A 9-1-1 Force for 9/11


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A 9-1-1 Force for 9/11

Michael Vickers	Published 09/28/2001 Highlight

Terrorists have attacked us in the past three years on land (the embassy bombings in East Africa), at sea (the USS Cole) and now, with the mass-hijacking attack on September 11, in the air. Each was more complex operationally, the last by orders of magnitude. We must now be prepared for even more complex—and lethal—forms of attack.

Fighting the war on terrorism and preparing for other twenty-first century conflicts will require changes on both the defensive and offensive side. Two of the most urgent tasks are strengthening our defenses against biological attack and increasing our capability for surprise, extended-range strike and special operations.

An exercise run last year by the Department of Justice involved simulated chemical and biological attacks against Washington, D.C., Denver, C.O., and Portsmouth, N.H. Hospitals were quickly overwhelmed by casualties, and antibiotics and breathing ventilators were in extremely short supply. A simulated smallpox attack conducted in June by the Center

for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank, was even more chilling. After 12 days, the virus spread to 14,000 people in 25 states; within five weeks, 100,000 were dead; within two months, 3 million Americans were infected.

The ability to quickly detect and contain such agents' effects should be an urgent national security priority. Biochemists are as accessible to terrorist groups and the states that sponsor them as are pilots capable of flying our most modern jetliners. Spending on biological warfare defense, now about $600 million a year, is woefully inadequate. Substantially more is needed to develop sensors to detect and classify biological agents and to prepare the public health system for a large-scale attack. Among the most pressing needs are protective gear and specialized training for first responders, more sophisticated epidemiological data bases, improved hospital communications networks and larger stockpiles of vaccines and decontamination equipment.

On the offensive side, revenge is a dish best served cold. Two systems, the intercontinental range, B-2 stealth bomber and converted Trident nuclear submarines (SSGNs)—capable of launching 154 cruise missiles almost two thousand miles inland—are ideally suited for unwarned, large-scale, extended-range strikes against terrorist bases and the states that support them.

The need for more B-2s and SSGNs, moreover, far transcends our war with terrorism. They would prove invaluable in major interstate conflicts if U.S. access to forward bases and adjacent seas were threatened by large numbers of ballistic and cruise missiles. Twenty additional B-2s and four converted Tridents would enable our armed forces to not only strike terrorists and those who harbor them without warning, but also permit us to project far greater combat power from day one in larger wars.

To strike terrorists we must first find them. In addition to more aggressive spying and use of special forces, a very long-range, stealthy unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) is needed to provide covert, persistent surveillance deep inland. Our current satellites pass overhead too infrequently to target fleeting terrorists, and non-stealthy reconnaissance aircraft advertise their presence, reducing our chances of catching our adversaries unaware. Two such UAVs were in development in the early 1990s, but succumbed to post-Cold War purse-tightening and shortsighted military thinking. A new program should be started immediately.

Special forces units will be a critical tool in America’s arsenal in the long war on terrorism. These forces can not only clandestinely collect information on terrorists’ whereabouts, but are also able to stealthily attack terrorists in their hideouts when long-range strike means can’t do the job. But to do this, they need to be able to reach their targets undetected. A long-range, stealthy transport aircraft is needed to insert these forces into deep into denied access environments, as well as to prevent neighboring countries from providing terrorists with forewarning of our operations in less-stringent threat conditions.

Our struggle with terrorism will likely be a long one. The United States not only requires better defenses at home against even more virulent threats, but also an improved capability to take the war where it belongs - to the terrorists' homeland.

The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent policy research institute established to promote innovative thinking about defense planning and investment strategies for the 21st century. The center is directed by Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich. For more information on CSBA, see our web site at: http://www.csbaonline.org.