The high-endurance but non-stealthy Global Hawk UAV is an excellent persistent surveillance platform, but it will only be able to perform its mission in benign air defense environments. The stealthy UCAVs (both land- and carrier-based) are tactical-range aircraft, and hence will not be able to deny sanctuary to adversaries who possess both anti-access capabilities and strategic depth (e.g., China).
Capabilities not on the above list, but potentially very responsive to the challenge of denying enemies sanctuary include: stealthy, long-range, ISR UAVs for covert, persistent, deep surveillance; space-to-ground, kinetic-strike platforms for rapid, limited global strike; stealthy, long-range bombers (either manned or unmanned) for high-volume precision fires; stealthy, air-launched cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles; stealthy, extended-range air mobility aircraft (both for SOF insertion and aerial refueling in denied areas); offensive information operations; and space control capabilities. More rapid, but still highly lethal, ground power-projection capabilities could also deny future enemies the sanctuary of time. But as the preceding discussion indicates, the sanctuary denial challenge needs to be addressed as part of a plausible joint operational concept.
A Paradigm Shift in Force Planning?
A major outcome of the QDR was the decision to abandon the Two Major Theater War construct that had served as the basis for US force planning since the end of the Cold War and to shift from a threat-based force planning model to a capabilities-based one. The new force sizing and shaping construct requires the US military to maintain forces capable of defending the United States;31 deterring aggression and coercion forward in four critical theaters—Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the Middle East/Southwest Asia; swiftly defeating two aggressors in overlapping timeframes while preserving the option for one major offensive to occupy an aggressor’s capital and replace the regime; and conducting a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations.32 The shift to a capabilities-based approach is intended, according to the QDR, to focus on how an adversary might fight rather than on who the adversary might be.33
Yet despite this “paradigm shift in force planning,” the QDR did not recommend any changes to existing force structure or modernization programs.34 The QDR does note that as transformation matures, “DoD will explore additional opportunities to restructure and reorganize the Armed Forces.”35 With its emphasis on strengthening forward deterrent forces and being able to swiftly defeat two adversaries with minimal reinforcement, however, the new force sizing and shaping construct could easily increase or reinforce demand for legacy force structure and retard transformation. Similarly, it is by no means clear that the shift to a capabilities-based approach will be unambiguous enough to foster transformation or that it will produce the required capabilities by the time they are needed. Indeed, the tension inherent in the new construct between the need to provide current forces for forward deterrence and warfighting on the one hand, and to develop capabilities to meet transformation challenges on the other, appears to have been resolved decisively in favor of the former.
Reshaping the force through new joint concepts of operation and new capabilities, however, could have a significant impact on force sizing. As the QDR notes, “capabilities and forces located in the continental United States and in space are a critical element of the new global posture. Long-range strike aircraft and special operations forces provide an immediately employable supplement to forward forces to achieve a deterrent effect in peacetime.”36 One would think that the swift defeat of Taliban and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan using precisely these means would not only serve to reinforce the deterrent effect the QDR describes, but would also create opportunities to begin reshaping the force. New approaches to forward presence and rapid reinforcement and warfighting (e.g., substituting in some cases SSGNs and “Streetfighter” Littoral Combat Ships for carrier battle groups; shifting toward bomber-centric in lieu of fighter-centric air attack; and greater reliance on special operations forces with allies and coalition partners providing ground forces) could have a multiplier effect on transformation—simultaneously challenging dominant warfighting cultures within the Services while creating substantial “slack” for transformational investment.37
Selectively Recapitalizing?
The QDR emphasizes the need to strike a balance between recapitalization of legacy forces and transformation in modernization programs. It asserts, however, that recapitalization will be “selective” to ensure that it does not crowd out transformation.38 In the FY 2003 defense budget request, however, recapitalization dominated. Pursuing more than selective modernization, of course, not only crowds out transformation financially, but also makes it easier to crowd it out culturally. It is all-the-more striking, therefore, how few of DoD’s major defense modernization programs are on the list of FY 2003 budget initiatives related to the key transformation challenges identified in the QDR.39
Only two major modernization programs have been terminated—the Crusader artillery system and Navy Area (ballistic missile) Defense—despite the President’s pledge to “shift budget priorities away from marginal improvements in current weapons systems.”40 While Navy Area Defense was killed for cost and technical reasons, Crusader was unambiguously cancelled because of its poor fit with the emerging strategic environment.41 Additional major program divestments are under consideration in the FY 2004 program budget cycle, largely due to looming “bow wave” concerns.42 Among major program cuts under consideration are a reduction in the F-22 buy to 180 aircraft and an additional restructuring/cancellation of the Army’s Comanche armed reconnaissance helicopter.43
While additional divestment is laudable from a transformation perspective, DoD’s senior leadership may have locked on to the wrong fighter. It is far from compelling that the Air Force and Navy require two new fighters each, or that the tactical air fleet needs to remain as large as it currently is given the increasing effectiveness and strategic utility of bombers and the potential of UCAVs and missiles. Massive investment in next-generation fighter aircraft seems to be a cultural legacy of the Cold War when bases were plentiful and US forces faced a very large Soviet air threat across the then inter-German border. Air superiority is still “Job One” for the Air Force, but the air-to-air threat has declined dramatically since the end of the Cold War, and US qualitative advantages in this area will increase enormously with the deployment of the F-22. The nature of the air superiority problem, moreover, is shifting more toward the threats that mobile ballistic and cruise missiles and advanced air defenses pose to US forward bases and non-stealthy aircraft.44 Air-to-ground attack (or “bomb dropping”) has thus become the primary role for land-based, multi-role fighters in the post–Cold War world, and this mission can be performed more effectively and efficiently by bombers and UCAVs, given the strategic environment described in the QDR. It is not clear what critical need the $220 billion, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is intended to fill from an Air Force perspective.45 A shift to bomber-centric attack and first-generation UCAVs—the latter for the tactical (i.e., short-range) air-to-ground attack mission, coupled with the significant increase in capabilities provided by the F-22 and next generation PGMs—should allow the size of the current manned fighter force to be significantly reduced. Such a shift would produce significant cost savings (UCAVs are projected to cost one-third as much as the JSF), while increasing US freedom of action and more effectively dissuading potential competitors.46 While the Navy has a compelling need for stealth, since it currently has no stealthy aircraft capable of penetrating advanced air defenses, it would seem prudent to cap the F/A-18 E/F buy as soon a contract terms permit and accelerate the development of the carrier version of the JSF.47 That, coupled with termination of the Air Force share of the JSF program would free up substantial funds for transformational investments.
Funding Leap-Ahead Technologies?
The QDR asserts that a robust research and development (R&D) effort is imperative to achieving the Department’s transformation objectives. It states that new information systems will be required, and these systems must be married with technological advances in other key areas, including stealth platforms, unmanned vehicles, and smart submunitions. To provide the basic research for these capabilities, the QDR calls for a significant increase in funding for science and technology (S&T) programs to a level of three percent of DoD spending per year. A robust test and evaluation program is likewise required to ensure that transformational systems are tested thoroughly before they are deployed.48
The FY 2003 budget request includes a $5.3 billion increase in funding for defense R&D, bringing the R&D budget to $53.9 billion. This is 25 percent more in real (inflation-adjusted) dollars than was provided in FY 2001, and 5 percent above the level provided in FY 1987, the previous peak for defense R&D.49 R&D spending is projected to remain at roughly this level through the 2003-2007 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), reaching a peak of $58.5 billion (in FY 2003 dollars) in FY 2005, and then declining to $53.7 billion in FY 2007.50 A significant and sustained increase in R&D spending is essential, given the need to transform the US military for the challenges of the twenty-first century.51 It is not clear, however, whether defense R&D is focused in the right areas to support transformation.
The S&T portion of the R&D budget is where “leap-ahead” technologies are developed. In the FY 2003 budget request, S&T is funded at $9.9 billion, or 2.68 percent of the total DoD budget.52 Not only did the FY 2003 budget not meet the QDR goal of funding S&T at three percent of total DoD spending, the amount requested is $600 million below the level Congress appropriated in FY 2002.53 S&T’s share of the total DoD budget, moreover, is projected to decline every year through the FYDP, dipping to 2.28 percent in FY 2007.54 The increase in S&T funding between FY 2001 and 2003 amounts to one-fifth the increase in percentage terms (5 percent vice 25 percent) in R&D across the board, and less that ten percent of the increase (in percentage terms) devoted to both missile defense and Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) of mature weapons systems.55 Within the military departments, S&T investment is even lower, ranging from 1.5 percent to 1.8 percent of FY 2003 budgets.56
Funding Robust Experimentation and Creating Transformational Organizations?
The QDR advocates a robust program of experimentation focused on the six, core transformation challenges it identifies.57 The QDR calls for DoD to explore the need for a Joint National Training Center and a Joint Opposing Force to facilitate high-fidelity, joint exercises focused on emerging challenges, and states that the Department will establish a space test range to better address the growing challenge of space control.58 The QDR acknowledges that field exercises oriented to military transformation have suffered from chronic resource shortages. It states that DoD will consider increasing the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) exercise budget. To ensure that sufficient forces are available for experimentation, DoD may authorize JFCOM to draw up to five percent of US-based forces each year for experimentation activities.59
DoD’s current experimentation program suffers from all the faults the QDR implicitly identifies. It has not focused on transformation challenges, and it lacks the infrastructure to conduct high-fidelity experimentation in support of transformation challenges. There is no evidence, moreover, that this is about to change.60
The creation of experimental organizations with warfighting capabilities has often been central to transformation. Such organizations can serve as the vanguard for the transformed force of the future while also offering immediate operational benefits. A very promising idea in the QDR is the proposal to create a Standing Joint Task Force (SJTF) for unwarned, extended-range conventional attack.61 Such an organization, the QDR notes, could be the vanguard for developing the capability to continuously locate and track mobile targets at any range and rapidly attack them without warning from the air and sea, on the ground, and through space and cyberspace.62
Presumably, an SJTF for unwarned, extended-range conventional attack would be centered on B-2 bombers (and, in time, a new long-range penetrating bomber, either manned or unmanned), F-22 air superiority fighters operating from extended range (and/or JSFs operating off of carriers), guided missile (SSGN) and attack (SSN) submarines, SOF, and space control and offensive information warfare capabilities. Such a force would be able to project power in anti-access/area denial environments and preclude adversaries from exploiting their strategic depth as an operational sanctuary. It could prove to be the “force of first resort” in a wide range of contingencies, and could serve as a powerful contributor to DoD’s dissuasion strategies by taking away asymmetric transformation options from would-be competitors and imposing significant costs on them.63
Whether existing fleet sizes (e.g., the limited number of stealthy, long-range bombers available) are adequate to realize the potential of such an organization should be expeditiously determined. Critical operational shortfalls that need to be addressed to realize the concept’s full potential also exist in the areas of survivable, extended-range, high-fidelity, persistent surveillance (e.g., development of Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI), SBR and very long-range, stealthy, ISR UAVs) and stealthy air mobility (for extended-range, denied-area insertion and sustainment).64
The QDR notes that other SJTFs may be established to meet the six transformation challenges the QDR identifies. One such idea might be an SJTF for rapid power projection and large-scale land control. A decision to stand-up an SJTF of any kind, however, has yet to be made.
From Politically-Restricted Access to Anti-Access: Meeting the “Rumsfeld Test”
Meeting the “Rumsfeld Test” does not require a wholesale restructuring of the defense program. As senior defense officials have repeatedly noted, a little transformation (of the right kind) can go a long way. The challenge in meeting the ”Rumsfeld Test”, moreover, is more cultural (e.g., shifting the Air Force from fighter-centric to bomber-centric attack) than it is financial.
Thus far, the enormous political capital created by the astonishingly successful and “unconventional” war in Afghanistan mostly has been used to request (and almost assuredly receive) large increases in the defense budget to fund legacy modernization. It should be used to close off all the potential avenues of attack that the QDR identifies. The war demonstrated the power of a transformational concept of operation (forward base-independent, long-range precision strike combined with special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational effects) that could migrate easily to the power-projection challenges described in the QDR, but only if key additional capabilities are pursued. In Afghanistan’s benign air defense environment, the entire suite of bomber and ISR UAV capabilities could be used, and Special Forces teams could be inserted from close range. If the challenge had been one of military anti-access instead of just political anti-access, the few remaining capabilities available would not have amounted to much. The penetrating bomber force would have been restricted to 16 operational B-2s. Non-stealthy UAVs and carrier-based, non-stealthy fighters would have been at far greater risk to advanced air defenses, as would the non-stealthy tankers essential to extending the reach of short-range fighters. SOF insertion would have been far more problematic. Space-Based Radar and SSGNs are important starts for dealing with the challenges of anti-access and strategic sanctuaries, but they are only a start. Additional capabilities—more stealthy, long-range strike; stealthy, long-range ISR UAVs; and stealthy, air mobility aircraft—are essential for sustained, multidimensional anti-access operations.
One of the most inexplicable actions of the Bush Administration has been its decision not to pursue a more robust long-range, precision-strike capability. The current B-2 fleet is far too small for sustained operations in anti-access, extended-range or deep-inland environments. Air Force explanations for not increasing its assured access, long-range, precision-strike capabilities—“bombers are only useful for striking fixed targets,” “speed and short-range trumps long-range, endurance and large payload capacity,” “forward bases will always be available,” and “fighters with aerial refueling are equivalent to bombers”—are not credible, and even less so following the war in Afghanistan.65 Afghanistan, of course, should not be the model for all future conflicts, but neither should the wars and theaters of the more distant past. The kinds of power-projection forces used in Afghanistan, moreover, are far closer to the kind that will likely be required to operate in future anti-access environments, especially early on in a conflict.
If more B-2s are not the answer for some reason that has not been disclosed (and therefore perhaps should not be disclosed), then it is imperative to begin aggressive development of a new “B-X” bomber immediately. Despite the QDR’s warning of the anti-access/strategic sanctuary challenges, it is not clear that DoD and Air Force leaders feel any sense of urgency. Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Edward C. “Pete” Aldridge, had asked the Air Force to begin studies for a new strategic bomber in 2008 that would be deployed in the 2030 timeframe.66 More recently, Aldridge told the Air Force that it needed to move forward its schedule by 15 years.67 The Air Force, however, seems intent on starting yet another fighter program—the FB-22.68 More fighters, including a “stretch” version of the F-22, however, will not solve the anti-access/strategic sanctuary problem. Its operational combat radius and endurance will be less than a third that of a bomber (e.g., the B-2), which raises questions of whether it will even be able to reach deep, mobile targets, let alone loiter for a significant time in the area awaiting their detection.69 It will be able to carry at most about one-eighth the payload; payload and volume constraints will limit its weapons mix flexibility (e.g., it ability to carry a mix of stealthy Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles (JASSMs), SDBs and large “bunker buster” bombs). A more robust, penetrating bomber fleet is required not only to support the two power-projection transformation challenges identified in the QDR, but also to provide the enhanced, conventional-strike capability called for in the recently completed Nuclear Posture Review.70 It will increase US freedom of action in crises by not making US forces so dependent on forward base access and will better deter and dissuade potential adversaries. As noted earlier, there are also compelling needs for stealthy, long-range ISR UAVs and stealthy air mobility aircraft.
In addition to redirected investment, transformation of US military capabilities could be facilitated by developing coherent Service, joint and interagency operational concepts for the six key challenges identified in the QDR. This would help ensure that “systems” solutions, rather than program solutions are developed (e.g., the ability to see deep, shoot deep with high-volume fires, and insert and sustain SOF deep into denied areas). These concepts should be the subject of vigorous experimentation, and resourced appropriately. Experimental organizations, such as the Standing Joint Task Force for unwarned, extended-range, conventional strike described in the QDR, should also be stood up.
The “Rumsfeld Test” gets to the essence of the link between portfolio rebalancing and transformation. The QDR compellingly makes the case for a significant shift in US military capabilities. The FY 2004 budget is likely the administration’s last chance to make good on its transformation pledges. It is time to begin meeting the “Rumsfeld Test.”
For more information, contact Michael G. Vickers at (202) 331-7990.
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments is an independent public policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking about defense planning and investment strategies for the 21st century. The Center is directed by Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich. For more information about CSBA, see our website at: http://www.csbaonline.org.
