Evaluating the effectiveness of the 9/11 deployments will probably provide support for all sides of the debate over the future role of the Reserves and may offer few insights into how best to shape the future force. Some will argue that the Reserve Component’s contribution to counterterrorism operations overseas demonstrates the importance of maintaining robust deployable Reserve forces. They will also point out that the Reserves showed they could adequately support homeland security tasks without a major reorganization. In contrast, others can argue that only a fraction of the force was employed after September 11 and therefore the response offers few insights into the appropriate use the Reserve Component as a whole. They will continue to contend that the Reserve force structure is bloated, insufficiently trained, and inadequately organized and equipped to meet the nation’s future needs.

Assessment
 The achievements of RCE-05 were quite modest. Out of over a million Reserve Component troops, less than an additional thousand personnel were dedicated to the task of protecting the homeland. Three factors seem to have largely driven the results.

 

  • RCE-05 did not offer a compelling argument for unique missions requiring specially organized and dedicated homeland security forces. The study fell short of making the case that potential threats required units that were organized, trained, equipped, and employed substantially differently than current Reserve Component forces.
  • The report failed to ameliorate anxiety that dedicating troops to homeland security would detract from warfighting missions. There was no persuasive strategic rationale for shifting the balance in the Reserve Component’s traditional roles of supporting civil authorities when needed, while preparing for operational missions overseas.
  • RCE-05 did not address concerns over the adequacy of resources for supporting homeland security tasks. Spending on homeland security, at the time, was not a high budget priority for the Department of Defense.

Can the Defense Department approach homeland security in a new way that will allow it to address the seemingly intractable problems of threats, strategy, and budget? There are several key questions it might consider.

 

  • Is the Reserve Component, as currently organized, equipped and structured, prepared to respond to emerging threats to the homeland? One challenge is the potential proliferation of nuclear or virulent biological weapons that might be delivered by cruise missiles or covertly smuggled to a target by ground, sea, or air transport. These weapons could inflict catastrophic casualties, killing tens of thousands of people and causing hundreds of billions of dollars in damage, destruction on a scale far greater than any catastrophe that the Reserve forces have responded to before. The form of the disaster could also differ markedly, requiring troops to deal with contaminated people and property.32 The Department of Defense should take a hard look at whether it has Reserve forces adequately prepared to deal with catastrophic disaster.
  • Is the force balance right? The military is tasked with conducting a global counterterrorism campaign; preparing for major theater conflicts and smaller-scale contingencies; and providing forward presence; as well as supporting homeland security. All these requirements have to be addressed in determining the appropriate balance between the Active and Reserve Components. This assessment also needs to consider the requirement for “homeland security” overseas as well as at home. Many areas where U.S. forces might deploy may face the danger of nuclear, chemical, or biological strikes. Host countries could well lack the robust infrastructure required to respond to these attacks. Thus, American homeland security forces may also be needed to provide consequence management for civil populations in forward deployed areas. But while such forces may be required at home and abroad, it is not clear what priority they should hold among all the missions competing for people and resources. A key step in addressing this problem is to develop a comprehensive defense strategy that establishes priorities among the principal mission areas. In September 2001, shortly after the 9/11 attacks the Department of Defense published its Quadrennial Defense Review, which outlined the goals of a new military strategy. The discussion, however, only briefly addressed the issue of homeland security and offered no insight into how to balance warfighting and homeland security missions.33 A homeland security strategy is not due to be released until July, and the national security strategy will not be out before the autumn. All three strategies need to be fleshed out and harmonized, providing the Department of Defense an appropriate framework for deciding how to best utilize the capabilities of its Reserve forces.