Responding to an Attack
The aftermath of a terrorist attack would involve response efforts both at home and abroad. response efforts at home would primarily focus on consequence management — limiting the damage caused by an attack. improving consequence management capabilities will require continued investment in a number of areas, for example training first responders, prepositioning stockpiles of medication to treat radiation sickness, ensuring that various federal as well as state agencies have clearly defined and well understood areas of responsibility in the event of an attack, developing public communication strategies that can quickly and effectively instruct citizens on how to respond to an attack, and improving capabilities for decontaminating large areas that have been exposed to radiation.
Although the government’s immediate focus will be on mitigating the consequences of an attack, it will quickly shift its attention toward identifying those responsible and retaliating against the perpetrators. As a first step, scientists would be tasked with analyzing the radioactive debris from a nuclear explosion in order to gain as much information as possible on the weapon and material used, in order to determine their origin — a field that has received increased attention and funding in recent years. An effective nuclear attribution capability could also help to prevent an attack in the first place by ensuring that state sponsors would not be able to retain anonymity. in fact, a number of analysts have advocated a strategy of deterring nuclear terrorism by threatening potential state sponsors (as well as nations that do not effectively secure their nuclear weapons and material) with retaliation if they are identified as the source of a nuclear weapon or material used in an attack.
Nuclear attribution is an important capability that deserves the increased attention and funding it has received. The US Government should continue to invest in this area, and may even want to publicly exaggerate its capabilities to encourage the belief that state sponsors will not be able to remain anonymous. At the same time, policymakers should also exercise caution when contemplating public declarations regarding who will be held responsible for an attack and what type of response will follow. Ambiguous warnings that do not explicitly call for a military reprisal could be useful by reinforcing the notion that governments may be culpable for the actions of a terrorist group. Alternatively, while declarations that overtly threaten a military reprisal will certainly capture a state’s attention, these threats may not prove credible or particularly effective, and could even risk doing more harm than good, for at least three reasons. First, although Pakistan and Russia are the two most probable sources of loose nuclear weapons or material, the United States would be unlikely to retaliate with military force against either one. in the case of Pakistan, an attack could further destabilize the government and weaken existing controls over its nuclear weapons, while an attack against Russia could provoke Moscow to retaliate and perhaps even trigger a nuclear exchange. Second, as noted above, the possibility that a state would deliberately provide nuclear weapons to a terrorist group is quite small. instead, terrorist are far more likely to acquire these weapons due to inadequate security at a nuclear facility. Third, while the threat of retaliation could compel nations to improve their security, it could also discourage them from seeking international assistance in a crisis to help secure any missing nuclear weapons or material, decreasing the likelihood that they could be recovered safely.