|
|
||
|
| ||
In releasing their latest report today on The Transformation of Strategic-Strike Operations, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments authors, Andrew Krepinevich and Robert Martinage, present a thought-provoking framework for considering how America’s strategic forces might be reshaped to meet the challenges of tomorrow. This report should help inform debate surrounding the Nuclear Posture Review that is currently underway and will be submitted to Congress by the end of the year. For the last forty years, the US strategic deterrent has centered on a triad of intercontinental bombers and land- and sea-based ballistic missile forces. A strong case can be made that the United States should take steps to create a new strategic-strike triad, relying on emerging conventional precision- and electronic-strike capabilities to form two of the three legs, with a smaller, but modernized, nuclear force comprising the third. Transitioning toward a strategic force posture that places greater reliance on non-nuclear strategic-strike capabilities could offer several major advantages: Potential adversaries would be far more likely to believe, and thus be deterred by, an unambiguous US threat to respond to non-nuclear provocations with conventional precision or electronic strikes than with nuclear weapons. In the event that deterrence of nuclear use fails, a robust non-nuclear strategic strike capability would provide a retaliatory option that would not further undercut the presumption of non-use. Enhanced conventional precision- or electronic-strike capabilities would not only provide US political leaders with increased flexibility during a crisis, they could also act as a firebreak preventing inadvertent escalation to nuclear war. Since a non-nuclear strategic strike would be far more discriminating than a comparable nuclear attack, the prospect of a relatively rapid return to normalcy may offer benefits in terms of war termination. Maintaining a larger-than-necessary nuclear force posture incurs substantial opportunity costs that impede efforts to improve US military capabilities in areas where real shortfalls exist. By transforming its strategic force posture in a way that devalues nuclear weapons, the United States may encourage other advanced military organizations to do the same. To be sure, there are several potential disadvantages associated with adopting this new strategic force posture that warrant careful study: Conventional precision- and electronic-strike weapons will, for the foreseeable future, be incapable of reliably disabling all, or even a majority of, strategic targets. Precisely because non-nuclear strategic-strike capabilities would be more useable, increased US reliance upon them might spur potential adversaries to acquire at least a small nuclear arsenal for deterrence purposes. By calling into question the survivability of the nuclear deterrent arsenal of other states, expanded strategic precision-strike and electronic-strike capabilities could conceivably destabilize nuclear deterrence. Reducing US nuclear weapons levels substantially could so lower the entry barrier to nuclear superpower status that it actually encourages small nuclear powers to increase their arsenal of such weapons. Finally, by reducing the perceived risk of nuclear conflict by introducing the option of non-nuclear strategic warfare, it is possible that conventional wars may become more frequent, thereby increasing the risk of inadvertent escalation to nuclear use. In the final analysis, this paper raises more questions than it answers. But by asking the right questions, it establishes a valuable framework for conducting a comprehensive strategic assessment of future strategic-strike operations and their implications for US security. # # # # # #
If you would like to read the report's executive summary, click here.
|
||||||||||||||