The Reserves and Homeland Security: Proposals, Progress, Problems Ahead

Through their responsibilities for providing support to civilian authorities, Reserve Component forces, particularly the National Guard, play an important role in responding to natural and manmade disasters such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, major industrial accidents and civil disturbances. At times, state missions can be substantial. The Florida National Guard employed 63 percent of its Army forces and 40 percent of its Air Force units in response to Hurricane Andrew’s devastation in 1992.⁵ Traditionally, however, the Reserve Component’s role in supporting state missions has been rather modest. States seldom employ large numbers of troops for extended periods. In 1993, for example, a year of above average use of the U.S. National Guard for state missions, state duty drew upon only six percent of its total strength.⁶ Two factors appear to govern the employment of the National Guard. First, states have relatively small budgets set aside for these missions or draw on a general contingency fund, which is usually well under $10 million.⁷ In addition, National Guard forces are usually brought in only when local capabilities to respond to a civil emergency are exhausted or insufficient.

The Reserve Component also conducts operations at the direction of federal authorities. In the last half century, however, major deployments have been relatively rare, and occurred only when state authorities requested assistance or were unwilling to enforce federal laws. The most common use of federal force was in cases of public disorder. One of the largest, during the 1971 May Day antiwar demonstrations in Washington, employed 2,000 guardsmen.⁸ The scale of this operation was unmatched until the 1992 Los Angles riots when over 10,000 guardsmen were called in to restore law and order.⁹

In the 1990s, the Reserve Component was assigned some specific homeland security missions. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 called for the Department of Defense to provide training for first responders (police, fire, and emergency medical treatment personnel) in 120 major U.S. cities.¹⁰ This mission was largely assigned to the National Guard. In addition, in November 1997 the Deputy Secretary of Defense ordered that more specific measures be developed to integrate the Reserve Component into the department’s consequence management effort. The resulting plan, published in January 1998, led to the creation of ten Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection Teams, later renamed Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (WMD-CST).¹¹ Each team contains 22 full-time Army and Air National Guard personnel. Their mission is to deal with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks. The teams can conduct surveys, surveillance and sampling, advise the on-the-scene civilian authority in charge, and provide communication and liaison with other DoD forces. In October 1998, Congress funded the project and later authorized additional teams, bringing the total number to 32.¹² The Department of Defense transferred management responsibilities for the program to the National Guard Bureau. The Guard leadership has generally been supportive of the teams.¹³

Even before 9/11, there was a concerted attempt to dramatically expand the role of the Reserve Component in the service of homeland security. This effort was in part an unexpected consequence of the legislatively mandated Department of Defense 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. Intended to refine the nation’s requirements for a post–Cold War military, the review virtually ignored the role of the Reserve Component, other than recommending cutting it by 55,000 personnel.¹⁴ The scope of the reductions in the Army (which has by far the largest Reserve forces) sparked a major controversy. At issue was the utility and relevance of Reserves, the appropriate distribution of resources, missions, and functions among service Components, and trust and confidence between the leadership of the National Guard and the Army leadership.

As part of the effort to diffuse the dispute and rationalize decisions over future Reserve force structure, in April 1998 Secretary of Defense William Cohen directed the Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study. The study focused on employing the Reserve Component in support of three missions: major theater wars, smaller-scale contingencies, and homeland defense.¹⁵ Completed the following year, the report recommended 20 follow-on actions, including further studies on the Reserves’ role in protecting the homeland.

After assuming office in 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld deferred addressing the RCE-05 proposals until after his Defense Strategy Review.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the report remained important for two reasons. First, prior to September 11, it provided the blueprint for future DoD initiatives in the arena of homeland security. Second, its work informed the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, which called for “new emphasis” in drawing on the capabilities of the Reserve Component for homeland security missions.¹⁷ RCE-05 made four major recommendations with respect to homeland security.¹⁸