The argument between advocates and critics of the Osprey appears to rest on a fundamental question: does the Marine Corps’ commitment to field the MV-22 as its sole medium lift helicopter-like capability help or hinder its ability to perform anticipated missions at an acceptable cost, both in dollars and overall effectiveness in an operational environment? Or should the Corps pursue a much less expensive path that gives it the ability to effectively execute the missions it is most likely to encounter even if this means it would not have the ability to conduct missions at extreme range in as timely a manner? Of course, not having the more advanced capability provided by the MV-22 precludes undertaking missions that would require it.
This leads one to assess the various advantages and disadvantages, or pros and cons, associated with either an MV-22 pure fleet or a mixed fleet of MV-22s and helicopters. From an institutional perspective, the Corps would benefit from the efficiencies of adopting the MV-22 as the sole replacement for its aging fleet of transport helicopters. By eliminating both the CH-46E and CH-53D and fielding the MV-22, supply, maintenance, avionics, and ordnance support will be simplified. Efficiencies would also be obtained in the training and assignment of personnel. Additional efficiencies might be realized in operational employment planning, since operating forces would become accustomed to the specific performance characteristics of the MV-22 rather than having to account for a mixture of platforms. If a mixed fleet approach is adopted, the Service will have to maintain all of the infrastructure and supporting establishment needed to service two platforms vice one, while also retaining the dissimilar communities that operate and maintain the helicopter fleet.
In evaluating such options, however, institutional efficiencies should not be the sole determinant. Resource limitations and overall force effectiveness must be taken into account. The United States has a Marine Corps to accomplish military missions for which it is uniquely suited—i.e. projecting combat power from a seabase to objectives ashore. But the resources made available to the Service to do this, to include equipping its operating forces for such tasks, are not unlimited. Therefore, other factors should also weigh heavily in deciding the type of capabilities to pursue, and the mix (if any) among the various types. Certainly, operational relevance and effectiveness, in addition to resource availability, must be taken into account.
A sound strategy should reflect careful prioritization in the allocation of limited resources. This often demands balancing a variety of capabilities and operational demands such that one can meet the challenges of the most likely threats or operational requirements while hedging against threats or operational requirements that are less likely to occur, but that are of high consequence when they do occur.
As discussed in our monograph, the Corps’ current approach to conducting routine operations in the littorals, expanding and enhancing its presence aboard US Navy ships, developing more aggressively its long-term relationships with the military forces of key US allies and partners, and meeting the likely operational demands of an assortment of missions associated with the strategic challenges facing the United States would all be ably served by a helicopter fleet. To be sure, a case can certainly be made that the MV-22’s speed and range would enable the Marine Corps to conduct raids, support widely dispersed units, and influence a much larger battle space than is currently possible with a helicopter force, especially in sustained operations ashore.
For operations that cover a very wide expanse of territory, assuming they can be procured in sufficient quantities, an MV-22 fleet would be valuable in supporting the movement, sustainment, and reinforcement of dispersed small units. It should be noted, however, that the advanced capability of the Osprey, its speed and range, would preclude use of escort support from the Marine Corps’ helicopter gunship, the AH-1W (soon to be AH-1Z) Cobra. Accordingly, an MV-22 raid force, or distributed operations force, would need to be supported by conventional fixed-wing, fighter-attack aircraft.
But, again, any assessment of the MV-22 must take cost into account, especially in what is likely to be an increasingly constrained fiscal environment. Just because the MV-22 can fly relatively long distances and at a relatively high rate of speed, it does not automatically follow that the type of missions it can undertake and the mission objectives it can accomplish justify the substantially greater cost of acquiring the capability in the first place.
Moreover, an MV-22-transported raiding force cannot travel with heavy armor or substantial ground mobility systems. Yet, if U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, or Israeli operations in Southern Lebanon, have taught us anything, it is that today even irregular enemy forces are likely to be equipped with very effective improvised and state-produced weapons. However, a force delivered and supported by MV-22s, operating far from supporting fires, will be limited in its ability to move, shoot, and sustain itself once on the ground.
Furthermore, the proliferation of modern anti-air weapons and more lethal anti-personnel capabilities to irregular forces likely means that even in low-end conflicts MV-22s may be highly vulnerable to enemy action while in flight. When all these factors are taken into consideration, it appears that the mission to be accomplished by an MV-22 transported force would of necessity have to be limited, both in duration and scope. The unanswered question is: does having the ability to conduct such a limited mission set justify its high cost?