The U.S. military’s performance in irregular warfare campaigns has not met with the same success as it has enjoyed in conventional combat. The difficulties encountered should not have been a surprise. Following the Vietnam War ground our armed forces were optimized for conventional warfare. The catchphrase “No More Vietnams” reflected the military’s desire to avoid protracted, ill-defined conflicts. General William DePuy, one of the Army’s leading thinkers, viewed the 1973 Middle East War as a godsend of sorts, as it enabled the Army to reorient itself back toward a more familiar, almost comfortable threat to U.S. security: the Soviet Army in Central Europe. The “No More Vietnams” attitude was heartily seconded by the American people and civilian leadership. It spawned the Weinberger and Powell doctrines of the 1980s and the “Exit Strategies” discussions that preoccupied political and military leaders during the deployment of U.S. ground forces in the 1990s. The U.S. military became increasingly structured, trained and equipped to fight short, conventional wars. When this proved unworkable, the intent became to set clear limits on the duration of U.S. force deployments to avoid “another Vietnam.”
Unfortunately, as our generals are fond of reminding us, “The enemy gets a vote,” and many of our enemies—especially those espousing a violent radical Islamist creed—have “voted” against taking on the United States with conventional forces, opting instead for irregular warfare.
There are three primary reasons for this:
- First, as noted above, the U.S. military has overwhelming dominance in conventional warfare;
- Second, and consequently, even if they wanted to confront the United States conventionally, most of our enemies simply lack the human and material resources to build conventional forces on anything like the scale and level of sophistication required to pose a serious challenge to our military; and
- Third, and perhaps most important, the U.S. military, and other first- rate militaries like Israel’s, have proven far less effective in combating enemies waging irregular warfare than those engaged in conventional war.
To buttress their line of thinking, our enemies can cite from an impressive run of successes by non-conventional forces, including the U.S. defeat in Vietnam, and the withdrawals from Lebanon in the 1980s and Somalia in the 1990s; Soviet losses in Afghanistan; and Israel’s inability to prevail over the Iranian-backed irregular forces of Hezbollah in the Second Lebanon War. Given these factors, it seems likely that the U.S. military is destined to face adversaries waging irregular conflicts unless these adversaries gain an advantage in conventional warfare (an unlikely occurrence in the foreseeable future), acquire nuclear weapons, or the U.S. military demonstrates an ability to deal effectively with the irregular warfare challenge.
The Diffusion of Information and Military Technology
Not only should we expect that many existing and prospective opponents will resort to irregular warfare well into the foreseeable future, but we should also assume that they will be able to do so more effectively than in the past. This is due in large part to a revolution in communications that has diffused to the lowest levels of society, as well as the growing availability of advanced weapons and military technologies.
Terrorist groups and insurgent forces have already demonstrated their ability to use mass media and information technology skillfully to communicate, recruit and organize new members, create and disseminate propaganda, and share “lessons learned” from their efforts. Moreover, the diffusion of advanced military technology (such as rockets and missiles, precision-guided munitions, advanced explosive charges, etc.) is significantly enhancing the capabilities of irregular forces, a trend that is likely to continue for some time. Perhaps most worrisome are the efforts of groups such as al Qaeda and the The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) to acquire weapons of mass destruction.