• The current training regime comprises courses and exercises conducted by at least ten federal departments and agencies, as well as by state and local governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

• There is little standardization, much duplication, huge gaps, and inadequate integration.

• Major exercises and recent disasters also suggest that there may be significant weaknesses in the nation’s ability to respond to emerging threats such as nuclear or virulent biological attacks.

• New initiatives that focus on training multi-echelon, complex tasks are required. These could serve as a catalyst for addressing current training weaknesses and provide the cornerstone for creating an integrated homeland security training and evaluation system.

This backgrounder describes current programs; identifies major problems and shortfalls; and recommends some new initiatives. It concludes that homeland security training should be a major mission for the new department, but that the costs and effort required to forge an effective system could be substantial, requiring new programs and facilities and close cooperation between federal, state, and local governments, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector.

Current Training Programs
Federal, state, and local agencies involved in homeland security have a wide variety of training opportunities available. Currently, they include:

• Department of Justice (DoJ). The department’s Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) is an administrative center which provides assistance to state and local public safety personnel in acquiring specialized training and equipment for responding to terrorist incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks. ODP organizes, certifies, funds, and conducts 25 different training courses and workshops. Most of this training is conducted through the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium which includes the Center for Domestic Preparedness at Fort McClellan, Alabama; the New Mexico Institute of Mining and Technology; the Louisiana State University Academy of Counterterrorist Education; Texas A&M University’s National Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center; and the US Department of Energy’s (DoE’s) Nevada Test Site. Courses are delivered through campus instruction, exportable training packages, satellite broadcasts, by correspondence, video, and the Internet. Training provided onsite at the Center for Domestic Preparedness and the Nevada Test Site includes exercises with live chemical agents, explosives, and various hazardous materials. Other training partners include the National Terrorism Preparedness Institute in St. Petersburg, Florida; the United States Army Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas; and the National Sheriff’s Association headquartered in Alexandria, Virginia. On October 1, 2000, the ODP also assumed responsibility for training first responders in dealing with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents.² In addition, the office maintains a clearinghouse of other training opportunities, including a catalogue of over 100 courses offered by other federal departments and agencies.³ The ODP is slated to become a component of the new Homeland Security Department.⁴

  In addition to the ODP’s efforts, the Department of Justice funds state and local antiterrorism training through a grant to the Institute of Intergovernmental Research in Tallahassee, Florida, as well as a variety of homeland security related training activities for federal, state, and local law enforcement through programs sponsored by the department’s research and development arm, the National Institute of Justice. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), also part of DoJ, provides training on conventional bomb disposal and dealing with hazardous material through the Hazardous Devices School at Redstone Arsenal in Anniston, Alabama, and through large vehicle blast exercises conducted at Vandenberg Air Force Base and China Lake Research Center, both in California. The FBI also sponsors interagency response exercises. The FBI’s Los Angles office, for example, cosponsored Westwind 1999, a crisis management exercise that included responding to a WMD incident.⁵

• The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). FEMA is responsible for coordinating the support of 23 federal agencies for national disasters and emergencies. In addition, it manages disaster aid and assistance programs. The agency has published a comprehensive guide for federal agencies and state and local governments on how to develop and administer exercise and training programs.⁶ FEMA also has two major institutions that provide courses and training on emergency response, vulnerability analysis, and counterterrorism: the National Fire Academy and the Emergency Management Institute, both in Emmitsburg, Maryland. The administration has recommended making FEMA a component of the new Homeland Security Department.

• The Department of Defense. The department sponsors a number of courses for both military and civilian responders who might have to react to a nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological incident. One source of training is the Uniformed Services University for the Health Sciences in Bethesda, Maryland, principally through its Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine. Some DoD training also deals with counterterrorism and counter-smuggling. Support is provided by various military research institutes: the US Army Chemical School at Fort McClellan, Alabama; the Defense Threat Reduction Agency’s Defense Nuclear Weapons School at Kirkland Air Force Base, New Mexico; the US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland (which also provides onsite training courses to local communities); and the National Interagency Civil-Military Institute in San Luis Obispo, California, a field operating agency of the National Guard Bureau. The US Army Maneuver Support Center in Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, currently trains Army active duty and National Guard personnel, including the Weapons of Mass Destruction/Civil Support Teams. Legislation has also been proposed to construct a Weapons of Mass Destruction Training Facility that would serve all DoD emergency responders.⁷ Another unique facility is the emergency responder and bioterrorism training center maintained by the West Virginia National Guard in partnership with West Virginia University at Camp Dawson. The Iowa National Guard has established a prototype Consolidated Interactive Virtual Information Center that uses the state’s fiber-optic, wide-area network to conduct distributed training and coordination among various state and local agencies, as well as National Guard armories. The National Defense University in Washington, DC, offers some curriculum and programs to facilitate homeland security training, including wargaming facilities, an introductory course on homeland security, and a program for interagency training, education, and after-action reviews. The Services also provide some training for various homeland security tasks. For example, the Marine Riverine Training Center and Engineer School at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, provides port security training to Coast Guard port security teams. Additionally, various commands within the department also conduct training and exercises. In June, for example, the North American Aerospace Defense Command sponsored Amalgam Virgo 2002, a multi-agency exercise involving an airborne terrorist incident. The US Pacific Command maintains the Center of Excellence for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance at Tripler Army Medical Center in Honolulu, Hawaii. It also sponsors interagency and disaster response exercises. These primarily deal with responses to disasters in countries in the Pacific theater, but also have application to the United States.

• Department of Energy. In addition to the department’s Nevada Test Site, DoE’s Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education (ORISE) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, offers a range of training services and facilities. ORISE manages the Training Resources Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site, which provides training and instructional courses on medical aspects of radiation accident management. The Institute’s Emergency Management Laboratory offers training on many emergency management-related activities through computer-based training, classroom instruction, hands-on emergency drills and exercises, and distance learning. ORISE also manages the Training and Data Exchange (TRADE) network which promotes conferences, workshops, courses, and exercises that include security and emergency management training. Three of the academies comprising DoE’s Nonproliferation and National Security Institute at Kirkland Air Force Base, New Mexico, provide homeland security related training, including courses on protecting nuclear facilities, counterintelligence, and emergency operations management.

• Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The department’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health maintains 15 education and research centers throughout the United States. The centers conduct and sponsor courses on nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological threats, as well as on other hazardous materials. They also provide a clearinghouse for various resources for worker safety and healthcare training on activities related to responding to terrorist attacks. The department’s Public Health Service Noble Training Center at Ft. McClellan, Alabama, is devoted to medical training for responding to weapons of mass destruction. The Office of Emergency Preparedness in HHS provides additional training programs. This office and the Noble Training Center are expected to be transferred to the Homeland Security Department.

• Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA’s Office of Emergency and Remedial Response provides classroom and field training as part of its emergency response training program which deals with responding to chemical spills, radiological contamination, and other hazardous material.

• Department of Transportation. The department’s Research and Special Programs Administration, Office of Hazardous Materials Initiatives and Training provides training packages and sponsors courses and other activities on the safe transportation of hazardous materials and how to respond to chemical, biological, and nuclear incidents. The US Coast Guard Institute in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and the US Coast Guard Training Center in Yorktown, Virginia, provide some training in emergency management, maritime inspection, counterterrorism intelligence operations, and security. The Coast Guard also sponsors and participates in interagency exercises. In July, for example, the Service sponsored a two-day exercise in Hawaii called Kai Po’ino. The administration has also proposed moving the Coast Guard to the Homeland Security Department.

• Office of Personnel Management (OPM). OPM manages the Federal Executive Institute and the Management Development Centers located at Charlottesville, Virginia; Denver, Colorado; and Sheperdstown, West Virginia, which have recently added courses on terrorism and critical infrastructure protection to their curriculum.

• Department of the Treasury. The department’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Agency, headquartered in Glynco, Georgia, provides training to more than 70 federal agencies, as well as to state, local, and international law enforcement services. Its courses include maritime and border enforcement and physical security programs. The Federal Law Enforcement Training Agency is also expected to be transferred to the Homeland Security Department.

• Department of Agriculture. The department’s Graduate School teaches two courses related to terrorism, including a distance learning curriculum.

• States. Some states maintain their own training facilities. For example, the California Specialized Training Institute is part of the state’s Office of Emergency Services. The institute, located in San Luis Obispo, offers training in disaster management, criminal justice, hazardous materials, emergency response, and incident mitigation. States also conduct their own training and exercise programs. In 2002, for example, Hawaii plans to participate in 19 major exercises relating to terrorism or WMD incidents.⁸ State academic institutions also play a significant role in training. In addition to the universities in the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium, many state academic institutions have centers that provide courses and technical assistance on matters concerning homeland security. The University of Delaware, for example, maintains a Disaster Research Center. Many of these institutions and programs are either funded by federal grants (primarily by DoJ, FEMA, and HHS) or managed in conjunction with federal agencies. The administration’s plan for establishing the Homeland Security Department proposes to consolidate grant-making under the new department.

• Nongovernmental Organizations. Many NGOs participate in federal and state programs and conduct their own training programs as well. The American Red Cross, for example, has established the Clara Barton Center for Domestic Preparedness at the Pine Bluff Arsenal as a facility for training nongovernmental agencies in delivering humanitarian aid in the wake of a WMD attack. The National Emergency Management Association in Lexington, Kentucky, conducts courses on many aspects of consequence management. The Public Entity Risk Institute in Fairfax, Virginia, facilitates the development of education and training on WMD response-related activities.

Several factors contribute to the dissatisfaction with homeland security training. Problems with current programs include:

• Homeland security training requirements can vary significantly from region to region. For instance, regions with high population densities, heavy industry, and concentrated transportation networks will face different problems than areas with dispersed populations and scattered infrastructure. Yet, federal, state, and local agencies that attempt to craft training programs to suit the specific needs of their area face a bewildering assortment of training and exercise programs. No simple means exist to determine which training opportunities might be most appropriate or whether the type and scope of training resources are adequate. In addition, there are no uniform standards by which to judge the competency or adequacy of trainers and facilities. The result is programs that can be duplicative, impart unnecessary or inadequate information, and, at the same time, overlook critical training needs.¹⁵

• The preponderance of training resources is aimed at preparing emergency first responders. There are far fewer training opportunities for those individuals and groups that focus on other aspects of homeland security, such as preventing or protecting against attacks. There are a few training opportunities for “senior-level decisionmakers,” like DoD’s Senior Officials’ Workshop. However, such opportunities are not widespread. Nor are there many resources committed to addressing the challenges of interagency operations. In addition, much of the existing effort is “stovepiped,” bringing together far too infrequently the various response assets into integrated exercises.

• Finally, no single organization has responsibility for approving or validating training programs with an eye towards eliminating unnecessary duplication, ensuring sufficient training is available for all homeland security tasks, and screening programs to certify that they contain appropriate and valid information. It is not clear how much authority or how many resources the new Department of Homeland Security will have to oversee and manage national training activities.

The Challenge: Major Contingencies
Even if all the current roster of training opportunities were better organized and managed, they might still prove inadequate to prepare the nation to respond to future threats. Catastrophic nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks could threaten tens of thousands of lives and hundreds of billions in property damage. Meeting these dangers will demand unprecedented responses in terms of speed, scale, and complexity. This could, in turn, require new training initiatives. The heroic, but flawed, response to the September 11 attacks, efforts in the wake of natural disasters, and recent major counterterrorist training exercises, suggest there is already enough known about the homeland security challenge to conclude that the current response system is inadequate to deal with a large-scale terrorist threat. A brief survey suggests that three major shortfalls consistently emerge in preventing, protecting against, and responding to large-scale disasters, which can, in part, be addressed through improved training regimes.

• Interagency Coordination. Operations are frequently plagued by a lack of information sharing and confusion over responsibilities among policymakers, law enforcement, emergency managers, first responders, public health workers, physicians, nonprofit organizations, and federal agencies. The necessity for speed can exacerbate the coordination challenge. Effectively negating threats in many cases requires a rapid response capability, and operating on compressed timelines leaves little room for miscues in coordination.¹⁶ One significant requirement, for example, is quickly emplacing an incident response structure that can detect and assess threats and mobilize appropriate resources. In particular, for a chemical or biological attack, actions taken in the first hours to identify, contain, and treat victims may significantly reduce the scope of casualties. Major exercises, however, are frequently marred by potentially crippling flaws. For example, during TOPOFF, a congressionally mandated “no-notice” exercise conducted to evaluate the federal response to a major strike, the Coast Guard asked for the assistance of the US Marine Chemical and Biological Incident Response Forces (CBIRF). The Defense Department rejected the request, arguing that FEMA, as lead response agency, was the only authority authorized to request department resources. This dispute delayed the CBIRF deployment by almost 24 hours.¹⁷ Even determining which agency is in charge can be a major problem. A National Capital Region exercise conducted in Washington, DC, in conjunction with TOPOFF simulated the explosion of a radiological dispersion device. Initially, hours were lost in confusion over whether the Energy Department or the EPA should lead the response. According to federal plans, under varying circumstances any one of five agencies might have the responsibility for coordinating activities during a radiological incident.¹⁸

• Organization and Communication. Virtually every large-scale exercise or response experiences problems in agency notification; mobilization; information management; communication systems; and administrative and logistical support. Organizations have particular difficulty in optimizing flexibility and the capacity to decentralize operations and conduct rapid problem solving, often a key requirement for responding effectively to major disasters.¹⁹ Significant organizational deficiencies, such as failing to provide redundant capabilities or alternative means for responding to a crisis, are frequently not discovered until the onset of a major operation. For example, the New York City Emergency Operations Center was on the 23rd floor of 7 World Trade Center. When the building was destroyed, the city had no adequate backup command and control capability available. It took three days to reconstitute all the functions and capabilities lost by the destruction of the emergency operations center.²⁰

• Convergence. Convergence is a phenomenon that occurs when people, goods, and services are spontaneously mobilized and sent into a disaster-stricken area.²¹ Although convergence may have beneficial effects, like rushing resources to the scene of a crisis, it can also lead to congestion, create confusion, hinder the delivery of aid, compromise security, and waste scarce resources. This proved to be a major concern during the response to the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center. When the first tower was struck, firemen, policemen, emergency medical technicians from all over the metropolitan area streamed to the site, leaving other parts of the city vulnerable and, after the towers collapsed, creating tremendous problems in accounting for emergency personnel.²² Additionally, in the days following the tragedy many organizations deployed assets to New York City only to find they were unnecessary.²³

Senior level and multi-echelon training, in other words, simultaneously exercising the myriad of federal, state, local, nongovernment, and private sector organizations involved in homeland security, could be particularly important. Multi-echelon training can be an effective tool for challenging assumptions and preconceptions, breaking down barriers to interagency communication, overcoming institutional bias, and building trust and confidence in and among organizations. These kinds of training activities can also provide insights into future needs, helping decisionmakers prioritize requirements and apply resources effectively.

Training Initiatives
Conducting collective training requires: clearly establishing missions and tasks; the means to practice the orchestrated employment of federal, state, and local organizations; documenting deficiencies and lessons learned; and developing senior leaders that can effectively guide and administer exercise programs. Several training techniques, practices, and organizational initiatives that are particularly well-suited to training complex, multi-echelon organizations might be profitably applied to the mission of protecting the homeland.

• Mission Essential Task Lists. These lists describe: the tasks to be accomplished; the conditions under which actions must be performed; and standards for measuring whether or not the task has been successfully conducted. The lists of individual organizations are compared to identify gaps, conflicts, and unnecessary duplication, thus ensuring that capabilities and responsibilities are properly distributed and the overall mission can be efficiently achieved. The lists are then used to develop training and evaluation programs. Such a system could be established for homeland security missions, including the roles of officials at all levels of government. Some civil authorities, such as the state of Iowa, already employ similar pedagogical methods, but an integrated national system could serve as a foundational planning tool for a comprehensive training program.²⁴

• Multi-echelon Training Centers. Today, most homeland security training exercises, if they incorporate multiple organizations and levels of authority at all, are usually done as “tabletop” exercises, where participants gather in one location and most activities are simulated. Organizations are not forced to use the communication and command systems they would have available in a real operation over realistic distances, in real time. A better solution might be to create national homeland security training centers as venues for multi-echelon exercises. These centers might be established on a regional basis, designed to meet the unique requirements of different areas, such as dealing with strikes on mass transit facilities or port security. Exercises would focus on responding to large-scale events and include the full range of tasks that would be required from providing medical assistance to conducting media relations to protecting civil rights. The centers would integrate organizations and agencies at the federal, state, and local level, as well as the commercial sector and non-governmental organizations.

• Training Documentation Systems. Effective multi-echelon training has to be an iterative process where lessons from one exercise are applied to the next training event. Lessons learned in training exercises have to be documented, including descriptions of how well or poorly organizations, processes, or equipment perform in accomplishing a certain task and suggestions for improving future performance. Many of these lessons can be extracted during a process called the “after-action review,” where participants compare what they planned to accomplish with the actual results of the exercise to determine their strengths and weaknesses.²⁵ In addition to improving training, information gleaned from lessons learned can also be used to develop new methods and practices, as well as provide insights for improving organization, personnel development, leader training, and equipment. Some state and federal agencies have also adopted formal systems for collecting and cataloguing lessons learned. DoE, for example, maintains an online lessons learned information portal that pools a variety of reports and other data on the agency’s various programs and activities, including protecting critical infrastructure. The lessons learned process, however, is neither universally practiced nor uniformly applied by the many agencies involved in homeland security. A more comprehensive lessons learned system might not only improve training, but could also serve as an invaluable resource for research and development by identifying key weaknesses and shortfalls that might be addressed with new technology.

• Senior Professional Education. The education of senior leaders and managers has an important impact on how organizations deal with the challenge of undertaking complex, collective training tasks. Their educational experiences often serve as a catalyst for how they approach the challenge of integrating their organizations with other entities. As the Homeland Security Department seeks to develop its leaders and managers responsible for integrating diverse activities among federal, state, and local agencies, it too might benefit by establishing a senior-level education institution focused on planning and coordinating activities at the national level and conducting interagency operations. The secretariat of the new department could manage this “Homeland Security University,” providing training on homeland security to executives from all federal agencies, as well as congressional staff, state administrators, and NGOs. This initiative could also serve as the anchor for developing the Homeland Security Department’s institutional professional development program.

These problems, however, are not insurmountable. Through TOPOFF, and other joint exercises, federal, state, and local agencies have already demonstrated the capacity to conduct integrated training. And there are many practices that might further facilitate shared training experiences. A presidential directive to guide federal activities and a national training plan could provide overall direction. Long-range training calendars, conferences and mutual cooperation agreements can be used to coordinate activities. Simulations and distance learning technologies might be employed to replicate some activities and integrate training over long distances. Stand-alone training and evaluations teams, as well as individuals who might serve as surrogate terrorists or “red teams,” could be established to support various training activities. These teams might be affiliated with the proposed Department of Homeland Security’s Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Division, ensuring that exercises best replicate both current and emerging threats. Support teams and facilities could provide “turn key” operations which would require minimum preparation time and resources from the agencies being trained. Many of the operations and activities might be conducted under the umbrella of the Homeland Security University. To facilitate interagency and inter-government cooperation and cost sharing, training activities could be managed and funded by unique federal, state, and private-sector partnerships, with oversight provided by a governing board that included representation by the various stakeholders in homeland security training.

Exercises will also have to contend with competing jurisdictional, proprietary, and political interests. For example, government leaders and political appointees might be worried that controversial decisions or mistakes made during exercises would be publicized and exploited by political opponents. Industries could be concerned about releasing sensitive or proprietary information on critical infrastructure to government agencies. Exercises will require policies and procedures to ensure security and confidentiality while allowing for the extensive information sharing that is key to effective training. This challenge is not unique. Virtually every aspect of homeland security activities will face similar dilemmas. Solutions adopted by the Homeland Security Department for sharing information and ensuring adequate operational security should be applicable to the training environment as well.

The second major obstacle to establishing a comprehensive training and evaluation program is funding. Cost savings from eliminating unnecessary duplication may provide flexibility for implementing additional programs, but are unlikely to be sufficient to support major new initiatives. Likewise, the stated preference of the National Strategy for Homeland Security to rely on the principles of federalism and cost sharing for funding new initiatives will likely not serve future integrated training efforts well. The strategy envisions the federal role as focusing on intelligence, border security, and policy coordination. Training is not a national funding priority.²⁶ Significant new training initiatives, however, are probably beyond most state and local governments for whom fiscal burdens loom large. By some estimates spending on homeland security by states and major cities alone has already topped $6.6 billion.²⁷ These costs are being placed on already strained budgets and there is little likelihood that states can by themselves fund new major training initiatives.²⁸ The administration’s fiscal year 2003 budget proposes to spend $3.5 billion in support of first responders.²⁹ Some of these resources will address the need for additional training programs, facilities, and exercises, but they will also likely be inadequate to support major efforts. If the administration hopes to institutionalize dramatic improvements in its ability to protect the nation against catastrophic threats, it may have few viable alternatives to substantially increasing training resources in the near term. The Homeland Security Department many find that its investments in training will be indispensable and a key metric for determining how prepared the nation is for the next attack.

Recommendations
The National Strategy for Homeland Security provides a clear mandate for the new Homeland Security Department to assume a lead role in managing the training challenge. This directive, however, represents only the glimmer of a beginning for forging an integrated training and exercise program equal to addressing the task of protecting the nation against catastrophic threats such as an attack by nuclear or virulent biological weapons. This overview of the current state of homeland security training suggests four major tasks will be required to get the department’s efforts up and running.

• First, the administration will have to draft an appropriate presidential directive outlining the Homeland Security Department’s authority to review, certify, and direct training initiatives throughout the federal government and to coordinate these activities with state and local governments, and the private sector.

• Second, the department will have to develop its own master training plan, establishing appropriate objectives, requirements, and priorities for addressing major training issues.

• Third, the department will have to reorganize current activities and create the necessary new institutions and programs that will add a layer of systemic, collective, multi-echelon training. Here, the Homeland Security Department might do well to adopt training initiatives such as: mission essential task lists, multi-echelon training centers, training documentation systems, and senior professional education.

• Fourth, Congress will have to provide the financial resources to implement a national training and evaluation system and build the infrastructure required to conduct multi-echelon training.

1. See, The National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002), p. 45
   [http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf].

2. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1996, commonly called the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act, directed the Department of Defense (DoD) to train first responders in the 120 largest US cities. The act also gave the president authority to transfer management of the program to another federal agency. Prior to the transfer the Defense Department completed training in 68 cities.

3. The DoJ’s National Institute of Justice also maintains a web site, titled Law Enforcement, Emergency Management, and Corrections Training Resources, which is designed to serve as a national repository of training information, course announcements and online training resources [http://www.lectr.org].

4. A List of the ODP’s courses and other training offerings can be found on the office’s web site at
   [http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp].

5. Statement of Ronald L. Iden, Assistant Agent in Charge, Los Angles Division, FBI, before the House Committee on Reform, Subcommittee on Government, Efficiency, Financial Management, and Intergovernmental Relations, March 28, 2002.

6. See, [http://www.fema.gov/tab_education.shtm].

7. S. 1993, a Bill to Authorize a Military Construction Project for the Construction a Weapons of Mass Destruction Responder Training Facility at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

8. William Cole, “Emergency Response Teams Focusing on Drills on Terrorism,” The Honolulu Advertiser, July 11, 2002.

9. Richard A. Falkenrath, “The Problems of Preparedness: Challenges Facing the US Domestic Preparedness Program,” Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness Discussion Paper, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2000, pp. 4-7.

10. For example, see Al Mauroni, “A Rebuttal to ‘Ataxia:’ The Smithson Report on US Response to CB Terrorism,” Journal of Homeland Security, July 15, 2002, pp. 3-6 [http://homelandefense.org/journal]. This article is a critique of a report prepared by the Henry L. Stimson Center which offered a scathing assessment of federal training efforts. Amy Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, “Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the US Response,” Stimson Center Report No. 35, October 2000, pp. 113-199.

11. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, Third Annual Report to the President and Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Washington, DC: December 2001), p. 8
    [http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel/terror3-screen.pdf].

12. A recent analysis of the Arlington County response to the September 11 attack on the Pentagon, for example, concluded that training, exercises, and shared experiences contributed significantly to the success of the emergency response operations, though the report still offered 235 recommendations and lessons learned on improving training, organization, and equipment. Arlington County, After Action Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon, (Arlington, VA: 2002), p. 12 [http://www.co.arlington.va.us/fire/edu/about/pdf/after_report.pdf].

13. US Conference of Mayors, Emergency Preparedness Survey (2002), p. 4,
    [http://www.usmayors.org/70thAnnualMeeting/securitysurvey_061302.pdf].

14. Third Annual Report, p. 18.

15. See, for example, US General Accounting Office (GAO), Combating Terrorism: Need to Eliminate Duplicative Federal Weapons of Mass Destruction Training, (Washington, DC: GAO, March 2000, GAO-NSIAD-00-64).

16. For example, an analysis that modeled the economic consequences of a biological attack found that the speed of the response was the single most important variable in reducing casualties. Arnold F. Kaufmann, et al., “The Economic Impact of Bioterrorist Attack: Are Prevention and Postattack Intervention Programs Justifiable?” Emerging Infectious Diseases, April-June 1997 [http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol3no2/kaufman.htm].

17. EPA, Exercise TOPOFF 2000 and National Capital Region (NCR) After-Action Report, The National Response Team, Final Report, (Washington, DC: August 2000), p. 10. For other shortfalls see, Thomas V. Inglesby, “The Lessons from TOPOFF,” comments at the Second National Symposium on Medical and Public Health Response to Terrorism, Washington, DC, November 28-29, 2000; Thomas V. Inglesby, et al., “A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF,” Clinical Infectious Diseases, February 2001, pp. 436-445; Richard E. Hoffman and Jane E. Norton, “Lessons Learned from a Full-Scale Bioterrorism Exercise,” Emerging Infectious Diseases, November/December 2000
    [http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol6no6/hoffman.htm].

18. Exercise TOPOFF 2000 and National Capital Region (NCR) After-Action Report, p. 17. The lead federal agency for a response of a radiological incident could be the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Defense, the National Aeronautical and Space Administration, or the Department of Energy. See, US National Response Team Report: Reconciling Coordination Issues between the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (Washington, DC: December 1999)
    [http://199.223.18.220/nrt/home.nsf/ ba1c0a482258334785256449000567e2/54b3776bb80d067485256865006b18c9? OpenDocumen].

19. For a discussion on the importance of decentralized execution and flexibility see, Kathleen J. Tierney, “Disaster Preparedness and Response: Research Findings and Guidance from the Social Science Literature,” Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, pp. 13-14 [http://www.udel.edu/DRC].

20. James Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf, “Elements of Resilience in the World Trade Center Attack,” Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, pp. 6-9 [http://www.udel.edu/DRC]. See also, Brian A. Jackson, et al., Protecting Emergency Responders: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2002).

21. For a discussion of convergence, see Julie L. Demuth, Countering Terrorism: Lessons Learned from Natural and Technological Disasters (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 2002), p. 7.

22. The problem of organizations, units, and individuals “self-dispatching” themselves without the knowledge or permission of the on-scene incident commander was also a problem at the site of the attack on the Pentagon. Arlington County, After Action Report, p. 12.

23. For example, the US Joint Forces Command’s JTF-Civil Support deployed a liaison team to New York City approximately three days after the 9/11 attacks. The City requested few DoD resources and the task force soon withdrew and handed coordination for the civil support mission over to a DoD regional Defense Coordinating Officer. New York’s WMD-Civil Support Team also deployed to the city days after the event and did not play a significant role. See, “JTF-CS Response to Terrorist Attacks on 11 September 2001,” Joint Center for Lessons Learned Quarterly Bulletin 4 vol. 1 (December 2001), pp. 11-12.

24. See, for example, State of Iowa, Strategic Plan for Domestic Preparedness (2000)
    [http://www.nemaweb.org/sdp/ Best_Practices/Iowa_Domestic_Preparedness_Strategic_Plan.doc]. The National Fire Protection Association, an international organization that establishes standards and codes for safety practices, has set minimum criteria for disaster/emergency management and business continuity programs for the public and private sectors. This code, approved by FEMA, may also offer a model for a standardized approach to some aspects of homeland security missions. NFPA 1600, Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, 2000). The military use of mission essential task lists may also offer a suitable model. See, for example, Naval Warfare Development Command, Naval Mission Essential Task List (NMETL) Development Handbook (June 2000) [http://www.nwdc.navy.mil/UNTL_NMETL/UNTL_NMETL.htm]; Field Manual 25-101, Battle Focused Training (September 30, 1990), chapter 2 [http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/25-101/fm25101.htm].

25. For an example of the military after action review process see, US Army, Training Circular 25-20, A Leader’s Guide to After Action Reviews (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, September 30, 1993)
    [http://call.army.mil/products/trngqtr/tq1-98/table.htm].

26. The National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. 63.

27. The National Governors Association estimated that homeland security spending by the states could top $4 billion per year. The National Conference of Mayors estimates that in total the 200 largest cities will spend an additional $2.6 billion.

28. See, for example, National Governors Association, National Association of State Budget Officers, The Fiscal Survey of States (May 2002), p. 1 [http://www.nasbo.org/Publications/fiscsurv/ may2002fiscalsurvey].

29. Fiscal year 2003 President’s Budget Document, “Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation”
    [http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/homeland_security_book.html].