

Defense Roles, Missions, and Requirements

TESTIMONY

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Introduction

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before you today, and to share my views on the subject of *Defense Roles, Missions, and Requirements*. My testimony focuses on how we might best restructure the US military in light of circumstances in which we now find ourselves that are very different from those which existed less than a decade ago.

The last major change in military roles and missions occurred following the United States' victory in World War II, when it carried out a major restructuring of its defense establishment. This effort was highlighted by the National Security Act of 1947, and culminated with the agreement of the military services at Key West, Florida, in March 1948. These efforts led to the creation of the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, an entirely new service—the US Air Force—and the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as the delineation of Service roles and missions.

The reorganization was stimulated by several factors. Among them were the geopolitical revolution and the new role the United States saw itself playing in the post-war world. Within a relatively short period the international system had been transformed from a multipolar world in which the United States viewed itself as an aloof member of a club comprising perhaps half a dozen great powers, to a bipolar system of two opposing superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union.

By mid-1948 the United States was moving rapidly away from its traditional peacetime semi-isolationist security posture: the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan had been announced; the Soviet blockade of Berlin had produced the American-led Berlin Airlift; and Washington was less than a year away from entering into its first peacetime alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The major overhaul of the US defense structure reflected the political and military leadership's ability to react quickly and, in hindsight, fairly effectively to the demands of these momentous events.

But these changes, to include those in the Key West agreement, were also driven by the country's experience in World War II. The war saw the American military involved in missions and operations that were significantly and, in some cases, radically different from those in previous conflicts. The Army exploited advances in mechanization, aviation and communication to field forces capable of waging the new *blitzkrieg* form of warfare introduced by the Germans. The Army Air Corps transformed itself from a force that had been seen by some as little more than a novelty in its early days to a major fighting force with the advent of strategic aerial bombardment and aerial interdiction campaigns that provided “flying artillery” support to ground forces. In the span of a few years, the Navy transformed itself from a fleet dominated by the battleship and the battle line to one that revolved around fast carrier task forces striking at long distances, and employing the submarine as a strategic weapon. Finally, the Marine Corps altered its organization from conducting the “small wars” missions that had occupied much of its attention during the 1920s and 1930s into a modern amphibious assault force capable of seizing stoutly defended positions.

The rapid improvements in technology related to mechanization, aviation, radio and radar also saw the Services acting together more frequently and more elaborately than ever before in a series of “joint” operations, as the traditional geographic division of Service responsibilities became increasingly blurred, and as warfare moved into the third dimension—the air—and into the electromagnetic spectrum. For instance, carrier-based aircraft could influence operations on land to a far greater extent than the biggest battleship guns, and Army Air Corps land-based bombers could shape combat hundreds of miles out at sea, far beyond the range of the Army’s coastal artillery batteries. The Services were beginning to “crowd” one another’s traditional battlespace far more extensively than had ever been the case before.

At Key West, two issues dominated the discussions. One concerned air power, and centered on whether the Air Force and Navy should share the strategic nuclear bombing mission. The second issue involved the ground forces, where the talks focused on the size and capabilities of the Marine Corps. The National Security Act and the agreement reached among the Services at Key West did little to resolve the dilemma that new technologies posed for Service roles and missions. To be sure, the Air Force was assigned the responsibility of controlling the air; the Army, the land; and the Navy, the seas. But, in addition to these primary functions, the Services also had “collateral functions” that could—and did—lead to overlapping capabilities, and redundancy. For example, the Navy’s conduct of a naval campaign could also involve its carrier-based aircraft bombing targets on land.

This combination of technological advances, the Services’ fears that their sister Services did not understand their requirements (or would not act upon them even if they did), and the vague language that characterized much of the Key West agreement all but insured the Services would poach on one another’s traditional “turf.” For example, the Army and the Marine Corps doubted that sufficient resources would be devoted by the Air Force and Navy, respectively, to provide them with close-air support. Consequently, the Army eventually developed its own “air force” in the form of attack helicopters, while the Marine Corps preserved its independent air wings. Over time, actions like these ran the risk of creating a duplication of effort and excess capacity. Yet many of these issues remained unresolved through the Cold War. Despite some efforts to resolve them after the Cold War, such as those of the Commission on Roles and Missions, they persist to this day.

In some cases, mission overlap, redundancy and excess capacity have been exacerbated by ever-advancing technology that has enhanced the Services’ abilities to operate in one another’s battlespace more extensively than they could thirty years ago, let alone the nearly sixty years that have passed since the Key West agreement.

Now the US military finds itself entering a new era, again characterized by major changes in the geopolitical environment, rapid advances in military technology, new security challenges, and the prospect that the rapid rise in resources for defense that has characterized much of this decade is coming to an end. In short, forces similar to those that produced a major restructuring of the US national security architecture and military roles and missions are at work today; indeed, they have been for some time. Yet we have not responded to them as quickly as that earlier generation of American leaders, who six decades ago laid the foundation of the military that would see us safely through the Cold War.

The results have been predictable. When enemies have challenged us in forms of conflict similar to those of the Cold War era, such as Saddam Hussein in the First and Second Gulf Wars, the US military has performed at a high level of effectiveness. Here our excess capacity was clearly in evidence. The Second Gulf War required less than half the strike aircraft employed in the First Gulf War, and only one of the Army's six heavy divisions was employed in the "March to Baghdad." However, when confronted with new forms of warfare, such as modern insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq, the results have been far less satisfactory. Making matters worse, America's current and potential rivals are clearly looking to alter the form of the military challenges they can pose to our security.

How to Think About Restructuring the US Military

How might the Congress exercise its role "to raise and support Armies" and to "provide and maintain a Navy" to enable the Defense Department to restructure the military services' roles and missions during this period of rapid geopolitical and military-technical change? The following outlines some steps that may prove useful in addressing this question.

What Kinds of Challenges do We Face?

The first matter that must be addressed is "What kind of military do we need?" We should stop maintaining large forces for conducting missions that are of little relevance to coping with the threats that confront the nation and recognize and support new mission requirements in light of changing threats.

Today, the United States confronts three major and enduring challenges to its security. One involves the war with radical Islamists. The second concerns the increasingly proliferated world of nuclear-armed states characterized by the "nuclearization" of Asia and the advent of a "Second Nuclear Regime" that has succeeded the superpower-dominated Cold War regime. Finally, there is the rise of China as a great regional power, which appears bent on developing a novel set of military capabilities sometimes referred to as the "Assassin's Mace," whose purpose may be to erode US influence in the Far East, undermine the confidence of America's allies in its ability to aid in their defense, and challenge the United States' *de facto* stewardship of the global commons.

The challenges posed by a rising China, the ongoing war against radical Islamists, and the recent surge in nuclear proliferation are unlikely to be resolved over the next few years, or perhaps even the next few decades. Moreover, they represent changes in the character of the military challenges to US security. Consequently, the US military must adjust its thinking regarding what constitutes its core missions, with some needing to be retained, others divested of excessive capacity, and new ones created. To inform our thinking on this central issue, it is useful to examine how the competition has changed, and how it might continue to change.

Changes in Form and Scale

How has the military competition changed since the end of the Cold War—or since the "strategic pause" of the 1990s? The three principal challenges described above are different in *form* from

what the US military focused its principal weight of effort during the Cold War and for much of the 1990s. These challenges are also far greater in *scale* than those confronted during the 1990s, and may, over time, exceed that posed by Soviet Russia during the Cold War. Consequently, US strategists and force planners are confronted with considering not only a different set of problems, but new military missions as well.

For example, radical Islamism can be based described as a theologically based transnational insurgent movement. But its leaders also seek to exploit advanced technology to mobilize the masses in support of their aims, and to intimidate and coerce those opposing them. Toward this end, they have declared their intention to gain access to weapons of mass destruction and disruption. To date, radical Islamists have also demonstrated a far superior capability than has the United States to exploit information (i.e., propaganda) to win others to their side, and to undermine the will of those who oppose them. This is critical, as the center of gravity in insurgency warfare is typically the indigenous population. In this kind of warfare, the ability to convince the population that you represent their aspirations and—more importantly—that you are the side that will emerge victorious, is critical to success.

In some respects China poses a “traditional” state-on-state challenge for the United States. Yet an ongoing information-technology-driven military revolution offers China a range of options for pursuing military competitions that are quite different from the traditional, symmetrical tank-on-tank, fighter-versus-fighter, and ship-against-ship kind of warfare that dominated US military planning during much of the 20th century.

A key element of Chinese military transformation appears to be oriented toward generating anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities for the purpose of extending the country’s effective defense perimeter substantially beyond China’s littoral area.¹ Of course, in the process of increasing its defensive depth by making it increasingly risky for US forces to operate along the eastern periphery of China, Beijing will also be increasing the insecurity of other states in the region, like Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, who rely on the US security umbrella to protect them from Chinese coercion or aggression. China’s military has paid particular attention to developing what some military analysts call “Assassin’s Mace” forces to field a multidimensional, anti-access/area-denial capability. In 2001 the Defense Intelligence Agency determined that:

In terms of its conventional forces, Beijing is pursuing the capability to defend its eastern seaboard—the economic heartland—from attack by a “high-technology” opponent employing long-range precision strike capabilities. This means China is expanding its air, anti-air, anti-submarine, anti-surface ship, and battle management capabilities, to

¹ Generally speaking, anti-access forces are designed to deny US forces access to forward bases. Area-denial capabilities are generally directed on denying US forces freedom of action in the littoral. In a larger sense, anti-access strategies seek to prevent US forces from entering a theater of operations, while area-denial strategies look to deny US forces freedom of action in a particular area within the theater of operations.

enable the PLA [People's Liberation Army] to project "defensive" power out to the first island chain.²

The effort has only increased since then. In a recent report on the state of China's military, the Defense Department noted

[E]vidence suggests the PLA is engaged in a sustained effort to interdict, at long ranges, aircraft carrier and expeditionary strike groups that might deploy to the western Pacific China is developing forces and concepts focused on denying an adversary the ability to deploy to locations from which it can conduct military operations. Increasingly, China's area denial forces overlap, providing multiple layers of offensive capability.³

Finally, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by hostile rogue regimes also threatens to disrupt the favorable military balance now enjoyed by the United States in key areas of the world. All things being equal, the United States' willingness to project power would likely be much more constrained against nuclear-armed adversaries compared to against those who do not possess them. At a minimum, Washington may be compelled to alter its war aims when confronted by rogue states armed with nuclear weapons (e.g., abandoning the option of regime change).

This seems to be a principal motive for North Korea and Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. As this occurs, it will reduce substantially, and perhaps precipitously, US freedom of action in two regions of vital interest. It may also make it far more difficult to deal effectively with ambiguous forms of aggression, such as Iran's support for the insurgency in Iraq, or potential North Korean trafficking in fissile materials.

It is fair to ask whether the United States would strike a nuclear-armed state under *any* circumstances. Here it must be remembered that during the Cold War the US military had plans to attack its nuclear superpower rival, the Soviet Union, with nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. It is possible to envision plausible scenarios, to include those involving regime change, when a nuclear-armed adversary would be subjected to the full range of US military capabilities. For instance, were North Korea to employ nuclear weapons, or execute attacks that resulted in mass casualties, the United States might consider regime change operations to be necessary.

In the case of Iran and North Korea, there also exists the possibility that the regimes in power will, at some point, either collapse or be overthrown. Should this occur, a period of chaos may ensue. If so, the security of these countries' nuclear arsenals could be at risk of falling into the hands of terrorist or criminal organizations.

² Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson (Director, Defense Intelligence Agency), "Global Threats and Challenges Through 2015," *Statement before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, February 7, 2001, p. 12.

³ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of China*, (2006), pp. 24-25.

Moreover, as the number of state (and perhaps non-state) entities armed with nuclear weapons grows, the potential for conducting ambiguous acts of aggression with these weapons stands to increase, perhaps dramatically.⁴ This may be especially true for lesser nuclear powers in a world in which the United States aggressively deploys missile and air defenses. Under these circumstances, a lesser power may find it more attractive to deliver its nuclear strike through unconventional (covert) means. There are two reasons for this: first, the aggressor may calculate that it has a greater chance of penetrating lax US border controls and internal defenses than American missile and air defenses; second, it may offer the prospect of inflicting catastrophic damage on the United States without being identified as the source of the attack. To be sure, as the number of nuclear-armed states increases, it will likely become increasingly plausible to contemplate ambiguous aggression through traditional delivery means. For example, it may prove difficult to trace the origins of a cruise missile-borne attack that emanates from transport craft off the US coast. Or consider another example: a decade from now, will it be possible to attribute a missile salvo launched from a site near the Iran-Pakistan border? From a launch site near the Yalu River separating China from North Korea?

In a similar vein, if they prove ubiquitous, effective, and difficult to trace and tag, electronic forms of strategic strike, such as those that recently were inflicted on Estonia, could also usher in an era of ambiguous warfare.⁵ The elements of deterrence that could sustain a limited warfare regime could hardly be expected to hold if an aggressor could not be quickly or reliably identified. An assessment of the emerging strategic-strike regime should, therefore, accord high priority to determining whether the uncertainty surrounding this form of strategic warfare can be reduced to the level where strategic electronic strikes cannot be executed without being promptly detected and, better still, defeated. This obviously implies a much greater role for intelligence that extends well beyond attack warning and heavy reliance on national technical means.

These shifts in the form of the threat to the national security stem in part from the United States' dominance in most traditional forms of military capability. This has exerted a strong dissuasive effect on its enemies and potential rivals, who are unable to challenge US military power directly. This has yielded clear benefits. However, it also finds rivals seeking other means for advancing their interests, and in so doing creating an age of asymmetric warfare. This stands in marked contrast to the 20th century, which found the US military's most important competitions occurring against enemies possessing forces roughly symmetrical to its own.

⁴ Worries over ambiguous attacks in a more proliferated world emerged early in the First Nuclear/Strategic-Strike Regime. Nevil Shute's book, *On the Beach*, written in the late 1950s, chronicles the risks of an ambiguous nuclear attack in a proliferated world. In Shute's book, a major nuclear exchange is stimulated by an atomic attack on the United Kingdom by Egypt. As the Egyptian aircraft used were manufactured in the USSR, the attack was mistaken as one led by the Soviets, leading to a nuclear retaliation on the USSR by the United States and Great Britain, which precipitated a major nuclear exchange.

⁵ In addition to tracing the electronic strategic strike to its source, it will likely be necessary to tag the source as representing the conscious act of a government or organization. For example, the United States was able to trace the source of electronic attacks during Operation Allied Force to locations in Russia and China. The US government apparently was not able, however, to discern whether the governments of those states sanctioned these attacks.

Geographic Shift

There has been a fundamental shift in the principal theater of geopolitical competition, from Europe to Asia. In the 20th century the US strategic posture was dominated by threats emanating from Europe. The First World War saw the first large-scale deployment of US forces outside of the Western Hemisphere, to Europe. World War II was, indeed, global, but primacy was again accorded to the European Theater of Operations. The 40-year Cold War with the Soviet Union riveted US defense planners' attention on Europe and the central front in Germany.

If the 20th century was the “Century of Europe,” the 21st century stands to be the “Century of Asia” for American strategic planners. Radical Islamism is concentrated in the Middle East and, to a lesser extent, in South and Southeast Asia. China's power is centered in the Far East. The recent proliferation of nuclear arsenals in India, Pakistan, North Korea and, as seems likely by decade's end, Iran, threatens to present the world with an unbroken line of nuclear-armed states stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Japan—an atomic arc of instability.

As the principal threats to US security have shifted to the east, so too has the center of economic power outside the United States. Projections are that China and India (in addition to Japan) will outstrip any single European state in terms of their GDP by 2025. The United States' economic interests, both in terms of trade and resources (i.e., oil) are almost certain to shift more in Asia's direction in the coming years relative to Europe.

The shift to Asia also finds the United States confronting a cultural, as well as a geographic, shift in the competition. If American defense planners were preoccupied with Germany and Russia—both products of western civilization—during the 20th century, they now confront rivals who come from a range of other civilizations—Arab, Persian, Chinese/Confucian, and others. The leaders of these current or prospective rivals likely see the world in very different ways than do western leaders. They may compete (indeed, they *are* competing) with us in ways that are quite different from America's 20th century western enemies. This must be taken into account in determining what military roles and missions the United States should seek to develop or maintain.

What Kind of Military Do We Need?

Contingency Planning

Once we have developed a clear understanding of how both the United States' existing and potential rivals intend to compete, it becomes possible to craft a set of scenarios or contingencies that can inform the kinds of missions the US military must be prepared to execute in defense of the nation's interests. These scenarios should reflect the new circumstances in which the military must operate. Properly crafted and evaluated, these scenarios can anticipate what roles and missions will be most important in meeting the new challenges to our national security.

The value of this approach can be seen in the “Color Plans” developed by the US military in the early 20th century, a time of great geopolitical and military-technical change. The original “Color” plans were developed between 1904 and 1938. The color plans established were:

Germany: Black; Great Britain: Red; Japan: Orange; Mexico: Green; China: Yellow; the United States: Blue; and US internal rebellion: White. Thus, for example, the US Navy prepared for contingencies involving a range of plausible adversaries and their navies. This was necessary since, during much of this period, it was unclear what kind of maritime threat the Navy might confront. These plans helped the US military to hedge against an uncertain future by focusing its efforts on preparing to confront a range of plausible contingencies, as opposed to the most familiar or those believed to be the most likely.

In the late 1930s, as the threat to US security became clear, the Color Plans were succeeded by the Rainbow Plans, which were designed to deal with potential conflicts that would arise in multiple theaters, involving several enemies. Another key element of the move to Rainbow Plans involved the need to plan for coalition warfare.

What set of Color Plans should be selected today to inform the Pentagon's thinking about Service roles and missions? The choice should be made carefully, not only with respect to the particular geopolitical situation (e.g., whether or not surprise is achieved; the disposition of key allies and other important state/nonstate entities, etc), but also in terms of what types of military capabilities might be available to the enemy, and in what quantities.

Given the time and effort required to develop a representative set of planning contingencies, the best that can be attempted here is a first cut at a set of Color Plans. While the range of plausible futures in which US security interests might be challenged is infinite, the number of Color Plans must be restricted to a handful, as there is a limit to how many plans can be reasonably evaluated, planned against, exercised against, and so on. The goal here is to identify a *representative* set of contingencies—one that encompasses the principal challenges the United States may plausibly encounter over the planning horizon (which the QDR sets at 20 years). If this can be accomplished, then even if the Color Plans do not depict the precise contingencies that will be encountered (an unlikely event), they will still be “close enough” to what actually occurs so that the planning process yields a US military that has given priority to preparing for the right set of missions and whose Service roles are well-defined and understood.

Some point-of-departure contingencies worth consideration are:

- Major Power Anti-Access/Area-Denial (Plan Yellow)
- Minor Nuclear State Aggression (Plan Red)
- Nuclear State Failure (Plan Green)
- Modern Insurgency (Plan Purple)
- Global Commerce Raiding (Plan Black)
- Global Commons (Space, Cyberspace, Sea, Undersea) Attack (Plan Orange)
- Nuclear/Biological Homeland Attack (Plan Blue)

Once a set of plausible scenarios is developed, they should be tested through simulations, war games and field exercises with an eye toward identifying how they are changing the character of the threats to US security, and how the US military might need to adapt to deal with them effectively. This involves identifying missions (and associated core capabilities) that the military should maintain, as well as those that might be divested or accorded reduced emphasis, and new ones that need to be developed.

Among the primary missions these contingencies seem likely to spawn are the following:

- Projecting and sustaining decisive power (i.e., power sufficient to achieve US security objectives) promptly and discriminately, over long distances, against a major power armed with anti-access/area-denial capabilities;
- Controlling the “Global Commons”—space, the seas, the undersea, and cyberspace—to enable power projection operations and homeland defense; and to preserve access to the global economy for the well-being of both the United States and the international community;
- Deterring, preempting, defending against, and mitigating the consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction/disruption—particularly nuclear weapons, but also biological and cyber weapons—against the US homeland and vital interests overseas;
- Employing superior intelligence and “strategic communications” capabilities, along with prompt global discriminate strikes and stability, security, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations to defeat adversaries seeking to mobilize popular movements, at home and abroad, whose objective is to threaten the homeland and US vital interests;
- Developing and maintaining a dominant position in the ability to adapt rapidly in the face of relatively high geopolitical and military-technical uncertainty, to include rapid fielding of equipment and capabilities (especially in the areas of the biological sciences; nanotechnology; robotics; directed energy; and the intersections of these technologies); doctrinal development; and education and training; and
- Maintaining and expanding, quickly when needed, the ability of allies and partners to increase the range and scale of US military effectiveness.

This list is meant to be illustrative, rather than comprehensive. Moreover, it also is meant to convey an understanding of the substantial way in which the US military’s “mission set” has changed over the past decade or so. The Committee Members will easily recognize that certain “core” military missions of the Cold War era, such as defeating combined arms mechanized forces, preserving sea control against a blue-water maritime surface threat, and establishing air

superiority against a manned enemy air force are not emphasized, since America's enemies and rivals are no longer posing, or even working to pose, these kinds of threats.⁶

Establishing or Extending—and Selectively Divesting—Allies and Alliances

Since the dawn of organized warfare, kingdoms and states have formed alliances to enhance their military capability and, by extension, their security. Through their contribution of military capabilities, allies can exert an important influence on any discussion of roles and missions. For example, during the Cold War the US Navy greatly reduced its emphasis on the countermine warfare mission, since many of its NATO allies agreed to take on the responsibility as a part of their contribution to collective defense.

At the time of the Key West agreement, the United States was building an alliance structure from scratch. Today strains are appearing in America's alliance edifice. It may be that the alliances that won the Cold War, like the Soviet threat that animated them, are destined to pass into history. As recent experience shows, it is the common interests of the allied states that bind them together, far more than the existence of the alliance itself. What Lord Palmerston said over a century ago, that "Britain has no permanent allies, only permanent interests," holds true for America and its allies today, as does former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's observation that "The mission determines the coalition, the coalition does not determine the mission." Put another way, alliances are formed to provide for the collective defense of their members. When the threat to their common security has passed, alliances tend to dissolve.

Thus, when the Soviet Union represented the principal danger to the security of many states, it was possible to form a broad alliance against the common threat. Today, however, the United States does not confront a super power challenger posing a threat on a global scale, but three relatively diffused challenges. Not surprisingly, then, the interests of many regional powers that comprise the ranks of America's most valued allies has become increasingly local. For instance, while the United States, the sole remaining power with global interests, may be concerned about the way in which China's rising power manifests itself, European states generally demonstrate comparatively little alarm, either because they do not see it as affecting them, or because they do not have (or plan to field) any significant military capability to influence the situation. While much of the world remains concerned about nuclear proliferation, the fact remains that, at least with respect to the latter, the United States is the only country with sufficient power to threaten nuclear rogues like Iran or North Korea with substantial military action.

Another factor working against the maintenance of the large, stable alliance structures that existed during the Cold War is the preponderance of US power. States have traditionally banded together to balance the power of a hostile power or coalition. Although this may change in the future, in recent years the United States has not required allies for balancing purposes. Thus

⁶ This is not to say that the US military should divest itself of this capability. In fact, a substantial competence in these areas should be maintained to dissuade rivals from challenging the United States in these areas of military competition. However, far less emphasis should be placed on these capabilities than was the case in the past, and which remains so today.

states whose interests generally coincide with America's have been able to act as "free riders"—counting on the United States to enforce a *Pax Americana* of sorts while contributing little if anything to the effort.

There is, finally, the matter of strategic posture and alliances. Simply put, it is easier to form a coalition to deter aggression or respond in its wake than it is for the purpose of taking preventive action. This was true before the Second Gulf War and is even more true in its aftermath. Yet it may be increasingly necessary to consider such action—as the Clinton Administration did with respect to North Korea and as the Bush Administration did with Iraq—in order to prevent a far more dangerous situation from emerging out of inaction.

Finally, the United States will likely need to seek allies among nonstate entities, such as tribes and clans, in those parts of the world where national governments do not exert an effective monopoly of power within their borders. Nonstate allies could prove important in helping to stabilize failed or failing states, such as those in sub-Saharan Africa. They may also prove important in the Middle East and Central Asia, where family, clan, and tribal ties still run strong.

The alliance requirements for a new era may prove challenging for US security planners, who may still think of alliances in Cold War terms—as grand (i.e., comprising many major allies focusing on a common threat) and enduring. Instead, alliances may come to be more a series of multiple transient coalitions—one for each of the three major challenges confronting the United States. These coalitions may be significantly different from each other, depending upon the particular threat and the defense posture (e.g., deterrence; preventive measures) adopted to address them. Ironically, while allies are likely to be an increasingly important factor in US defense planning, they are also likely to be less reliable and less durable in character. Consequently, even though the United States is almost certain to need allies more in the future, it may prove difficult to assess those circumstances under which allies will commit their militaries to conduct combined operations with US forces.⁷

Promote Competition Among the Services—and Minimize Redundancy

There have never been sufficient resources available to any nation to eliminate entirely the risks to its security. The best that can be done with limited resources is to minimize the overall risk. Accomplishing this means moving resources into mission areas where the threat is growing and away from those areas where threats are diminishing; i.e., where "excess capacity" exists.

Each Service tends to recognize the value of its encroachments on the traditional battlespace of its sister Services. Yet each Service typically recoils at the notion that it should reduce its capacity in those areas where it has traditionally dominated but where other Services can now operate effectively. Thus the Air Force sees how its long-range bomber force, with its global reach, can substitute for carrier aviation strikes in a number of contingencies. But the Air Force

⁷ This is not to say that the United States should not try to engage allies for this purpose. For example, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Michael Mullen, has talked of a "1,000 Ship Navy" involving the fleets of other maritime nations with an interest in preserving global trade security against low-end threats.

has a more difficult time accepting that the Army's growing capacity to conduct precision artillery fires may reduce the need for certain kinds of close air support. Similarly, the Navy rightly touts the virtues of its carriers, whose mobility makes their air wings less vulnerable to enemy ballistic and cruise missile strikes than Air Force strike aircraft located at fixed forward bases. Yet, again, the Navy has trouble seeing how long-range air power might reduce the need for forward-stationed carrier forces.

The Services must realize that, in certain mature mission areas, they have long since lost their mission monopolies. Here the Services need to create "alliances" to minimize excess capacity in certain traditional capability areas and move resources to develop capabilities that are currently undersubscribed. By combining their assets to cover a mission area, the Services can complicate enemy planning by presenting the need to counter several different US military capabilities, as opposed to just one. This was the unrealized hope of Defense Secretary James Forrestal when he convened the Key West meeting nearly 60 years ago.

When it comes to *new* mission areas, however, a different approach is needed, one that initially promotes "redundancy" in order to stimulate competition among the Services to identify the best way of exploiting a new capability and/or addressing a new mission requirement. Here the Congress should *support* inter- and intra-Service competition. This approach has paid dividends in the past. For example, in the 1950s when ballistic missiles were in their infancy, the Army, Navy and Air Force each had their own ballistic missile programs.

To some, this might be considered to be a wasteful and redundant use of resources. Yet the Air Force program led to the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a key leg in the US nuclear triad. The Navy program produced the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), another key component of the nuclear triad. The Army's ballistic missile program was instrumental in the birth of the US space effort, thanks in part to its Jupiter/Redstone rocket. As the nuclear strike and space missions matured, the Army effort was eventually terminated.

The competition fostered among the Services during the early stages of ballistic missile development produced highly desirable outcomes. The same kind of competition might be useful in today's emerging mission areas, such as projecting power in against an enemy armed with A2/AD capabilities, or maintaining C4ISR capabilities against an enemy with an anti-satellite (ASAT) capability, or in defending the homeland against cruise missile attacks, or in cyber warfare at the strategic and operational levels.

The Challenge

The time has long since passed for the US military to restructure itself in light of the new set of roles and missions emerging in the wake of profound changes in the geopolitical and military technical environment. How should this be done? What missions should remain the monopoly of a single Service? Which should be shared? Scaled back? Competed? "Outsourced" to allies or other executive branch departments and agencies—or even to the private sector?

Finding answers to these questions will depend on our ability to grasp the key aspects of what has become a competitive environment very different from that which existed at the time of the

Key West agreement of 1948, or even from the Cold War era that ended forty years later (and nearly two decades ago). What kinds of security challenges will we confront? How will we choose to address them? What resources will be made available for these purposes? What contributions can be reasonably expected from allies and partners and other elements of the executive branch? These are fundamental, first-order questions, matters to be considered as part of a review of US grand strategy—a review that has yet to be undertaken. But these questions must be addressed before a comprehensive review of roles and missions can be usefully undertaken.