Washington’s long-time suspicions regarding the Iranian nuclear weapons program were not without foundation. By the fall of 2012 the U.S. intelligence community suspects that Iran possessed a clandestine inventory of up to eight nuclear weapons and nearly 1,400 ballistic missiles. The Iranian military also boasted over 1,200 cruise missile systems (including several hundred low-observable missiles), over eight hundred precision-guided munitions (PGMs) (e.g., laser- and optically-guided bombs), and wide access to commercial and national satellite networks. Iran also possessed significant chemical munitions stocks, nearly 7,000 anti-ship mines (some quite advanced), and substantial quantities of late-generation "traditional" systems (e.g., tanks, aircraft, surface warships), including five diesel submarines capable of conducting clandestine mine-seeding operations.

On 6 November 2012, Iranian ballistic and cruise missile forces were dispersed. Mine seeding of the Strait of Hormuz commenced. Iranian submarines began their “underwatch” patrols of the mine fields and anti-ship cruise missile batteries were positioned along the approaches to the strait. Iran’s small air force, equipped primarily with PGMs and anti-ship missiles, also was dispersed.

The Iranian leadership moved to deep underground shelters for its protection. Essential communications and data flows were handled by fiber-optic land lines or through satellite “subscriber” services on systems like Iridium and Teledesic. Overhead reconnaissance was provided by commercial satellite services augmented by Russian satellites. Global positioning data was available both from the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) and the Russian Glonass system.

On 9 November, having deployed its forces to their wartime positions, the Iranian leadership announced the conditions that must be met before the Straits would be reopened and the flow of oil resumed: All western forces must depart from the region (i.e., the U.S. support forces in Saudi Arabia); Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states must substantially curtail oil and gas production; and tankers transiting the Strait of Hormuz must pay a transit fee to Iran.

The Iranian leadership believed that, if they could achieve these objectives, the key, enduring effect would be to make the Saudi Kingdom and the Gulf Cooperation Council states wards of Tehran. Recalling the Gulf War, Tehran issued a warning to all states in the region. Cooperation with any powers “external to the region” will lead to “dire consequences” being visited upon the cooperating state. Several options were open to Iran in making good on this threat: it might employ weapons of mass destruction, or conduct precision strikes on oil and gas fields in the region. Iran’s hope was that these threats would deter potential U.S. allies, especially those within the region.

Back in Washington, the President is concerned about the risks posed to deploying U.S. ground and tactical air forces because all major in-theater ports and airfields are well within range of the Iranian military’s distributed stockpile of ballistic and low-observable cruise missiles. Tehran’s access to third-party commercial satellites enables its military to plot the movement of U.S. forces in and around the strait. Washington faces the dilemma of allowing its forces to be observed in this manner, or of attempting to deny this information to the Iranians. This would require convincing the governments of national satellite systems and the multinational corporations that control commercial satellite constellations to cease providing satellite information to Iran. Additionally Washington would have to shut down certain portions of its Global Positioning System data links, which have become indispensable for a variety of commercial activities. Other options involve employing electronic warfare against the satellites. The United States possesses no specific capability for attacking the satellites themselves.

The scenario described above illustrates the very different kind of challenge U.S. power-projection forces may face in the future from what they experienced during the Gulf War, and which animated planning in the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review. In particular, this scenario represents an Iran which has taken a very different path than that chosen by Iraq in 1990.

This paper examines the potential impact the emerging military revolution could have on the character of naval warfare and on the potential challenges the U.S. Navy will face in light of its shift toward operations in the littoral. The paper begins with a discussion of the changing character of conflict. Next, a description of the emerging anti-access challenge is provided, with particular emphasis on important enabling technologies. The paper then concludes with an assessment of the implications of the foregoing for U.S. Navy operations and suggests directions for future research.

The Military Revolution and the Emerging Threat Environment
Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. Navy was an important instrument of American foreign policy. The Navy projected presence away from home shores, serving to deter prospective enemies while reassuring alliance partners. The frequent deployments of carrier task force groups also provided rapid response in times of crisis.

In the assessment which took place after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, the Navy accorded primary focus in the post-Cold War period to littoral operations.² This stems from its recognition that there simply is no "blue water" enemy fleet to sink, nor is there any naval competitor on the horizon that one could envision possessing the ambition and the capability to challenge the U.S. Navy directly for command of the sea. It also reflects the Navy’s rapidly increasing potential to influence the land battle.

The recognition of U.S. naval preeminence has not, however, eliminated any prospect of competition with emerging regional powers. Although potential Third World aggressors have little capability to challenge the U.S. Navy on the open seas, they will increasingly have the potential to deny U.S. forces access to in-theater bases and littoral waters.

The Emerging Anti-Access Challenge
The international post-mortem which occurred in the aftermath of the Gulf War indicates that many states believe that the measures of military power have changed. Many regional powers have channeled a growing percentage of their resources toward a few critical areas (such as precision-guided munitions; increasingly cheap command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets; and advanced surface to surface missiles), rather than revamping their military capabilities across the board along traditional Cold War lines.³ Potential U.S. competitors seem inclined to adopt asymmetrical counters to the “American” style of warfare. Chinese military theorists are now writing about a future anti-access environment which is characterized by underwater aircraft carriers, undersea mine-laying robots and seabed military bases, while the Iranian government appears to be focusing on weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, long-range aircraft for power projection in the region, and improved air defenses.⁴

Missiles. Third world rogue states are acquiring the means to strike targets at far greater distances and with greater precision than they could just a few years ago. The relatively primitive Scud ballistic missiles employed by the Iraqis during the Gulf War are being supplanted by missiles of greater range and accuracy. For example, North Korea possesses a growing number of such systems, which it not only produces but exports as well. Iran has provided financial support for Pyongyang’s missile programs since the mid-1980s, and both Iran and Syria have test-fired North Korean-made ballistic missiles in recent years.⁵

But this is just the tip of the iceberg. More than 20 nations (including Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea, and Libya) have ballistic missiles. Moreover, more than a score of countries possess or are developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) – nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.⁶

Over forty Third World militaries now possess anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), which can be launched from land, aircraft, ships, or submarines. While not cheap, these missiles have been used to devastating effect in recent years. For instance, during the 1982 Falklands War Argentine Exocet missiles caused substantial damage to the Royal Navy.⁷ In 1987, when the U.S. Navy escorted reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War, another Exocet fired by Iraq severely damaged the USS Stark, killing 37 of her crew.⁸

Iran seems particularly enamored of ASCMs. One commander of U.S. naval forces in the region has expressed concern that, over time, Iran’s acquisition of an increasingly capable inventory of ASCMs, when combined with its attack submarines, ballistic missiles and anti-ship mines could make the fleet’s job “a lot tougher.”⁹

If they can be detected by the enemy, surface combatants will likely exhibit greater vulnerability to the high-velocity, sea-skimming weapons increasingly available on the international arms market. This is especially true for those surface combatants operating in littoral areas where warning times are likely to be far shorter than for those combatants operating far out at sea. Over time, as the stockpiles of these weapons increase, the fleet will confront the problem of defending against saturation attacks of ASCMs.

Mines. Mines have long posed a vexing challenge for the Navy. Of the 18 Navy ships seriously damaged in operations since 1950, 14 were due to mines.¹⁰ According to Navy lore, after enemy mines stalled the amphibious assault at Wonson during the Korean War, a disgruntled U.S. admiral observed that “we lost control of the seas to an enemy without a navy, using World War I weapons employed from vessels that were built before the time of Christ.”¹¹

Things have not changed significantly since then. Anti-ship mines in the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm hampered sealift, fire support and other operations and were an important factor in preventing an amphibious landing of Kuwait.¹² Three U.S. ships hit mines in the open waters of the Persian Gulf. The combined damage to the USS Princeton and the USS Tripoli was about $21.6 million, while the cost of the two mines that sunk them was $11,500.¹³ The effectiveness of anti-ship mines in the Gulf War has not gone unnoticed. Since 1991, worldwide production of sea mines has increased about 50 percent.¹⁴ Today there are nearly 50 navies capable of laying mines, over 30 nations manufacturing mines, and more than 20 nations exporting mines.¹⁵

Most of the world’s mines are tethered contact mines of a kind that has been in existence since the beginning of the century. During its 1980-1988 war with Iraq, Iran deployed Russian-made mines (some purchased through North Korea) using pre-World War I technology.¹⁶ These types of mines also were used by Iraq during the Gulf War. Now, however, about 30 percent of the world’s mine stockpile is comprised of so-called “smart” mines. These mines are remotely activated by sensing the target’s acoustic, magnetic, pressure, underwater electrical potential (UEP) or extremely low-frequency electromagnetic (ELFE) signatures, either singly or in combination.¹⁷ These mines can distinguish decoys and be set to respond to the signatures of specific types of ships or submarines, and, theoretically, even individual vessels.¹⁸ The Russians are developing underwater rocket-powered torpedoes, and continental-shelf mine for use against submarines in 60-300m of water.¹⁹ These mines can be deployed from ships, helicopters, airplanes, and submarines.

Submarines. Conventional submarine sales are expected to double over the next decade, with an estimated 60 submarines being bought by 20 countries from shipbuilding firms in the former Soviet Union, Sweden, Germany, Australia, and Italy.²⁰ The Navy has voiced concerns over the Russian military’s continued emphasis on submarines, despite its obvious resource difficulties.²¹ These concerns center, in part, on Russia’s willingness to sell its sophisticated submarines to any country with the money to pay for them. At eight percent of total military exports, Russian naval equipment might not seem a significant proliferation problem, unless one considers the fact that the newest generation of Russian Kilo-class diesel submarines (SSKs) are ostensibly some of the quietest in the world.²²

Although SSKs are relatively slow and easily spotted during long voyages, they are well-suited to operations in the littoral.²³ Indeed, until recently, U.S. sonar designs for submarine detection were optimized for blue-water environments. The proliferation of submarine technology and the reorientation of Naval operations to the littoral have highlighted limitations of traditional deep-water active and passive anti-submarine sonar. Used in the littoral, sonar effectiveness is hampered both by extensive background noise levels and the contours of the sea floor.²⁴ As a result of this technological shortfall, diesel submarines could provide important stealthy mine-laying capabilities and anti-surface vessel warfare platforms.

The Military Revolution
The United States and its coalition partners had a decisive victory over Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War. The United States brought successfully to bear an arsenal of advanced weaponry, demonstrating capabilities with dramatic effectiveness and possibly foreshadowing a “revolution in military affairs” (RMA). The F-117 Stealth Fighter alone, flying two percent of sorties but striking 40 percent of strategic targets in Iraq, confirmed both the technological prowess and the military power of the United States. The situational awareness achieved by the constellation of coalition reconnaissance and surveillance satellites, aircraft and ground sensors, and the ability to use this information to target Tomahawk missiles, queue Patriot missiles and locate friendly and enemy ground forces, was the outgrowth of an information revolution which has not yet seen its maturity. These are but a few of the examples which are commonly used to confirm an emerging military revolution.

Since the mid 1980’s, a debate has raged in military circles regarding an emerging military revolution. Military revolutions are major discontinuities in military affairs brought about by changes in militarily-relevant technologies, concepts of operation, methods of organization, and/or resources available. They relatively abruptly – most typically over two to three decades – transform the conduct of war and make possible order of magnitude or more gains in military effectiveness. They typically advantage the strategic/operational offense and create enormous inter-temporal capabilities differentials between military regimes.²⁵ This could have profound consequences for military operations and global strategic balances. War in the air, on land, and at sea, could be transformed, as well as expanding into two new dimensions – space and the information spectrum.

The Gulf War demonstrated some trends which are likely to evolve during the emerging revolution:

• Long-range precision strike (LRPS);

• The emergence of information-intensive, network-based systems and organizations;

• The increasing substitution of unmanned for manned systems;

• The increasing robustness (multi-aspect) and breadth (multi-function) of stealth; and,

• The maturity of independent and integrated information warfare and space warfare capabilities.

Navy Budget Overview
How will the Navy respond to the anti-access challenge? To begin, the Service will almost certainly be limited to current resource levels, or less. The Navy’s budget has fallen in real terms every year since 1985. Given the defense funding projections in the Clinton Administration’s plans, defense funding is unlikely to rise, barring a dramatic change in the international environment. Under DoD’s Quadrennial Defense Review, DoD budgets are assumed to flatten out at $257 billion,²⁷ while the June 1997 congressional budget resolution suggests an even lower plateau for DoD budgets is conceivable, if not likely.²⁸

At the same time, the Navy is facing a major gap between its resources and plans. According to DoD, the Navy’s budget is projected to reach $78 billion in FY 2003. Even if the Navy can maintain this level of funding over the long term, it will face a severe plans-funding mismatch. Assuming it wants to maintain readiness levels comparable to today’s, the Navy will likely have to spend at least $51.5 billion a year on operations and support (O&S) activities over the long term. (The O&S accounts – e.g., operations and maintenance, military personnel, military construction, and family housing accounts – are closely associated with readiness.) This would leave some $27 billion for research and development (R&D) and procurement. The Navy is planning to fund R&D at $7.9 billion in FY 2003. Assuming the Navy wants to maintain this level of R&D funding over the long term, this would leave about $18.7 billion a year for procurement – clearly well below the level that would be required to support the Navy’s modernization plans. Historically, the Navy has allotted about 34 percent of its procurement budget to its shipbuilding accounts. This implies that the Navy would have about $6.4 billion available for shipbuilding over the long term. By contrast, current Navy plans would require annual funding of about $10 billion for shipbuilding.

Another way to view the Navy’s funding mismatch is to compare projected shipbuilding plans for FY 2003 with long-term requirements. Under the QDR, the Navy plans to maintain a fleet of some 300 ships, including 12 carriers, 50 submarines and 116 surface combatants.²⁹ Assuming average service lives of 35 years, this suggests the Navy will need to buy an average of eight to nine ships annually over the long term. By contrast, the Navy is currently projected to build only six ships in FY 2003.

Navy options for shrinking this gap between its resources and its plans include cutting O&S costs by scaling back on training and deployments, reducing force structure, shifting funding from R&D to procurement, adjusting its procurement budget, or some combination of the above. Force structure emerges as a major prospective “bill payer.” To garner significant savings in O&S costs, the Navy would likely have to make at least modest cuts in the size of its force structure. Moreover, if O&S costs associated with maintaining forces at high states of readiness continue to grow at historical rates, a modest cut in force structure might be necessary just to keep O&S costs at $51.5 billion annually. Given this trend, it is more likely that growing O&S costs will continue to “crowd out” procurement accounts than that O&S savings will allow the Navy to increase procurement funding. Another solution would be to shift funding out of R&D into procurement. However, given the size of Navy’s R&D budgets (on average $9 billion since the Gulf War), measurably shrinking a $3-4 billion annual gap in shipbuilding alone would require drastic cuts and probably damage long-term naval modernization. A third possibility would be to allocate more procurement funding toward ships. This is problematic, however, given other, competing priorities. The Navy is committed to buying at least 548 F/A-18E/Fs at an estimated cost of $41.3 billion, the majority of which have yet to be procured.³⁰ And sometime around the middle of the next decade, the Navy will begin procuring its replacement, the Joint Strike Fighter.

Finally, the Navy could adjust its modernization plans; however, its commitment to a 12-carrier fleet has limited its flexibility. Carriers, which are expensive to construct and operate, have been well-insulated from budget cuts. Since carriers operate with other ships whose principal mission is the carrier’s protection, the cost of a carrier also must incorporate the cost of its escorts and its aircraft. On average, it costs about $1.9 billion a year to equip, operate and support a single carrier battlegroup.³¹ Constructing a carrier costs nearly $5 billion, excluding the cost of procuring the carrier’s aircraft and the surface combatants and ships comprising the carrier battle group.

Implications For U.S. Strategy
As competitors erect anti-access barriers, U.S. forces, as currently constituted, will find themselves increasingly at risk, whether they are forward deployed or attempting to deploy into theater. Although the U.S. Navy views its forward presence forces both as means to deter would-be enemies and reassure allies and friends, this could change, perhaps, markedly as the military revolution matures. As both great powers and regional "rogue" states acquire ever greater numbers of long-range strike capabilities, dramatically more effective munitions, and far more sophisticated C4ISR assets, ships operating in the littoral may well become increasingly vulnerable. Eventually, barring dramatic improvements in missile defenses, the ever-increasing engagement envelopes and strike capabilities of major powers and rogue states alike will put at risk U.S. ground and land-based air forces access to major ports and airfields within a theater of operations. As former U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman observed, "Saturation ballistic missile attacks against littoral forces, ports, airfields, storage facilities, and staging areas could make it extremely costly to project U.S. forces into a disputed theater, much less carry out operations to defeat a well-armed aggressor. Simply the threat of such enemy missile attacks might deter the U.S. and coalition partners from responding to aggression in the first instance."³²

Preparing For The Future Threat Environment
How might the Navy meet the anti-access challenge? One option might be to surround U.S. carrier task forces with ever thicker arrays of defenses. This might prove an effective short-term solution. However, eventually the fleet will encounter the problem of large numbers of missiles, and the prospective of fleet defenses. Over the longer term, a solution may be found along a different path, one that relies less on marginal improvements to existing capabilities, instead exploiting rapidly emerging technologies and capabilities to develop a dramatically different solution to this prospective operational challenge. Given existing resource constraints and the opportunities offered by an emerging military revolution, the Navy has both fiscal and warfighting reasons to begin reducing its emphasis on carriers and increasing its emphasis on distributing its warfighting among all of the platforms in the U.S. defense arsenal. Fortunately, the service has positioned itself to do exactly that, should it choose to proceed with a strategy for transforming the battle fleet.

Network-Centric Warfare. An outgrowth of the Combined Engagement Capability (CEC) program, network-centric warfare emphasizes the integration of information processes on all Naval platforms to facilitate the timely exchange of data among them. All combat systems and major sensors on surface, aerial, space, and sub-surface platforms will be integrated into a single architecture for C4ISR. Not only would shore-based or sea-based forces be able to move large volumes of data over great distances, but this capability would give commanders a dramatically improved picture of the extended battle area and greatly improve their ability to engage successfully targets at extended ranges. Sensor grids of satellites, UAVs, and ground and undersea sensors would generate battlespace awareness, synchronize battlespace awareness with combat operations, and increase the speed of information dispersal throughout the force. At the same time, shooter grids would exploit this enhanced battlespace awareness to generate increased combat power, enable the massing of combat effects as compared to a massing of forces/platforms, and thereby maximize joint combat power.³³

Instead of relying principally on aircraft carriers whose strike ranged is being exceeded by missiles and whose survival may be increasingly at risk from area denial strategies, the Navy should migrate toward a “distributed” capital ship. Three important platforms can help realize this vision of the future: the arsenal ship, the land-attack destroyer and the converted Trident submarine.

The Arsenal Ship. The concept for an arsenal ship dates back at least to the late 1980s, when Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf published a paper in the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings challenging traditional surface combatant designs and laying out the basic characteristics of the “strike cruiser”: a stealthy, sturdy warship that could deliver a devastating amount of ordnance at great range.³⁴ Envisioned as a highly automated, semi-submerisble combatant with a very low profile incorporating stealth design and composites, the arsenal ship would operate with a crew of less than 100, as compared to the 5,000-6,000 crew of a carrier. It also would have active-point defenses, and a mine and missile resistant double-ballasting hull.³⁵ The arsenal ship would have some 500 vertical launch systems (VLS) capable of launching a wide variety of extended-range precision munitions like the Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile (TLAM), the Naval Tactical Missile (NTACMS), and the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile, as well as UAVs.³⁶ It would be nothing less than the battleship of the 21st century.³⁷

Even though the prestigious CNO Executive Panel (comprising distinguished defense experts whose advice on the Navy’s future is frequently sought by CNOs) recommended the arsenal ship be built and incorporated directly into the fleet, the Navy recently canceled the program. Although the Navy cited a shortage of funds, it has vigorously pursued funding for yet another Nimitz-class carrier and a new class of carriers. The arsenal ship had been in danger since at least April 1997 when the Director of the U.S. Navy Surface Warfare, Rear Adm. Daniel Murphy, decided to modify the function of the arsenal ship to become a floating battle lab, the Maritime Fire Support Demonstrator, for technologies to be used on the first ship of the Surface Combatant 21 family, the Land Attack Destroyer (DD-21).³⁸ The SC-21 program is the next generation of surface combatants, set to be added to the fleet over the next several decades. It is another case where investment in a key Navy program has been “crowded out” by more traditional concerns.

The Trident “Stealth Battleship”. Submarines have a proven track record as “capital ships” in their own right. For example, during World War II, with only 2 percent of naval personnel, the Navy’s submarine force accounted for 55 percent of Japanese losses at sea. The Navy’s submarines sunk over 1,300 Japanese ships, including a battleship, eight aircraft carriers, and eleven cruisers.³⁹

Today the Navy has the opportunity to convert four Trident ballistic missile submarines to “stealthy, general purpose” warships. One conversion option would modify 22 of the 24 large-diameter ballistic missile tubes in the middle of each ship. This would give the Trident a total capacity of 132 missiles. The remaining 2 large-diameter missile tube sections would be used to support embarked special operations forces (SOF).⁴⁰ Implementing this option would cost about $2.155 billion in FY 1998 dollars (less than half the cost of one carrier), or an average of $539 million per ship.⁴¹

In 1996, the Navy proposed an alternative option, which would make the Trident conversion START compliant. This would involve removing the entire 24-tube mid-hull missile section of each ship and replacing it with a newly constructed mid-hull section containing 45 or 54 reduced-diameter tubes, each capable of storing 3 missiles, for a total of 135 to 162 missiles.⁴² It has been suggested by the Navy that this option might have a total incremental acquisition cost of over $700 million per ship.

Battle for the Strait of Hormuz
How will the U.S. military conduct joint operations to meet the challenge posed in the scenario above? And, given the problems associated with deploying Army and Air Force units forward in the absence of having safe access to forward bases, how will the Navy shoulder what would likely be increased responsibilities early in the conflict? The answers to these questions cannot be divined at present. However, it is possible to at least offer a "first-cut" concept for how the battle fleet might operate under such conditions.

As described above, maritime forces rely heavily on the "Network Centric" operations of a "distributed" battle fleet comprising a strike element of converted Trident submarines, arsenal ships, land-attack destroyers, carriers (employing both tactical aviation, and reconnaissance and strike UAVs), attack submarines, and other surface combatants oriented principally on fleet defense. Operations might be conducted along the following lines:

The battle fleet is led by a screen of attack submarines, whose mission is twofold: to conduct ASW against enemy submarine forces, and to employ underwater unmanned vehicles to begin clearing the anti-ship minefields blocking chokepoints in the littoral. Behind the screen are Trident “stealth battleships” (each equipped with 100 or more precision-guided strike missiles, or several teams of special operations force troops) followed by the semi-submersible arsenal ships. The arsenal ships each have some 500 launchers able to support a variety of missile types.

Once lanes have been cleared in the mine belts, other multipurpose Trident boats move close to shore and begin to disgorge Marine "Hunter Warrior" teams and Army special operations forces (SOF).⁴³ The “stealth battleships” and arsenal ships, along with small, dispersed forward-deployed Army units and long-range Air Force elements, launch UAVs, along with missiles designed to deploy remote sensors. This action is intended to "flesh out" the U.S. precision-strike architecture, comprising an upper tier of satellites, a UAV “grid,” remote sensors, and special operations forces (those deployed by the Navy, Marine Hunter-Warrior "infestation" forces, and Army special operations forces based ashore).

Even before the architecture is in place the “stealth battleships” and arsenal ships, in combination with long-range Air Force bombers, commence an extended-range precision-strike campaign designed to neutralize enemy fixed strategic targets, and, if necessary, to arrest the advance of enemy ground forces. These strikes are supplemented by similar (although far less effective) attacks on those critical mobile targets – especially enemy missile forces – which can be identified and tracked by the U.S. deep-strike architecture. A key objective is to establish "information dominance." If necessary, forward-deployed Army forces employ their extended-range precision strike capabilities (e.g., attack helicopters and rocket artillery) against advancing enemy ground forces.

United States forces attempt to deal with enemy missile attack barrages through a combination of attacks on his command and control architecture, direct strikes on his missile forces, and land- and sea-based ballistic missile defenses.

If the missile threat, at some point, begins to subside, the full range of US forces can be brought to bear within acceptable risk levels. Navy carriers can move closer to shore, allowing them to increase aircraft and UAV sortie rates. Tactical land-based air forces might deploy in small numbers to forward air bases. Ground forces could be reinforced through "over-the-beach" resupply operations, and perhaps through airlift operations as well. Landings (and over-the-shore operations) are made only during periods of intense US attacks on suspected enemy mobile missile force locations, while the airfields chosen for resupply operations are protected by preferential missile defenses.

Once enemy missile forces and WMD have been reduced to relatively low levels, operations may be undertaken to reverse the aggression, either through continued strategic bombardment of the enemy homeland or operations designed to reoccupy friendly terrain (e.g., urban eviction operations).

A major benefit of considering alternative operational concepts such as the one presented above is in its replacing the "default" Desert Storm operational paradigm (halt-pound-counterattack) as a far more relevant point of departure for a Navy transformation effort, both in terms of exploiting the potential of emerging technologies and in preparing to meet the very different operational challenges that will likely emerge over the next decade.

Conclusion
The Navy’s strike capabilities are not likely to be sustained at even today’s level of effectiveness unless the Navy can meet the challenge of increasingly capable Third World military systems. As shown in the contingency scenario above, to do this the Service will have to increase its emphasis on conducting long-range precision strikes, and on defending the fleet from the threat of submarines, mines and anti-ship missiles.

Much as the carriers of an earlier era held a range advantage in strike operations over the battleship, so today these latter-day “battleships” – the arsenal ship and converted Trident submarine – can “outrange” the carriers. They do so by virtue of their missiles and their reduced vulnerability, which will allow them to operate more closely to shore than do carriers at a comparable level of risk. The “stealth battleships” also can undertake offensive mining and counter-mine operations, and still operate with less detection – and less protection – in the littoral areas than can the carriers.

In summary, it seems prudent for the U.S. Navy to begin the transition toward a more distributed fleet comprising perhaps eight to ten carriers (the number that can be sustained within projected Navy budgets), while experimenting with several arsenal ships and Trident “stealth battleships.” A vigorous level of experimentation and innovation can help to determine the optimal mix of ships that will comprise the “distributed capital ship.” If the Navy undertakes to exploit emerging technologies in this manner, the worst case would be that the new systems prove relatively ineffective. But the consequences would not likely be dire. The Navy would still have eight to ten carriers to cover at least one major regional conflict, and probably two, while maintaining adequate forward presence in this period of relatively low danger to the national security.

However, if the Navy fails to invest in a distributed capital ship strike architecture, and carriers do become progressively more vulnerable, the worst case scenario could be catastrophic, as the Navy would have bet everything that the future conflict environment at sea will be very similar to what it was during the Cold War or the Gulf War, leaving it with very little operational flexibility. The Navy had wisely given itself the opportunity to create a fleet that will meet the very different geopolitical and military-technical challenges of a new era. But it must seize upon that opportunity, for as Francis Bacon once observed, “He who will not apply new remedies must expect new evils.”

1. This scenario was adapted from Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., A New Navy For a New Era (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1996) and Michael G. Vickers and Robert C. Martinage, The Military Revolution and Intrastate Conflict (Washington, DC: CSBA, 1997).

2. Admiral J. Boorda, John H. Dalton, and General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Forward . . . From the Sea (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1994).

3. Patrick J. Garrity, Why the Gulf War Still Matters: Foreign Perspectives on the War and the Future of International Security (Los Alamos, NM: Center for National Security Studies, 1993), p. xviii.

4. Shen Zhongchang, Zhang Haiyin, and Zhu Xinsheng, “21st-Century Naval Warfare,” Chinese Views of Future Warfare, Ed. Michael Pillsbury (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997), pp. 262-263; Garrity, p. 97-99.

5. For an overview of the North Korean program, see Greg Gerardi and Joseph Bermudez, Jr., “An Analysis of North Korean Ballistic Missile Testing,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (April 1995) and Joseph S Bermudez, Jr., “N. Korea Set For More Ballistic Missile Tests,” Jane's Defense Weekly (October 23, 1996), p. 5. It is believed that North Korea tested a production version of its No-dong 1 intermediate-range ballistic missile in 1996. The No-dong 1 is believed to have a range of 1,000 kilometers. More sophisticated missiles, the Taep’o-dong 1 and Taep’o-dong 2 missiles (with ranges of 2,000 km and 3,500 km, respectively) are in development.

6. William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997), p. 213.

7. Anthony H. Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner, The Lessons of Modern War, Volume III (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), p. 249.

8. K. Scott McMahon and Dennis M. Gormley, Controlling the Spread of Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (Marina del Ray, CA: American Institute for Strategic Cooperation, 1995), p. 12; Tim Weiner, “Cruise Missile Is Test-Fired From a Ship By Iran’s Navy,” New York Times (January 31, 1996), p. 5.

9. Weiner, p. 5. The missile is the Chinese-made C802, which has a 15-120 kilometer range, and a 700 kilogram warhead.

10. John Robinson, “Navy Crafting Mine Warfare Campaign Plan,” Defense Daily (October 31, 1995), p. 138.

11. David Wood, “Navy Tries to Handle Mines,” Cleveland Plain Dealer (September 23, 1995), p. B-11.

12. John Donnelly, “Forces Wield New Weapons to Defeat Old Foe: Mines,” Defense Week (September 8, 1997), p. 1.

13. GAO, Navy Mine Warfare (Washington, DC: GAO, 1996), p. 2.

14. Donnelly, p. 1.

15. Robert Holzer, “U.S. Navy Seeks Ways To Counter Threat of Mines,” Defense News (November 10-16, 1997), p. 12.

16. “Sea Mines and Minelaying,” International Defense Review (September 1, 1996), p. 5.

17. Rupert Pengelley, “MCM Forces Aim For A Clean Sweep,” Jane’s Navy International (June 1, 1997), p. 47.

18. Pengelley, p. 47.

19. Pengelley, p. 47.

20. Tony Perry, “Hunting Beyond Red October,” Los Angeles Times (October 21, 1997), p. 1.

21. Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide Submarine Challenges (Washington, DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, 1997), p. 2.

22. Pyotr Yudin, “Russia’s Navy Breaks Down Amid Chronic Lack of Funds,” Defense News (November 10-16, 1997), p. 16. Over the last 15 years, Russia has exported 90 Kilo-class submarines to nine countries: India, Iran, China, Poland, Romania, Algeria, Bulgaria, Syria and Libya.

23. Perry, p. 1.

24. David Foxwell, “Sub Proliferation Sends Navies Diving For Cover,” Jane’s Defense Review (August 1997), p. 30.

25. Vickers and Martinage, p. 11.

26. “Multidimensional” warfare refers to the integrated conduct of military operations across all dimensions of the battlespace – land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. See Michael G. Vickers, Warfare in 2020: A Primer (Washington, DC: CSBA, 1996); Andrew Krepinevich, “Forging a Path to a Post-Nuclear U.S. Military,” Issues in Science and Technology, Vol. 13 No. 3, Spring 1997.

27. All numbers are in constant FY 1998 dollars unless otherwise noted.

28. For an examination of the Clinton Administration’s budget projections, see Steven M. Kosiak, Analysis of the FY 1998 Defense Budget Request (Washington, DC: CSBA, March 1997). For an overview of congressional projections, see Steven M. Kosiak and Elizabeth Heeter, “Defense Spending Under the Balanced Budget Agreement” (Washington, DC: CSBA, June 6, 1997).

29. For more information, see also Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Major Shipbuilding Programs and Shipbuilders: Issues and Options for Congress (Washington, DC: CRS, 96-785F, September 1996) and GAO, Surface Combatants: Navy Faces Challenges Sustaining Its Current Program (Washington, DC: GPO, May 1997, GAO/NSIAD-97-57), p. 58.

30. Assuming the Navy buys just 548 aircraft. The Navy may purchase more, depending on when the Joint Strike Fighter becomes available. “Navy Top Gun Sees Full Hornet Funding,” Defense Week (August 11, 1997), p. 8.

31. See GAO, Navy Carrier Battlegroups: The Structure and Affordability of the Future Force (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, February 1993). The annual cost could reach some $4 billion (FY 1998 dollars) if a broader range of indirect O&S and acquisition costs are included. See Paul Taibl and Steven Kosiak, An Affordable Long-Term Defense (Washington, DC: Defense Budget Project, February 1993), p. 27.

32. Bill Gertz, "The Air Force and Missile Defense," Air Force (February 1996), p. 72.

33. Scott Truver, “Harnessing the C4ISR Revolution,” Jane’s Navy International (October 1, 1997), p. 29.

34. Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III, “Revolution at Sea,” Proceedings (January 1988). See also Jacques J. Bally, “The Shape of Ships to Come,” Armada International (February/March 1994); Colonel James A. Lasswell, “Why the Arsenal Ship Concept Is Gaining Momentum,” Marine Corps Gazette (January 1996), pp. 31-32.

35. During Desert Storm, roughly 30 double-hulled tankers hit mines, but only three had to be taken out of service. “Industry Gears Up for New Arsenal Ship Concept,” Navy News & Undersea Technology (October 30, 1995), p. 1.

36. Department of the Navy, The Arsenal Ship (Unpublished briefing, August 29, 1995), p. 7. The Navy estimated the arsenal ship would fire more than fifteen types of missiles and rockets. See Eric Schmitt, “Aircraft Carrier May Give Way to Missile Ship,” New York Times (September 5, 1995), p. 1.

37. Indeed, Admiral Boorda himself once referred to the arsenal ship as “a modern equivalent to the battleship.” Schmitt, p. 1.

38. Described by Rear Admiral George Huchting, the program executive officer for surface combatants/Aegis program, as “junkyard dogs capable of throwing significant lead ashore in support of our land warriors,” the SC-21s will replace non-Aegis destroyers and frigates being retired. The lead ship is scheduled to be delivered in 2008. Glenn W. Goodman, Jr., “Sea-Based Firepower,” in Armed Forces Journal International, November 1997, p. 36.

39. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun (New York: Random House, 1985), pp. 486-87.

40. The ship would have 66 berths for SOF personnel and could carry two Advanced Swimmer Delivery Systems or Dry Deck Shelters. Ronald O’Rourke, Navy/DARPA Arsenal Ship Program: Issues and Options For Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1997), 84.

41. O’Rourke, 84. Under this option, the ships might be START accountable, an issue that would need to be resolved in negotiations among the parties to the START treaties.

42. O’Rourke, 85.

43. “Hunter Warrior” teams are six-man reconnaissance team which, instead of closing with and destroying the enemy by fire and maneuver, they “infest” the battlefield and clandestinely monitor, target and destroy enemy forces by calling in long-range precision munitions from long-range. Chris Lawson, “The Corps’ ‘Hunter Warriors’ take on today’s Marines,” Navy Times (March 24, 1997), p. 15.