The impact of the wars on the Army’s modernization plans has not been what one would expect. The Future Combat Systems (FCS) was the Army’s main modernization program, with a price tag projected at upwards of $160 billion. The program’s high cost limited projected fielding of FCS systems to only one third of the active force, with the rest receiving less-capable upgrades to existing equipment.
The FCS also suffered from technical risk; many of the technologies essential to its performance are far from mature. Furthermore, the program appeared greatly weighted toward addressing traditional, or conventional, threats in what has become an era of persistent irregular conflict. Recognizing these problems, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently terminated the program’s eight ground combat vehicles. It remains to be seen whether a restructured program will represent an improvement.
Overall materiel readiness has also been affected by the wars. The cost of “resetting” the force — overhauling the existing inventory of equipment, which has seen much higher usage rates in Iraq and Afghanistan — is significant but appears to be sufficiently funded. However, the increased maintenance and repair requirements along with the deteriorating condition of equipment and previously existing shortages combine to worsen the materiel readiness situation further.
Taken together, the impact of the wars on troop quality, force structure, modernization plans, and materiel readiness poses a serious challenge for overall Army readiness. Eroding troop quality, a force structure that is not optimized for irregular warfare, and weapons that are too expensive to field in sufficient quantity risk having devastating consequences on overall military effectiveness.
While the challenge may be daunting, it also presents a unique opportunity for the Army to remake itself into a fighting force better suited for the challenges ahead.