
Reflecting 50 years of preparation for war, almost half (641) of the total shelters in Asia are concentrated in South Korea. Employing these bases to conduct operations other than for South Korea’s defense raises uncertainties; South Korea may be reluctant to get engaged, while the bases could come under heavy attack
from North Korea should a conflict widen. Most of the other shelters are located in Japan (107) Taiwan (203 shelters), India (229 shelters) and Pakistan (176 shelters)—an average of about 180 per nation, sufficient to shelter a single AEF. But the total number available for use could be reduced by several factors. Are these widely separated bases located in the right position for the conflict? Will the nation support combat operations from its soil by US aircraft? Finally, each nation fields substantially more combat aircraft than shelters. Accordingly, the host nation would need to expose more of its own aircraft to attack in order to shelter US aircraft. All this suggests that the number of shelters available for use will be lower than the total and in a larger-scale conflict, significant numbers of US fighters could have to deploy to unhardened bases.
Regarding logistics, forward-deployed aircraft require fuel and munitions to operate from host nation airfields. Aviation fuel could be readily available; if not, fuel is a fairly fungible commodity that, with sufficient time, could be provided to the fighting force. Fuel production, storage, and distribution facilities would, however, remain vulnerable to attack. Supplying munitions has historically been the most challenging logistical task, but advances in munitions technology offer the potential to increase radically US flexibility in supporting deployed forces.
How Vulnerable Are These Bases to Political Access Problems and To Emerging Military Threats?
Political Anti-Access Threats to Forward Bases
Although the number of airfields has increased around the world, the USAF’s overseas basing posture has declined because of changing strategic circumstances, budgetary pressures, and internal opposition from host nations. To employ forward bases and air space, the United States will need political support from host countries. Political access problems have erupted in almost every
contingency and conflict in which the United States has engaged since World War II. The United States has powerful economic, diplomatic, and military cards to play in securing access—and has employed these cards successfully in many crises. But historical evidence also demonstrates that on many occasions, difficulties in obtaining political access to airspace and bases has constrained US power-projection capabilities.
The attitude of host countries regarding access in future crises is difficult to predict, raising significant uncertainties regarding the basing and employment of combat aircraft. The United States can bring enormous pressure to bear on a host country to accept US forces, but success, as has been seen in numerous crises, cannot be guaranteed.