

**CSBA**



**Forward Based Forces**



**Forward-Deployed Forces**



**Global Attack Forces**



**Forcible Entry Forces**



**Global C3I Network**



**Strategic Mobility & Log Forces**



**Security Relationships & Legal Frameworks**

# A New Global Defense Posture for the Second Transoceanic Era

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## What This Brief is About

- **How to think about global military postures**
- **Understanding the evolving transformation of the US global military posture since the end of the Cold War**
  - US basing network
  - Forward-deployed forces
  - Global attack forces
  - **Strategic mobility and logistics forces**
  - **Forcible entry/rapid base construction forces**
  - Global C3I network
  - Security relationships and legal agreements

## Premise

**If national strategy defines America's *intent* in US foreign policy and its engagement in global affairs, then the US Global Defense (or Military) Posture defines US *capabilities* to project military power beyond its borders and across intercontinental ranges in support of US national security policy objectives.**

**While national strategy can change from administration to administration, making major adjustments to the US Global Defense Posture is much more difficult and time-consuming—and the results are far more enduring.**

**Indeed, since 1783, the United States has assumed only three distinctly different Global Defense Postures. It is now in the process of assuming a fourth—one uniquely tailored to this Second Transoceanic Phase of National Policy.**

**Whenever the nation contemplates a major adjustment to its global defense posture, the desired changes should thus be seriously and broadly debated, primarily because the posture will shape US strategic options for some time to come.**

**Therefore, Congress should be closely involved in the debate over, and formulation of, America's new Global Defense Posture.**

## How We Got Here

- The 2001 QDR promised a major “reorientation” of the US Military Posture
  - In essence, OSD wanted to rationalize, consolidate, and accelerate the changes to the US Global Military Posture that had been occurring since the end of the Cold War
  - These changes had lacked coherent strategic direction, as the US lacked a framework for thinking systematically about its defense posture
- CSBA conducted a study of past US global defense postures in order to develop such a framework, and to use it for assessing ongoing changes to the US Global Military Posture
- This effort started with a review of definitions. In this regard, although the 2001 QDR did not offer an explicit definition of the term “Global Military Posture,” it did say the reorientation effort would encompass:

***“new combinations of immediately employable forward stationed and deployed forces; expeditionary and forcible entry capabilities; globally available reconnaissance, strike, and command and control assets; information operations; special operations forces; and rapidly deployable, highly lethal and sustainable forces that may come from outside a theater of operations.”***

## The Initial Results of This Global Posture Review Were Published in *Strengthening the US Global Defense Posture*

- The lack of definitional clarity in the 2001 QDR was partly corrected in this 2004 report, which describes the *US Global Defense Posture* as:
  - “The size, location, types and capabilities of its forward military forces. It constitutes a fundamental element of our ability to project power and undertake military actions beyond our borders.”
  - This definition reflected OSD’s focus on changes to America’s overseas basing network, in preparation for the 2005 BRAC round
- However, this definition is clearly incomplete. As indicated in the 2001 QDR, the overall global stance the US military assumes to project power and to undertake military actions beyond its borders includes at least four additional components as important as “forward military forces.” These are:
  - Forces based in the United States (or in space) that can conduct attacks over intercontinental ranges
  - Forces that can move, reposition, and logistically support forces over transoceanic ranges
  - Forces capable of creating forward access where none exists, even in contested theaters
  - Global command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) forces

## **CSBA Thus Developed the Following Working Definition to Guide its Analytical Effort**

### **Global Defense Posture**

*The deliberate apportionment and global positioning of forward-based and forward-deployed forces...*

*...and the development of supporting global attack, global mobility and logistics, forcible entry, global command, control, communications and intelligence forces, and supporting security relationships and legal agreements,...*

*...in order to facilitate the rapid concentration of forces in time and space across transoceanic distances, support and sustain US military presence and operations in distant theater, and to establish a favorable global strategic balance.*

**CSBA uses the terms Global Defense Posture and Global Military Posture interchangeably**

## This Definition Makes Plain That One Can't Talk About Global Postures Without Considering How All Seven Key Components Work Together

- Forward-based forces, and the permanent and temporary bases that house and support them;
- Forward-deployed forces, and the permanent and temporary bases that house and support them;
- Global attack forces based in the continental United States or in space that can conduct prompt attacks over intercontinental ranges;
- Strategic mobility and logistics forces that link together and support all global attack, forward-based, forward-deployed, and surge forces;
- Forcible entry and rapid base construction forces consistent with the overall strategic access environment;
- A global command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) network capable of identifying emergent threats, and marshalling, concentrating, and controlling forces to meet them; and
- Supporting security relationships and legal frameworks to provide US forces access and/or transit rights.

## Forward-Based Forces

- ***Forward-based forces*** are often the most visible component of any military posture, as they are those forces stationed permanently at military bases located beyond a great power's contiguous borders or natural defensive perimeter
- Military bases are settlements, reservations, or installations that shelter military personnel and/or equipment, and which may also contain large concentrations of military supplies in order to support military logistics
- Seizing or negotiating rights to establish military land bases is a particularly tough job for a global basing power in the post-colonial era
  - During the latter part of the Cold War, the term “facilities” was frequently substituted for the word “bases” to soften the negative political overtones normally associated with the basing of foreign troops in a sovereign country
- However, bases can also be defined as a locality from which (military) operations are projected or supported, or an area or locality containing installations which provide logistic or other support. Conceptually, then, bases can also be erected:
  - On and under the sea
  - In the atmosphere
  - In space

# Toward a Basing Taxonomy

- **Interior or Exterior bases**
  - All bases located outside the “lower 48” are exterior bases
- **Sovereign or Foreign bases**
  - Sovereign bases are under absolute control of the state, and operations from them are “independent of uncertain neutrals and doubtful allies”
- **Exclusive, Shared, Participating bases**
  - Exclusive base: only US forces operate from the base
  - Shared base: US and host nation forces operate from same base, but generally conduct independent operations
  - Participating base: US forces are allowed access to a host nation’s facilities
- **Campaign or expeditionary bases**
  - Are not a permanent part of the global basing network; however, they are frequently—but not always—absorbed into the permanent network after a war or campaign

## Global Basing Networks


- **All bases are individual “nodes” in a global basing “network”—each base must be assessed not only in terms of its intrinsic characteristics, but also in terms of how it fits into the overall constellation of bases**
- **One can also describe bases with respect to their proximity to a primary threat:**
  - **Forward (frontier) bases**
  - **Intermediate bases**
  - **Peripheral (Rim) bases**
  - **Remote bases**
  - **Sanctuary bases . . . and also**
- **. . . in terms of their role in supporting US power projection operations**
  - **Main operating bases (MOBs)**
  - **Forward operating sites (FOSs)**
  - **Cooperative security locations (CSLs) . . . . Finally,**
- **. . . chokepoint bases are a special type of network bases that simultaneously improve friendly global movement and maneuver and hinder an adversary’s global movement and maneuver**
- **Great powers often have extensive basing networks**

# Roman Empire, c. 100 AD



■ = Forward based legions     
 ● = Roman naval bases

# British Imperial Basing Structure c. 1898



## Forward-Deployed Forces

- **Forward-deployed forces** operate away from their interior or exterior home bases to assure allies; coerce, dissuade, or deter potential rivals or adversaries; perform reconnaissance and intelligence gathering; train an ally's armed forces or participate in combined exercises; mount or participate in peace-keeping or peace-making operations; respond to minor crises; to conduct a punitive raid; or conduct other missions.
- In so doing, they protect a great power's enduring regional and global interests
  - They also simultaneously demonstrate the great power's latent power-projection capabilities to allies and potential adversaries alike
- N.B.
  - Postures that emphasize forward-based forces can be thought of as *garrison postures*
  - Postures that emphasize forward-deployed forces can be thought of as *expeditionary postures*
  - The forward-based and forward-deployed forces maintained on a more or less continuous basis represent a power's *steady-state or baseline military posture*
  - Postures that retain forces to deploy to conduct MCOs or major foreign expeditions represent a *temporary or surge posture*

## Mobile Bases

- **Mobile Bases bridge the “gap” between forward-based and forward-deployed forces**
- **Extended naval patrols comprising substantial maritime forces and conducted on a continuous or near-continuous basis represent a form of *distributed, mobile, (sea) bases***
- **The distributed, mobile sea bases can temporarily substitute for land bases, which can:**
  - **Establish a temporary overseas presence**
  - **Reinforce threatened portions of a great power’s extended defensive perimeter, or**
  - **Serve as the initial bridge to geographic areas not covered by an existing exterior basing network**
- **In the future, it may be possible to create mobile bases in the atmosphere and in space**
  - **Today’s satellite constellations could be viewed as a “mobile base;” more accurate to think of space as a remote base of operations**

## Global Attack Forces

- **Global attack forces** are “those forces capable of conducting *prompt* strikes over transoceanic or intercontinental ranges without substantial forward basing support”
- Although global attack forces can be forward deployed, and distributed naval forces can conduct prompt strikes along the global littorals, a defining characteristic of modern global attack forces is that they can conduct global attacks from sovereign interior or remote bases:
  - Land-based long-range bombers and missiles
  - Remote undersea missile bases
  - Small special operations and special-purpose ground units (e.g., parachutists) that can be assembled, transported, and delivered rapidly over intercontinental ranges by transport aircraft
  - In the future, global attack forces may also include forces that can attack over global ranges from remote space bases
- Global attack forces afford a great power enormous freedom of action, enabling strikes against any target on the planet without relying on overseas bases (to include the operational restrictions that often come with them)

# Strategic Mobility and Logistics Support Forces

- **Strategic mobility is a function of the range or geographical area over which a military force can project and sustain itself, and the time required to do so**
- **The faster a force can project power over a given range, and the greater the area over which a military force is able to conduct sustained military operations, the greater its degree of strategic mobility**
- **Strategic mobility forces and logistics forces . . .**
  - **Increase the range over which a great power can project power;**
  - **Decrease the time required to concentrate forces over transoceanic ranges; and**
  - **increase the duration over which these forces can be sustained in distant theaters.**
- **These forces include:**
  - **Strategic sealift (both surge sealift and sustainment sealift)**
  - **Strategic airlift**
  - **Forward prepositioning of equipment and supplies (land and maritime)**
  - **Global mobility support forces such as naval combat logistics forces and aerial tanker forces**
  - **Mobile logistics forces**

## Forcible Entry and Rapid Base Construction Forces

- Should a crisis erupt in a theater with few forward bases, a campaign can be prosecuted from long-range using global attack forces, or using forward-based or forward-deployed forces operating from bases located in adjacent theaters of operations
- For anything other than a quick raid or short punitive campaign, however, this is not likely to be a viable option
- Any major new expeditionary operation thus often results in a unique campaign basing structure which can be seen as a temporary expansion and extension of the steady-state global basing network
- In cases where access is contested, *forcible entry forces*—intact combat units capable of penetrating hostile territory and establishing a “lodgment” on enemy-held or controlled territory—are required. These forces include:
  - Amphibious landing forces
  - Airborne forces
  - Air-landed/air assault forces
- Because they are often used to establish a lodgment in a theater with no forward bases, forcible entry forces are often accompanied by *rapid base construction forces*—construction units skilled at the rapid assembly of expeditionary bases

## Global C3I Networks

- **C3I forces, including communications, ISR, and indications and warning (I&W) assets, have long been a key part of the US military posture**
  - **Global C3I networks allow the global surge, synchronization, and control of widely dispersed forces**
- **The first discernable C3I “networks” were composed of tightly linked frontier (forward) bases linked to an empire’s center by improved communications and strategic mobility capabilities**
- **With advent of undersea telegraph in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, the first true global C3I networks were formed**
  - **Undersea telegraph communications offered major improvements in significant I&W and response time**
- **The undersea telegraph was later supplanted by global radio telegraph and telephony, which in turn spurred the development of global intelligence collection networks**
- **Today, the US global C3I network includes land, air, sea, undersea, and space components, which places its own unique great demands on the US global basing network**

# Security Relationships and Legal Agreements

- **Early empires and colonial powers forged security relationships by conquering, colonizing, or annexing territory and then dictating terms to a subjugated population**
- **In the post-colonial era, all habitable territory is now claimed by a sovereign state**
- **Thus while the United States, as the world's dominant contemporary power, has been compared to some of the great empires in history, this comparison fails when applied to its global military posture since . . .**
  - **The United States must enter into security relationships and legal agreements (e.g., alliances; bi-lateral treaties; SOFAs; transit right agreements) to base its forces on foreign territory**
  - **Consequently, the US “Leasehold Empire” has traditionally enjoyed far less unfettered operational use of forces operating from foreign exterior bases**
  - **This creates a level of conditionality or uncertainty with the US global posture unknown to the imperial powers of an earlier day**

## Missing the Forest for the Trees

- **It is important to remember that the ultimate aim of the US global military posture is create advantage in strategic reaction time and in the positioning, concentration, and sustainment of its forces, thereby contributing to a favorable military balance in both peace and war**
- **It is impossible to change any of the seven components that comprise the global defense posture without affecting the other six—it is the *overall combination* of these components that defines the posture**
- **However, as mentioned earlier, once a global posture is established it typically lasts anywhere from four to ten decades**
  - **While postures do change, they are much more stable than national strategies**
  - **The stability of these postures can help to identify broad national security policy phases**

## Previous US Global Defense Postures

- **1783-1889—The Continental Phase of National Security Policy saw the adoption of a Naval Expeditionary Era/Posture (light global naval footprint)**
  - No permanent overseas bases; instead, fleet stations in areas of US interest
  - The posture relied on forward-deployed naval forces
- **1890-1946—The Oceanic Phase of National Security Policy saw a new Service Expeditionary Era/Posture (heavy regional Army and maritime footprint)**
  - This phase saw the first true US exterior basing network, primarily on sovereign-controlled territory in the Pacific and Caribbean Basin
  - US naval forces based in China were a special case
- **1947-1988—The Transoceanic Phase of National Security Policy (aka, the Cold War) spawned a radically different Garrison Era/Posture (heavy global joint footprint)**
  - Expansive global basing network on allied territory augmented by continual naval forward deployments of “combat credible forces”
  - First true global attack forces, focused on nuclear warfighting

## Toward a New Global Defense Posture

- Given continued heavy US involvement overseas, the post-Cold War period can be aptly described as the Second Transoceanic Phase of National Security Policy
- Since 1990, the US has been slowly but surely adapting its global defense posture to the new national security era; since the end of the (First) Transoceanic Phase (Cold War):
  - US forward-based forces has been steadily declining
  - The emphasis on forward-deployed forces has been steadily rising
- Moreover . . .
  - Global attack forces have been transitioning from a focus on nuclear to conventional attack
  - The US global C3I network has been transitioning from a mainframe backbone to a web-based applications backbone, and gradually extended down from strategic to operational and tactical commanders
    - C4I for the warfighter! Information both pulled and pushed; collaborative planning/chat rooms increasingly routine
  - Alliances and bi-lateral defense treaties remain important, although bi-lateral access agreements have gained in relative importance

## **This New Posture is Best Described as the *Joint Expeditionary Era***

- **Compared to the Garrison Era, the Joint Expeditionary Era posture is giving way to:**
  - **Far fewer forward-based forces on foreign soil in Europe and the Pacific**
  - **Major force concentrations on sovereign external exclusive bases in the Pacific (Alaska, Hawaii, and Guam)**
- **At the same time, residual and new US external foreign bases are being converted into a new type of global expeditionary “cooling station” network designed to support the rapid global concentration of US expeditionary forces across transoceanic ranges**
  - **These include both “warm” and “cold” forward operating sites and cooperative security locations with extremely small footprints**
  - **Bases in Europe are now used more as “strategic trampolines” to support the rapid deployment of US forces moving both east and south**
- **In conjunction with this shift in the US external basing network, all of the Services are establishing rotation bases to support routine and persistent joint forward deployments**
  - **This Explains why all Services are now emphasizing “expeditionary capabilities,” “deployability” and “joint interoperability**
- **The return to an expeditionary posture should come as no surprise; since 1783, the only time the US has *not* adopted an expeditionary posture was during the (First) Transoceanic Phase/Cold War**

## **A Key Goal When Establishing Any Expeditionary Posture is to Enhance Global Freedom of Action & Strategic Response Times**

- **This explains DoD interest in expanding conventional global attack capabilities:**
  - **New Air Force Long-range Strike Systems and Navy long-range, carrier-based UCAVs**
  - **Conventional Trident Missile?**
  - **SSGN as part of a global strike system?**
  - **New space-based strike systems?**
- **Also explains the evolutionary goals of the ever-expanding US global C3I network**
  - **Heavily dependent on space-based intelligence collection, navigation, and communications**
  - **Heavily dependent on undersea fiber optic networks (GIG-Bandwidth Expansion program)**
  - **Increasing emphasis on theater UAVs**
- **And also explains the dramatic increase in SOFAs and “gas and go” agreements**

## **Obviously, Strategic Mobility Forces and Forcible Entry Forces/Rapid Base Construction Units Are Especially Critical Components of an Expeditionary Posture**

- **The Oceanic Phase/Service Expeditionary Era saw the United States develop an expansive Global Expeditionary Maneuver and Movement System (GEMMS), designed to support operational maneuver from strategic distances, operational maneuver from the sea, and the global repositioning of forces, equipment, and supplies**
- **The GEMMS included:**
  - **Large amphibious landing fleet and airborne forces for operational maneuver from strategic distances and forcible entry**
  - **A 5,000-ship sealift fleet plus 3,800 aerial transports for global movement of forces, equipment, and supplies**
  - **Naval combat and logistics forces that enabled the formation of vast sea bases**
  - **Rapid base construction forces and expeditionary base sets**
  - **Mobile harbors**

## **Obviously, Strategic Mobility Forces and Forcible Entry Forces/Rapid Base Construction Units Are Especially Critical Components of an Expeditionary Posture (II)**

- **Transoceanic Phase/Garrison Era saw the GEMMS transformed into a Strategic Military Transportation System (SMTS) focused on the rapid reinforcement of strong forward garrisons**
  - **The Garrison Era posture diminished the need for operational maneuver from strategic distances; the planning focus of the SMTS was on reducing the timeline necessary for reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI) of garrison reinforcements**
  - **Jet transport became the primary means to move personnel; sealift the primary means to move heavy cargo (CRAF and RRF)**
  - **Prepositioned equipment becomes increasingly important in reducing reinforcement timelines (e.g., POMCUS and NALMEB)**
  - **With assured forward access, there was no strong demand signal for forcible entry forces, and the amphibious landing fleet and airborne forces gradually diminished**
  - **Late in the era, US TRANCOM was formed to oversee SMTS**
- **The late period requirement to move forces rapidly to austere theaters with few forward-based forces (e.g., Southwest Asia) led to the development of afloat prepositioned forces and JLOTS—both assumed assured access, however**

## The Evolution of Strategic Mobility Forces Since the End of the Cold War Has Been Heavily Influenced by the First Gulf War

- **During Operation Desert Storm, the US enjoyed uncontested theater access, much like the conditions of the (First) Transoceanic Phase/Garrison Era; as a result, improvements were made on this assumption**
  - **For example, new Ready Reserve Fleet ships (i.e., the LMSRs) and maritime prepositioned forces all were optimized for offloading equipment at piers**
  - **Meanwhile, the amphibious landing fleet was capped at 2.5 MEB lift—a lower requirement than at any time in the Garrison Era**
- **The transition to an expeditionary posture also spurred a reshuffling of land-based pre-positioned sets and prompted the Army to adopt maritime prepositioned forces**
- **The C-141 fleet was replaced by the more capable (and expensive) C-17 strategic transport**
- **Operation Desert Storm also resulted in a strengthening of TRANSCOM's authority and power**
- **However, because the SMTS is still optimized for conditions of assured access, its ability to move forces into areas with austere access remains poor**
  - **Task Force Hawk**

## **A Key Question for DoD and Congress: In the Joint Expeditionary Era, Do We Want More SMTS- or GEMMS-like Strategic Mobility Forces?**

- **A GEMMS assumes uncertain access; a SMTS assumes assured access**
  - **Right now, US strategic mobility and logistics forces are much more like the SMTS; is this smart in a new Expeditionary Era characterized by uncertain access?**
- **In this regard, a 1996 DSB Task Force on Strategic Mobility noted that during Operation Desert Storm, most sea-lifted forces and supplies came through just two ports and most air-lifted forces and supplies came through just 5 airfields**
  - **The Task Force noted that had Iraq had attacked these ports, the prosecution of the war would have been much more difficult; it also worried about the “seam” between TRANSCOM and the Combatant Commanders (i.e., the amount of time necessary for RSOI)**
  - **The final report recommended that logistics infrastructure be reduced to greatest degree possible**
  - **In essence, the DSB was arguing for a return to more GEMMS-like system**
- **This echoed Army and Marine thinking; during the 1990s, the Army began to talk once again about operational maneuver from strategic distances, and Marines about operational maneuver from the sea**
- **The bottom line: the US’s ability to maneuver intact combat forces over transoceanic distances is poor**
  - **This is likely one of the biggest structural weaknesses of the evolving US global defense posture**

# With This Exception, However, the Evolving US Global Defense Posture Appears to be Basically Sound

- **A return to an expeditionary global defense posture is consistent with past US postures, as well as a national security policy phase characterized by diffuse threats**
    - **Without a compelling global ideological threat, it is practically impossible to maintain a global basing network with large numbers of foreign external bases; a return to an expeditionary posture is therefore to be expected**
    - **However, continuing US global involvement demands both a posture and a force structure designed to support large steady-state forward presence and surge operations**
  - **Of course, the most important consideration is: will the posture help to assure US allies; dissuade potential competitors; deter potential adversaries; and, if necessary, to defeat threats to US security**
  - **Rephrased: can a single global military posture be optimized to counter four divergent strategic challenges**
    - **The Long War**
    - **A proliferated world**
    - **A rising China**
- Embedded in all: Homeland Defense**

# The US Global Defense Posture

## The Long War

- **The threat from Radical Islamism is global, yet the ranks of its forces are thin—thus, a highly distributed but highly networked enemy argues for a distributed network of bases on a global level**
  - **Because Radical Islamists do not yet possess large forces, the US military footprint in threatened areas can be kept relatively small—implying a global network of “micro bases,” to include mobile sea bases**
  - **The current de-emphasis on main operating bases and the pursuit of large numbers of smaller, less intrusive, “warm” and “cold” FOLs and CSLs is consistent with a global counterinsurgency strategy**
  - **As “actionable” intelligence may be highly perishable, US forces must be positioned at these locations to act quickly**
- **Regarding mobility and logistics requirements, in terms of overall demand they should remain relatively small as long as the Radical Islamist movement does not metastasize**
  - **However, keeping large numbers of distributed, remote micro bases supplied poses special challenges (explains the development of the JCA)**
- **Overall, the emerging posture for the Long War appears to be on the right track, with one caveat**
  - **While the 2006 QDR talks of defending the homeland in depth against terrorist attack, there is no elaboration on what this should mean for the global defense posture**

# The US Global Defense Posture

## Nuclear-Armed States

- **The steady state posture for a proliferated world will place a premium on sovereign external bases, multiple distributed CSLs and sea-based forces and CONUS-based global attack forces**
- **This potential strategic challenge is made more acute if the US military is expected to conduct preemptive action (to include regime change) against a regional nuclear power**
  - **Armed with even a small number of missiles with nuclear warheads, countries like North Korea and Iran could make it prohibitively costly or risky for the United States to maintain MOBs within the range of these countries' missile forces**
  - **Indeed, if confronting a regional nuclear power, the US will likely find it difficult to gain access of any kind in countries within range of an adversary's strike systems**
  - **And even if successful in gaining access, the price will likely be a substantial allocation of missile defense and consequence management forces**
- **In a proliferated world, posture and forces would need to be optimized for range; persistence; and stealth**
  - **May require an ability to insert and sustain small, distributed forces while** 31  
**under an enduring nuclear threat**

# The US Global Defense Posture

## A Rising China

- **At a minimum, US forces must be prepared to counter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. They must also hedge against the rise of a hostile China seeking to establish hegemony over Asia**
- **As China's Assassin's Mace capabilities mature, the US Navy and Air Force may find themselves pushed ever further from the Chinese littoral, encouraging a US shift toward greater reliance on range, persistence, and stealth**
  - **Global attack forces; long-range ISR/strike from carriers; submarines**
- **US forward bases within easy range of Chinese strike forces will likely need to operate out of hardened MOBs, on mobile sea bases, or from rapidly constructed CSLs, until the enemy's extended-range ISR capabilities are degraded**
- **To diminish the need for forward bases, to hold key assets at risk throughout China's strategic depth, and to neutralize the defenses protecting them would require expanded global attack forces and new persistent long-range targeting (ISR) components in the global C3I network far in excess of what the US military currently possesses**
  - **If Beijing positions important capabilities deep in its interior, US FOS and CSL bases in Central Asia may become attractive to minimize the effects of China's strategic depth**
- **The shift move toward dispersed Pacific basing structure will place increased demands on US strategic mobility and logistics forces; yet there is no indication this is being taken into account**
- **Conceptually, the posture/force structure necessary to confront regional nuclear powers and a rising China are generally the same**
  - **Effective ballistic missile defense will be key**

## Summary

- **The United States' global military posture is indispensable to securing its national interests**
- **The United States' global defense posture is appropriately becoming more expeditionary in character and global in its orientation**
- **This posture transformation is made even more critical with to hedge against the collapse of the NPT and the steady development of A2/AD capabilities in the Pacific, which will make the problems of operating from large, fixed forward bases far less attractive**
- **The diminishing number of available overseas main operating bases, the demands associated with operations in the Western Pacific, the threat of nuclear-armed regional states and the development of A2/AD networks requires increased emphasis on global attack forces as well as highly distributed, highly networked forces designed for range, persistence, and stealth**
- **The United States must be prepared to seize and defend access when needed, to rapidly build hardened, defended bases where none exist, to operate from mobile defended sea bases**
- **The Defense Department's efforts to date to realign the US global military posture represents an encouraging beginning—with more to be done**
- **Congress needs to be involved in the debate**



**Questions?**