

CSBA



Seabasing: All Ahead, Slow

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Four Key Points

- There is nothing new about seabasing beyond its *many* new “transformational” definitions
- That said, with the end of the Cold War, seabasing is an idea whose time has come...once again
 - Seabasing is an inevitable operational requirement in the **Second Oceanic Era** and for its associated *Joint Expeditionary Posture*
- Unfortunately, the development of seabasing since the end of the Cold War has been hampered by sloppy thinking, and been undone by a poorly conducted DoN debate over the best capability mix for the future *Expeditionary Maneuver Fleet*— a debate that has been overly influenced to this point by a focus on strategic speed
- This is a perfect time for a *Joint* “zero baseline review” of seabasing
 - Don’t pull the plug on LPD-17 or pull the trigger on MPF(F) just yet

Since the End of The Cold War, There Has Been Much Confusion Over the Term “Seabasing”

- “Seabasing is what we saw – or what I describe as the city at sea – that we literally built in Indonesia to help those countries [after the 2004 Tsunami]. There is no other institution in the world that could have done that. **Seabasing is what we did for Katrina, seabasing was the hundreds of ships off the Turkish coast and all the around the northern Arabian Gulf prior to the commencement OEF.**”

Adm Mike Mullen, CNO, 2005

- Seabasing is “the rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operations Area (JOA). **These capabilities expand operational maneuver options and facilitate assured access and entry from the sea.**”

Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept, 2005

In Truth, Both Views are Accurate Depending on the Situation or Context in Which They are Used

- **However, they reflect two very different conceptual frameworks:**
 - **One sees seabasing in terms of naval strategy and operations, which** “...deal with ships, shipbuilding, war at sea, and military forces associated with navies. Moreover, naval theory is primarily concerned with the means and methods of employing forces at sea to achieve national goals while increasing national power and prestige. The emphasis on naval operations and fleet actions results in a “sea” and “[naval]”-centric perspective.”
 - Naval proponents of seabasing tend to think in terms of *replacing* land bases
 - **Meanwhile the other see seabasing in terms of maritime strategy and operations, which concern** “the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor.” It does not concern itself solely with fleet operations or even operations upon the sea, but it “regards the fleet and army as one weapon, which co-ordinates their action, and indicates the lines on which each must move to realise [sic] the full power of both.” To think of naval and military (i.e., land force) strategy as separate is to disregard the theory of war, “which brings out their intimate relation.”
 - Maritime proponents of seabasing tend to think in terms of using the sea as a temporary base of operations
- **The concepts are two sides of the same coin; when a naval officer flips the coin, it is apt to come up on the naval side; but in the joint arena, it is weighted in favor of maritime strategy and operations**
 - The first requirement when discussing seabasing: establish the context

The Second Requirement is to be Leary About Much of What's Been Written About Seabasing

- “Today’s *amphibious operations* focus on assaults over the shore and into seaports, to establish footholds ashore permitting the build-up of sufficient combat power to conduct operations against inland objectives.”
- In contrast, “*operations from a future sea base* focus on direct assault of inland objectives (with no operational pause) followed by moves to capture seaports or safe shore lodgments for heavier follow-on forces.”
- As a result, the Task Force “...concentrates on the *ship-to-objective maneuver role of the seabase*, since it is the most transformational application. However, the seabase will support other concepts of operations, including *amphibious, over-the-horizon assaults* (emphasis added).”

Defense Science Task Force on Sea Basing, pp. 14-18

The DSB's Tortured Distinction Between Amphibious and Seabasing Operations Have Only Helped to Confuse the Current Debate Over Desired Future Seabasing Capabilities

- ***From the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms:***
 - **Amphibious operation:** a military operation launched from the sea by an amphibious force, embarked in ship or craft with the primary purpose of introducing a landing force ashore to accomplish the assigned mission.
 - **Amphibious assault:** the principal type of amphibious operation that involves establishing a force on hostile or potentially hostile shore.
 - **Forcible entry operations:** seizing and holding a lodgment in hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held, will enable continuous landing of troops and materiel and provide maneuver space for subsequent operations.
- **Bottom line: any (joint) seabasing operation is, by definition, an amphibious operation**
 - One of the key requirements for any amphibious/seabasing force is to conduct forcible entry operations, which are characterized by the injection of ready-to-fight forces from the sea

The Only Reason to Draw a Distinction Between Amphibious and Seabasing Operations is to Draw a Distinction Between “Legacy” Amphibious Warships and “Transformational” Seabasing Ships

- **Therein lies the true nature of the seabasing debate so far, particularly within the Department of the Navy**
- **There is a large body of people in the Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, and the US Navy who see forcible entry as a declining requirement and who see amphibious landing ships as expensive, legacy platforms of diminishing utility**
 - This group would like to replace active duty crewed amphibious ships with cheaper (on a ton-for-ton basis) MPF ships crewed by civilian mariners
 - For those amphibious ships that remain, this group would generally like to do away with well decks, emphasizing aerial maneuver over surface maneuver
- **Meanwhile, there is a large body of people within the US Marine Corps who naively believe that improved MPF-F capabilities should not compete with amphibious ships**
 - Marines argued from the very beginning that MPF-F ships should *not* participate in a forcible entry capability
 - However, they insisted on giving the MPF-F squadron capabilities that only made sense within the context of a forcible entry operation

It is No Wonder That, After a Decade Plus of Briefings and Discussions, There Remains Much Confusion About Seabasing—Both Inside and Outside the DoN

- “Planning for the sea base is still in its infancy. Coordination across the Services is just beginning, with discussions between the Navy, the Army, and the Marine Corps, and in response to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) initiatives. As a consequence, the details have yet to emerge, especially with respect to joint operations and with respect to the availability and needed development of technology to perform the tasks that are envisioned for the sea base.”

Committee on Sea Basing, Naval Studies Board
National Research Council of the National Academy of Science
Sea Basing: Ensuring Joint Access From the Sea, 2005

- The title of the NSB’s report, and the aforementioned definition of seabasing found in the approved Seabasing Joint Operational Concept, make clear that while seabasing may be viewed as both a naval and joint maritime context, its biggest payoff comes from *providing the joint force with transoceanic operational access and global freedom of action*
 - This briefing is based on the *maritime* view of seabasing

From the Maritime Perspective, Seabasing is About Providing the US Joint Force With Strategic Mobility and Global Freedom of Action

- In its broadest sense, *strategic mobility* can be defined in terms of the range or geographical area over which a military force can project and sustain itself, and the time required to do so
- Great powers have always sought an advantage in strategic mobility, for four, inter-related reasons:
 - Enables the expansion of markets, territory or national defensive perimeter;
 - Underwrites long-range military power projection;
 - Allows for the efficient concentration of forces for defense or offense more quickly than their opponents; which therefore
 - Allows the great power to maintain smaller armed forces that might otherwise be necessary to defend its interests
- The Persian and the early Roman Empires were able to project and sustain land forces over ranges that rival contemporary regional armies—2,500-3,000 miles by 1,000 to 1,500 miles
 - Extensive road networks and dedicated logistics support units
 - Road networks also performed an importance C3I and strategic I&W function; in the Persian Empire, using horse relays along hard-packed roads, a message could travel 1,500 miles in 15 days

The Development of Militarily Useful *Sealift* Changed the Conception of Strategic Mobility

- **Simple reason: ships can move large weights and volumes much faster over water than ground forces can move over land (or aircraft can move over water). This has remained true even after the appearance of mechanized armies:**
 - Roman Legion: moved 20-25 miles per day on paved roads; six to 10 miles per day over land
 - German Western Front (blitzkrieg): moved about 200 miles in seven days, or a little less than 30 miles per day
 - OIF: US ground forces moved approximately 400 miles in three weeks, an average of 130 miles per week, or about 20 miles per day
- **Sealift can easily move a combat force over an order of magnitude faster—over 3,000 miles in seven days**
- **The development of reliable sealift allowed great maritime powers, the United States among them, to consider using the sea itself as a base for global power projection operations**
 - However, forces delivered by sealift are not always ready to fight on arrival
 - Over time this led to the development of a hybrid sealift ship—a *warship* designed to transport, disembark, and support *combat ready forces*; today these ships are known as amphibious landing ships
- **The traditional distinction between sealift and amphibious landing ships is an important one, although both have played an important role in US *global defense postures***



Forward Based Forces



Forward-Deployed Forces



Global Attack Forces



Forcible Entry Forces



Global C3I Network



Strategic Mobility & Log Forces



Security Relationships & Legal Frameworks

Global Defense Posture:

The deliberate global positioning of forward-based and forward-deployed forces, and the development of supporting global attack, global mobility and logistics, forcible entry, and global command, control, communications and intelligence forces, as well as supporting security and legal agreements, in order to facilitate the rapid concentration of forces in time and space across transoceanic distances and to support and sustain military operations in distant theaters

A Global Defense Posture Underwrites the Ability of Any Great Global Power

- If national strategy defines America's *intent* in US foreign policy and its engagement in global affairs, then the US Global Defense Posture defines those *capabilities* needed to project US military power across intercontinental ranges in support of US national security policy objectives
- While national strategy can change from administration to administration, making major adjustments to the US Global Defense Posture is much more difficult and time-consuming—and also more enduring
- Since 1783, the United States has assumed only three distinctly different Global Defense Postures; it is now in the process of shifting to a fourth

Seabasing Capabilities Have Been Central to Past US Global Military Postures

- **1783-1889—The Continental Phase of National Security Policy**
 - A Naval Expeditionary Posture
 - Fleet stations substitute for land bases; temporary access agreements for ship and crew maintenance
- **1890-1946—The Oceanic Phase of National Security Policy**
 - A Service Expeditionary Posture
 - Sovereign basing structure; Army and the Navy have their own sealift
- **1947-1988—The Transoceanic Phase of National Security Policy (aka, the Cold War)**
 - A Garrison Posture
 - Foreign basing structure; ready-to-fight forces located in expected combat theaters
- **As this overview makes clear, in its first 205 years as a sovereign power, the US had adopted some type of expeditionary posture for 163 years (8 out of every 10 years)**
 - Up through the end of World War II, seabasing became an increasingly important aspect of the US global military posture
 - It was not until the later stages of that war, however, that seabasing became more than a **naval concept**

By 1944/45, Seabasing Underwrote all US and Combined Power Projection Operations

- **By 1944/45, the US had assembled a Global Expeditionary Movement and Maneuver System (GEMMS) that relied extensively upon seabasing capabilities**
 - Mobile airfields (aircraft carriers)
 - An Expeditionary Maneuver Fleet consisting of:
 - An amphibious landing fleet capable of lifting 13 *ready-to-fight* division equivalents
 - A strategic sealift fleet capable of moving millions of tons of cargo and personnel
 - Combat Logistics Forces and mobile logistics seabases
 - MULBERRY mobile harbors
 - These seabasing capabilities were augmented by the first aerial transports, five airborne divisions, and rapid base construction units (i.e., Seabees)
- **By the end of the war, US seabasing capabilities were staggering**
 - By early 1945, the US established a seabase off of Okinawa for 88 days in essence, 1,200 ships duplicated the land, sea, and air bases located in Britain during the Normandy invasion
 - By mid-1945, the Sea as Base Joint Power Projection Fleet was prepared to transport and land over 1.3 million men, and support them with thousands of aircraft and extensive logistical support
- **The claim that seabasing “is the most transformational things the Department of Defense, and our naval forces, will ever do,” may be correct...it’s just six decades late!**

During the Cold War/Garrison Era, the Demand For Seabasing Declined Dramatically

- **The decline was a natural result of the new strategic environment**
 - Expeditionary Era's potential and actual conditions of contested access were replaced by the Garrison Era's conditions of **assured access**
- **With large garrisons overseas in established theaters, the requirement to seize bases or to gain theater access no longer commanded attention**
 - **Ready-to-fight forces were already in place**
 - Requirement to deliver combat ready forces from the sea (**naval maneuver**) was replaced by the need for rapid garrison reinforcement
 - Minimizing the **Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI)** of garrison reinforcement units became the prominent focus
- **Over the course of the era, the World War II GEMMS was gradually transformed into a Strategic Military Transportation System, or Rapid Reinforcement System**
 - Strategic airlift and CRAF
 - Land-based prepositioning
 - Surge Sealift + Maritime Prepositioning
 - Sustainment sealift
- **Also over the course of the era, all services (including the Marines and Navy) became more access dependent**

Naturally, the Law of Supply and Demand Took Over, and the Capabilities of the US Expeditionary Maneuver Fleet Gradually Declined

- **Focus on the rapid reinforcement mission placed a high priority on the development of “strategic airlift”**
- **In any event, the large residual World War II sealift fleet depressed the need to pursue new capabilities**
 - The Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946 created the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), a fleet of mothballed ships that could be activated to meet shipping requirements during national emergencies
 - At its peak, the NDRF consisted of 2,277 ships laid up at 12 ports or anchorages throughout the United States
- **In 1964, the US Navy and Marines staged a division-sized amphibious assault over beaches in Spain, but thereafter the US intervened in Vietnam, which triggered an accelerated decline in US amphibious capabilities (despite the Marine Corps’ best efforts)**
 - Ended the Cold War with a requirement to lift the “AEs” of a MEF and MEB
 - Actual lift capability was around 3 MEBs
- **Vietnam also contributed to the demise of early moves toward maritime prepositioning**
 - In July 1963, three World War II Victory ships, designated T-AGs, were to be the first of a planned fleet of 19 ships that would form a Floating Forward Depot (FFD)
 - Each ship carried the equipment to equip and Army infantry battle group of 2,100 men
 - Had been specially modified with climate and dehumidification equipment to allow the long-term storage of equipment
 - Navy and Marines objected, and then Vietnam occurred

Things Began to Change Somewhat After 1979

- **First, DoD realized it could no longer afford to ignore US sealift capability**
 - By the mid-1970s, the MSC maintained only 30 tankers and 27 dry cargo ships in a ready status; could lift perhaps a division equivalent
 - Another 145 ships in the NDRF were earmarked for activation in time of crisis, but it was becoming progressively more costly to maintain them
 - Moreover, the ships had difficulty transporting new generation of heavier, bulkier Army gear (e.g., the 70-ton M1A1 tank)
 - As a result, in 1976 a new Ready Reserve Force (RRF) was carved out of the larger NDRF
- **Second, defense planners began to worry about projecting power into austere theaters with undeveloped ports and logistics infrastructures**
 - In 1977, the National Security Council concluded that the country was ill-prepared to project power in austere theaters, particularly the Persian Gulf
 - Planning for a new “Rapid Deployment Force” was already well advanced by 1979, when the Shah of Iran was overthrown
 - Spurred the Navy and Marine Corps to re-think the merits of maritime prepositioning
 - Led to the Afloat Prepositioning Program (Near-term Prepositioning Force to MPF)

The Designers of the RRF and APF Essentially Tried to Blend the Concepts of Surge and Sustainment Sealift With Mobile Harbors

“The importance of MULBERRY [harbors] goes far beyond the operational issue of how efficacious they were. Until their invention it was axiomatic that invading armies would need to capture a major functioning port soon after landing, to replenish those forces already ashore and to sustain the build-up...Meanwhile, having persuaded themselves (wisely or not) that their logistical needs would be met, for an extended time after the landings, by transportable [harbors], the allied planners freed themselves to think in a rather different geographical box from the German staff officers whose job was to second guess their plans. *Its highest purpose, indeed, was to enable an exercise in maneuverism of a scale unsurpassed since Hannibal.*”

- **MPF ships were specifically designed to be off-loaded “in stream” using lighterage and side-warping tugs**
 - However, the process was far less efficient and slower than off-loading pierside
- **Auxiliary Crane Ships. LASHs, and FLO-FLOs were all added to the RRF/APF**
- **JLOTS—Joint Logistics Over The Shore—program was designed to set up temporary piers and port facilities**
- **Two Marine Corps T-AVBs, container ships carrying an aviation maintenance capability, were also purchased**
- **Two floating hospitals were added by converting tankers**

One Has to Wonder How The US Expeditionary Maneuver Fleet Would Have Evolved if Not For Desert Storm

- **US forces had access to superb port facilities**
- **Enemy did not disrupt the flow of forces or attack logistics bottlenecks**
- **Although the largest amphibious landing force (combination of amphibious landing ships and MPF ships) assembled since 1964 was prepared to land US Marines in Kuwait, a landing was never ordered**
 - Threat of amphibious attack tied down an estimated ten Iraqi divisions
- **Subsequent US strategy assumed future wars would generally involve US reinforcement of an ally**
- **The practical result: while planners assumed that theater logistics infrastructure might be primitive, they still assumed *uncontested* access**
 - Neither the RRF nor MPF were designed for the forcible entry mission
 - MPF deployment operations were considered essentially logistical in nature
 - Minimizing RSOI remained far more important than naval maneuver
- **First decisions of the post-Cold War Era reflected this thinking:**
 - The SecNav reduced the amphibious landing fleet lift requirement to a “fiscally constrained” target of 2.5 MEB AEs
 - MRS BURU recommended that maritime prepositioning forces be improved (add an Army brigade afloat; MPF-E)
 - MRS BURU recommended LMSRs for surge sealift

Desert Storm Occurred Just as the United States Entered a New National Security Policy Era, and Began to Modify Its Global Defense Posture

- **After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the Soviet Union, the United States began to:**
 - Reposition the majority of US combat forces to sovereign soil
 - Dismantle its overseas ready-to-fight garrisons
 - Replace foreign bases with access agreements
 - Re-emphasize global expeditionary operations, but with a joint twist
 - Navy and Marine Corps had easiest adjustment
 - Air Force adopted a variation of the naval GNFP (AEFs)
 - The Army was the only service not to create a sustainable expeditionary rotation base
- **Desert Storm was the “defining battle” of the Guided Weapons Warfare Revolution, and had an enormous influence on both early post-Cold War US strategy and defense posture decisions**
 - Perceived success of GN Act ensured a steadily increased emphasis on joint multidimensional operations
 - US assumed a continued monopoly in guided weapons warfare, which would allow it to solve a regionalized Cold War defensive problem with few forward-based forces
 - Two-war strategy; idea of “rapid halt” gives way to “rapid decisive operations” gives way to “shock and awe” gives way to “10-30-30”

Given the New Strategy and Expeditionary Posture, It Was Only a Matter of Time Before the US “Rediscovered” the Benefits of Seabasing

“The whole power of the United States, to manifest itself, depends on the power to move ships and aircraft across the sea. Their mighty power is restricted; it is restricted by the very oceans which have protected them; **the oceans which were their shield, have now become both threatening and a bar, a prison house through which they must struggle to bring armies, fleets, and air forces to bear upon the common problems we have to face.**”

Winston Churchill, 1942
Maritime view!

“With its command of the sea it is now possible for the United States Navy to develop the base-characteristics of the world’s oceans to a much greater degree than it has in the past, and to extend significantly the “floating base” which it originated in World War II...**The objective should be to perform as far as practical the functions now performed on land at sea bases closer to the scene of operations.**”

Samuel Huntington, 1954
Naval view!

- The first indication things had radically changed in the **Second Oceanic Phase of National Policy and its evolving Joint Expeditionary Posture** was the debate over the **Mobile Offshore Base**
 - Chief proponent was Admiral Bill Owens, who took Huntington’s thoughts to their ultimate extreme
 - Admiral Owens described the MOB as a “movable American island”
 - **Intent: recreate land bases at sea**

It Was Also Only a Matter of Time Before the Idea of Naval Maneuver Once Again Took Hold


- **The 1996 DSB Study on Strategic Mobility**
 - During ODS, 96 percent of all seabased cargo went through two ports; 78 percent of all air landed cargo went through five airfields. Task force thought this would be a future critical vulnerability
 - Identified the RSOI handoff between TRANSCOM and a COCOM as an exploitable, vulnerable seam; argued that the joint force needed to reduce the joint force logistics footprint on the ground
 - Although not expressed in the same terms, the Task force was essentially arguing for new type of Global Expeditionary Maneuver and Mobility System (GEMMS)
- **Army: began talking about operational maneuver from strategic distances**
 - Although some argued for aerial mechanized maneuver, most argued for new means of seabased lift
 - High-speed Shallow Draft Ship and Theater Support Vessel
- **Marines: began talking about operational maneuver from the sea**
 - Ship-to-objective maneuver
- **However, the Navy, in the midst of a general fleet demobilization, was not interested in building up the Expeditionary Maneuver Fleet**
 - Navy leaders studiously ignored calls for improved capabilities

The Contemporary Idea of “Seabasing” Was Born During a Period When the Navy and Marine Corps Were Struggling to Find a Common Position on Naval Maneuver

- **1997-98:**
 - National Defense Panel questioned the Cold War/Desert Storm idea of assured access on both political and operational grounds
 - In the process, the NDP overemphasized the vulnerability of land bases, and underemphasized the vulnerability of sea bases
 - Marine Corps published *MPF 2010 and Beyond*
 - First key goal: conduct RSOI at sea
 - Would augment, not replace, amphibs
 - Second key goal: provide logistics support for forces operating ashore
 - Navy tried to kill the idea of MPF 2010 in staffing
- **2000-01: Admiral Clark decided to change the direction of the debate**
 - He liked the idea of “seabasing;” it became a key part of *Seapower 21*
 - However, he was less enthralled with the idea of spending money to build up the Expeditionary Maneuver Fleet
 - To save money, his negotiating position was to gradually replace amphibious landing ships with MPF-F ships
- **Admiral Clark adopted a clever negotiating ploy: he decided if he couldn’t convince the Marine Corps that he was right, he would co-opt them**
 - Focused on the need for strategic speed
 - Exploited the Marines’ commitment to the MV-22 by emphasizing aerial maneuver

The DSB Task Force on Seabasing and the Subsequent Seabasing JIC Supported Admiral Clark's Position

- The Task Force argued that future forcible entry operations should be conducted from far out at sea, primarily by aerial maneuver
- The Task Force did suggest the formation of a Joint Seabasing Office
 - However, the concept became part of the JCIDS process and the Navy was assigned as the JIC lead
- The primary focus of the JIC became speed of response— "seizing the initiative" in a power projection operation against a "traditional" foe
 - "10-30-30" was the driver
- As a result, the focus of seabasing programs became the MPF(F)



The Current Discussion About Seabasing Conflates Several Important Ideas

- **Using the sea as a base for amphibious assault/forcible entry/operational/naval maneuver**
 - Injection of ready-to-fight forces
- **Using the sea to reinforcing early entry forces with follow-on ready-to-fight forces**
 - Conduct RSOI at sea
- **Conducting “In-stride” seabased sustainment of early entry forces from the sea**
 - Minimizing the footprint of vulnerable logistics in the early phases of an operation
 - Selective offload
- **Rapid throughput of follow-on reinforcements over the sea**
 - Minimize RSOI in port
- **Using the sea to by-pass existing ports**
 - MULBERRY 21 (JTF-Port Opening)
- **Establishing a high-capacity logistics sea bridge**
 - JLOTS
 - Ability to transfer/handle containers at sea and to forces ashore
- **More recently, especially since 2006 QDR, using the sea as a base for *naval shaping operations* for the long war**

Need to Deconstruct the Discussions and Focus on Seabasing Capabilities That Provide the Highest Payoff for the *Joint Force*

- **2006 QDR provides the perfect opportunity to conduct a Joint “zero baseline review” of the evolving Joint Seabasing Portfolio**
- **QDR calls for a new focus on US capabilities-based planning**
 - “...the essence of capabilities-based planning is to identify capabilities that adversaries could employ and capabilities that could be available to the United States, then evaluate their interaction, rather than over-optimize the joint force for a limited set of threat scenarios.”
 - Portfolio must address traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challengers
- **The QDR’s emphasis on building partner capacity, achieving greater global freedom of action, pursuing an indirect strategic approach; fashioning a joint force characterized by great strategic agility, responding to crises with more moderated efforts, and imposing costs on a potential adversary provides a compelling implicit endorsement for seabasing**
 - Assumptions that drove the seabasing debate inexorably toward the MPF(F) may no longer be valid

There is Absolutely No Need to Rush

- **US already possesses the greatest power projection capability in the world**
- **The current direction of seabasing will result in the ability to inject a single brigade from the sea within 10-17 days**
 - Given the TOR for the 2006 QDR—which seems to emphasize agility over speed—is this a good return on a \$15.5-16 billion investment?
 - Shouldn't we rethink the MPF-F's focus on the “seize the initiative phase” against traditional opponents?
- **The DoN plans to buy out the current MPF leases. Why not do so and take more time to conduct a “bottom up” reassessment of Joint Sea Basing requirements?**
- **In the process, how about rethinking the decision not to stand up a Joint Project Office?**
 - Initial focus of effort: a Joint experimental and technology development program
 - “Fleet problems”
 - It took over two decades, extensive war gaming and concept development, the building of seven operational prototypes, and yearly Fleet problems to figure out carrier aviation; is there any reason to believe why the developing of US seabasing capabilities won't take that long?

A Proposed Definition

Seabasing: In maritime operations and joint littoral warfare, leveraging command of the seas by using the world's oceans and littoral waters as a secure base of operations for global power-projection. Seabasing provides for the rapid transoceanic expeditionary maneuver of ready-to-fight combat units and the rapid movement of personnel, goods, and services, even into austere theaters, thereby providing an interdependent joint force with a high degree of global freedom of action and *initial* operational independence from forward land bases.

Develop a Framework for a Pointed Portfolio Review and Debate, Led by the Seabasing JPO

- **Category Zero:** *Access-insensitive shaping forces*
- **Category One:** *Access-insensitive forcible entry forces*, optimized for the opposed theater entry role, and consisting of forces capable of operating under threat of nuclear attack
 - Amphibious landing ships
- **Category Two:** *Access-insensitive assault reinforcement forces*, optimized to inject ready-to-fight combat units as part of the assault follow-on echelon
 - The Army's SDHSS concept competes with MPF(F)...which one is better?
 - The JHSV program contributes here...modern day LSM
- **Category Three:** *Access-sensitive rapid combat reinforcements*, designed to deliver rapidly the equipment and supplies associated with personnel deploying from the continental United States to a forward theater, in order to facilitate a rapid RSOI process
 - The Fast Sealift Fleet and the legacy MPF and CPF fleet fall here. The SDHSS might replace the FSSs...a twofer?
- **Category Four:** *Access-sensitive combat reinforcements*, designed to offload equipment and cargo ashore in support of a land-based RSOI process, through both developed and austere ports
 - The LMSR force fits here
- **Category Five:** *Access-sensitive sustaining forces*, designed to offload equipment and cargo ashore in support of extended joint campaigns, through both developed and austere ports
 - The RRF RO/RO and other cargo ships fit here
- **MULBERRY 21: mobile joint theater entry portals**
- **Joint Offshore Logistics Support Base**



Questions?

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