Publications

Simple solutions to complex problems are inherently attractive and almost always wrong. So it is with the Pentagon’s recent decision to enter into “crash” production of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected armored vehicles, or MRAPs. Political and military leaders are currently grappling with this problem, which can be summed up as: How much to invest in a new system that appears to provide enhanced protection for troops against the most common, lethal threat in Iraq, without undermining either the ability of the force to conduct the current mission set before it, or the ability to remain effective across the range of missions and operating environments it will also have to be ready for in the years ahead?

This report explores the near-term modernization choices now facing the Department of Defense (DoD) in fixed-wing air power. Presently, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program is the largest programmatic element in the Pentagon’s plans for modernizing US air power.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, sparked grave concern that the United States might be struck by terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Typically, policymakers and analysts include nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons in this category. Of these WMD, biological agents may pose the greatest danger. Like nuclear weapons, biological weapons can, under the right circumstances, cause massive casualties. Compared to nuclear weapons, however, biological weapons may be substantially easier to acquire.

If national strategy defines US intent in its approach toward global affairs and provides focus for American foreign policy, then the US global defense (military) posture reflects the US capability to project military power beyond its borders and across transoceanic ranges in support of US national security policy objectives.  The United States thus adopts and maintains a global military posture as an  indispensable means of securing its national interests.

When hearing the term “ships-of-the-line”—warships that take their place in a navy’s line of battle—most think of old two- or three-deck sailing ships carrying large cannon batteries, or perhaps steam-powered, armored battleships. Since entering the age of jet aircraft, guided missiles, and nuclear-powered submarines, however, the US Navy’s “surface battle line” consists of battle force capable (BFC) surface combatants—large, multi-mission and focused-mission warships designed first to operate as part of a fast Carrier Strike Group. These include guided missile cruisers (CGs), guided-missile destroyers (DDGs), and general-purpose destroyers (DDs). Battle force capable combatants are separate and distinct from legacy  protection of shipping combatants (now known as frigates and guided missile frigates) and newer littoral combat ships, both of which are smaller, and less capable, focused-mission warships.

The research and analysis underlying this report began in 2003 and aimed at answering the following question. How has the maturation of non-nuclear guided munitions during the late 1980s and early 1990s affected the conduct of warfare by advanced militaries, especially by the various combat arms of the US armed forces? In this context, guided munitions were understood to be those that could actively home on their targets or aim-points after being fired, released, or launched.