• The fact that Iraq did not employ chemical and biological weapons during the Persian Gulf War is cold comfort. Iraqi actions during the conflict and the results of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections demonstrated: 1) Iraq was willing to expend tremendous resources to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; 2) the Iraqis were adept at concealing the extent of their weapons programs; and, 3) they considered virtually any means of offensive action justified to protect the continued existence of the regime.

• It is likely that Iraq has, or may develop in the near future, the means to conduct attacks on the United States, including catastrophic strikes with nuclear or biological weapons.

• Iraq is unlikely to garner significant aid in attempting to attack the United States, though some terrorist groups may conduct strikes that could coincide with a US-Iraqi conflict.

• While Iraq may have both the means and motive to attack the US homeland, strategic and operational issues may make undertaking major offensive efforts highly problematic.

The Gulf War Revisited
It was only after Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990 that the United States began to consider seriously the possibility that the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein might employ terrorist strikes or biological or chemical weapons against the West.¹ Initially, the United States remained primarily concerned about attacks against allied military forces or the civilian populations in Saudi Arabia and Israel. As preparations for Operation Desert Storm, the campaign to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait, got underway, the Bush Administration began to consider whether terrorist strikes might be launched on US territory. While senior US officials suspected that Iraq had the capability to launch ballistic missiles armed with chemical or biological warheads, they also knew that Iraqi missiles did not have sufficient range to strike the United States. Iraq, however, also had some experience with disbursing chemical weapons from ground and airborne aerosol sprayers. This suggested Iraq had some expertise in how to conduct attacks against civilian populations with chemical or biological weapons. Consequently, as war loomed security at federal buildings and defense installations throughout the country was increased. Special attention was given to Washington, DC. A task force under the direction of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) undertook some modest precautions including conducting training exercises and stockpiling 48 hours worth of antibiotics for 51,000 people.² HHS also established liaison with both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The results were modest at best. A senior HHS official concluded that in the event of an attack these preparations would have been totally inadequate.³ Fortunately, they were never tested.

The United States did make some effort to deter Iraqi use of chemical and biological weapons. In December 1990, while the buildup of US forces in the Persian Gulf was still underway, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney declared, it “should be clear to Saddam Hussein that we have a wide range of military capabilities that will let us respond with overwhelming force and extract a very high price should he be foolish enough to use chemical weapons on United States forces.”⁴ On January 9, 1991, during talks held in Geneva between Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, Baker presented a letter from the US president which included a general warning that Iraq would pay a “terrible price” for employing chemical or biological weapons. Baker added his own admonition of possible US retaliation.⁵ At a press conference on February 5, the president issued an additional warning, though he remained intentionally vague, declaring he would want the Iraqi leadership to “think very carefully” about launching a chemical attack.⁶ US field commanders also made threatening statements to the press.⁷ Before Operation Desert Storm, Iraq fielded up to 200 bombs and 25 short-range ballistic missiles laden with biological agents and field-tested spray tanks attached to fighter planes.⁸ These weapons could not have been used to threaten the United States, but could have hit targets in Israel, Turkey, or Saudi Arabia. None were used, nor did Iraq employ its vast arsenal of chemical artillery and mortar rounds.

Conventional terrorist attacks, such as truck bombings, hijackings, and assassinations, were also not a major factor during the war. Despite its long history of sponsorship and terrorist support, like the Abu Nidal group, no major terrorist organization took up Iraq’s call to conduct attacks on the United States. Iraq was also largely unsuccessful in infiltrating the United States.⁹ In addition, Iraqi intelligence officers and diplomatic personnel were expelled from many countries after the invasion of Kuwait, further limiting Saddam’s ability to direct events outside his country. Still the number of international terrorist incidents rose during the war. Half of the 557 incidents worldwide in 1991, occurred during January and February, while Desert Storm was under way.¹⁰ Most bombings were primarily outside the Middle East, against commercial property belonging to firms from coalition countries. There were no terrorist attacks in the United States. After the war, the number of incidents dropped sharply.

In the end, propaganda and crude attempts at psychological operations proved to be the extent of Iraq’s offensive efforts against the United States. Saddam sought to undercut US domestic support for the war particularly among American Muslims. The Iraqi press, for example, accused the United States of desecrating holy sites and deliberately bombing civilian targets. Iraq also portrayed US led operations as part of an Israeli-inspired plot against the Arab world. ¹¹

It was only after the war that the United States gained an appreciation for the scope of the Iraqi weapons program. From June 1991 to December 1998, UNSCOM, under Security Council Resolution 687, conducted inspections and supervised destruction of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and related production facilities and equipment. Inspection of nuclear facilities was conducted by the UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iraq made a concerted effort to conceal the extent of its unconventional weapons development from inspectors, denying, for example, that it had even undertaken a biological weapons program.

Inspections revealed, however, that between 1985 and April 1991, Iraq manufactured a large stockpile of chemical weapons including orthochlorobenzylidene “tear gas” (CS), mustard blister agents, and nerve gases: VX, tabun (GA), sarin (GB), and cyclosarin (GF). Iraq claimed to have expended or destroyed much of this material before the Gulf War. Additionally, UN teams removed or destroyed 480,000 liters of chemical agents, 28,000 chemical munitions, and 1,800,000 liters, 1,040,000 kilograms, and 648 barrels of the precursors used to manufacture chemical weapons. Under UNSCOM's supervision, Iraq also eliminated biological weapons, including 8,400 liters of anthrax, 19,000 liters of botulinum toxin, and unspecified amounts of aflatoxin. Inspections also uncovered Iraqi experimentation with other biological agents, including clostridium perfringens (gas gangrene), trichothecene mycotoxins (T-2 and DAS), haemorrhagic conjunctivitis virus, rotavirus, and camel pox, and potential agricultural bioweapons, such as wheat cover smut and foot and mouth disease. Additionally, the Iraqis also experimented with a number of incapacitating psychochemicals, including 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ), phencyclidine (PCP), and a hallucinogenic chemical called Agent 15. Plans also included expanding research into the area of genetic engineering. Finally, postwar international inspections revealed that the Iraqi government was adept at illicitly obtaining materials, equipment, and scientific knowledge; disguising facilities; and concealing the scale and progress of its weapons programs.¹²

After the war, no evidence was found suggesting that Iraq had contemplated weapons of mass destruction attacks on the United States. There were also few clues to suggest why the regime did not employ its stocks of chemical and biological weapons. UNSCOM inspectors were told that field commanders had predelegated authority to use chemical or biological weapons against military or civilian targets in the theater, if Baghdad was under nuclear attack.¹³ This guidance suggests Saddam Hussein might order the employment of unconventional weapons if the survival of his regime were at stake. After the Persian Gulf War, in August 1995, Husayn Kamil Hasan al-Majid, the former head of Iraqi military industries, defected to Jordan. In interviews he claimed that the Iraqi command was convinced that the United States would use nuclear weapons if Iraq employed chemical or biological weapons.¹⁴ This admission suggested that statements by US officials may have played a role in deterring Iraqi action. UNSCOM inspectors found that many copies of Bush’s January warning to Saddam had been distributed around the country.¹⁵ This also might imply that the Iraqis took the president’s threat very seriously.¹⁶

Iraqi nuclear scientist Khidhir Hamza, who defected in 1994, recently testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Iraq views weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear arms, as essential to deterring attacks against the regime.¹⁷ Hamza cites historical examples in which the regime believed chemical weapons helped turn the tide of battle during the Iraq-Iran War and deterred the threat of a second Israeli strike against Iraqi nuclear facilities.¹⁸

The fact that Iraq did not employ chemical and biological weapons during the Persian Gulf War is cold comfort. Iraqi actions during the conflict and the results of the UNSCOM inspections demonstrated that: 1) Iraq was willing to expend tremendous resources to obtain weapons of mess destruction; 2) the Iraqis were skilled at concealing weapons programs; and 3) protecting the regime’s leadership justified virtually any action.

Saddam’s Arsenal
In December 1998, UNSCOM withdrew its staff from Iraq after the regime ceased cooperating with UN inspectors. The cessation of inspections effectively ended the monitoring of Iraqi activities. At the same time, the Iraqi scientists and security organizations that built and supervised Saddam’s massive secret weapons program were left largely untouched. Equally unaffected by the inspection regime were Iraq’s internal intelligence apparatus and terrorist support infrastructure.¹⁹ The United States continues to gather information on the country through overflights, satellite intelligence, and covert means. These are, however, the same kinds of assets the United States used to gather information before the Gulf War, which proved wholly inadequate in establishing the scope and character of many of Iraq’s secret military projects. Today, there are many unknowns concerning the current state of Iraq’s unconventional military capabilities. The following facts, however, can be reported.

• Nuclear. Before the Gulf War, Iraq had undertaken a concerted effort to develop a nuclear arsenal. The UN assigned the IAEA responsibility for verifying the destruction of Iraq’s nuclear weapons program.²⁰ The effectiveness of the IAEA’s inspection regime, which ceased in 1998, has been a subject of some controversy.²¹ In addition, since that time IAEA inspections have been limited to verifying stocks of nuclear material (low-enriched, natural, and depleted uranium) sealed under IAEA safeguards. Despite this limited access it is widely believed that Iraq does not currently have the capacity to produce the weapons grade uranium or plutonium needed to fuel a nuclear bomb.²² On the other hand, it is less clear whether Iraq has or can build the other components of a workable bomb. The IAEA investigations concluded, “no documentation or other evidence is available to show the actual status of [Iraq’s nuclear] weapon design when the program was interrupted [in 1991].”²³ Reports by former UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter and others state that Iraq has hidden the components of one to three devices which lack only the nuclear materials.²⁴ These weapons are allegedly about the size of a large refrigerator, too big to be contained in a missile warhead. They might, however, be transported by various covert forms of air, land, or sea transport. If Iraq has a nuclear device it could be made operational by illicitly buying or stealing weapons-grade material. Twenty-five kilograms of enriched uranium or 8 kilograms of plutonium or less is sufficient to build a relatively unsophisticated bomb with a yield in the kiloton range.²⁵

  Obtaining weapons-grade material from states such as North Korea is unlikely since they would probably hoard any stocks they possess for their own programs. A more likely source would be stealing or buying stolen materials. While export controls and security measures are a significant impediment, there are gaps that can be exploited. Worldwide, in the last decade ten percent of the almost four hundred documented cases of attempted nuclear materials smuggling involved plutonium or highly-enriched uranium.²⁶ Every nuclear country, including the United States, has some issues regarding the security of its materials. Of greatest concern is the safekeeping of Russian nuclear weapons and material, which represents 95 percent of the world total outside the United States. It is known, for example, that at least 4.5 kilograms of weapons grade uranium have been stolen from Russian institutes in the last ten years.²⁷ The overall enforcement of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the effectiveness of US counterproliferation are also troublesome issues.²⁸ Thus, it appears not beyond the realm of the possible that Iraq could acquire the fissile material needed to assemble a functional nuclear device in the near future.

• Radiological. In 1995, Iraq reported to UNSCOM inspectors that during the Iran-Iraq War it tested three prototype radiological dispersal devices. These proved to be impractical weapons. Each weighed about 1,400 kilograms. In addition, the devices did not disburse significant amounts of radiation beyond a relatively short distance from the crater. Iraq claims to have abandoned further weapons research in this area.²⁹ There is, however, nothing to prevent Baghdad from building a so-called “dirty bomb,” a core of radioactive material that could be disbursed by conventional explosives. Unlike nuclear weapons, a radiological dispersal device does not require plutonium or enriched uranium. All that is needed is some form of highly radioactive material. Any nuclear reactor is capable of producing material for a radiological weapon. While materials inside Iraq are allegedly under safeguards, sealed and periodically inspected by IAEA officials, there are many other sources for radioactive material. Worldwide, the IAEA lists 438 nuclear power reactors, 651 research reactors (284 in operation), and 250 fuel cell plants.³⁰ Additionally, there are tens of thousands of radiation sources in medical, industrial, agricultural, and research facilities. Highly radioactive materials, such as spent fuel rods, are subject to export controls. It is, however, far more easily bought or stolen than weapons-grade material. An alternative to employing a radiological dispersal device would be to sabotage nuclear facilities in the United States. The vulnerability of nuclear facilities to ground, sea, and air attack is somewhat controversial.³¹ A major release of radiation from a reactor or spent fuel storage site caused by sabotage or a direct attack could kill tens of thousands, force large numbers of people to evacuate, and inflict severe economic disruption.³²

• Chemical. While Iraq’s known weapons stocks were destroyed, over the last ten years it has smuggled precursors, the ingredients used to manufacture chemical weapons into the country. In addition, UNSCOM inspectors could not account for all Iraqi chemical stocks and equipment.³³ Iraq has also reconstituted part of its chemical infrastructure for commercial industrial use. Unsupervised, production facilities could be diverted to weapons production. The country may have the resources to reconstitute some small-scale covert weapons program. Employing chemical weapons against the United States would be a challenge. Iraq does not have long-range ballistic missiles.³⁴ However, it is known to have studied various methods of dispersal including employing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and these vehicles are widely available. For example, a low-tech version of a cruise missile attack could be attempted with a system like the Autonomous Helicopter, a 14-foot-long pilotless aircraft, remote-control helicopter built by Yamaha for crop dusting in Japan. The $100,000 aircraft uses a GPS system and video camera to allow its flight route to be preprogrammed and monitored. Iraq has some expertise in employing UAVs.³⁵ Delivery vehicles and chemicals could be covertly transported to the United States and launched from commercial or private ships or land-based sites. Iraqi agents could also buy or steal much of the equipment they would need to launch an attack here in the United States. There are also many other methods through which chemical weapons might be covertly disbursed. Perhaps of greater concern, however, should be the thousands of toxic chemicals used for industrial and commercial purposes that could be turned into effective weapons. Tanker trucks, rail cars, ships, pipelines, trucked-barrels of poisons and other hazardous materials, and chemical manufacturing and storage facilities are all prospective weapons. In 2001, the Environmental Protection Agency reported that at least 123 US chemical plants contain enough chemicals that, if a major release occurred, each could result in one million casualties.³⁶

• Biological. In addition to its expertise in weaponizing anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin, Iraq may retain undetermined amounts of ebola virus, bubonic and pneumonic plague bacteria, and ricin.³⁷ Iraq also has not accounted for significant amounts of mediums (Casein, Yeast Extract, and Petone), which it imported to culture bacteria. Viruses can also be grown on cultured tissue or fertilized eggs. In fact, Iraq maintained large egg incubators near several biological research facilities. Most troubling is the fact that Iraq has the materials and technical knowledge to manufacture the equipment (including double-jacketed fermenters, spray dryers, and separating centrifuges) required produce abundant supplies of stable, biological agents.³⁸ Production can also be easily disguised or concealed in small facilities. Furthermore, Iraq is known to have mobile laboratories.³⁹ As with chemical weapons, biological agents could be delivered by a variety of covert means. Attempted contamination of food and water supplies or deliberate attempts to spread infections to either humans or livestock are also possible and could have significant consequences. For example, responding to a recent outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Great Britain and lost productivity to the country amounted to $11.6 billion .⁴⁰

• Computer Attacks. Virtually nothing is known about Iraq’s ability to attack computer and information systems. Today, Iraq is not a significant source of illicit activity on the Internet.⁴¹ Still, initiating computer attacks requires virtually no infrastructure. A capacity to conduct digital attacks could be achieved in short order. Digital attacks could be used for everything from disrupting communications to causing physical destruction. For example, an enemy might attempt to create a catastrophic failure in the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems of the national energy network.⁴² The attack might cause power outages, spark explosions, and unleash fuel spills.⁴³

• Psychological Warfare. Iraq has not demonstrated the capacity to manage and conduct sophisticated or effective psychological operations against the United States. On the other hand, a serious concern could be attempts by Iraq to specifically target Muslim populations in America and around the world. A successful attack may not even require a very sophisticated effort. A powerful example is the post-9/11 belief among many Muslims that the World Trade Center attacks were engineered by the Israeli secret service to build sympathy for their country and discredit radical Islamic groups. This conspiracy allegedly included warning thousands of Jewish employees to stay away from the buildings on the day of the attack. It is unclear whether this story was the result of a deliberate psychological operations campaign. Nevertheless, it has been effectively spread by a relatively modest mix of the Internet, Arabic papers, radio, and satellite television, demonstrating the potential for even a limited effort to influence a large, receptive audience.⁴⁴

• Armed Attacks. Iraq has probably not fully recovered its ability to conduct attacks overseas since the expulsion of Iraqi agents from many countries during the Gulf War.⁴⁵ In 2000, the Department of State concluded, that “the regime has not attempted an anti-Western terrorist attack since its failed plot to assassinate former President Bush in 1993 in Kuwait.”⁴⁶ Yet, it has sent operatives abroad and agents are suspected to have been involved in tracking and killing Iraqi dissident expatriates. Iraq also still maintains contacts with or provides sanctuary to several groups and individuals that have practiced terrorism.⁴⁷ It is therefore quite possible that Iraq has some direct action capability, including the capacity to conduct assassinations, highjackings, kidnappings, and bombings. Reports in the Saudi weekly news magazine, al-Watan-Al-Arabi, allegedly drawn from the minutes of an Iraqi leadership council meeting suggest Saddam has ordered the establishment of “sleeper” cells that might conduct attacks in the United States.⁴⁸

• Wild Cards. There is always the possibility that Iraq could attempt new and novel means to employ chemical or biological weapons against the United States. One option is a covert maritime attack employing commercial or private vessels as launch platforms for cruise missiles, pilotless vehicles, or even ballistic missiles. By some estimates, for example, Iraq has between 20-80 operational Scud missiles and has considerable expertise in building launch platforms. ⁴⁹ A vertical launch system could be installed on a cargo ship, turning it into a ballistic missile carrier. There are technical obstacles to creating ocean-going missile launchers, such as venting missile gases and providing inertial navigation on a moving ship, but these are not insurmountable issues. More significant would be the technical challenges in achieving any accuracy at all from a moving platform at sea. Still, such a project is feasible, though the result would probably be a “terror” weapon that might not land anywhere near its intended target.

Iraq’s Allies?
Another prospect is that other state or nonstate actors might conduct or assist in attacks. Iran, along with Iraq named by the president as part of an “axis of evil,” is one possibility.⁵² Iran currently does not have nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles that can reach the United States.⁵³ Tehran, however, does routinely employ terrorism as a means to advance its regional security interests and to reaffirm the regime’s commitment to the founding principles of the Iranian revolution. Its interest in terrorism has waxed and waned over the course of the last decades, and most support currently goes to the Lebanese Shiite militants of Hezbollah, Palestinian groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, a Kurdish separatist movement in Turkey. Recent reports also suggest that high-level al Qaeda operatives may be in Iran.⁵⁴ There is no conclusive evidence that the country has sponsored direct attacks on the US homeland, but it still views terrorism as a legitimate weapon and it has sponsored acts to advance its own interests at the risk of regional stability. If Iran perceived supporting attacks against the United States as in its interest, and believed it could avoid attribution or otherwise protect itself from US countermeasures, it might well represent a serious terrorist threat. The Iranian government might be concerned that deposing Saddam’s government would destabilize the region and Iran would also no doubt be wary of any increased American influence in the area. Iran’s foreign ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi has publicly stated opposition to US military operations against Iraq, but then again so have a host of other countries in the region, many friendly to the United States. Iran’s declaration alone does little to suggest it would materially contribute to an Iraqi attack on US soil. In addition, relations between Iran and Iraq have been strained since the Iran-Iraq War, and Iran would probably be reluctant to put itself at risk for an Iraqi regime which it distrusts deeply.⁵⁵ There are also moderate forces in Iran which seek to ameliorate confrontation with the United States who might oppose employing terrorism against America.⁵⁶

Transnational groups are another potential source of support for Iraq. It is, however, worthwhile noting that there have been virtually no terrorist acts conducted in recent years that claim to have been executed on behalf of the Iraqi regime, nor does Iraq appear to have predominating influence over major terrorist group with capabilities to conduct operations in the United States. On the other hand, groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah do have worldwide networks that can direct and support terrorist activities. They might find common cause with Iraq, particularly if a military confrontation with the United States expanded to include Israel. In addition, Iraq has done much in recent months to foster pan-Arab support against Israel and encourage the second Palestinian intifada (the so-called Al Aqsa intifada), including widely publicizing recent financial donations by Saddam to the families of suicide bombers. This public diplomacy may perhaps be an attempt to lay the groundwork for linking the fates of the Palestinians and Iraqis in the event of a future conflict, much as the Iraqi regime attempted to do during the Gulf War.

Al Qaeda, which envisions itself as an “Islamist International” has expressed widespread sympathy for Iraq, though pointedly not the Iraqi leadership. Osama bin Laden’s February 23, 1998, Fatwah cited “Americans’ continuing aggression against the Iraqi people,” and the “the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people.”⁵⁷ While there have most likely been contacts between the Iraqi intelligence and al Qaeda and some al Qaeda agents may have fled to Iraq in the wake of US military operations in Afghanistan, bin Laden and Hussein have never trusted one another. Hussein’s secular, nationalist regime is ideologically and politically at odds with bin Laden’s clericalism.⁵⁸ These differences suggest there is little likelihood of a long-term alliance between the Iraqi and al Qaeda leadership. It would also seem unlikely that Iraq would share nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons with al Qaeda, or any group, over which it did not exert significant control, unless it were truly desperate. Yet, cooperation between the Iraqis and al Qaeda for specific operations is not out of the question, particularly if al Qaeda views these actions as contributing to removing the presence of US forces in Saudi Arabia, a cherished bin Laden goal.

Finally, any military confrontation might well provoke some independent, individual acts. Timothy McVeigh, who perpetrated the bombing of the Murrah federal office building, claimed his act was primarily intended to punish the federal government for the 1993 FBI assault on the Branch Dividian compound in Waco, Texas.⁵⁹ Other individuals, for whatever reason, may feel impelled to attack the United States in the event of an Iraqi-US military confrontation. False threats, issued for no purpose other than malicious mischief, may also be made. These threats are often a common occurrence after major incidents. In 1982, for example, seven people in the Chicago area died as a result of ingesting Tylenol laced with cyanide. In the months following, the Food and Drug Administration reported a wave of 270 incidents of suspected product tampering, virtually all of them hoaxes. Hundreds of anthrax threats were prompted by the anthrax letters mailed through the US postal system in October 2001. In the event of US-Iraqi confrontation, countless hoaxes from bomb threats to malevolent rumors distributed over the Internet should be anticipated.

While Iraq may attract some modest diplomatic support, it is unlikely to receive significant material assistance from other states for planning and conducting an attack on the United States. Some countries or groups unfriendly to US interests in the region may supply intelligence and other means of support, particularly if they are confident these actions can escape US attention. If Iraq receives any assistance, it will likely be from transnational criminal and terrorist organizations or lone individuals and small groups, though even here extensive cooperation cannot be expected. It is more likely that any hostile acts taken by these groups will be independent efforts that might parallel Iraqi actions. Particularly possible is that some groups will try to portray any US activity as anti-Islamic and pro-Israeli and may conduct attacks to fan anti-American sentiment in the Islamic world.

Courses of Action
Though Iraq has a modicum of capability to strike at American soil, the prospects for an attack may well hinge on the strategy that Saddam Hussein elects to adopt and what countermeasures the United States undertakes to counter it.

Iraq. The Iraqi leadership might threaten or attack the United States for the following reasons.

• Threats of attack by biological or nuclear weapons might be used to deter the United States from undertaking military operations to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime.

• Attacks on the American homeland might be undertaken as part of an anti-access campaign, striking or threatening targets in the United States to prevent the deployment of American forces overseas. For example, the overwhelming bulk of US military power is still moved around the world by ship. Most supplies and hardware depart through only 17 US seaports. Strikes that interfered with port operations during the height of a foreign crisis could slow the deployment of forces to overseas theaters by preventing them from leaving the United States. While it would be extremely difficult for Iraq to mount sufficient attacks to cripple a deployment, even temporarily stymieing the projection of American power might upset and complicate US plans, perhaps allowing time for Iraq to undertake additional defensive preparations or offensive actions in the Mideast theater.

• Strikes on the United States might be attempted for psychological effect to demoralize and undercut domestic support for military operations; weaken the resolve of allies; or increase Saddam Hussein’s stature in the Islamic world and widen the conflict.

• Attacks could be undertaken as “last ditch” revenge strikes when regime survival is at stake.

Emplacing weapons covertly and then using them deter US forces, such as hiding a nuclear weapon in a ship near a major city, is also problematic. Saddam might deliver a general warning that he will attack the United States if American forces strike Iraq, but given his past record of issuing vague and exaggerated pronouncements, there is little chance a statement alone would represent a credible threat. A threat would likely have to be more specific in time and place and be accompanied by some evidence that Iraq has both the capacity and the willingness to strike. Once a threat is announced, however, it becomes vulnerable to US countermeasures. So, for example, Iraq might threaten to attack a US nuclear reactor if American forces attempt to deploy to its country. Once this threat is revealed, however, the United States might increase security at nuclear plants and position air defense units around reactors.

Given the difficulty that aggressive action might prompt rather than forestall US action, Saddam Hussein may elect to wait until a confrontation is imminent before taking offensive measures. This, however, may not allow sufficient time to launch a major effort. Iraq was surprised at the speed of US ground operations during Operation Desert Storm, perhaps making the Iraqi leadership wary that it will have time to engage in operations to stem a future US offensive. Iraq may believe that by withdrawing its military forces into the cities it can protract military conflict and allow time for it undertake offensive missions against the US homeland.

United States. To minimize the potential for strikes on the homeland, the United States may undertake the following actions.

• The president could threaten to employ nuclear weapons against Iraq.

• Military action might be taken to quickly destroy weapons stocks and incapacitate the Iraqi leadership before it can act.

• Defensive measures could be employed to prevent, protect against, or limit the effects of an attack.

• The US nuclear deterrent may not prove effective against a regime threatened with being overthrown. While it is possible the Iraqi military and some political leaders might be reluctant to undertake orders under any circumstances that would prompt a nuclear attack, there is no certainty as to what actions might or might not be taken in a moment of crisis.

• Gaining accurate intelligence of the full scope and location of Iraq’s unconventional capabilities and the location and activities of the senior Iraqi leadership has always been difficult and seriously complicates the challenge of launching effective preemptive strikes to incapacitate the government.

• Protection of critical US infrastructure such as chemical and nuclear facilities is problematic. After 9/11, to offset future terrorist threats new site security and transportation guidelines were issued and sensitive information on locations containing hazardous material was withdrawn from public web sites on the Internet. The wide range of possible targets and the questionable degree of compliance and effectiveness of new countermeasures, however, all leave room for some uncertainty over the security of infrastructure and the threat an Iraqi terrorist attack might pose.

• It is difficult to predict the effectiveness of a serious digital attack. Even if attacks can be successfully launched, it is often impossible to anticipate the consequences of a strike. Indeed, many organizations have difficulty conducting risk assessments of their own infrastructure and determining the full scope of strengths and vulnerabilities of information systems. This situation is made more problematic by the fact that information technology continues to change at a rapid pace. Each year new software and digital devices are introduced and system architectures are modified. Vulnerabilities may be highly transitory. Only after an attack may the United States gain a full appreciation for its vulnerabilities.

• In the face of a covert maritime missile threat, the United States has no ballistic missile or cruise missile defense systems. Presently, any national defense would have to be pulled together from existing systems such as Aegis cruisers for cruise missile defense or the PAC-3 Patriot to shoot down short-range ballistic missiles. With adequate warning, a system could be marshaled to provide a measure of security, but currently there are scant means to deal with a surprise attack.⁶⁰

• Perhaps the greatest challenge would be preventing covert threats from entering the United States. The numbers that define the scope of the opportunities to penetrate US borders by commercial or private vehicles are staggering. In 2000, a half billion people, 11.5 million trucks, 2.2 million rail cars, 200,000 ships, and 11.6 million shipping containers crossed US borders, or entered through 314 American ports, while 80 million air passengers and tons of cargo moved in and out of over 18,000 airports.⁶¹

Conclusion
Iraq has, or may soon develop, the means to strike at the United States. On the other hand, it faces enormous strategic and operational obstacles in conducting a major attack. In addition, strikes on the US homeland are extremely unlikely to materially affect the outcome of a US-Iraqi conflict. Yet, undeniably the United States does have vulnerabilities. Americans can not be confident that the US nuclear deterrent will be sufficient to dissuade Saddam from attempting to strike at the United States.

There is no question that Iraq presents the United States with some profound strategic issues. Saddam Hussein appears committed to developing offensive means to ensure the continued maintenance of his regime, particularly biological and nuclear arms. These capabilities are likely to grow significantly in the next decade. Commensurately, the risks to the US homeland in the event of a military confrontation between the United States and Iraq will only grow as well. Furthermore, the divergence of US and Iraqi interests in the region as well as Saddam Hussein’s penchant for “adventurism” make the potential for conflict ever present.

1. In fact, before 1990 Iraq was not on the State Department’s list of state-sponsors of global terrorism. See, US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism (Washington, DC: US Department of State, April 30, 1991).

2. Testimony of Frank Young before the Senate Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations October 10, 2001 [http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearrrings/ 10102001Hearing390/Young628.htm]; Judith Miller, et al., Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), pp. 111-112.

3. Testimony of Frank Young.

4. William Arkin, “US Nukes in the Gulf,” The Nation, December 31, 1990, p. 834.

5. Office of the Federal Registrar, National Archives and Records Administration, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 21 vol. 3 (January 12, 1991), p. 44.

6. Presidential news conference, February 5, 1991 [http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91020500.html]. Though the president’s statement was intentionally ambiguous, Baker recalls in his memoirs that President Bush had decided not use nuclear weapons if the Iraqis employed chemical weapons. James Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons), p. 359.

7. Quoted in Scott D. Sagan, “The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Attacks,” International Security 24 vol. 4 (Spring 2000), p. 94.

8. Figures for the Iraqi arsenal vary somewhat. Some reports cite the number of bombs at 150. See, Miller, et al., Germs, pp. 186-187.

9. Andrew W. Terrill, “Saddam’s Failed Counterstrike: Terrorism and the Gulf War,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 16 vol. 3 (July-September 1993), pp. 151-171.

10. US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism.

11. Department of Defense, Background Briefing on Enemy Denial and Deception, October 24, 2001, [http://www.defenselink.mil/ DoDnewsBackgroundBriefingonDenialandDeception/htm]. Most Iraqi propaganda efforts were aimed at countries in the region. See, Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2002), pp. 206-207, 208-209.

12. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Implementation of the Special Commission’s Plan for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq’s Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), S/1995/494 (June 20, 1995), p. 6; United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of the Implementation of the Special Commission’s Plan for the Ongoing Monitoring and Verification of Iraq’s Compliance with Relevant Parts of Section of Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), S/1995/864 (October 11, 1995), p. 22.

13. United Nations, S/1995/864, p. 10.

14. Other factors which have been suggested for explaining why Iraq did not employ chemical or biological weapons include: the unexpectedly rapid advance of US ground forces which left little time to plan or conduct chemical or biological attacks; the poor state of Iraqi chemical or biological defense capabilities; weather conditions that did not favor chemical and biological attacks; allied air supremacy and effective counter battery fire which would have made attacks by airplanes, artillery, or mortars difficult; and, the poor dispensing mechanisms on Iraq’s missile warheads. See, for example, Central Intelligence Agency, Subject: Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Capability: Lack of Use During War, (document released August 8, 1997) [ http://www.gulflink.osd.mil].

15. Headquarters, US Strategic Command, “Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence,” 1995, p. 7.

16. Some analysts argue such evidence is inconclusive. See, for example, Sagan, “The Commitment Trap,” pp. 95-96. After all, the United States also threatened to retaliate if Iraq attempted to destroy the Kuwaiti oil fields and this did not deter Iraqi forces from setting fire to Kuwaiti oil wells. Sagan suggests Iraqi officials claim to have taken Bush’s threats seriously may have been a postwar fiction designed to make Iraq appear as a victim of Western nuclear blackmail or create an impression that the regime was deeply concerned about saving the people of Baghdad from a nuclear holocaust.

17. Testimony of Khidhir Hamza before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 31, 2002, pp. 1, 3. Recently, Hamza also stated that he believes Iraq still has 1.3 tons of low-enriched uranium bought many years ago from Brazil, from which it could extract sufficient highly-enriched uranium to fuel three atomic weapons. See, Paul Martin, “Iraqi Scientist Says Materials For Nuclear Bombs in Hand,” Washington Times, September 16, 2002. Such claims have not been verified and some have questioned the veracity of his conclusions about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs. His critics include former supporters such as UNSCOM weapons inspector Scott Ritter and David Albright, President of the Institute for Science and International Security. See, Peter Beaumont, “Should We Go to War Against Saddam?” The Guardian, March 17, 2002.

18. Israel undertook a preemptive strike against the Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981.

19. UN resolutions required Iraq to cease support for terrorist activities, however, no inspection regime was put in place to ensure compliance.

20. For a summary of the IAEA’s inspection results see, United Nations, Fourth Consolidated Report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency under paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 1051 (1996), S/1997/779 (October 8, 1997) [http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/ActionTeam/ reports/s_1997_779.pdf].

21. See, for example, Steven Doley and Paul Leventhal, “Overview of IAEA Nuclear Inspections in Iraq” Nuclear Control Institute, [http://www.nci.org/new/iraq-ib.htm].

22. Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January Through 30 June 2001
    [http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ bian/bian_jan_2002.htm#4].

23. Ibid. For a summary of what is known about Iraq’s weaponization program see pp. 54-59.

24. Testimony of Scott Ritter, before the House International Relations Committee, September 15, 1998, Khidir, Hamza, Saddam’s Bombmaker (New York, Scribner, 2000), pp. 239-340; Shyam Bhatia and Daniel McGory, Brighter than the Baghdad Sun: Saddam Hussein’s Nuclear Threat to the United States (Washington, DC: Regnery Publishing, 1999), p. 289. These reports have not been verified by other sources.

25. These estimates are made by the IAEA. See, IAEA Safeguards Glossary, 1987 Edition IAEA Safeguards Information Series No. 1 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Commission, 1987), pp. 23-24. Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher B. Paine argue, however, that current estimates are based on building a first-generation, low-technology bomb and that with more sophisticated designs far less amounts of bomb-making material might be required. They conclude 3 kilograms of highly-enriched uranium or 1 kilogram of plutonium could be sufficient to achieve a yield in the kiloton range. Thomas B. Cochran and Christopher B. Paine, The Amount of Plutonium and Highly-Enriched Uranium Needed for Pure Fission Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: Natural Resources Defense Council, 1994).

26. Since 1993, the IAEA has recorded 376 cases. International Atomic Energy Agency, Annual Report 2000 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, July 2001).

27. National Intelligence Council, Annual Report to the Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces (February 2002), http://www.cia.gov/nic/pubs/other_products/ icarussiansecurity.htm.

28. The capacity to circumvent the treaty was amply demonstrated by Iraq. After the Gulf War it was discovered the country violated its safeguard agreements. In response, the IAEA developed new safeguard techniques to detect undeclared nuclear activities, known as the Programme 93+2. This resulted in the Model Protocol, which countries may add to their existing safeguard agreements with the agency. Even if the protocols are adopted worldwide, however, loopholes will remain. John Simpson, “Redressing Deficiencies in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,” Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction: Findings from USIP-Sponsored Projects,” ed. Deepa M. Ollapally (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, September 2001), pp. 10-14; and, A Report of the Center for Counterproliferation Research, The Counterproliferation Imperative: Meeting Tomorrow’s Challenges (Washington, DC: November, 2001), pp. 12-17. See also, US General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: US Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning, (Washington, DC: GAO, May 2002, GAO-02-426). For the proliferation of nuclear technology the three nations of greatest concern are Russia, China, and North Korea. Each nation relies on the sale of technology as much for economic gain as foreign policy objectives. See Jason Ellis, “Beyond NonProliferation: Secondary Supply, Proliferation Management, and US Foreign Policy,” Comparative Strategy 20, 2001, pp. 1-24.

29. United Nations Security Council, Tenth report/ratio on the activities of the Special subcommittee, presented in accordance with paragraph 3 of the resolution 699 (1991) of the Security Council by the executive President Special subcommittee consisted the Secretary-general pursuant to the paragraph 9 b) I) of resolution 687 (1991) S/1995/1038 (December 17, 1995).

30. IAEA Annual Report for 2001 (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2001), Annex: Facilities under Agency safeguards or containing safeguarded material on 31 December 2001.

31. See, for example, Statement of Paul Leventhal, Nuclear Control Institute, before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, December 5, 2001; Security Gap: A Hard Look at the Soft Spots In Our Civilian Nuclear Reactor Security, A Staff Summary of Responses by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to Correspondence from Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-MA), (March 25, 2002), [http://www.house.gov/markey/iss_nuclear_rep020325.pdf]. Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism; Making the Nation Safer; The Role of Science and Technology in Countering Terrorism (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 2002), pp. 2-3.

32. United States House of Representatives, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, “Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences (CRAC2) for US Nuclear Power Plants (Health Effects and Costs) Conditional on an SST1 Release,” November 1, 1982.

33. Testimony of Charles A Duelfer before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Senate Armed Services Committee, February 27, 2002.

34. National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and Ballistic Missile Threats Through 2015, (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, December 2001), pp. 13-14.

35. An unclassified Central Intelligence Agency report concluded, “Iraq has worked on its L-29 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program, which involves converting L-29 jet trainer aircraft originally acquired from Eastern Europe. In the past, Iraq has conducted flights of the L-29, possibly to test system improvements or to train new pilots. These refurbished trainer aircraft are believed to have been modified for delivery of chemical or, more likely, biological warfare agents.” Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress.

36. “Threat Assessment: Chemical Plants Could Be Targets,” Global Security Newswire, [http://www.nti.org/d_newswire/issues/2001/12/17/11s.html]. For more on chemical risks see, Environmental Protection Agency, The Chemical Safety Audit Report FY 1997 (Washington, DC: Environmental Protection Agency, October 1998), [http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/pubs/97report.pdf].

37. For useful ranking of the danger posed by various biological threats see, Lisa D. Rotz, Ali S. Khan, Scott R. Lillibridge, Stephen M. Ostroff, and James M. Hughes, “Public Health Assessment of Potential Biological Terrorism Agents,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 8 vol. 2(February 2002), [http://cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol8no2/01-0164.htm].

38. Testimony of Richard O. Spertzel before the Senate Government Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, March 1, 2002.

39. The August 2001 defection of an Iraqi civil engineer, Adnan Saeed al-Haideri renewed concerns that the country was reconstituting its capability to manufacture biological, as well as chemical and nuclear weapons. Al-Haideri claims to have participated in building 20 new facilities including some hidden underground beneath civilian infrastructure such as hospitals and residential housing.. His claims have not been verified. Judith Miller, “An Iraqi Defector Tells of Work on at Least 20 Hidden Weapons Sites,” New York Times, December 20, 2001.

40. “Dissecting the Challenge of Mad Cow & Foot-and-Mouth Disease,” Agricultural Outlook, August 2001, p. 4.

41. According to one study, for example, illicit intrusions against commercial industries worldwide are undertaken mostly by individuals with 70 percent of these originate from ten countries. The countries are the United States (30 percent), South Korea (9 percent), and China (8 percent), with the remaining 47 percent coming from Germany, France, Canada, Taiwan, Italy, Great Britain, and Japan. The most significant source of illicit Internet activity in the Middle East is from Israel. See, Symantec, Internet Security Threat Report (January 2002),
    [http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm? articleid=1539&PID=12807550&EID=0] pp. 15, 21.

42. Such systems monitor and control the flow of oil and gas through pipelines and the transfer of electricity across transmission lines.

43. For an assessment of this threat see, Alexander E. Farrell, et al., “Bolstering the Security of the Electrical Power System,” Issues in Science and Technology 3 vol. XVII (Spring 2002) p. 53.

44. In February 2002, Gallup published the Survey of People in the Islamic World. The survey measured the views of 10,000 people in nine predominantly Islamic countries: Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, Indonesia, Turkey, Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan and Morocco. Less than half the respondents believed the 9/11 attacks were perpetrated by Arabs.

45. There are claims that Iraq has sponsored terrorist strikes from the bombing of the Murrah Federal Office Building to attacks on the World Trade Center. See, for example, Laurie Mylroie, Study of Revenge: Saddam Hussein's Unfinished War Against America (Washington, DC: The AEI Press, 2000). These claims for the most part are based on circumstantial evidence and are unverified. Reports that 9/11 highjacker Mohammad Atta met with Iraqi intelligence agent Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani in Prague, the Czech Republic, are still a subject of some controversy. If the meetings did take place, they might not be proof of Iraqi complicity in the 9/11 attacks. Iraqi agents routinely seek to meet with anti-American groups. Even frequent contacts between Iraq and terrorist organizations may not indicate close cooperation.

46. US Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism (2000), [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/2441.htm].

47. US Department of States, Patterns of Global Terrorism, (2001),
    [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/html/10249.htm].

48. Arnaud de Borchgrave, “Saddam Hussein’s War Plan,” UPI, July 10, 2002. The accuracy and veracity of this report have not been verified by other sources. Al-Watan-Al-Arabi has printed reports in the past on Iraqi and other terrorist activities which later were determined to be inaccurate, including a claim that Osama bin Laden purchased 20 nuclear bombs from sources in Russia. If Iraqi leaders did make these statements, they may be a crude attempt to deter US action by intimating it has the military capability to strike on US soil. This would certainly be consistent with Iraqi threats made in the past.

49. Testimony of Anthony H. Cordesman before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 31, 2002, p. 8.

50. United Nations, S/1995/864, p. 10.

51. Iraq employed mustard gas on at least 9 occasions during the Iran-Iraq War between 1983 and 1988. In 1988, Iraq used mustard and nerve gas against the Kurdish population in Halabja.

52. Office of the Press Secretary, President Delivers State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002,
    [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129/11.html].

53. National Intelligence Estimate, Foreign Missile Developments and Ballistic Missile Threats Through 2015, pp. 13, 14

54. Saudi officials reported that in June, Iran deported 16 al Qaeda members that it had detained to Saudi Arabia. A recent report in the Washington Post claims high ranking al Qaeda members may still be operating in Iran. The source of this report is not identified. Peter Finn, “Al Qaeda Deputies Harbored By Iran: Pair Are Plotting Attacks, Sources Say” Washington Post, August 28, 2002, p. A1.

55. Iran has largely given up on initiatives to destabilize the Iraqi regime and made some modest diplomatic overtures to Saddam Hussein. Iran’s efforts to demonstrate restraint toward Iraq appear largely part of an Iranian effort to enhance regional stability by improving relations with moderate and conservative Arab states and the European Union. While some radical elements in Iran argue for joining in an anti-coalition with Iraq against the United States, significant factions including the military and President Khatami view such talk as dangerous “adventurism.” See, Daniel L. Byman, et al., Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001), pp. 55-59; Mark J. Gasiorowski, “Iran: Can the Islamic Republic Survive,” in The Middle East in 2015: The Impact of Regional Trends on US Strategic Planning (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2002), pp. 133-136.

56. Ely Karmon, “Counterterrorism Policy: Why Tehran Starts and Stops Terrorism,” The Middle East Quarterly vol. 4 (December 1998), [http://www.meforum.org/meq/dec98/elyk.shtml]. Karmon argues that only a confrontational approach will deter Iranian terrorist activity. For a different analysis of Iranian decisionmaking and the prospects for the future see, Byman, Iran's Security Policy, pp. 99-104.

57. See, Magnus Ranstorp, “Interpreting the Broader Context and Meaning of Bin-Laden’s Fatwa,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 21 vol. 4 (October-December 1998) pp. 321-330.

58. For further discussion on Iraqi-al Qaeda relations see, Roland Jacquard, In the Name of Bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002).

59. Lou Michel and Dan Herbeck, American Terrorist: Timothy McVeigh and the Oklahoma City Bombing (New York: HarperCollins, 2001).

60. Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 1993) p. 205; Steve Fetter, “Ballistic Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction: What is the Threat? What Should be Done?” International Security 16 vol. 3 (Summer 1991), p. 11; Michael O’Hanlon, “Cruise Control: A Case for Missile Defense,” The National Interest, Spring 2002, pp.. 89-93.

61. See, Department of Transportation, Transportation Annual Statistics Report, 2000.