The first major choice that the British and Americans agreed upon in January 1942 was a “Germany first” strategy. This decision was based on the insight that defeating Germany first would make Japan’s surrender a matter of time, whereas defeating Japan first would not materially weaken Germany, especially if the Germans succeeded in conquering Russia. The next strategic decision the four Allied leaders faced was how to defeat Nazi Germany. George Marshall argued from the beginning that Germany’s defeat would require a cross-Channel invasion of northern France followed by a direct advance into Germany to confront the German army head on and, by capturing the Ruhr and Saar, deny Nazi forces the ability to fight on indefinitely.
Churchill and Brooke, however, ever mindful of the limits the First World War had imposed on Commonwealth resources and of the superior fighting power of the Germans, were inclined to pursue peripheral objectives in the Mediterranean. The campaigns in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy eventually deferred the Allied landings in Normandy until June 1944. In hindsight, these peripheral campaigns were not major strategic mistakes. By mid-1944, the Allies’ campaigns in the Mediterranean had given US forces, commanders, and staffs needed battle experience and had also tied down substantial German forces in Italy. In addition, the Combined Bomber Offensive had placed increasing stress on Germany’s war economy; the Allies had achieved air superiority over Western Europe; and the German disasters at Stalingrad and Kursk had kept Russia in the war while further weakening the Wehrmacht and limiting Hitler’s capacity to move forces from the Eastern Front to Western Europe. Churchill and Brooke were undoubtedly right to oppose a cross-Channel invasion in 1942 and even in 1943, but Roosevelt and Marshall were right to insist on one in 1944.
Hitler’s major decisions, by contrast, were rife with strategic blunders. He began World War II without fully mobilizing the German economy. He attacked the Soviet Union in 1941 without fully appreciating the resources that defeating Russia might ultimately require. He pursued counterproductive objectives as exemplified by his racial policies in Russia and his obsession with Stalingrad as a prestige objective.
Time and again, Hitler’s “no retreat” decisions wasted resources Germany could not afford to waste. His contempt for the productivity of the US economy and the fighting power the Allies would eventually bring to bear against Germany reflected a lack of understanding of his adversaries. Thus, German grand strategy during World War II was prone to repeated blunders whereas Anglo-American grand strategy was not.
What conclusion about the importance of strategic competence can be drawn from this case study? The temptation to attribute Allied victory exclusively, or even mostly, to superior Anglo-American strategic performance must be resisted; the causes of Allied victory were many. Allied air power, for example, did not win World War II for the Allies by itself, but it was a critical weakness on the Axis side and perhaps the greatest single advantage enjoyed by the Allies. The Allies gave greater priority to air power, particularly to heavy bombers, than did the Germans and, as World War II unfolded, the Allies took full advantage of their strength in the air. By contrast, the Luftwaffe’s failure to gain air superiority over the Royal Air Force in 1940 precluded a German cross-Channel invasion of England and turned Hitler’s thoughts toward invading Russia instead. Thus, one cannot attribute Allied victory to any single cause, including superior strategy. Nevertheless, Germany’s strategic blunders together with the absence of major mistakes on the Allied side were surely contributing factors in the ultimate outcome.