• “It is not all that it seems.” The proposal for a Department of Homeland Security is far less sweeping than the name of the department implies. The president’s legislation does not address all the current, critical organizational deficiencies that exist with respect to protecting the homeland.

• “The devil is in the details.” Compromises in standing-up the department could result in an organization that is incapable of delivering the promised efficiencies and reducing overlap, duplication, and overhead.

• “Things may get worse before they get better.” In the short term the government’s effectiveness in providing homeland security may decline as organizations transferred to the department adapt to new lines of authority and develop appropriate practices, systems, and organizational cultures.

The Plan
The rationale for combining numerous federal agencies, programs, and facilities under a single Homeland Security Department parallels the thinking behind the formulation of the 1947 National Security Act, consolidating key assets into one big, powerful organization and creating the means to orchestrate that department’s efforts with other federal activities. Large, centralized organizations have drawbacks, the most obvious being managing a vast bureaucracy.² But big organizations can also have great strengths, to include providing unity of purpose, a wealth of capabilities, economies of scale, and fostering a common institutional culture and practices that build trust and confidence, and facilitate coordinated action. Large federal departments with sizable budgets also hold the attention of official Washington, increasing the likelihood that policymakers will provide proper oversight for the task of protecting the homeland, an important factor considering that terrorist threats may be enduring as well. For these reasons, the president’s proposal to create the Homeland Security Department makes eminent sense.

The proposed department would provide an appropriate core capability for protecting the homeland by combining agencies and activities that make major contributions to the most critical homeland security tasks, providing the means to: 1) prevent terrorist attacks from entering the United States; 2) protect against attacks by reducing vulnerabilities; and 3) respond to mitigate the effects of an attack. In addition, the proposed department would provide a science and technology base for developing future capabilities to support each of these efforts.

The administration’s plan calls for a department comprising of four major divisions: border and transportation security; information analysis and infrastructure protection; emergency preparedness and response; and chemical, biological, and nuclear-related countermeasures.³ The House and Senate versions of the legislation modified this proposal.⁴ Key differences are noted below, but for the most part, under each plan the department would be created by shifting existing resources and responsibilities.

Border and Transportation Security Division. This organization will assume responsibility for controlling the borders and monitoring the flow of people, goods, and services. In addition, while not assuming control of the Department of State’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, it will have the authority to establish rules and regulations governing the issuance of visas. The Border and Transportation Security Division will also include:

• The Coast Guard. A uniformed military service operating under the direction of the Department of Transportation, the Coast Guard conducts a range of maritime support missions including search and rescue, waterway icebreaking, bridge administration, aids to navigation, recreational boating safety, vessel traffic management, enforcement of marine resource laws and treaties, at-sea drug and illegal migrant interdiction, and port security and safety. The Coast Guard would remain a distinct service within the new department.

• The Customs Service. This service is the border enforcement arm of the Treasury Department. It monitors compliance with international trade agreements and domestic laws, inspects cargo, and interdicts cross-border smuggling, human trafficking, and the outbound flow of illicit money. In the Senate and House bills the service remains a distinct entity within the department.

• Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The INS is an agency within Department of Justice (DoJ). The service conducts immigration inspections of travelers seeking entry to the United States at officially designated ports of entry. The agency also regulates permanent and temporary immigration, including identifying and removing people who have no lawful status. The service’s law enforcement arm is the Border Patrol. Differing from the administration’s proposal, both the House and Senate bills would move only border and law enforcement functions to the Homeland Security Department. The Senate version would establish these under a separate Directorate for Immigration Affairs.

• Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. A component of the Department of Agriculture, the service has a number of responsibilities, including enforcing animal and plant import and export regulations and preventing the introduction of animal and plant diseases into the United States. In both the House and Senate versions of the bill, only the service’s border inspection functions would be transferred to the new department.

• The Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Established after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the TSA is an agency within the Department of Transportation charged with supervising the security of the national transportation system including bridges, rail, pipelines, and air transport. Its most immediate task is federalizing aviation security.

• The Federal Protective Service. This service is responsible for policing General Services Administration facilities which support and house a wide variety of federal activities.

Other resources in the proposed Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division include:

• National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). The center is part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It primarily focuses on protecting information systems. NIPC’s Computer Investigations and Operations Section is not slated to be transferred to the Homeland Security Department.

• Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO). The Department of Commerce’s CIAO also focuses on cyber-security.

• Federal Computer Information Response Center. The General Services Administration currently operates the Federal Computer Information Response Center as the central coordination and analysis facility dealing with computer security for civilian agencies in the federal government.

• The National Communications System (NCS). The NCS is responsible for national security and emergency preparedness communications programs, including coordination with the telecommunications sector. It is managed by the Defense Department.

• National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center. Jointly administered by Sandia and Los Alamos National Laboratories, the center is part of DoE.

• The Computer Security Division. The Computer Security Division of the Commerce Department’s National Institute of Standards and Technology conducts research on cyber-threats and advises federal agencies on information technology vulnerabilities and countermeasures. The House bill does not transfer this division to the Homeland Security Department.

• Federal Emergency Management Agency. FEMA is already responsible for coordinating support provided by 23 federal agencies. FEMA also manages disaster aid and assistance programs.

• The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program (NPSP). The program is currently managed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, an agency of HHS. NPSP is responsible for the storage and deployment of pharmaceuticals, supplies, and equipment for responding to a national health emergency or disaster.

• Nuclear Incident Response Teams. These would include the current interagency teams supported by DoE, FEMA, the FBI and DoD. Managed by DoE, the teams conduct threat assessments and search for, identify, assess, and disable nuclear weapons in the United States. In addition, the Nuclear Incident Response Teams would also be able to call on teams and assets from or managed by DoE and the EPA that would respond to radiological incidents.

• Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP). The ODP is an administrative center within the Department of Justice which provides assistance to state and local public safety personnel in acquiring training and equipment for terrorist incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks.

• Domestic Emergency Support Teams (DESTs). DESTs consist of experts from DoD, DoE, HHS, and the EPA who would be used to respond to a weapons of mass destruction incident. Currently, the FBI is the lead federal agency.

• Office of Emergency Preparedness. This office in HHS is responsible for managing and coordinating federal health, medical, and health related social services related to recovery efforts for major emergencies and disasters.

• National Domestic Preparedness Office. Part of the FBI, the National Domestic Preparedness Office coordinates federal responses to terrorist incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks. This office is largely dormant; most of its functions have been transferred to FEMA.

• Plum Island Animal Disease Center. This center conducts research and experiments on a wide range of animal pathogens for the Department of Agriculture.

• Environmental Measurements Laboratory. The laboratory is part of DoE. It measures and evaluates radiation in the environment.

• National Bio-Weapons Defense Analysis Center. This center is a DoD research facility chartered to develop countermeasures for terrorist attacks.

In total, the Department of Homeland Security will comprise over 200,000 personnel with a budget of about $26.5 billion.⁶ Since the department is combining existing agencies, some with several responsibilities, not all these resources support homeland security. For example, only about half of FEMA and the Coast Guard’s proposed budgets for FY 2003 relate to combating terrorism.⁷ Still, while the reorganization alone does not represent a major shift or increase in resources, it does combine organizations and programs with significant responsibilities in critical areas under one department and provides the promise of creating an appropriate core capability for homeland security.

The Challenges
Effectively combining over 22 agencies and numerous facilitates and programs into a new department will be a formidable task. Comparing this reorganization to the implementation of the 1947 National Security Act offers insights into the major challenges that may be encountered and subsequent reforms that could be needed.

Following World War II, President Truman hoped to eliminate the inter-service rivalries and unnecessary duplication that marred wartime operations by unifying the Armed Forces under a single civilian secretary and creating an intelligence agency to preclude surprise attacks like the Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor. The National Security Act of 1947 established a Secretary of Defense who was to coordinate three separate executive departments, the Departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. It also formalized the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); and created the NSC and the CIA. Finally, the act established boards to deal with mobilization, munitions, and research and development.

While the key institutions created by the National Security Act of 1947 served the nation well during the Cold War, their effectiveness was not apparent at the outset and initially, the new organizational structure struggled to improve upon the jerry-rigged wartime system it replaced. It took years for the national security system to mature and subsequent legislation to correct the deficiencies in the 1947 Act.⁸ Overcoming the barriers to realizing President Truman’s goal proved no easy task. The current administration will need to avoid similar pitfalls.

Problem #1: “It is not all that it seems.” While the National Security Act reorganized the military and intelligence services, it did little to improve their integration with other political, diplomatic, and economic instruments. To solve the coordination challenge, Truman did propose a National Security Council in the revised bill he presented to Congress on June 15, 1946. The NSC was to address all major national security issues and foster collegiality among departments, but the mandate provided by the final act was vague and, other than prescribing the membership of the council, the organization lacked formal structure. The council’s membership did not even include the Secretary of the Treasury, who had responsibility for many economic aspects of national security. It took three presidential administrations, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, to flesh out the modern NSC structure with its current membership and staff, and establish the position of National Security Advisor. ⁹

Like its predecessor, the Homeland Security Act is less comprehensive than its title implies. Even after the reorganization over fifty federal agencies, sub-departments, and offices outside the new department will have significant homeland security tasks.¹⁰ Only the Executive Office of the President has the authority to orchestrate a true national effort. The administration believes these functions can be accomplished by two new additions to the Executive Office of the President, the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council, both established by executive order shortly after the September 11 attacks.¹¹ The Office of Homeland Security is led by the president’s Homeland Security Advisor with responsibility for coordinating all federal government terrorist prevention and protection activities within the country. The council consists of select cabinet members and agency directors to advise the president on matters of homeland security.¹² The administration’s proposed legislation for establishing the Homeland Security Department, however, does not elaborate upon the responsibilities and authorities of the office and the council.

Effective management from the White House will require an appropriate staff and forums for consultation, particularly for performing the key tasks of strategic planning, program and budget review, and harmonizing the homeland security and national security agendas. To ensure a coherent, long-term effort, the structure for this activity should be established by law to guarantee a continuity of operations from one administration to the next. The House and Senate bills each flesh out different concepts for formalizing how the Executive Office of the President should manage the integration of homeland security activities over the long term. The House reorganizes the council, trying to keep its size manageable while including the organizations which will have to coordinate regularly with the new Homeland Security Department, such as the Secretary of Agriculture.¹³ It also authorizes a council staff, joint meetings with the NSC, and legislates responsibilities for drafting a national strategy and a homeland security budget. The Senate bill, in contrast, establishes a National Office for Combating Terrorism within the Executive Office of the President. This office would develop strategy in coordination with the Homeland Security Secretary; have budgeting responsibilities; and serve as an advisor to the National Security Council. The appointment of the office director would be subject to Senate confirmation.

Spelling out the White House’s role in greater detail and formalizing it in the legislation should facilitate the maturing of the Executive Office of the President’s ability to integrate activities and provide comprehensive policy guidance. In this respect, elements of both the House and Senate proposals appear promising. The House’s proposal to establish formally a council and staff responsible for establishing strategy and policy makes sense, helping to ensure continuity in operations from one administration to the next. There is, however, also a need for a strong presidential advisor with responsibility for reviewing all the disparate homeland security efforts within the federal government, in the same manner as the National Security Advisor oversees the activities of the NSC.

Formalizing overall management of the national effort, however, will not, by itself, address all the major challenges of integrating the new department with other homeland security efforts. Ensuring that the other stakeholders have the means they need to support the Department of Homeland Security is another matter. Preventing attacks against the United States, one of the key functions of protecting the homeland, offers a striking example. The reorganization does provide for consolidation of federal responsibilities by integrating the national assets that monitor US territorial waters, borders, points of embarkation, and the security of national transportation networks into the Homeland Security Department.¹⁴ But the department does not, by itself, constitute a “perimeter” defense. Law enforcement and intelligence must play key support roles, providing early warning, intelligence indicators, pursuing suspects, conducting investigations, and disrupting the links between terrorist and criminal organizations. Together, border and transportation security, law enforcement, and intelligence form a triad for preventing terrorist attacks against the United States.¹⁵

The Homeland Security Act addresses only one leg of the triad. Ensuring that the triad’s other two legs, law enforcement and intelligence, are prepared to do their part will require additional measures.¹⁶ In the area of law enforcement several concerns loom large. Manpower is one. An announced restructuring of the FBI on May 29, 2002 offers a case in point. The FBI director declared that combating terrorism would become the bureau’s primary mission, but even after the proposed reorganization more than two-thirds of its agents will remain focused on investigating traditional crimes, and the agency’s top ten priorities are equally split between homeland security and other tasks.¹⁷ In comparison, the investigation of the September 11 attacks required over 6,000 special agents, more than half of the agency’s special agents.¹⁸ Thus, even after reorganization if the agency has to conduct another major counterterrorism initiative it might once again have to disrupt its workforce, abandon ongoing investigations, and ignore other responsibilities. Whether the FBI, or the half dozen other major federal law enforcement activities that will be outside the new Homeland Security Department, are sufficiently manned and organized to meet all their obligations remains debatable.¹⁹

Nor are the problems of focusing on homeland security issues solely a question of manpower. Agencies lack the information they would need to preempt or deter attacks. There are, for example, insufficient information sharing and intelligence networks, or shared data bases that link federal, state, and local agencies.²⁰ Nor are information systems integrated adequately at the various levels of government. A Department of Justice study group found that 22 percent of the cities it surveyed with populations over 250,000 had no municipal-wide systems for sharing information. Only 16 percent of respondents indicated that their departments of motor vehicles were integrated into other government systems, a key shortfall given that driver and vehicle registration are often vital for identifying and tracking down suspects.²¹ Overall, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies will likely simply need a lot more resources to provide all the means required to effectively address their homeland security missions.

Intelligence support should be another area of concern. The new department is tasked with developing, as part of Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division, an intelligence center that will focus on terrorist threats and assessing vulnerabilities to attack.²² The Homeland Security Department, however, will still greatly depend on other agencies to provide much of the information it will analyze. In the end, the department will be an “intelligence consumer,” competing with other members of the national security community to ensure its priority requirements are met. Both the FBI and CIA directors have pledged to provide any support the new agency requires.²³ Such assurances, though well intended, fail to address how agencies with competing demands and priorities will parse scarce resources, particularly during periods of national crisis when the United States is engaged in active operations overseas and faces a significant terrorist threat at home.

Counterintelligence could also be a major issue. One goal for improving anti-terrorist efforts is to expand the sharing of classified information across the federal government, as well as with state and local agencies. Expanding access to intelligence, however, will also increase the opportunities for enemies to find ways to steal America’s secrets and use them to their own advantage. As secrets are shared with greater numbers of people and organizations, there may well be a need to greatly expand national counterintelligence capabilities to prevent enemies from exploiting classified US information.

Creating appropriate solutions to address all the intelligence issues related to homeland security, will likely be found only in a broader intelligence reform effort, which includes the FBI, the CIA, and the National Security Agency.²⁴

Problem #2. “The devil is in the details.” Many opposed the creation of a centralized Department of Defense in 1947, and compromises in the final legislation produced an organization far less efficient than the one President Truman envisioned. The Secretary of Defense was given virtually no staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had no statutory power. The Services prepared and submitted their own budgets.²⁵ As the early Defense Secretaries and JCS Chairmen discovered to their chagrin, all the leadership in the world could not overcome the limitations of poorly defined authority and lack of organizational clout.

The current administration also faces the challenge of ensuring that key elements of its initiative are not lost in the legislative process. The president’s proposal aims at building an agency that encompasses the critical tasks of preventing, protecting against, and responding to attacks. Consolidating agencies and creating a new center of power in the federal government, however, will clash with interests attempting to protect the prerogatives of their programs and organizations. It will be a great challenge to avoid introducing or leaving unaddressed flaws in the legislation that might make the department less effective than it could be in order to preserve the prerogatives of other organizations.²⁶ A well thought-out legislative mandate could forestall future bureaucratic battles over responsibilities and resources.

The most important management tool that the new department requires is oversight authority of budgets and programs within the various agencies it will command.²⁷ Other critical details relate to carefully articulating authorities, particularly with regard to the balance between the traditional responsibilities of existing agencies and the missions of the new Homeland Security Department.²⁸ In areas such as customs, immigration, information-sharing, intelligence, and privacy and freedom of information issues, both the House and Senate bills pay considerable attention to the details of assigning appropriate authority. The treatment of other major issues may require similar mindfulness. In particular, the Department of Homeland Security’s authority in relation to the Defense Department should be given greater scrutiny. In theory, the lines between defense and homeland security seem clear cut. DoD provides military forces to deal with threats external to the United States and also supports other federal agencies within the United States for homeland security. But the distinction between internal and external threats and the determination as to which agencies have lead responsibility may be much more difficult to discern in practice. Part of this problem is due to the nature of emerging threats, which may blur the traditional distinctions that define which agency should take charge. For example, in the case of cyber-attacks, it may be difficult to determine if a strike originated from within the United States or overseas and consequently, whether responding to it is a military responsibility or civil function.²⁹

Another factor which may complicate the goal of establishing clear lines of authority is that the Defense Department is currently reorganizing how it supports homeland security missions. The standup of the US Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the Department’s proposal to create an Assistant Secretary for Homeland Security will add another dimension to the issue. When NORTHCOM is established on October 1, 2002, it will represent the first time a single combatant command has assumed responsibility for the defense of the North American continent. NORTHCOM will also be responsible for coordinating military support to homeland security activities conducted by the Department of Homeland Security, as well as other federal agencies. The roles and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security and NORTHCOM could overlap to a great extent, in much the same way as the roles of the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and the US Special Operations Command clashed when these organizations were established. Further complicating the issue is that other commands will have some homeland security responsibilities as well. The soon-to-be-reorganized US Strategic Command will provide national missile defense and conduct defensive information operations. Hawaii is in the area of responsibility of the US Pacific Command. The US Southern Command could play an important role in conjunction with NORTHCOM on the nation’s southern flank. The National Guard Bureau may also assume a more important role in homeland defense. Complicating matters, the House bill requires the establishment of a joint interagency task force for homeland security made up of civilian and military agencies with responsibility for responding to terrorist threats. The task force’s purpose and role, however, are only vaguely defined. The Homeland Security Department will have to sort out issues of authority and responsibility with all these organizations, a task which may not prove simple in practice. In turn, DoD might be called upon to provide extensive support to the new department.

It may not be possible for the legislation’s drafters to anticipate all the ramifications of redistributing and reconciling authorities. Congress and the administration should be prepared to undertake subsequent legislation to address more details and work through conflicts in lines of authority that may come to light after the organizational relationships are put into practice.³⁰

Problem #3. “Things may get worse before they get better.” After the 1947 reorganization, it took years to sort out responsibilities, eliminate confusion, and develop effective operational practices for government activities that by the end of World War II were conducted routinely. During the course of the war, the federal government established a plethora of boards and committees to coordinate its efforts. The most important of these was the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. After the war, the committee served to facilitate interagency policymaking. The committees and boards were largely swept away by the 1947 Act and the subsequent establishment of the Defense Department.³¹ As a result, for a time, interagency coordination was actually less effective. For example, because of the new lines of authority established by the legislation, the State Department was no longer authorized to negotiate policy positions directly with the Army, Navy, and Air Staffs who were the Defense Department’s executive agents for operations overseas, even though some of Services’ missions, like postwar occupation duties, directly affected foreign policy. Regardless, matters had to be taken up with the Department of Defense or the JCS staff, which had limited means and scant authority to override decisions reached collectively by the Service chiefs.³² It took another decade for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to gain the authority and sufficient staff to serve as an effective instrument of interagency coordination. Many issues were not resolved until 1958.³³

Similarly, despite consolidating many activities, the process of standing up the Department of Homeland Security will likely create problems as well as solve them. In particular, its establishment, like implementing the National Security Act, will probably generate new interagency coordination challenges, as authorities and responsibilities for various programs are realigned. Working with law enforcement agencies outside the new department will almost certainly be a key challenge. One example is searching for “absconders,” individuals known to be in the country illegally that the INS identifies as a priority for deportation. The service, however, has scant enforcement capabilities. The INS does not even have sufficient resources to deport criminal aliens released from federal and state prisons.³⁴ When the service identifies absconders, the names are entered into the National Crime Information Center Data Base, which is managed by DoJ, which in turn relies on federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to use the database to check on individuals during traffic stops, criminal investigations, and other encounters. After the reorganization, the INS will no longer work for DoJ. Thus, the Homeland Security Department will largely be dependent on another federal agency to track down absconders and coordinate with state and local law enforcement. Interagency procedures will have to be developed to ensure effective cooperation and coordination.

Customer service could be another significant problem for the new department. Many of the agencies moving to the Homeland Security Department have dual missions. For example, the Coast Guard patrols US territorial waters, but it also gives maritime safety classes and conducts search and rescue. FEMA directs emergency operations, but it also gives out and manages loans for disaster recovery. In some cases, the range of services provided is far removed from homeland security issues. The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) offers a case in point. The APHIS is responsible for regulating the movement, importation, and field testing of genetically engineered plants and microorganisms; insuring compliance with the Animal Welfare Act; providing a range of cooperative programs for protecting the health of animals and plants; administering the National Veterinary Accreditation Program; and advising on wildlife management. It is very possible that the quality of customer services provided by organizations joining the department might decline as organizations orient resources on the primary task of providing homeland security.

Part of the solution to the customer service challenge may be to leave as many service functions as possible with the department of origin, transferring only the security-related activities to the Homeland Security Department. In some cases, such as the Coast Guard and FEMA, there is a great deal of overlap between operations and most customer service activities with regard to the resources used and the issues involved. Here, dividing organizations makes little sense and would lead to unnecessarily further proliferating the number of federal agencies. In the case of APHIS or the INS, which has distinct enforcement and service branches, splitting agencies may be appropriate. Both the House and Senate bills have made prudent efforts in this direction, moving only homeland security related activities to the new department.

The Homeland Security Department will also have to contend with reforming troubled agencies added to its ranks, such as the INS, which has been plagued in the past with chronic underfunding and poor management, as well as the responsibility for ensuring the effectiveness of new organizations like the TSA. In addition to organizational and coordination challenges, simple “housekeeping tasks,” such as submitting budgets, managing personnel, hosting web sites, and moving offices will consume time and energy, detracting from the efficiency of the department in the short term.³⁵

In other areas, things may not immediately get worse, but it could be a long time before they get better. One trouble spot will likely be internal information management. Each new division of the department will have to combine the information systems of disparate organizations. Border and Transportation Security Division may face the most serious challenge. It must integrate the activities of six major agencies, and to achieve gains in operational effectiveness, will have to demonstrate the capacity to move and share information in ways that allow the division to preempt and interdict threats with greater speed and efficiency. This will require a common system to share information. The system will have to provide security from unauthorized intrusion and cyber-attacks. It will also require databases that allow for data mining and other methods of information retrieval that will serve the different needs of the department’s many agencies. Building a common information system will inevitably engender debate and controversy; could take years to develop; and cost billions. Building a suitable information system will be a difficult, but essential “growing pain” that the new department will have to undergo to deliver on the promises of providing more effective and efficient security for the homeland.³⁶

Research in science and technology could be another area of concern. After the reorganization, there are many research programs that will still remain outside the authority of the Homeland Security Department, but which could be of great significance to the department’s operations and programs.³⁷ This includes, for example, research related to combating infectious disease. The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, part of the Department of Health and Human Services, is largely responsible for vaccine development against infectious diseases.³⁸ In addition, some of the National Institutes of Health’s other 27 institutions and centers or 2,000 affiliated research institutions may have valuable scientific contributions to offer. Although the epidemiology for infectious disease and bioterrorism can be very different, in some cases the resources and science used to fight one can be helpful in combating the other. Harmonizing these efforts to achieve the most effective use of the nation’s science and technology resources will be a challenge.³⁹

The House and Senate bills each add positive measures to jump start the science and technology effort with an appropriate, balanced mix of intramural (government) and extramural (academic and private sector) research. Both, for example, recommend establishing a Federally Funded Research and Development Center and a Homeland Security Science and Technology Council to guide the national research agenda. The Senate bill creates a Office for National Laboratories to coordinate efforts with DoE’s national laboratories and provides guidelines for coordinating bioterrorism research with the National Institutes of Health.

Even with the best legislation, however, building on the combined strengths of different organizations and improving underperforming agencies takes time. If the new department demonstrates significant gains in efficiencies in 3-5 years it will be a remarkable achievement.

Not So Great Expectations
The National Security Act of 1947 marked the beginning of the effort that created a new organization and national security structure that served the nation well throughout the course of the Cold War and into the present. Passage of the Homeland Security Act could yield a new security architecture that could stand for generations. It is worth remembering, however, that the national security instruments used to fight the Cold War were not cut from whole cloth. It took over a decade of experimentation, trial and error, and innovation to create the national security system that we know today.

Expectations of major immediate gains in homeland security as a result of reorganization are probably overblown and unrealistic. The Homeland Security Department, if given the proper authority and resources, should provide some long-term benefits, but the history of the National Security Act suggests there are troubles ahead. Great gains in efficiency will only come after the polyglot agencies assigned to the department are wedded into an effective organization that can swiftly move, share, and act on information and integrate diverse activities in a manner better performed than current organizations.

In summary, the prospects for laying a sound legislative foundation for a Homeland Security Department are promising, but more effort is needed. Addressing all the challenges of homeland security will require energetic leadership from the Executive Office of the President, more resources, and greater reforms than are likely to be achieved in creating the Department of Homeland Security. Creating a Homeland Security Department is a good place to start. But other initiatives must surely follow if the administration hopes to achieve dramatic improvements homeland security and realize efficiencies more quickly than the authors of the 1947 National Security Act.

1. For the text of the President’s speech see, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020606-8.html].

2. A General Accounting Office (GAO) report, for example, concludes that six of the government’s top 22 most serious management challenges are in the Department of Defense (DoD), one of the nation’s largest federal bureaucracies. See, GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, (Washington, DC: GAO, January 2001, GAO-01-263).

3. In the Senate version of the bill these divisions are referred to as directorates.

4. The President’s proposal is contained in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 submitted to Congress on June 18, 2002, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/bill/index.html]. H.R. 5005 was passed by the House on July 26. The Senate is currently considering S. 2452.

5. Currently, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has responsibility for conducting vulnerability assessments for the chemical industry and water treatment systems and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has responsibility for assessing the vulnerability of commercial nuclear facilities.

6. The estimated budget figure is drawn from Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Cost Estimate H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Washington, DC: CBO, July 23, 2002) p. 9. The administration’s original plan projected a workforce of 185,000, but this did not include an estimate that the Transportation Security Agency could grow to include 70,000 personnel.

7. FEMA’s proposed FY 2003 budget (discretionary spending) is $6.55 billion. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) estimates counterterrorism spending at $3.551 billion. The Coast Guard proposed budget (discretionary spending) is $5.523 billion. OMB estimates for counterterrorism spending is $2.6 billion. Fiscal Year 2003 Budget of the United States Government, (Washington, DC: OMB, n.d.) pp. 266, 322; Executive Office of the President, OMB, Unclassified Report to Congress on Government-wide Spending to Combat Terrorism, (Washington, DC: OMB, June 24, 2002), pp. 81, 85.

8. For the legislative and executive changes implemented in the wake of the 1947 act see, Alistair J.K. Shepherd, “Evolution of Security Agencies and Departments,” Stephen A. Cambone, A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning (Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1998), pp. 145-187. For a discussion of the challenges involved in implementing the National Security Act of 1947 see, Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); David R. Rudgers, Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1943-1947 (University of Kansas Press, 2000); Steven L. Rearden, The Formative Years, 1947-1950, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense vol. 1, (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1984).

9. Zegart, Flawed by Design, p. 56.

10. See, [http://www.theinteragency.org/upload/acf1538].

11. The text of the order can be found at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/20011008-2.html].

12. Membership of the Homeland Security Council includes: the President and the Vice President, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of HHS, Secretary of Transportation, Director of FEMA, Director of the FBI, Director of Central Intelligence, the Homeland Security Advisor, and other cabinet members and federal officials the president may designate to attend.

13. H.R. 5005 adds the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Agriculture, and the Secretary of State, and deletes FEMA, the FBI, and the Secretary of Transportation.

14. The organization does not include responsibility for air and space defenses which will become the responsibility of the military US Northern Command and US Strategic Command, respectively. Strategic Command is also responsible for conducting offensive and defensive information operations.

15. The Defense Department will also continue to play an important role in defending national borders. This legislation does not alter the department’s traditional responsibilities. Air and missile defense, for example, will remain military missions.

16. For examples of concerns over the ability of law enforcement and intelligence organizations to respond to terrorist threats see, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, Counterterrorism Intelligence Capabilities and Performance Prior to 9-11: A Report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and Minority Leader (July 2002).

17. Remarks prepared for delivery by Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation at a Press Availability on the FBI's Reorganization, Washington, DC, May 29, 2002, [http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/speech052902.htm]; FBI Strategic Focus (May 29, 2002), [http://www.fbi.gov/page2/52902.htm].

18. Testimony of Robert S. Mueller III before the Senate Judiciary Committee on June 6, 2002.

19. For a list of federal law enforcement agencies and one reform proposal see, William Wechsler, “Law in Order: Reconstructing US National Security,” The National Interest 67 (Spring 2002) pp. 25-28.

20. The National Governors Association recently listed improving intelligence sharing as one of the states’s top priorities. National Governors Association, “States’ Homeland Security Priorities,” Issue Brief, August 19, 2002, p. 1.

21. Bureau of Justice Assistance, Mission Possible: Strong Governance and Structures for the Integration of Justice Information Systems (February 2002), p 25. This report also provides an extensive discussion of obstacles and requirements for system integration.

22. The three legislative proposals for establishing the department’s intelligence arm vary. The Senate version appears to be the most comprehensive and well developed. The House version, however, does include a requirement for assessments on transnational crime, counterintelligence, and illicit financing of terrorist activities in addition to assessments on vulnerabilities, weapons of mass destruction, and domestic and international terrorism. This directive seems prudent given that the problems of transnational crime and terrorism are often intertwined. The House version also adds important emphasis on dealing with cyber-security threats. On the other hand, the House bill transfers the functions, assets, and personnel from the intelligence elements of the Coast Guard, Customs Service, INS, and Federal Protective Service to the department’s intelligence center. It is not clear how this proposed reorganization will balance the efficiencies to be gained from consolidating resources with ensuring responsive operational support for each of these agencies.

23. Testimony of George J. Tenet before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on June 27, 2002; Testimony of Robert S. Mueller, III, before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on June 27, 2002

24. For example, of recommendations to reorganize the national intelligence system, see Report of the Independent Task Force, Making Intelligence Smarter: The Future of US Intelligence (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996); Bernard C. Victory, Modernizing Intelligence: Structure and Change for the 21st Century (Fairvax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 1997), pp. 34-49. Before September 11, a study group headed by Brent Scowcroft, chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, conducted a wide-ranging examination of the need for intelligence reform. The group considered a number of recommendation, including proposals to centralize federal intelligence agencies under the director of central intelligence and contemplated putting the director of central intelligence above the CIA director, separating responsibility for running US intelligence collection programs from the day-to-day activities of the CIA, and allowing the director to focus on coordinating the efforts of the entire intelligence community.

25. Shepherd, “Evolution of Security Agencies and Departments,” pp. 166, 170-171.

26. For an argument against centralization of authority in the area of homeland security see, Ivo H. Daalder and I. M. Destler, “Advisors, Czars and Councils,” The National Interest 68 (Summer 2002) pp. 66-78. See also Ivo Daalder, et al., Assessing the Department of Homeland Security (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2002). Daalder proposes only combining the agencies involved in border control. See also, Testimony of Ivan Eland, Director of Defense Policy Studies, Cato Institute before the Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, Senate Judiciary Committee, June 25, 2002.

27. GAO, Homeland Security: Proposals for Cabinet Agency Has Merit, But Implementation Will be Pivotal to Success, (Washington, DC: GAO, June 25, 2002, GAO-02-886T).

28. Another detail which has received considerable attention in the public debate over the legislation has centered on the administration’s request for managerial flexibility. Flexibility would be achieved by obtaining relief from civil service requirements that might limit how personnel in the new department could be organized and employed. See, for example, the president’s speech of July 26, 2002, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020726-1.html]. The president argues that the current Senate version of the bill does not provide sufficient management flexibility. A number of compromise proposals have been offered that could adequately address this issue. One set of promising recommendations made by the Partner for Public Service, a non-profit, advocacy group on federal civil service issues, suggests a combination of: broader pay bands that will allow managers to offer higher pay to senior people with critical skills; early outs and buyouts to eliminate unnecessary positions; and more flexible hiring practices. Partnership for Public Service, “Homeland Security: Winning the War for Talent to Win the War on Terror,” July 31, 2002.

29. Similar issues of conflict over responsibilities were raised in recent Army wargames, see, Protecting the Homeland: Insights from Army Wargames (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002), pp. 29-32.

30. One area that should not require major revisions is the restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act. Posse Comitatus prohibits federal forces from performing law enforcement activities without the permission of Congress. This was, perhaps, the least credible objection. The act has never been a serious obstacle to the use of federal forces for domestic operations, nor does it preclude the military from providing logistical support, loaning equipment, and offering technical advice, facilities, and training to civil authorities. Though there is much confusion in this area that might be addressed by more clearly stated and publicized policies, there is strong precedence to support using military forces for homeland security activities. The Posse Comitatus law and other strictures are not significant legal impediments. See, Jeffrey D. Brake, “Terrorism and the Military’s Role in Domestic Crisis Management: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, April 19, 2001, p. 11-18; Craig T. Trebilcock, “Posse Comitatus—Has the Posse Outlived Its Purpose?” Center for Strategic and International Studies Working Group, 2000, pp. 1-5.

31. A 1949 amendment to the National Security Act, transformed the National Military Establishment created by the 1947 legislation into the Department of Defense and modestly increased the department secretariat and the JCS staff; the service secretaries were dropped from membership in the NSC; and the position of a nonvoting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was established.

32. These shortfalls were noted by several contemporary reviews of postwar reorganization. See, Paul Y. Hammond, “The National Security Council as a Device for Interdepartmental Coordination: An Interpretation and Appraisal,” The American Political Science Review,” 54 vol. 4 (December 1960) pp. 901-902.

33. David Jablonsky, “Eisenhower and the Origins of Unified Command,” Joint Force Quarterly 23 (Autumn/Winter 99-00) pp. 24-31. See, also Shepherd, “Evolution of Security Agencies and Departments,” pp. 161-165; William W. Epley, Roles and Missions of the United States Army: Basic Documents with Annotations and Bibliography (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1993), pp. 299-310. Additional major revisions were made by the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. See, James R. Locher III, Victory on the Potomac (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002).

34. GAO, Immigration Enforcement: Challenges to Implementing the INS Interior Enforcement Strategy, (Washington, DC: GAO, June 19, 2002, GAO-02-861T), p. 4.

35. CBO estimates that the first year costs of establishing the new department will be $4.5 billion in addition to the $37.7 billion the administration has already requested for homeland security in FY 2003. CBO, Cost Estimate H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Washington, DC: CBO, July 23, 2002).

36. It has been reported that the administration is developing an extensive information architecture for the Homeland Security Department. See, Shane Harris, Government Executive, July 1, 2002,
    [http://www.govexec.com/news/index.cm?mode=report&articleid=23304].

37. For example, the Technical Support Working Group is an interagency activity that directs counterterrorism research and development for a host of federal, state, and local agencies. Created by presidential directive in 1982, the group’s mission is to conduct national interagency research and development on technologies for combating terrorism. In FY 2001, the group’s total budget was $72 million. Although the group has over a hundred members spanning state and federal agencies, most of its funding comes through the Defense Department. A briefing on the group is available at
    [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2001/g011129-D-6570X.html].

38. The Department of Defense also plays a large role in vaccine development and acquisition. See Department of Defense, Report on Biological Warfare Vaccine Research and Development Programs (July 2001).

39. Research in defending against cyber-attacks could be another problem. The Department’s proposed Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division lacks a substantial research and development capability. As currently configured, the Department will have to rely largely on other agencies or the private sector to investigate advanced means for defending information systems. Here, the president’s legislation might be improved by beefing-up, the division’s information technology research capability.