1. Public Law 107-107 §1511.
  2. Kurt M. Campbell and Michéle A. Flournoy, To Prevail: An American Strategy for the Campaign against Terrorism (Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 2001), p. 74; L. Paul Bremmer III and Edwin Meese III, Defending the American Homeland (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2002), p. 76. Even before 9/11 there were calls for making homeland security a major mission area for Reserves. See, The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map For National Security: Imperatives for Change, Phase III Report (February 15, 2001), p. 77. This report issued a general recommendation that the Reserve Component be assigned a primary role in homeland security and they should be “trained and equipped to respond as deployable forces to natural, manmade, and/or WMD-triggered disasters.”
  3. These figures do not include the Coast Guard Reserve which comprises approximately 13,000 personnel.
  4. For an explanation of Reserve Component status see, [http://www.defenselink.mil/ra/secondary/Componentsfaq.html].
  5. Roger Allen Brown, et al., Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1995), p. 40.
  6. Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs Fiscal Year 1993 (January 1994), p. 57.
  7. Brown, Assessing the State and Federal Missions of the National Guard, p. 35.
  8. John Dowling, ed., Civil Defense: A Choice of Disasters (New York: American Institute of Physics, 1987).
  9. The riots and the military response are described in James D. Delk, Fires and Furies: The L.A. Riots (Palm Springs, FL: ETC Publications, 1995).
  10. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, PL 104-201. This law is also known as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act.
  11. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) include chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, or conventional high explosive attacks. Consequence management includes the ways and means to address the physical, socio-economic, and psychological effects of a WMD event. It can involve both the initial response to an attack and post-strike recovery.
  12. For issues involved in establishing the teams see, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Audit Report: Management of National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams (D-2001-043, January 31, 2001); Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense, Testimony: Statement of Robert J. Lieberman, Deputy Inspector General, Department of Defense to the Subcommittee on Emerging Threat and Capabilities on National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction-Civil Support Teams, (D-2001-113, May 1, 2001).
  13. See, for example, National Guard Association of the United States, Fiscal Year 2003 Legislative Priorities, pp. 3-4.
  14. The proposed cuts were 45,000 Army, 4,100 Navy, 700 Air Force, and 4,200 Marine.
  15. The Department of Defense does not have official definitions for the term homeland security and homeland defense. Secretary of the Army Thomas White, acting executive agent for these efforts, defines homeland defense as those homeland security tasks in which the Defense Department assumes the role of lead federal agency. An example would be missile defense. See, News Transcript, Secretary White Briefing on Homeland Security, October 26, 2001, [http://defenselink.mil/news/Oct2001/t10262001_t1026sa.html].
  16. Department of the Army, DAMO-SSW, Memorandum for Reserve Component Coordination Council, Subject AC/RC Integration Item 00-120, RCE05, 1 June 2001.
  17. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (September 30, 2001), p. 19.
  18. In addition to homeland security missions, RCE-05 also recommended using Reserve Component personnel for missile defense missions. Under current plans, a missile defense brigade in Alaska with a complement of about 200 National Guard personnel will be operational in 2008. For an overview see, Department of Defense, Missile Defense Agency, Harnessing The Power of Technology, The Road to Ballistic Missile Defense From 1983-2007 (September 2000), [http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/power.pdf].
  19. “Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study Completed,” DoD News Release, July 22, 1999, [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul1999/b07221999_bt345-99.html].
  20. For more on this debate see, Mathew Carlton Hammond, “The Posse Comitatus Act: A Principle in Need of Renewal,” Washington University Law Quarterly, Summer 1997, p. 3, [http://www.wulaw.wuslt.edu/75-2/752-10.html]; Jeffrey D. Brake, “Terrorism and the Military’s Role in Domestic Crisis Management: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, April 19, 2001, p. 11-18; Craig T. Trebilcock, “Posse Comitatus—Has the Posse Outlived Its Purpose?” Center for Strategic and International Studies Working Group, 2000, pp. 1-5.
  21. See, Annex C, Missioning RC Units for WMD CM and Critical Infrastructure Physical Security.
  22. Eric V. Larson and John E. Peters, Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland Security: Concepts, Issues, and Options (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), p. 94.
  23. U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Army Is Integrating Active and Reserve Forces, But Challenges Remain, (Washington, DC: GAO, July 2000, GAO/NSIAD-00-162), p. 13.
  24. For reaction to the QDR see, Chris Anderson “QDR Looms Large at NGAUS Executive Council Meeting,” National Guard, (January 1997 p. 23-24. The uncompleted personnel cut amounted to 25,000 spaces. These reductions were eventually deferred.
  25. Department of the Army, DAMO-SSW, Memorandum for Reserve Component Coordination Council, Subject AC/RC Integration Item 98-92, Homeland Security, March 11, 2002.
  26. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Final Report, Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 (RCE-05): Joint Reserve Component Virtual Information Operations Organization (JRVIO) for Department of Defense Mission Support (October 13, 2000).
  27. The agencies supported by JRVIOs are the Defense Information Systems Agency and the Joint Task Force— Computer Network Defense, both in Arlington, Va.; the National Security Agency and the Information Operations Technical Center, both at Fort Meade, Md., and the Joint Information Operations Center, Kelly Air Force Base, Texas.
  28. Army National Guard, Fiscal Year 2002 Posture Statement, p. 16.
  29. “JTF-CS Response to Terrorist Attacks on 11 September, 2001,” Joint Center for Lessons Learned Quarterly Bulletin, December 2001, p. 11-12.
  30. On June 5, 2002, the total number currently on active duty in support of the partial mobilization after September 11 was 31,431; Naval Reserve, 9,011; Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, 36,977; Marine Corps Reserve, 4,144; and the Coast Guard Reserve 1,566; for a total of 83,129 including both units and individual augmentees. See, [http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2002/b06052002_bt286-02.html].
  31. DAMO, SSW, Memorandum, subject: AC/RC Integration Item 98-2, Homeland Security, December 10, 2001.
  32. For a notional list of requirements for responding to a catastrophic attack see, Larsen and Peters, Preparing the U.S. Army for Homeland, p. 60.
  33. Quadrennial Defense Review Report, pp. 18-19.