Risks Associated with General McChrystal’s Request
Let’s address the second question first. Given the high stakes for which the president has stated we are fighting in Afghanistan, will the dispatch of 40,000 additional troops find the United States incurring even greater risks? These risks have been expressed in two general forms. First, the continued deployments of our ground forces—the Army in particular— risks “breaking” the Army (i.e., triggering a precipitous decline in unit combat effectiveness owing to soldiers being deployed too frequently, for too long, into combat zones); and second, that the deployment of an additional 40,000 troops to Afghanistan will leave our military unprepared for other contingencies (i.e., without a strategic land force reserve).
Both the current and former administrations have acted to address these legitimate concerns. The Obama Administration plans to dramatically reduce our troop presence in Iraq. Even if that drawdown in Iraq stabilizes, with 30-40,000 US troops remaining there for an extended period, and even if General McChrystal’s request is honored by the president, the combined total of our forces in Afghanistan and Iraq would still be significantly below the levels reached during the Surge. Moreover, thanks to steps taken by the bush and Obama Administrations, the Army and marine Corps have each seen their end-strength increased, by 65,000 soldiers and 27,000 marines, respectively, over the past few years. Recently the Army has been authorized a further temporary end-strength increase of 22,000 soldiers. The Army’s reserve Component has also been modestly augmented. Increasing the size of our ground forces by over 100,000 troops further reduces the risk of our ground combat effectiveness suffering a precipitous decline.
To be sure, other contingencies might demand large numbers of ground combat forces, and one would always like to have a large strategic reserve. But no nation, however powerful, has ever had sufficient military capability to eliminate all risk to its security, and the United States is no exception. Moreover, the two contingencies most often discussed as concerns—North Korea and Iran—do not appear to pose immediate threats to our security. Furthermore, in the case of North Korea, our principal source of advantage lies in our air and sea forces, which are far less stressed in Afghanistan and Iraq than our ground forces. While war in another theater of operations cannot be ruled out, the risk appears small, especially when matched against the prospective consequences of failing to accomplish our objectives in Afghanistan.
Why a 40,000 Troop increase?
We now turn to the first question: What level of force is needed to turn the situation around
in Afghanistan? As the administration has noted, a major reason for the deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan in recent years stems from our inadequate and incremental response to the escalation of enemy activity in 2006. This implies a significant increase in the war effort is warranted. But it also begs the question: How much is enough?
To answer the first question we must have a sense of how these forces would be used. Both President Obama (in his march 2009 statements) and General McChrystal (in his leaked assessment) intend to employ these forces within the context of a counterinsurgency campaign plan. This is important, since if the president and his field commander had a different view of how the war should be fought, the size and shape of the forces required would most likely also be different.
Counterinsurgency plans are quite distinct from plans for conventional war against regular military forces, and also, apparently, from our recent operations in Afghanistan. In conventional warfare, the enemy’s military forces and major power centers are often considered its centers of gravity, meaning that losing either would spell defeat. In the two Gulf Wars, for example, the coalition concentrated on destroying Saddam’s Republican Guard and capturing key terrain, such as Kuwait (in the First Gulf War) and Baghdad (in the Second Gulf War). But the centers of gravity in counterinsurgency warfare lie elsewhere entirely, and focusing efforts on defeating the enemy’s military forces through traditional forms of combat is a mistake.